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"(...) present international differences in 
per capita income ( . . • ) are due only in 
part to differences in the rates of growth 
of per capita income during the period 
associated with the industrialization 
process of the advanced countries. In other 
words, the presently developed countries 
were already in advance of the 'rest of the 
world' when modern industrialization began
"(...) [there] is the possibility of a 
causal connection between degree of 
development and distance. (...) The fact 
that the countries on the periphery of 
Europe tend to have less-developed 
economies (...) may be due partly to their 
being simply 'far away' from everybody that 
matters in trade."2
V
1. Kuznets (1956, p. 25).
2. Beckerman (1956, p. 37).

Introduction
When this study was started, my main purpose was to examine 
the thesis according to which Portuguese economic growth, during 
the second half of the nineteenth century, was hindered by an 
excessive export specialization in one product (wine) and one 
market (Britain). This is the dependence thesis. To pursue that 
objective it was necessary to compile the official data for 
foreign trade, to check for its accuracy, to construct aggregate 
series and to compute price and terms of trade indices. That data 
set is by far the major primary source on which the present 
dissertation is based.
Form the beginning, it was felt necessary to analyse the new 
trade series together with indicators for domestic output 
magnitudes and growth. After all, a crucial assumption of the 
dependence thesis, that Portugal had a high export 
specialization, implies a large share of exports in domestic 
output. A preliminary joint analysis of the output indicators and 
the new trade series led to the first conclusion that the
vi
Portuguese economy was not so much "dependent" on the export 
sector as it had been hypothesized. This finding, together with 
the finding that some of the other basic assumptions of that 
thesis were not confirmed, led me to conclude that the framework 
of analysis it provides was not of great help for further 
empirical research. It is important to take into account, 
explicitly, the historiographical heritage. Yet, if the 
underlying assumptions do not fit historical facts, it may be 
more fruitful not to start from there.
With the new data for agricultural and industrial output 
growth and for foreign trade, the next step was to look for 
another theoretical framework. One such alternative framework is 
that of models« of growth and trade provided by development 
studies for the post World War II period. According to these 
models, countries that historically had a wider insertion in the 
international economy managed to get better off. The underlying 
rationale is that exports allow for increasing product 
specialization, generate scale economies in production, and bring 
higher capacity to import technology and economic growth. It is 
worth noting that these assumptions are quite opposite to those 
of the dependence school, where autarcy and import substitution 
are seen as fostering growth through industrialization.
Export-led growth models, however, are not entirely 
satisfactory because they assume exports as an exogenous variable
vii
that can be promoted by policy measures, independently of general 
domestic economic conditions. Yet exports do depend on the 
country's competitiveness, and competitiveness is a function of 
productivity levels. Generally speaking, then, the capacity to 
export depends on average labour productivity of the country and 
thus on GNP per capita.
These first theoretical digressions led to a central 
question which lies on the foreground throughout this study - 
What was the potential of the Portuguese economy to increase its 
pace of growth, and to converge to Western European levels of 
labour productivity and income per capita? This is a central 
question for the analysis of the contribution of any particular 
economic sector, because that contribution does not depend only 
on the potential of the sector to expand, but also on the 
potential for overall economic growth. Good politics can promote 
exports and exports can promote growth, if growth can be 
promoted.
Economic theory tells us that growth can be promoted in 
several ways. However, we observe that, historically, it is not 
possible to sort out the factors that led some countries to 
achieve higher levels of income than others. One thing we know 
now is that it is not possible to impute growth to single factors 
alone, and that similar policies may have different outcomes in 
different countries. Moreover, decisions over economic policies
viii
are not exogenous to the economy at large. Conditions for growth
- or for growth promoting policies - differ from country to 
country. The analysis of alternative policies and possible 
counterfactual stories needs to take into account the limits to 
growth.
Chapter 1 is an attempt to discuss and to measure the growth 
potential of the Portuguese economy. Firstly, it shows how 
different perceptions on Portugal's growth potential led to 
different historical interpretations of the performance of its 
economy during the nineteenth century, and before. Secondly, it 
shows that Portugal was by mid-nineteenth century one of the 
poorest countries in Western Europe. This low starting level of 
development implied that Portugal's productive structure and 
level of capital accumulation was not the best to introduce new 
and more productive technologies and forms of economic 
organization, developed either domestically or imported from more 
industrialized countries.
Chapter 2 is mostly a descriptive chapter of the growth of 
the agricultural and industrial output in Portugal from 1851 to 
1913, as well as a presentation of the historiographical debate 
on Portugal's backwardness. Following the preoccupations 
expressed in chapter 1, there is no intention to find causes of 
growth or stagnation, but only to present its major features 
given by the new quantitative evidence. At the end of the
ix
chapter, the issue of the contribution of the export sector to 
economic growth is raised. The election of that issue, however, 
does not imply that it is expected to find in the export sector a 
clue to understand Portuguese nineteenth century growth. The fact 
is that, at the present stage of research, it is necessary to 
isolate specific sectors to go deeper in the analysis.
Chapter 3 deals with the export sector. More importance is 
given there to the description of the conditions in international 
markets, than to a detailed analysis of the domestic production 
of exportables. There is a good lot of literature that points to 
the major constraints of the expansion of exports. According to 
that literature, goods for exports were badly produced, not 
standardized, and badly packed; moreover the successive 
governments failed to negotiate trade agreements with Portugal's 
major partners and potential new clients. Thus it is concluded 
that if goods were better produced and shipped, and if trade 
agreements were signed, exports could have expanded and growth 
promoted. The digression on the case of Scandinavia - that may 
appear displaced in a chapter on Portuguese exports - was 
necessary to avoid circular reasoning as the above. The success 
of those small countries shows that export growth depends on the 
capacity to adapt to changes in international demand. Changes in 
the composition of exports were accompanied by changes in the 
domestic economic structure. One sound hypothesis we may draw
x
from this example is that exports could have been promoted by 
growth, and not the other way round. The hypothesis that export 
growth can be limited by the capacity to increase domestic output 
is further explored by the study of two important Portuguese 
export branches - cork and wines.
Chapter 4, on the import sector, does not stem from the 
study on the export sector. This is a result of the present 
dissertation and not one of its methodological weaknesses (it is 
hoped). In fact, I have tried to look into the import sector for 
consequences of the observed slow export growth. However, no 
direct relation between export and import fluctuations was found. 
As such, to avoid frustrating conclusions, I have decided to 
study the import sector on its own and to look for further 
information that may help characterising Portuguese economic 
growth. The major conclusion of chapter 4 is that the Portuguese 
economy managed to find successive alternative sources of foreign 
earnings to pay for the needed imports. Thus the slowdown of 
export growth observed after 1886 did not affect import growth. 
This was important because economic growth in Portugal had a high 
import content.
Chapter 5 is the concluding chapter. In the present study to 
conclude meant to put together a sequence of partial results. No 
straightforward thesis to explain Portuguese economic growth from 
1851 to 1913 is offered here. The one disadvantage of such an
xi
option is that it renders more difficult to perceive and to 
discuss the results of the research. Yet that cost was preferred 
to the cost of following a strict model with strict conclusions 
of the negative kind, regarding what did not cause Portugal's 
development lag.
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CHAPTER 1
THE PORTUGUESE NINETEENTH CENTURY GROWTH POTENTIAL RECONSIDERED
1.1 - Introduction
1.2 - The historiography of decadence
1.3 - An evaluation of the Portuguese growth potential, 1850-1913
1.1 - Introduction
To write on a country's history is a task loaded with an 
influence from past historiography. The issues that we elect for 
discussion and further investigation tend to be the same that 
have been elected over time by other historians and analysts, and 
there is no easy way to break this chain. Yet, one may wonder if 
that is at all essential. My departing point here is not 
different from that of most historians who have studied 
nineteenth century Portuguese economic history: I shall try to 
understand why Portugal was a poor country within Western Europe.
However, it was found necessary to specify and discuss some 
assumptions regarding the possibilities for alternative paths of
1
development, implicit in most economic history books on the 
country. One of the most important and which will be addressed in 
this chapter, is the evaluation of Portuguese economic growth 
potential. There is a general feeling that Portugal could now be 
a much richer country than it is. That idea stems from 
perceptions of a Portuguese age of greatness from which the 
country has been decaying for the last three or four centuries.
To measure properly a country's growth potential is not an 
easy task because it would involve a complete counterfactual 
macro-economic model. My approach here is just a first attempt, 
and it is based on inferences drawn from international 
comparisons. Section 1.3 presents a measure of Portugal's growth 
potential based on the idea that the possibilities of development 
are not independent from the national economic conditions of the 
period in which industrialization started. Before that, in 
section 1.2, I discuss Portugal's historiography in order to 
ascertain the extfent to which it has been influenced by the idea 
that in the nineteenth century the economy was decaying. A 
cursory comparison with the Swedish historiography tries to make 
the point that, unless we assess and talk about potential and 
growth in their proper historical context, historical 
explanations become teleological. In other words, descriptive 
elements of a country's economic growth are turned into causes of 
either stagnation or growth, depending on the assumption of 
whether the country is decaying or not.
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1.2 - The historiography of decadence
Contrasted with the glorious image, quite common in 
Portuguese historiography, of the period of Overseas discoveries, 
expansion and colonization (which lasted from the fifteenth to 
the eighteenth centuries), it is not surprising to find that the 
nineteenth century history of Portugal is presented as one of 
economic and social decline. The evident economic backwardness of 
Portugal (in relation to other Western European countries) during 
the second half of the nineteenth century, has been explained in 
terms of social and political impediments to development, which 
implicitly assumes that Portugal failed to fulfil some unrealized 
potential for economic growth. The reasons for that failure, as 
well as the idea that there was a high economic potential, 
originate in the contrast drawn by historians between the post­
imperial period following the loss of Brazil (starting in 1808- 
1810), and their perspectives on the country's previous economic 
history. A recent work poses the question in a most 
straightforward fashion: "With such a prosperous beginning, with 
such tremendous resources for industrialization, why did not 
Portugal generate self-sustained growth?"1
1. Schwartzman (1989, p. 28).
3
Some authors would argue that the structure of the 
Portuguese economy was negatively affected over the long run by 
an excessive concentration upon trading activity and a 
significant loss of human capital, due to emigration to the 
Empire. Strong connections between a colonial past and Portuguese 
decline is clear for instance in the following words of Joel 
SerrSo:
"all of our economic life (as well as social and cultural 
life) was conditioned not only by the gigantic effort made in 
the colonization and exploration of the vast Brazil, but also 
by their fruits - sugar, gold, cotton, etc. (...)".
Sérgio (1924), who more than any other author is responsible 
for popularizing the view that Portugal had diverted far too 
large a share of her resources to colonization and imperial 
expansion, edited three short texts of seventeenth century 
Portuguese economic writers who put forward the same general view 
for their own times - the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
Sérgio's own re-interpretation of the writings of these authors 
was presented in a most eloquent form and, despite the fact that 
his thesis had been previously defended by authors such as Antero 
de Quental, Oliveira Martins, Basilio Teles, and Alberto Sampaio, 
it was Sérgio, who declared himself not to be an historian, that
1. Serráo (1978, p. 10) ["toda a nossa vida económica (e a social e a cultural 
também) foi condicionada nio s6 pelo esforgo gigantesco levado a efeito na 
colonizag&o e na exploragáo do vasto Brasil, mas também pelos seus frutos - o 
agúcar, o ouro, o algodáo, etc.").
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directly most influenced Portuguese historiography.1
For S§rgio, Portugal's main problem over the centuries were 
the persistent lack of political and economic interest in the 
metropolitan area, in contrast to the large volume of resources 
devoted to commerce with Asia and Brazil. In other words, 
Portuguese resources had been "wasted" in peopling the colonies 
and in carrying and financing inter-continental trade. According 
to the same author, these developments were the consequence of 
what he has depicted as "transport" or "carrying trade" policy, a 
policy that promoted trade activities based on the products of 
the Empire. This he considered as the opposite of what Portuguese 
economy missed since the fifteenth century: a "settlement" or 
"production" policy, a policy that might have provided the 
stimulus for the optimal development of the nations' industrial 
and agricultural resources, fixating labour and capital to the 
land. Instead, Portugal lived on the money earned successively by 
its Empire: gold from the Mina, specie from India, gold and 
diamonds from Brazil, and later, in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, the money earned from its emigrants and from
1. See Quental (1982), Oliveira Martins (1954) Basilio Teles (1901) and 
Alberto Sampio (1923). The sources of Sérgio's inspiration are clearly seen by 
comparing with Teles (1901, p. 22), although his inspiration can be traced 
backed to Antero de Quental and Alexandre Herculano, as he recognizes (Sérgio, 
1924, p. xlviii-xlix). See also Valente (1980, pp. 84-86) and Serrao (1970, p. 
25). Although Sérgio (1980, p. 263) declares himself not to be an historian, 
his essays on history allow me to call him that. Sérgio's influence on our 
contemporary historians is explicitly recognized by authors such as Saraiva 
(1972, vol. 1, p. 11), and Godinho (1968, vol. 1, p. vii). Pereira (1979, pp. 
50-72) is also clearly inspired by Sérgio. For a short commentary on Sérgio’s 
influence on Portuguese historiography see Bonifácio (1989a).
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easy borrowing abroad. But the most serious consequence of all 
this was that the country acquired a certain type of "social 
mentality" that did not favour productive activities. Thus 
Portugal had during "seven centuries of its history" an 
educational system that did not foster a "school for work".1
This Portuguese historiography that traces the historical 
origins of decline, implies some kind of organized political 
power or institutional system which could over time have chosen 
one policy rather than another and have implemented it 
effectively.2 Yet Sergio's assumption of the state having had the 
capacity to intervene, historically, in the shaping of the 
structure of the Portuguese economy, could not hold up to a 
detailed historical examination. And that assumption is crucial 
for him because according to his perspective, the rate and pace 
of structural change was determined by policy, in particular by
1. See Sérgio (1924, pp. xix-xx), (1972, p. 69-70) and in relation to the 
nineteenth century Sérgio (1972, pp. 137-38). Quoting the original: "Podemos 
chamar &s duas escolas (...) a 'politica da fixaç&o' e a ’politica do 
transporte'; a politica da produç&o e a politica da circulaç&o; a politica da 
estabilidade e a politica do aventureirismo; a politica nuclear e a politica 
periférica; a politica de D. Pedro e a politica de D. Henrique; a politica da 
boa capa e a politica do mau capelo." In Sérgio*s wordB commerce and transport 
are also associated with adventurism, whereas settlement and production are 
associated with stability. A related dichotomy, protectionism vs. free-trade, 
is proposed by Bonif&cio (1989a, p. 134). On the theme of Sérgio*s 
interpretations of the role of education, see Valente (1980).
2. This is precisely what mercantilists expect from the State. According to 
Blaug (1990, vol. 1, p. 48), a major purpose of the mercantilist school would 
be to justify the increase of the power of the central State. This idea is 
basically taken from Heckscher, who according to Gerschenkron (1954, p. 
xxxvi), may have failed to note that laissez-faire policies could also be 
related to the increase in State power. See on the rise of mercantilist ideas 
in Portugal, Cardoso (1989, pp. 67-69).
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the "transport or commercial" policy emanating from a central 
power and successfully transmitted to the economy at large. There 
is no attempt in S6rgio's work to ascertain whether the economy 
had the capacity or the potential to respond to the hypothesized 
stimulus.1
Thus, Sergio's popular interpretation raises the whole 
problem of supposedly autonomous political power and the extent 
to which economic policies emanated from that power can be 
successfully implemented. It may be that institutional change is 
not an autonomous process, if it depends on changes in the 
economy, as, for instance, changes in the rate of savings and 
capital formation, as North (1981) would argue.2 Sampaio (1923), 
for instance, is well aware of the interaction between 
institutions and economic conditions when he argues that over 
time Portugal's institutions adapted to economic change. But 
Sampaio only displaces the argument. According to him, the fact 
that political power in Portugal was not autonomous, was a 
consequence of the inability of the society to act in an 
organized and aggregated form and with common political ideals.
1. Bonif&cio (1989a, p. 138) is apparently in disagreement with this 
interpretation of Sergio's work. In fact, according to her, Sergio does not 
say that the "transport policy" was dictated by economic interests of any 
social groups. Yet a few lines below Bonif&cio states that Sergio saw history 
set in motion by men, and men Bet in motion by economic interests.
2. See North (1981, p. 208).
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Thus, Portugal was, "(...) no doubt, an exception in Europe."1
Portugal could be an exception, but the present discussion 
is by no means peculiar to the country. Interestingly enough, 
this same point has been made in a similar fashion by Fenoaltea
(1968), when discussing the works of Alexander Gerschenkron and 
Rosario Romeo. According to him, these two historians of the 
Italian industrialization could be "poles apart in their 
assessments of the contribution of public policy to the Italian 
industrialization." But both postulated a "stage mechanism 
wherein growth is held up by a pervasive industrial supply 
bottleneck until the prerequisite structural change sets off the 
industrial revolution, big push, or whatever."2
The general view of economic growth led by the state ignores 
the alternative perspective according to which economic agents 
were attempting to seize the available opportunities to make 
profits, and that the state would not have enough power to 
control or direct their activities. Institutional factors do 
matter, but it is not likely that over the centuries they can 
shape individual action in one direction or another.3 Possessing 
the technology and the opportunities to exploit gains from trade 
over the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans, it might have been
1. Saxnpaio (1923, p. 445). [Ela constitul sem duvida uma excepcg&o na Europa.] 
The author is not referring to a specific period, but to the whole period 
following the discoveries.
2. Fenoaltea (1968, pp. 6-10).
3. The key reference regarding the role of institutions in economic growth is 
North and Thomas (1973).
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probably inefficient to leave these opportunities to third 
countries, in order to concentrate resources within the Mediaeval 
boundaries of Portugal. And it might also have been difficult to 
arrest that drive, especially if overseas discoveries and 
expansion were in fact a continuum of the Christian reconquista 
within the Iberian peninsula, as Jones (1981) argues, or if they 
were motivated by a quest for grains because of insufficient 
domestic supply, as Godinho (1944) or Marques (1968) 
hypothesized.1 State action could probably not do much in 
diverting resources from "commerce" to "production", to use 
Sérgio's words.2 Although constrained by the institutional 
environment, individuals were probably acting according to the 
information available to them, which was probably scarce. To 
assume that the State could have fostered the economy to grow in 
another scenario is quite a strong assumption, which is not deal 
with by Sérgio or other authors of the same vein.
The Discoveries were in fact an adventure and nobody could 
guess what economic gains could be derived from the new lands.3
1. See Jones (1981, p. 75), Godinho (1945), and Marques (1968, pp. 236-37).
2. For a view on the capacities of the states to foster economic development 
in Early Modern and Modern Europe, see Jones (1981, pp. 104-26).
3. Arrow (1969) - who has attempted elsewhere to specify the competitive 
paradigm according to which individuals when maximizing their welfare may 
attain Pareto efficiency - argues that this was one case when "theory should 
not take place of history" because, although economic factors could have 
motivated the Discoveries, the fact is that "the brute, though unknown, facts 
of geography determined what in fact was their economic result." (Quoted by 
Jones, 1981, pp. 79-80). See also Arrow (1974) and the review of the 
competitive paradigm in Kennedy (1987, pp. 4-6), which is discussed in chapter
9
We can assume however that the gains ended up to be enormous for 
Europe as a whole. But unfortunately there are no attempts to 
quantify the net benefits that Portugal draw from the Discoveries 
and Expansion. Thus, until that is done and we can have a more 
clear idea of the level of Portugal's economic conditions in 
comparison to other parts of Europe, such as the Flanders, the 
Northern Italian states or even England, it is better to analyse 
the more recent times independently of our perceptions regarding 
the Modern Age.
An illustration of how historical analysis is influenced by 
the idea of decline, as opposed to growth, can be insightful and 
justifies further this preoccupation with the historiographical 
heritage. For that purpose we compare now the writings of Eli F. 
Heckscher (1879-1952) on Sweden, and Ant6nio S6rgio (1883-1969) 
on Portugal. Both writers aimed to understand economic 
development in their own times, and both studied their nations' 
history back to the late Mediaeval period, in order to search for 
a broad structural historical perspective. As mentioned, S£rgio 
focused on the conflicting benefits of two different policies, 
the transport or carrying trade policy and the settlement or 
production policy. Heckscher's historical analysis constantly 
refers to the gradual development from what he calls a storage
contd.
5 below.
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economy to a modern market economy.1 My main purpose in comparing 
the histories of these two authors is to reveal the influence of 
different economic environments upon historical interpretation. 
Heckscher wrote at a time when Sweden was clearly one of the most 
successful countries in Europe, while Sergio was steeped in a 
historiography of decline. Their respective positions led to 
different interpretations of the long term consequences of 
broadly similar set of historical facts.
For instance, both authors observe that throughout the 
eighteenth century their countries external trade was largely 
dominated by foreigners - Hansards and the Dutch in Sweden and 
the British in Portugal - but the consequences of this domination 
are interpreted in radically different ways. For Hecksher this 
"passive trade" exercized positive effects upon the Swedish terms 
of trade because prices would be set in its ports and foreigners 
would then have less bargaining power because they would have to 
sell their merchandise at reasonable prices.2 The same trading 
regime is however perceived as a major disadvantage for Portugal 
and S6rgio argues that British dominance of Portuguese foreign 
trade involved a loss of revenue for Portugal. Both conclusions
1. Probably due to its political position and to the lack of freedom of press 
in Salazar's Portugal, S6rgio did not complete his projected History of 
Portugal, having only published a first volume, dealing with geographical and 
natural constraints. E. Heckscher published in 1935-1949 (in Swedish) Swedish 
Economic History from the times of Gustav Vasa (5 vols.). In spite of this, 
there are still grounds for comparison because the two authors resumed their 
perspectives in S6rgio (1929) and Heckscher (1954).
2. Heckscher (1954, pp. 47, 63 and 66).
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are theoretical, and are not grounded on research into terms of 
trade or the balance of payments.1
Another example concerns the level of trade concentration in 
both countries. To Heckscher that appears as an expected 
consequence of the available natural resources in Sweden, while 
SSrgio stresses that concentration was a manifestation of 
Portuguese dependence vis-a-vis Great-Britain. Other examples of 
differences of the significance attached by the two authors to 
other descriptive elements common to the two countries, such as 
the low level of urbanization, or the high fragmentation of the 
land. To put it bluntly, according to S6rgio, Portuguese 
backwardness was a consequence of those elements (among others), 
whereas according to Heckscher, Sweden developed despite those 
descriptive elements.2
The different historical interpretations of the two authors 
mentioned above may reflect different ideological points of view. 
Hecksher believed in free markets, while Sergio's ideas favoured 
state intervention in the economy, and this may go far in
1. Valente (1960, p. 87) makes the same point regarding the work of S6rgio.
2. See Heckscher (1954, pp. 138-39, 142, 144-45 and 153) and S6rgio (1929) and 
(1972). Some of these examples are only referred by S6rgio in passing, and the 
importance they reached in our historiography is largely due to historians 
whom he influenced, as MagalhSes Godinho, Joel Serrio or Miriam Halpern 
Pereira. Referring to the industrial development in the second half of the 
eighteenth century, that Macedo (1982) has identified, Pereira (1986, pp. 286- 
87) concludes that it occurred despite the Methuen treaty of 1703, and because 
in that century Portuguese foreign "dependence" was "commercial" and not 
"industrial". The influence of Ant6nio S6rgio is clear. In the nineteenth 
century dependence turned to be "industrial" thus explaining to a large 
extent, according to her, Portuguese economic backwardness (for a critique of 
this author'b views on the nineteenth century see the next chapter).
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explaining the importance he gives to the role of the state in 
his historical analysis. SSrgio was never worried in checking the 
implications of the mercantilist ideas of the seventeenth century 
authors he revived, whereas Heckscher refuted the basic 
assumptions of the mercantilist school of thought because, 
according to him, they were not built on the observation of the 
facts.1 Yet, it is interesting to note that both authors were 
involved in politics, although S6rgio was an opponent of the 
ruling dictatorial regime, while Hecksher was directly involved 
in policy making for Sweden.2
Moreover, these different interpretations may also reflect 
real differences in the facts that are only apparently similar. 
It may be true that foreigners who came to the Swedish ports had 
a lesser bargaining power than those that came to the Portuguese 
ports, because the demand for Swedish iron could be less elastic 
in respect to prices than the demand for Portuguese wine. But 
that would go in accordance with the point I am trying to make 
here. Sirgio takes the descriptive element of the presence of 
foreigners as a causal factor with negative consequences, whereas 
the true factor could lie behind, in the shape of the demand
1. Blaug (1990, vol. 1, pp. 50-51). On Blaug's critique of Heckscher see 
Gerschenkron (1954, p. xxxv).
2. Political involvement, together with the preoccupation in explaining the 
long-term economic evolution, that characteirze both Sergio and Hecksher, are 
typical of what Hartwell (1973) has designated the "good old economic 
historians".
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curves for exports, and it is not even mentioned.1
The perception of economic history appears as crucial for
historical analysis. In this respect, it is also interesting to
note that authors such as Astrom (1973) argue that Sweden, even
during its Age of Greatness in the seventeenth century (1632-
1697), when it controlled large parts of the Northern Europe,
was far from being a great economic power. According to him:
"Despite all her attempts to present a splendid appearance to 
the world, Sweden was during her Age of Greatness, a poor 
country" and "waged her wars not with her own armies or at 
her own expense, but (at least in part) with German 
mercenaries paid by French subsidies."2
And Astrom's conclusion exemplifies well my departure point here:
"The correlation of economic and political factors can indeed 
be a tricky business, as an attempt to analyse Sweden's 
status as a great power, and her subsequent collapse, 
sufficiently reveals."
It is my conviction that Portuguese real economic potential
1. This example calls the attention of the possible importance of the 
contribution of natural resources. However it should be recalled that natural 
resources is not a pure gift from nature: they have to be explored, for what 
investment and transport facilities are needed. If these complementary factors 
are not taken into consideration, it is hard to explain why some countries 
developed their natural resource basis and others did not. This theme is 
further discussed in chapters 2 and 3.
2. Astrom (1973, p. 73).
3. Astrom (1973, p. 101). Another example of how the simple association of 
historical facts can be misleading, is the historiographical debate on the 
consequences to the Danish economy from the loss of the Duchies to Germany in 
1864. Contrarily to what one could expect from Portuguese historiography 
vantage point, the loss of territories is considered by some Danish historians 
as a positive element for the Monarchy's "industrial boom " that followed the 
Three Years War. Hornby (1969), however, casts substantial doubts on the 
causal relation between these two contemporary historical facts.
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during its own glorious period has not yet been properly defined 
and measured. And it is my conviction too that the hypothesis 
that Portugal was not an economic power in those centuries is 
most plausible and that it is worth exploring further. If that is 
the case, then the idea of decadence should be revised. However, 
the present work does not aim at such a revision. My only concern 
here is to show how putting aside the idea of decadence can lead 
us to redirect the research on Portuguese nineteenth century 
economic history.
A second comparison of the Portuguese and Swedish economic 
historiography, now referring to the nineteenth century, may 
further illustrate this point. That comparison concerns two 
articles that again analyse similar historical facts: the failure 
of the attempts to raise foreign funds to finance the 
construction of the first railway lines in Portugal and Sweden.1 
These attempts, that took place in 1845-46 and 1853-54, 
respectively, came at a moment when capital was again available 
for international loans, in London, Paris, Hamburg or Amsterdam, 
and when the governments of peripheral countries of Europe, like 
the Swedish and the Portuguese, were trying to raise long-term 
loans for funding investment in social overhead capital. 
Soderlund (1963) concentrates mainly on a
1. See Söderlund (1963) and Vieira (1985). The first railways were to be 
inaugurated later on in very close years: 1854 in Portugal and 1856 in Sweden.
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"narrative (...) intended to illustrate the nature of the 
difficulties confronting a small, little known and 
industrially underdeveloped country (...), endeavouring with 
this inadequate organisation to lay the foundations of a new 
government credit structure."1
While the Vieira (1985) article is more general, because the 
author aimed to
"understand the structural components of railway funding in 
Portugal during last century, of which government policy, 
scarcity of resources and financial dependence on European 
capital markets are probably the more significant".
For Portugal the reasons offered for failure are 
"structural": the fragility of the political institutions caused 
by the turmoils of the period from the first French invasion 
(1807) until the relatively more stable first government of Costa 
Cabral (1842-1846); the lack of economic reforms, in order to 
"exploit the internal economic potential (...) given that from 
the Empire, Brazil, only nostalgia was left"; and the lack of 
credibility on the external capital markets, as a consequence of 
problems with servicing the debt.3 In contrast, the reasons for 
failure to fund the loan in the Swedish case are considered as a 
normal consequence of
1. Soderlund (1963, p. 44).
2. Vieira (1965, p. 125). ("perceber quais as componentes estruturais do 
financiamento ferroviàrio em Portugal no século paseado, de que a politica 
governamental, a escassez de recursos e a dependdncia financeira em relagfto 
aos mercados de capitais europeus aio, talvez, as mais significativas.”]
✓
3. Vieira (1985, p. 126-28) ["explorar o potencial económico interno (...), já 
que do Impèrio, o Brasil, só restava a saudade").
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"the paucity of the Board's [i.e. National Debt Office] 
acquaintance with conditions on and the organisation of the 
capital market; lack of initiative; and inadequate 
appreciation of the fact that these new tasks demanded 
methods of working other than the traditional ones."1
Again different reasons are put forward to explain rather similar 
historical facts in the two countries. For Portugal the causes of 
the failure to obtain external funds are related to the imperial 
heritage. For Sweden this particular failure is related to a 
"natural" lack of experience of Governmental officers and 
institutions.
Although the creditworthiness of the two Governments was
considerably different (Sweden's external debt was insignificant,
while Portugal had already defaulted) the relevant consideration
might have been the information available to foreign creditors.
Thus, in contrast to Vieira's emphasis on credit ratings,
Soderlund noted the disinterest of foreign investors in the
Swedish loan and concluded:
"All the evidence indicates that it signified little that the 
Swedish Government was in the unique position to be almost 
unencumbered by debt and that the loan was to be used for 
productive purposes. Swedish Government bonds were, as Hambro 
[a London banker] puts it, 'an entirely unknown quantity on 
the capital market'."
Similarities between Portuguese and Swedish economic history 
in these years are probably not profound. But, given that neither 
Sérgio or Heckscher, nor Soderlund or Vieira provide definitive
1. Soderlund (1963, p. 55).
2. Soderlund (1963, pp. 58-59).
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quantitative evidence, the perceived and hypothetical 
consequences of similar problems are significantly different. 
This seems to be so because the Swedish historians are concerned 
with an economy that became "successful" in the late nineteenth 
century, whereas Portuguese historians study one of the poorest 
economies of nineteenth and twentieth century Europe. The 
differences reside in the search for reasons for success and 
failure.
The point that these comparisons make clear is that it seems 
necessary to provide a yardstick to measure, however crudely, the 
"potential for growth", which should be defined in terms of the 
period under analysis, thus avoiding references to past periods 
for which our economic knowledge is scanty and thus can be 
biased. The question - "Could Portuguese economic growth and 
structural change have been more rapid between 1850 and 1913?" 
is of central importance. It is the gap between actual and 
potential economic growth that is the heart of the discussion of 
the political and social history of Portuguese decadence. The 
importance of social and political explanations for backwardness 
is then in direct proportion to the size of the gap. My point of 
departure is not a long term historical comparison between 
periods that historiography has pictured as of the rise followed 
by the decline of the Portuguese economy; instead I will look at 
the economy as it evolved between 1850 and 1914 and analyse its 
successes and failures in exploiting the opportunities of those 
years. For that purpose it was necessary to use a yardstick to
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measure the real possibilities for economic development during 
that period.1 And I will ignore the counterfactual heritage of 
missed opportunities for earlier centuries. In the next section I 
attempt to assess the potential for economic growth in Portugal 
in the years from mid-nineteenth century to the outbreak of World 
War I.
1.3 - An evaluation of the Portuguese growth potential, 1850-1913
The evaluation of economic growth potential is an exercise 
in conterfactual, quantitative and comparative economic history. 
The aim must be to find an alternative path of growth, assumed as 
being within the reach of a particular country for a given 
period, and which would lead to higher rates of economic growth. 
The posited alternative pattern can only be abstracted from the 
historical experience of more successful economies operating 
within a comparable social, political and geographical context»
The obvious framework for this comparative exercise is total 
factor productivity analysis, related either to particular 
economic sectors, to certain factors of production, or to a
1. A most recent work which departs from a similar perspective is Kennedy 
(1987, Chap. 1).
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general indicator like gross domestic product. Modern economic 
growth in the Kuznetsian sense may be defined as the shift of 
resources from less to more productive sectors.1 In the 
perspective of the economic history of the last two centuries, 
that shift is identified with industrialization, i.e. the shift 
of resources to the industrial sector. Thus a comparison of 
productivity levels of the Portuguese industrial sector with 
those of a more "successful" country - which had similar initial 
economic conditions by way of natural resources, the size of the 
national economy, or a comparable geographical position relative 
to international markets - could provide a first fruitful 
approach to the problem of measuring growth potential. The point 
is to estimate gains in productivity that might have been 
achieved by a more modern and efficient industry. The comparison 
of the industrial structures would probably reveal how higher 
efficiency or productivity standards had been achieved in the 
successful country.2
1. Kuznets* definition of modern economic growth is mostly known for these two 
characteristics. Nevertheless he adds a third one which is of much importance 
in the context of the present chapter: the international spread of modern 
economic growth. See Kuznets (1973, pp. 248-50), and also Kuznets (1966, Chap. 
10).
2. This is the approach developed by Kennedy (1987) in an attempt to evaluate 
late Victorian economic performance, namely in the period of British 
climateric. It is interesting to note that the debate on Portuguese economic 
backwardness has something in common with the debate on the causes of slower 
growth in Britain after the 1890s. See McCloskey (1981).
Another possibility would be to compare not only the industrial 
structure of each country, but a wider range of structural variables related 
to accumulation, resource allocation and demographic factors, in the lines of 
what Chenery and Syrquin (1975) have done for a sample of 101 countries for 
1950-1970 (see Chenery and Syrquin, 1975, pp. 6-10). Crafts (1985), Prados
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Another possible way to approach growth potential is to 
consider levels and trends in the productivity of the production 
factors. In that case the best choice would be to study labour 
productivity, given that it reflects the contribution, not only 
of labour itself, but also of the other production factors, 
capital, technology and natural resources.1 Labour productivity 
is equivalent to GNP per capita divided by the participation rate 
of the labour force. For inter-country comparison purposes we 
may assume similar trends in labour participation rates. 
Consequently, the levels and growth rates of GNP per capita may 
be taken as proxies to the levels and trends of labour
contd•
(1988), and Molinas and Prados (1989) have done similar exercises for the 
nineteenth century Europe, and their objectives are close to mine here, that 
is to review the concepts of Spanish "backwardness** or British "climateric". 
However the Chenery-Syrquin typology draws an important distinction that we 
cannot depict for the nineteenth century because the sample of countries for 
which there is data is too small. That distinction is between small and large 
countries. Chenery and Syrquin (1975) have found that, within a given level of 
GNP per capita, large countries are less dependent on foreign trade, their 
exports are less specialized, their pace of structural transformation is 
quicker, and thus they tend to industrialize earlier. Large countries also 
tend to have higher levels of investment, a larger industrial labour force and 
"marginally higher" levels of education (Chenery and Syrquin, 1975, pp. 67- 
78). Thus it could be misleading to compare the structure of the Portuguese 
economy with a nineteenth century European norm biased towards large 
countries.
1. See O'Brien and Keyder (1978, p. 84).
2. See, for instance, Kuznets (1973, p. 250). This is so, if a negligible 
depreciation of capital is assumed, as Tilly (1983, p. 47) points out.
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productivity.1 This is why growth potential for a given country, 
and the extent of its achievement, may also be inferred from the 
experience of growth of GNP per capita elsewhere.
Growth potential for backward countries has traditionally 
been referred to the British experience during the Industrial 
Revolution, either in an implicit or an explicit form. Yet, it is 
now well established that British industrialization is not 
paradigmatic and that its major features - like the rapid shift 
of the agricultural labour force to industry and services, or the 
rapid pace of urbanisation - were not repeated elsewhere.^ For 
that reason approaches such as those of Rostow's (1966), Landes'
(1969) and Gerschenkron's (1962), that view economic growth in 
the second-comers as a process of response, emulation, or 
substitution of the main elements of British Industrial 
Revolution, are not satisfactory.3 The British level of GNP per 
capita can be taken as a rough measure for potential productivity 
growth, because it was the highest achieved in nineteenth 
century Europe, but it has to be considered independently of the
1. Participation rates varies with population growth and socio-cultural 
factors which may vary across countries. However, during the second half of 
the nineteenth century population increased at quite similar growth rates 
'throughout Western Europe (with the exception of Ireland). Socio-cultural 
factors are assumed to be neutral. Based on evidence from Maddison (1982) 
regarding trends in labour participation rates, Baumol (1988, p. 1079) also 
uses GNP per capita growth as a proxy to labour productivity growth.
2. See, for instance, Cameron (1985), Crafts (1985) and O'Brien (1986).
3. The literature reviewing these growth theories is now immense. For general 
surveys see Gould (1972, pp. 421-34) and Trebilcock (1981, chap. 1). See also 
O'Brien (1986).
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specific structural features of the British economy. In other 
words, the degree of fulfilment of economic potential should not 
be gauged by a comparison to the economic structures of the first 
industrial nation.
The gap between real and potential Portuguese economic
development can be taken as a scalar of the gap between average
level of productivity in Portugal and Britain. Thus, our
assessment of the rate of success or failure of Portuguese
economic growth in the period considered would be measured by the
rate at which this gap was narrowed. Given the large size of that
gap, however, as Kuznets (1966) remembers:
"a minimum degree of successful exploitation of the potential 
(...) cannot be assumed to be as great as the rise in the per 
worker [or per capital product of the developed country at 
the top of the array."1
The present approach is by no means out of tune with the
literature on the history of economic growth. For example,
O'Brien and Keyder (1978) follow the same view to take into
account the historiographical concept of French "retardation"
vis-a-vis Great Britain, although the methodology may differ
given that they use direct measures of physical output instead of
indirect measures of GNP per capita. In their own words:
"(...) the gap between British and French per capita incomes 
provides the least ambiguous and perhaps the only viable 
statistical basis for introducing or focusing historical 
discussion related to the retardation of the French economy
1. Kuznets (1966, p. 481).
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between 1780 and 1914.m1
A measure for potential growth of the Portuguese economy may 
thus be given by a rate of GNP per capita (as a proxy of labour 
productivity) that would allow a convergence of the Portuguese 
level towards Britain or a Western European average level. This 
measure is less accurate than the alternative one mentioned 
above, which would involve the comparison of Portugal's 
industrial structure and productivity levels with that of some 
country with higher productivity levels. However, the assessment 
of the growth potential is only an introductory point for the 
present work, and given the state of present research on 
Portugal's industrial structure, the choice of this best 
measurement for growth potential would imply the choice for a 
full study of the industrial sector. Having said this, it should 
be present in the reader's mind that the assessment of Portugal's 
growth potential that follows is speculative.
International economic growth comparisons have recently 
revealed a pattern of convergence of productivity levels of 
countries from Western Europe, Northern America and Australasia, 
from 1870 until our own days, towards the levels first of Britain
1. O'Brien and Keyder (1978, p. 22). This ie also Abramovitz'b (1979) 
approach for analysing post World War II economic growth and growth potential 
in the OECD area.
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and then of the United States of America.1 The same is to say 
that, for that set of countries, there is a strong inverse 
correlation between the ranking level in 1870 and its rate of 
growth since then.2 As it is shown below, Portugal did not 
converge in the period to 1913. The question is then to know 
whether that was due to failure or to lack of potential.
It is most important to note, however, that the group of 
converging countries is rather restricted. In fact if countries 
other than those that have succeeded (the countries of today's 
OECD), are added to the sample, the convergence pattern is less 
clear, or disappears altogether, a point of crucial importance to 
which I return below.3 Furthermore, one fundamental assumption of 
the convergence hypothesis is that economies are working under 
diminishing returns in output per unit of capital. In other 
words, convergence would imply that new and more productive forms 
of production have decreasing rates of return. This is why it is 
expected that countries with higher output per worker levels tend
1. Britain was surpassed by the US in the early 1890s; the other European 
countries only reached British per capita income level between 1960 and 1970. 
The productivity gap was rather large. See Haddison (1982, pp. 96, 212).
2. See Baumol (1986, p. 1073) and Abramovitz (1986, pp. 390-92).
3. On "divergence" see Barro (1989), Baumol (1988), De Long (1988), and Romer 
(1986). Barro (1989) found divergence for a sample of about 100 countries. 
However, he also found out that, "holding constant a set of variables that 
includes proxies for human capital", convergence holds. For the restricted 
sample of OECD countries, convergence holds in both cases. (Cf. with note 
below). For evidence relative to the LDCs experience in the 1913-1980 period, 
see Hanson (1988a, pp. 332-33). Barro and Sala (1990) give evidence for 
convergence across the United States (1840-1988). They conclude that in the 
case of open economies the process of convergence is accelerated.
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to have lower rates of increase of output per worker. Convergence 
also implies that the transfer of new forms of production - 
stemming either from technical or from organizational innovations
- are spread out from first comers to other countries. This is a 
crucial point for our analysis because it implies that late 
comers have to offer an "institutional and technical 
preparedness" to import the higher productive methods of the 
frontrunners.1 These conditions may be of different kind, and the 
importance of two have been stressed. The first is the need for 
similar product mix between late and early comers: new
technological methods in British cotton yarn industry or in 
German chemical industry may be only successfully exported to 
countries where similar industries exist. The second condition is 
the level of the importing country's knowledge.2
The importance of this much discussed but impossible to 
measure element - knowledge - is more evident if differences 
between country productivity levels are explained by the 
application of modern technology, as is argued by Hanson
1. Abramovitz (1979, p. 2) See also Abramovitz (1986, p. 405) and Kuznets 
(1953, p. 22).
2. On the first condition see Abramovitz (1986, p. 397-98) and Baumol (1986, 
p. 1080); on the second condition see Abramovitz (1986, p. 390), Baumol (1986, 
p. 1281) and Römer (1986, p. 1003).
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(1988b).1 Furthermore, if the knowledge factor is considered, the 
crucial diminishing returns assumption is attenuated or weakened, 
given that this "basic form of capital" may enjoy increasing 
returns due to the externalities it may create, which are not 
present in other forms of physical capital invested by the 
firms. If we resort to the assumption that, within the 
geographical and historical context of Europe, a country1s level 
of 1 institutional and technical preparedness1 is intimately 
related to its level of per capita income, the discussion can 
continue. If so, it may be assumed that to enter the convergence 
group it is necessary, though not sufficient, that a country has 
attained a minimum level of GNP per capita in 1870, or some other 
year.3 This minimum level may be taken at the level of the 
poorest European country in 187 0 to became a member of the
1. Hanson (1988b) is a comment on Clark (1987a) who explains the differences 
in labour productivity between developed and under-developed countries "in 
terms of local culture and environment". Clark's argument is further developed 
in an article on agriculture where he concludes that: "(...) the people in the 
low-productivity areas were different from the people we [from high 
productivity areas] are familiar with" (Clark, 1987b, p. 431). Hanson replies 
by arguing that the differences in productivity levels, between developed and 
less developed countries are explained in terms of capital/labour ratios, his 
empirical support being a regression of proxies to these two variables (the 
same as used by Clark) (see specially Hanson, 1988b, pp. 671-72).
2. See the critique of the convergence hypothesis in these terms and with a 
model by Romer (1986).
3. A "minimum adequacy level" to "tap successfully growth potential" is also 
identified by Kuznets (1966, pp. 477-84) with a minimum product per worker, 
within certain limits related to the valuation to factors such as slavery and 
freedom. On the other hand, Abramovitz (1986, p. 388) hypothesizes that "a 
country's potential for rapid growth is strong not when it is backward without 
qualification, but rather when it is technologically backward but socially 
advanced."
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"potential convergence group".
That country would be Finland.1 The point is the following: 
if Finland belongs to the group of countries that eventually 
converged, it may be assumed that other countries, in Europe, at 
the same level of 1870 per capita income had the potential to 
fare equally well.2 Ipso facto, those countries which did not 
actually converge neglected some growth potential which was not 
exploited for whatever reason. Thus Portugal's GNP per capita in 
1870 can be indicative of whether Portugal failed or not to 
fulfil its growth potential. If Portugal's income was above the 
Finish, then the Portuguese economy would have lost momentum. 
Consequently we would have to be looking for reasons for failure, 
along the lines of the historiographical interpretations of 
backwardness.
1. See De Long (1988, p. 1141) and table 1.1 below. For reasons related to the 
availability of compiled figures for other countries, the following 
comparisons will be limited to the decades from 1870 to 1913 (although some 
elements for the 1850-1870 period are given in table 1.1) and to Western 
Europe. The comparison with countries from this area seems the most evident, 
given that it is the area with which Portugal has stronger historical and 
economical ties.
2. Romer (1986, p. 1012) concludes along the same lines for the wider set of
successful and unsuccessful countries: "(...) the key observation is that
those countries with more extense prior development appear to benefit more 
from periods of rapid worldwide growth and suffer less during any slowdown. 
That is, growth rates appear to be increasing not only as a function of 
calendar time but also as a function of the level of development."
Romer’s perspective is different from the one of the present text given that 
he is concerned with ascertaining the convergence phenomenon at worldwide 
level, while I am only concerned with the experience within Europe. Romer is 
most critical on the convergence hypothesis although he agrees that 
convergence is clear among industrialized countries, and it disappears only 
when centrally planed and less developed countries are included in the sample. 
See Romer (1986, p. 1013).
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Following what has previously been said, the problem then is 
to know where Portuguese 1870 GNP per capita ranked among 
European nations. In modern times, the first attempts to compare 
levels of income per capita, at purchasing power parity exchange 
rates for a large set of countries, were made by Clark (1951), 
Zimmerman (1962) and Maizels (1963). Bairoch's (1976a and 1981) 
more extensive works have been more often used. Bairoch compared 
GNP levels in 1960 at purchasing power parity exchange rates, and 
then extrapolated those levels backwards using estimated rates of 
output growth for each country. For countries for which no GNP 
indices were available, as it is the case of Portugal, Bairoch 
constructed his own indices. His estimates have been improved by 
other authors who used better output indices for the nineteenth 
century, and more accurate and complete estimates for purchasing 
power parity GNP levels.1 New estimates for output growth in 
Portugal by Justino (1987) and those discussed in the next 
chapter, and the new estimates for purchasing power parity GNP 
levels from Summers and Heston (1988), which include a first 
direct estimate for Portugal, help us to rank Portugal with
Oaccrued precision among other European countries.
In Bairoch1s (1981) ranking of GNP per capita, Portuguese
1. See Maddieon (1982), Crafts (1983), Abramovitz (1986), and De Long (1988).
2. In Summers, Kravis and Heston (1980), Portugal was not a "bench-mark 
country", meaning that purchasing power parity exchange rates were indirectly 
estimated. If the same process had been uBed in Summers and Heston (1988), the 
error for Portugal, that is the difference between the actual and the 
estimated values would be of 17% in 1980 (see, idem, Data Table).
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standing was quite high in 1870, but it had fallen by 1913. 
According to his figures, Portuguese GNP per capita in 1870 was 
relatively close to Danish level (79%), the Spanish (82%), the 
Italian (86%), the Finnish (86%) and above the Swedish (110%) 
levels. Except for Spain, all these countries subsequently 
converged towards the European level. In this respect Portugal 
appears as a country that failed.1 Another estimate from Crafts 
(1983), based on indirect indicators for GNP, imply a similar 
high ranking for Portugal for 1890. By then Portuguese GNP per 
capita was very close to the Finnish (94.8%), Italian (96.5%), 
Spanish (96.1%), Swedish (97.1%) and above the Norwegian 
(115.5%) levels.2 On the other hand, De Long (1988), who is 
looking for convergence patterns, groups Portugal in 1870 
together with other countries which he concludes to have 
experienced a limited degree of convergence or no convergence at 
all: Argentine, Chile, New Zealand, and Spain.3
1. See Bairoch (1976a, pp. 284, 286). These figures have been used by authors 
such as Berend and R&nky (1982), Reis (1984) and Lains (1991b). Bairoch 
estimated indexes of GNP growth using as a proxy the evolution of some wage 
indexes for each country. The problem with these estimates involve not only 
the method, but the data the author has used. Following Bairoch*s method but 
with better data, Justino (1987) gets higher growth rates for that same 
period.
2. Crafts (1983, pp. 389-94).
3. See De Long (1988, p. 1141). De Long's data is worked out as in Bairoch 
(1981) and Maddison (1982), that is by extrapolating backward through national 
income indexes, per capita income figures for each country from recent times. 
To take into account modifications in national borders, these authors refer to 
the post-1945 (and pre-1991) borders, as it is the case for Argentina and 
Chile referred in the text.
His model to analyse the convergence hypothesis incorporates the 
predictable measurement error of the variables on the regression for the
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But the figures for Portugal presented by Bairoch, Crafts 
and De Long must be revised. The problem with Bairoch's ranking 
is that his indirect estimate for Portugal's income growth 
between 1870 and 1913, which he used for the backward 
extrapolation, is close to zero. However, the available direct 
evidence on output growth for that period, to be discussed in the 
next chapter, points out to growth rates for real GNP per capita 
of about 0.8% per year. Thus Bairoch's figure for 1870 is 
overvalued. Crafts' estimates are not compatible with the 
evidence on Portuguese output growth for the 1910-1950 period. In 
fact, his 1910 GNP per capita value for Portugal ($550 dollars of 
1970) does not fit with the figure for 1950 ($456), taken from 
the same source used for other countries, because it implies a 
negative rate of growth between 1910 and 1950.1 This is not in 
accordance with the evidence of economic growth for the period 
1913-1947 from Valerio (1983), or with the evidence for the 
period from the early 1930s provided by Moura (1974) or by the
contd.
convergence pattern:
Y(1979) - Y(1870) « a + b x Y(1870)
The slope of the regression (b) varies with the standard error for per capita 
income (Y) in 1870. Zero measurement error implies b=-0.566 (positing 
convergence); a measurement error of 17% implies b=+0.669 (positing 
divergence). His results depend crucially on the quality of national accounts 
data. See De Long (1988, p. 1144) and Barro (1989, p. 8).
The convergence pattern within industrialised countries differs 
according to the period considered. Rank correlation between initial levels of 
labour productivity and rates of growth varies from -0.32 for the period 1870- 
1890, to -0.97 for the period 1870-1979. See Abramovitz (1986, p. 391).
1. I am grateful to Leandro Prados for this crucial remark. See Kravis et al. 
(1978), and Bairoch (1976a and 1981).
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United Nations. The bias of Crafts' estimates derives from the 
kind of proxies used to estimate per capita income, namely, 
infant mortality rates, the age distribution of the population, 
coal consumption per person, and the number of letters posted per 
person. In late-comer countries these indicators may reach 
certain levels at lower per capita income, because poorer 
countries may benefit from externalities generated by the earlier 
industrializers. Coal consumption levels in a non producer 
country as Portugal may depend not only on national income but 
also on British export prices; infant mortality rates may be 
reduced by the improvement of overall health conditions in other 
countries.
In the case of Bairoch's estimates of income per capita, it 
has also to be noted that they are not compatible with his own 
estimates for labour productivity in industry and agriculture. 
For instance, his level of Portuguese GNP per capita was slightly 
above the Italian in 1860 (104%), in clear contrast with his 
estimates for relative labour productivity in agriculture and 
industry shown in the table below (78% and 80% of the Italian 
level, respectively). In comparison with France and the United 
Kingdom the overestimation of Portuguese GNP per capita is even 
larger. Differences between per capita national income and labour 
productivity relative levels stem from the fact that the latter 
were computed by using contemporary evidence on output and labour 
distribution, whereas GNP levels are the outcome of 
extrapolations based on indirect estimates for income growth,
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which are biased downwards as already mentioned.
Table 1.1
Bairoch's Relative Levels of Development for Portugal 
(in percentage of the countries shown)
France Italy Spain U.K.
1860 1913 1860 1913 1860 1913 1860 1913
GNP per capita 76% 50% 104% 74% 89% 84% 48% 31%
Agricultural male
labour productivity 34% 21% 80% 54% 67% 41% 23% 15%
Manufacturing
output per capita 40% 24% 80% 54% 73% 64% 22% 12%
Note: The figures for agriculture do not coincide with those established in 
table 2.5 below, because they have been recalculated according to the new 
quantitative data.
Sources: Bairoch (1981, p. 10); (1982, p. 287) and (1989, p. 329)
Using the latest estimates for 1950 purchasing power parity 
GNP per capita levels from Summers and Heston (1988) and the new 
indices of output growth (see chapter 2), Portugal emerges in 
1870 as quite the poorest country in Western Europe, at a 
considerable distance from Sweden, Norway, Finland, Italy and 
Spain (see table 1.2). After all, Portugal was already a 
relatively poor country by mid nineteenth century. What is more 
important for our argument is that Portugal no longer appears as 
a country with the GNP level (or the potential) necessary to 
enter the convergence club, i.e. a GNP per capita at the Finnish 
level.
This conclusion has a speculative character, because of the 
large uncertainties regarding historical national accounts, and 
the difficulties of inter-country comparisons of income, derived
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from our ignorance of national output, consumption and prices 
structures. But the fragility of this exercise is common to every 
attempt to quantify assumptions that run implicitly throughout 
the historiography. In this particular case, the assumption that 
is implicit in the historiography of Portuguese decadence is that 
the international standing of the country was better in some 
historical periods than in others. Moreover, comparing historical 
national accounts through backward extrapolation of present per 
capita incomes, measured in terms of purchasing power parity, is 
the only way of depicting the historical origin of the actual 
differences of personal income between nations.
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Table 1.2
Economic Growth: selected European Countries (1650*1985)
GOP per capita In 1980 dollars Growth rates (X, year)
(purchasing power parity ex.rates) ...............................
...................................... 1850 1870 1913 1950
1850 1870 1913 1950 1985 -1870 -1913 -1950 -1985
Portugal (456) (504) (652) 9 77 3622 0.5 0.6 1.1 3.8
(538) (517) (728) X s -0.2 0.8 0.8 s
Belgium 1229 1791 2748 3557 9595 1.9 1.0 0.7 2.9
Denmark 1132 1276 2525 4380 10893 0.6 1.6 1.5 2.6
Finland na 695 1434 2676 9266 na 1.7 1.7 3.6
NetherI. (1056) (1451) 2323 3354 9098 1.6 0.8 1.0 2.9
(1463) (1649) x X x 0.6 1.1 X X
Norway na 1059 1845 3980 12575 na 1.3 2.1 3.3
Sweden 716 946 1794 4014 9780 1.4 1.5 2.2 2.6
Switzer. na (1859) (3105) 4893 10670 na 1.2 1.2 2.3
France 1005 1156 2192 3167 9947 0.7 1.5 1.0 3.3
Italy na 1014 1429 1850 7445 na 0.8 0.7 4.1
Spain na (850) (1420) 1647 6385 na 1.2 0.4 3.9
(995) (1526) x * 1.0 0.2 _x
Germany 814 1033 2045 2647 10600 1.2 1.6 0.7 4.0
G.B. 1464 2051 3015 4032* 8682* 1.7 0.9 0.9 2.2
(*) U.K.
Notes and sources:
Growth rates for 1950-1985 do not differ substantially (roughly, more or less 0.5 percentage 
point for annual rates) according to the available alternative sources. A difference of 0.5 
point, nevertheless, accumulates over 35 years to a difference of 20X. To bias the above 
comparisons against the argument presented in the text, the rates for the 1850-1913 period 
were chosen in order to increase Portugal's position in 1950, so that its position in 1870 was 
also increased. Figures between brackets are less reliable. For three countries (Portugal, 
Spain, and Netherlands) it was possible to present lower and higher bound estimates.
GDP per capita for 1950 and 1985 is from Summers and Heston (1988). For previous 
years the sources are Maddison (1982, pp. 44, 170-73, 180-83), and for Spain: Prados (1988); 
Sweden: Krantz (1988, pp. 173, 178); Netherlands: Brinkman, et al. (1988, pp. 259-60, col. 4) 
and Van Stuijvenberg and De Vrijer (1980), quoted in the previous article; and Portugal: 
Valério (1983), Justino (1987) and Lains (1990).
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Even if the comparisons of levels and growth rates of per 
capita income involve a large degree of uncertainty, they still 
can tell us if the actual lag of Portugal's GNP per capita was 
formed after 1950, after 1913, after 1870 or before. Looking at 
the figures presented in table 1.2, and assuming that the data 
for growth rates for 1950-1985 and for income comparisons for 
1985 are not too bad, we can conclude with some degree of 
confidence that Portugal's actual disadvantageous position was 
not formed after 1950, because its GNP increased at the pace of 
Europe after that year. Part of that gap was formed in the period 
previous to 1950, as can be inferred just by comparing the 
available growth rates (and not the levels) of GNP per capita.
Moreover, we could play around with the data on growth rates and
GNP levels in the table and conclude that Portugal's ranking by 
1870 would be much different only with very large margin of 
errors. In fact we have revised here Bairoch's (1981) ranking for 
Portugal in 1870, but that involved a revision of the annual 
growth rate for 1870-1913 from about 0% to about 0.6-0.7%. 
Although it is unlikely, we cannot reject prima facie that a 
further revision of the same magnitude could be given by further
research for any period from 1870. However such a revision would
change radically the perception we now have of the Portuguese 
economic growth from 1870. Table 1.2 is thus a fair summary of 
our present knowledge of Portugal's modern growth.
Apart from other sources of error, the range of values for 
Portuguese GNP per capita in 1913 and 1870 is purposely biased
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upwards perhaps by as much as 20%, because they were computed by 
backward extrapolation from the 1950 figures which overstate for 
that year and result from taking the lowest estimate for the rate 
of income growth for the 1950-1985 period. Yet, the difference 
between Portuguese and Finnish GNP per capita in 1870 is not 
sufficiently wide to conclude firmly that the potential for 
growth differed between these two countries.1 However, the 
Portuguese rate of economic growth between 1850 and 1870 seems to 
have been lower than the Finnish, and so the difference in the 
levels of income could have been narrower in 1850.2 Thus, even if 
Portugal does not appear as a country that had the necessary 
(though not the sufficient) conditions to belong to a convergence 
group in 1870, it might be because conditions looked different 
from the vantage point of 1850. But even if this new picture of 
comparative levels of GNP per capita in Portugal and in the 
poorest converging country in Western Europe is confirmed by new 
and better evidence, Portugal's lack of potential might still 
hold. Finland stood in a singularly low position in the ranking
1. It should be noted that the Finnish rate of GNP per capita growth between 
1870 and 1913 is quite high compared to the ones of the other countries. It is 
worth noting too that the previous estimate for Sweden gave a even higher 
rate, but it was recently revised downwards by Krantz (1988), from 2.1% to 
1.5% per year, in the same period. These figures led Krantz to revise 
Sandberg's (1979) view of Sweden as an "impoverished sophisticate", that is a 
country with high literacy levels despite its alleged low income per capita, 
as it was given by Bairoch's figures. See Krantz (1988, p. 178n).
2. Portugal's GNP per capita either decreased or increased slightly in this 
period (see table 1.1). For Finland the available estimates from 1860 point to 
quite a high growth in the 1860-1870: 1.9% per year (Maddison, 1982, pp. 170, 
172, 180 and 182).
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of income levels in Western Europe. Thus Finnish convergence may 
be considered to be special. Convergence was in easier reach for 
wealthier countries, but that did not exclude special cases like 
Finland or, for that matter, Japan. The problem remains why some 
countries managed to overcame their disadvantages, as exhibited 
by low levels of GNP per capita, while others, like Portugal, did 
not? - And the fact is that the effort that a country like 
Portugal would have to make to follow the pace of European 
economic growth was well above that of most other Western 
European countries.
To sum up, Portugal had a very low level of GNP per capita 
which would not allow us to predict that it could have grown at a 
faster rate than other countries. Portugal was simply not in 
position to take up new industries and technologies at the rate 
postulated for other follower countries in Europe.1 If Portugal 
had overcome its disadvantages, that would appear in the light of 
what has been argued here as an extraordinary feature. Whether 
that effort could be expected from Portugal is a much debatable 
point, and would lead us back to the discussion that introduced
1. The view according to which Portuguese economic growth potential was low 
has been formally expressed first by Reis (1984), who hypothesizes that the 
major obstacles to attain higher levels of development were of the 
"structural" kind. Among these, he includes unfavourable natural resources 
endowments, the small size of the domestic market, or the adverse 
configuration of the demand in external markets. However, in opposition to our 
findings, Reis (1984), led by Bairoch's figures, departs from the assumption 
that by mid-century Portugal's relative level of income per capita was high. 
Accordingly, nineteenth century Portuguese economic growth would not be much 
below the growth potential, but that growth potential would have been close to 
zero.
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this chapter: to know whether history allows us to expect the 
Portuguese economic could have had a higher performance, in 
relation to its own potential, which other European countries 
apparently did not show.1 Any interpretations of the descriptive 
elements of Portuguese economic growth set up in the next chapter 
should take into account the actual possibilities of the more 
optimistic counterfactual stories.
1. An argument on the opposite direction could also be explored, on the lines 
of Olson (1983), if the long period of Portugal's continuity as a political 
unit is considered as a factor favourable to the survival "institutions that 
control entry and innovation" (idem, p. 31).
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CHAPTER 2
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN PORTUGAL, 1851-1913
2.1 - Introduction
2.2 - Histbriography
2.3 - The growth of agricultural and industrial production
2.4 - Growth and exports
2.1 - Introduction
The debate on nineteenth century Portuguese economic growth 
has focussed with particular attention on the period we are 
analysing here, from the RegeneragSo government in 1851 up to the 
eve of the first World War. Although there was a handful of minor 
political and social disturbances, the fact is that these six 
decades represent, as elsewhere in most of Europe, a relatively 
calm period. Some authors would prefer to put a break in 
stability in 1890-91, when Portugal suffered severe problems in 
its finances and balance of payments, but it will be shown below 
that there was no such break in economic growth trends. Other
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authors would argue that the calm political system established in 
1851 was lost by 1865, when the "system started being seriously 
criticized and the subject of decadence was revived."1 Yet, these 
political disturbances did not show up in the analysis of the 
economic trends, although for this period the quantitative 
evidence is more scanty given that most series have blanks before 
1865.
Stability renders easier the study of economic growth - if 
not economic growth in itself. Probably correlated to this 
peaceful environment, the second half of the nineteenth century 
is also a period for which there is a considerable amount of 
quantitative evidence as compared to that available for earlier 
times. In spite of that, the study of Portuguese economic growth 
has been up to recent years mostly based on qualitative sources 
and unsystematic analysis of sparse quantitative evidence. For 
this reason there is disagreement as to the achievements of the 
Portuguese economy during the period, not only on the question of 
knowing if there was growth at all, but also on what were the 
sectors that led or lagged this process, and on the periodization 
of growth or stagnation. The relatively thin literature on 
quantitative economic history implied the construction of new 
series for agricultural and industrial output, which are 
presented in appendix A.
Recent empirical research on agricultural and industrial
1. Valente (1982, p. 25).
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output, namely the works of Reis (1986a) and Justino (1988-1989), 
has redirected the debate towards the discussion of the available 
quantitative evidence.1 This new basis for debate enables us to 
set the discussion of Portuguese economic growth in an 
international context, and it is now possible to study Portugal 
as a case of more general studies of economic growth and 
industrialization. This is important if we have in mind that 
inter-country comparisons of economic growth are one of the few 
tools we have at our disposal to take into account the growth 
potential of the economy.2
Hypotheses aimed at better understanding Portugal's 
persistent degree of backwardness throughout the period will be 
discussed. However, there is no attempt to isolate here specific 
causes for Portuguese economic backwardness. One of the best ways 
to explain economic growth in a country with so backward a 
historiography as Portugal is by describing it. According to the 
new quantitative evidence, Portugal appears as a country where 
economic growth was not absent during the 1850-1913 period, but 
where fundamental structural changes did not take place or were 
only partial. This pace of growth, however, was not sufficient to
1. The data basis for output on certain sectors and in particular on regional 
economies has been growing recently thanks to the works of Reis (1979), Feij6 
(1983), Mendes (1984), Silveira (1988), Martins (1990 and 1991) and Fonseca 
(1992). 1 arc grateful to Holder Fonsenca for permission to use his unpublished 
work. Data for national output from 1900 to 1930 are also published in Marques 
(1991, chapts. 3 and 4). For a bibliographical survey of official statistics 
and reports see Marques (1981, chapt. 9).
2. See chapter 1.
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close the gap between the level of productivity of the country 
and that of her neighbouring Western European countries.
International comparisons will show that one particular 
feature of the Portuguese economy was its low degree of openness 
to international trade. At the end of this chapter this problem 
is raised, but the fact that the analysis of the foreign sector 
has been chosen to continue in the following two chapters does 
not mean that the low share of trade in Portuguese national 
output is seen here as a particular hindrance for the economy. 
Moreover, the study of the foreign sector will show that the 
problem of Portuguese economic backwardness cannot be imputed to 
this factor alone.
The purpose of this chapter is twofold: to present the 
historiographical discussion on Portuguese economic history for 
the period from 1851 to 1913; and to discuss the new quantitative 
evidence regarding economic growth trends. I start in section 2.2 
by presenting a broad overview of contemporary historiography on 
Portuguese economic backwardness, including recent writings to 
which this chapter is largely indebted. Section 2.3 presents and 
discusses the indexes for agricultural and industrial output 
growth; and the concluding section (section 2.4) will analyse 
Portugal's level of international integration.
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2.2 - Historiography
One important common feature across the works of the authors 
to be discussed here, is that they aim above all at explaining 
Portuguese economic backwardness. What distinguishes these 
authors is how they see backwardness as more or less avoidable. 
Two opposite poles may be represented by Pereira (1979, 1983), 
who attributes backwardness to errors of political choice and 
thus implicitly assumes that it could have been overcome, and 
Reis (1984), who argues that there was not much room for 
alternative policies and that economic growth was close to its 
potential. In between we find authors such as Cabral (1979, 
1981), Castro (1978) and Serrâo (1978), who identified periods of 
rapid industrialization, and attempted to explain why 
industrialization reached its limits before the productivity gap 
that separated Portugal from most European countries was bridged. 
Our purpose now is to look into these different views with some 
detail.
As far as Portuguese agriculture is concerned, the current 
debate on the 1850-1900 period is still largely indebted to 
Pereira (1983).1 This book essentially brings to our times the 
impressions expressed by contemporary authors. Halpern Pereira 
held that Portuguese agriculture benefited for a certain time
1. This book was first published in 1971.
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from a "dependent" relationship vis-a-vis Great-Britain 
(Portugal's major trading partner). That connection helped to 
develop a "capitalist" agricultural export sector. Agricultural 
growth, according to the same author, reached a limit by mid- 
1880s when international markets for Portugal contracted in 
favour of the new agricultural exporters from "other continents". 
However, agriculture still had a more "dynamic" evolution than 
industry. Thus, despite the fact that the industrial sector also 
registered some progress, the economy at large suffered a process 
of "de-industrialization" over the second half of the nineteenth 
century.1
But a reorientation of agricultural production towards the 
national market after the mid-1880s did not occur, according to 
Pereira, because of a sluggish growth of internal demand, caused 
by a slow growing industrial sector. The stagnation of industry 
is seen as the consequence of free trade policies formed in the 
period between the major tariff revisions in 1852 and 1892. Low 
tariff rates would have implied that a large share of the 
Portuguese market was taken by industrial imports from Britain. 
Agricultural specialisation for external markets and free trade 
tariffs are perceived as the roots of Portuguese economic 
backwardness. As the Portuguese tariff policy, according to 
Pereira (1983), was determined by British willingness to open 
Portugal's markets for its manufactured exports, backwardness is
1. See Pereira (1983, pp. 315-17) and (1979, pp. 63-64).
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closely tied to "dependence" on Albion.1
Halpern Pereira's perspective is now under revision through 
closer examination of the evidence relative to factors like the 
share of foreign trade in national output, levels and patterns of 
tariffs, the behaviour of external markets, and through the 
comparison of new output indices for agriculture and industry. To 
start with, as we shall see in detail in the next section, 
agricultural output growth lagged behind growth in industry by 
roughly one percentage point per annum (1.5% against 2.5%). 
Moreover, the importance of foreign markets for Portuguese 
agriculture does not appear as paramount and it peaked at a level 
somewhere between 13% and 19% of total agricultural output by 
1900. In a large country such as France, for instance, that share 
peaked at 15% during the third quarter of the century.2
In opposition to what is assumed by Pereira (1983), among
1. See also Serr&o (1978, pp. 28-29). This approach has been recently revived 
by Miranda (1991). For a short summary of Pereira's thesis in English see 
Pereira (1986, pp. 293-335). It is interesting to note that Pereira (1983) 
closely follows earlier authors such as Pery (1979, p. 97), who also concludes 
that agriculture was more dynamic than industry, based on the analysis of 
export trends, but who however point out that industry had "always" been under 
tariff protection. Yet, the impression that Portugal was a free-trading 
country in these decades is widespread among contemporary writers. See for 
instance, Martins (1979, p. 330), Cordeiro (1896, pp. 42-43) and Teles (1901, 
p. 66).
2. In Lains (1986, p. 382) I give an export share for Portuguese agriculture 
of 13%, computed directly from estimates of production and exports (1903/12). 
However, if we take into account an export share for the total economy of 
13.6% (see section 2.4) the agricultural ratio (Xa/Ya) would be somehow higher 
(19.4%), given that (X are exports, Y output and the subscript a is for 
agriculture)x
Xa/Ya * Xa/X x X/Y x Y/Ya,
Xa/X * 0.716, X/Y * 13.6 and Ya/Y is assumed to be 0.5 (see appendix A). 
For the case of France see Toutain (1977, p. 56).
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other authors, trends in agricultural exports cannot be used as 
proxies for trends in agricultural output.1 In several instances, 
like cattle exports, we may note that decreasing exports were not 
accompanied by a decrease in output. As Pereira (1983) has 
pointed out, cattle exports dropped significantly from the early 
1880s. However, this was compensated by an increase in domestic 
consumption to such an extent that the sector surpassed the 
export crisis, and there was even a slight increase in animal 
output.2
The relatively small size of the export sector of Portuguese 
agriculture casts some doubt on any inferences on the conditions 
of the sector drawn from trends in exports. Besides this problem, 
we still have to take into account that the drop in exports by 
mid-1880s - which assumes such a large importance in Pereira's 
interpretation of Portuguese backwardness - was to a large extent 
due to a loss of competitiveness rather than to increasing 
competition from "other continents", as she argues. Despite 
being closer to Britain, the world major foodstuffs importer, 
Portuguese sales of wines, cattle, or fruits increased at a 
slower pace than international demand for these products. 
Portugal lost market shares not only to Argentinian meat, but
1. Sideri (1970) also makes an extensive use of foreign trade statistics in 
his analysis of Portuguese "dependent” economy. Schwartzman (1989, chap. 3) 
follows closely this kind of approach to economic history.
2. See Lains (1986).
3. Pereira (1983, pp. 319-20). See also Miranda (1991, p. 8).
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also to Spanish and Italian Mediterranean products.1
The last contention of Pereira’s (1983) general explanation 
for Portuguese backwardness regards tariff policy. Here again 
facts do not bear out theories. In disagreement with her opinion, 
free trade was not an hindrance to industrial growth, simply 
because since 1837 Portugal never ceased to have high duties on 
industrial imports.2 As elsewhere in Europe, the political debate 
over tariff policy took up a large part of the preoccupations of 
contemporary writers, and frequently those in charge in 
government were theoretically free-trade supporters. Yet, the 
economic history of tariff protection has to be based on the 
analysis of duties actually paid to the customs in terms of 
import prices, and not on the analysis of changes in nominal 
tariffs. This is a point that does not show up often in the 
economic history literature. When actual duties are analysed, the 
conclusions about changes in the level of nominal protection
1. See Lains (1986).
2. Pereira (1985, p. 523), in debate with Tortella (1985b), argues that 
protectionism would require a complete different set of historical events in 
Portugal. Yet the fact that Portugal was protectionist is still compatible 
with some of the pioneer views of Pereira's work. It is also interesting to 
note that in a later work, Pereira (1991, p. 109) refers to Portuguese trade 
regime as one of a "mild" free-trade. Contemporaries, and in particular the 
concerned British diplomatic clerks, were of course well aware of the 
protective character of the Portuguese tariffs. See the detailed analyses in 
Parliamentary Papers (1867-68) and (1878).
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become rather different.1
Due to the importance tariffs had for government revenue in 
Portugal, duties were never reduced below the ad valorem level of 
about 25%.2 Changes in the specific rates (that is, rates 
imposed on the volumes of imported goods) were offset by changes 
in import prices.'* And in fact, import prices fluctuations 
affected more the average level of protection than actual changes 
in specific tariff rates. Table 2.1 shows the evolution of tariff 
levels corrected for changes in the composition of imports for a 
sample of years chosen according to major changes in duties. We 
may see that tariffs increased successively after 1856, and 
decreased slightly only after 1897. Moreover, specific tariff 
rates changes affected all imports, from raw materials to 
finished products, so effective rates of protection were not much
1. See Milward (1981, p. 58) and the most complete empirical evidence in Capie 
(1983). When actual duties are analysed, the conclusions became rather 
different. A good related example is provided by comparing the two works of 
Nye (1989) and (1991). In the first, where actual tariff levels are not 
measured, the author assumes the conventional wisdom over the Anglo-French 
treaty of 1860. In the second article he reaches an outstanding re-assessment 
of British and French tariff regimes simply by plotting actual tariff rates of 
the two countries. See also for Spain, PradoB (1982, p. 28n), and Costas 
(1988, p. 100), who shows that Figuerola's supposedly free-trade tariff reform 
of 1869, was nothing of the kind. I have also carried on this kind of analysis 
in Lains (1987).
2. See Reis (1984; 1986b), Mata (1985, pp. 90-91), Justino (1988-89) and Lains 
(1987). Previous to these authors, Cabral (1981, pp. 105 and 164) had already 
the intuition that free trade was never installed, but a "gradual 
protectionism A outrance" of the "highly protectionist" 1837 tariff. Regarding 
the political debate on tariffs see Ribeiro (1977). For the analysis of tariff 
policy prior to 1852, see Bonif&cio (1986, 1987, 1989b).
3. See for the American tariff Hawke (1975, p. 98).
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affected (table 2.2).1 In conclusion, Portugal was never a free- 
trade country. Consequently, it is certainly exaggerated to argue 
that "the protectionist tariff of 1892 marked, after 189 years, 
the true end of the Methuen treaty between Portugal and England 
[from 1703].m2
1. For the evolution of effective rates of protection for cotton goods see 
Lains (1987). There are some instances of negative effective rates of 
protection, as Martins (1954, p. 114), writing in 1882, had already the 
perception.
2. Bairoch (1989b, p. 79). This author draws his analysis of Portugal's trade 
regime basically from Pereira (1983).
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Table 2.1 
Average Ad Valorem Tariffs (%)(*)
1843 1851 1856 1865 1873 1886 1890 1897 1905 1913
Total imports
Current »value 24.1 29.4 20.3 30.4 27.2 35.4 33.2 31.9 28.6 22.1
Fixed weights
1865 base 25.8 30.4 24.9 30.4 32.6 52.4 43.1 43.9 40.8 34.0
1913 base 15.8 19.7 13.4 18.5 17.2 27.0 30.3 27.8 26.9 22.1
Excluding cereals, tobacco and sugar
Current value 21.6 25.4 18.8 19.9 17.8 20.7 25.7 25.2 21.6 17.2
Fixed weights
1865 base 19.9 24.0 18.6 19.9 19.6 25.1 31.2 33.4 30.2 25.9
1913 base 14.1 17.8 11.9 15.6 13.5 16.6 22.9 22.4 20.1 17.2
(*) Total duties/total imports.
Source: Lains (1987, p. 485)
Table 2.2
Ad Valorem Tariffs for Main Imports <%)
1843 1851 1856 1865 1873 1886 1890 1897 1905 1913
Foodstuffs 28.6 45.0 23.7 28.3 33.4 45.1 48.8 45.8 47.2 40.2
Cereals 8.4 11.1 2.4 9.1 5.6 28.3 43.3 26.1 38.1 27.8
Raw materials 3.8 3.9 1.1 0.8 0.6 3.1 4.2 5.2 5.3 4.1
Raw cotton 5.6 3.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.9 1.7 1.2
Coal 4.4 5.3 1.3 0.0 0.0 8.3 9.4 11.2 8.5 7.7
Intermediates 14.0 16.1 8.7 10.4 8.2 8.4 13.4 15.0 12.5 7.7
Cotton yarn 20.8 32.5 21.5 19.2 24.3 32.6 38.2 52.5 50.5 32.8
Chemicals 17.8 17.1 9.4 10.3 11.5 13.9 21.2 16.0 10.6 10.1
Metals 11.9 16.3 4.7 6.8 4.1 2.5 3.8 4.7 4.2 3.3
Manufactures 28.2 30.8 27.5 22.7 25.5 29.6 29.6 42.1 20.7 25.9
Cottons 25.1 28.5 28.2 17.3 23.3 36.5 40.0 44.5 40.0 34.7
Woollens 38.0 40.3 33.7 37.5 38.5 44.7 49.2 79.4 69.8 60.2
Machinery 2.0 0.8 0.7 1.4 0.9 1.1 8.6 11.0 11.5 10.6
Metals 26.4 31.1 9.8 22.9 21.6 25.5 34.2 36.4 32.5 28.4
Source: Lains (1987, p. 490).
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In clear contrast to Pereira (1983), other authors have 
presented a favourable picture for Portuguese industrial output 
growth. Their analysis is based on scattered observations for 
imports of industrial raw materials and machinery and on evidence 
for the growth of horsepower capacity in industry. Castro (1978) 
and Cabral (1979) argue that there were two important leaps in 
industrial output in the mid-1870s and early 1890s. For the 
latter period, Cabral (1979) proposes quite high growth rates for 
industrial output, in close agreement with an earlier author, 
Vieira (1905), who hypothesised a rate of industrial growth from 
1891 to 1904 of about 9% per year.1 Whereas Pereira (1983) had 
focused on the importance of external markets that hindered, 
according to her, sustained agricultural expansion and thus 
industrial development, Cabral and others pay more attention to 
the possibility of industrial import-substitution opened by 
changes in economic policy derived from financial difficulties 
and problems in the balance of payments. Such industrial upsurge 
could be the result of the new 1892 tariff, which increased 
specific duties on industrial imports into Portugal. In the same 
year a colonial tariff protected the African markets for 
Portuguese cottons and wines by imposing higher differential 
duties for foreign goods and shipping. However, as already noted,
1. See Castro (1978, p. 36), Serr&o (1978, p. 23) and Vieira (1905, pp. 477- 
78). Regarding the effects of the 1892 tariff see, among other historians, 
Castro (1978, p. 145), Cabral (1979, pp. 85 and following). For a short review 
of this literature see Reis (1986b, pp. 68-69). Pedreira (1988) gives an 
interesting review of "old” models for industrial fluctuations for Portugal 
from 1670-1890.
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the new 1892 tariff did not imply significant changes in the rate 
of industrial protection in Portugal.1 And the increasing 
protection of the colonial markets that in fact occurred was not 
particular significant, given the weight of the colonial trade in 
the economy.2
SerrSo (1978), who also follows closely Pereira (1983) in 
her description of trends in agriculture, argues that an 
industrial spurt occurred around 1885-1890. Industry would have 
benefited from the investment of resources diverted from the 
contracting agricultural export sector. In agreement with Cabral 
(1979 and 1981), he argues that there was an import-substitution 
industrial spurt dependent on the domestic and colonial markets. 
Neither SerrSo nor Cabral give a precise idea of which industries 
would have led the industrial "spurts" they talk about. The 
quantitative evidence they provide is based on foreign trade 
statistics, in particular imports of machinery and raw materials. 
Because only raw cotton is imported for a specific sector, the 
only industry that is specifically mentioned is cotton
1. Cabral (1974, p. 72) and (1981, pp. 226 and 275), following authors such as 
Vieira (1905, p. 466), argues that the 1892 tariff did not have as many 
effects on industrial output as currency depreciation that followed the "curso 
forfado". He also argues that free trade did not apply to the industrial 
sector - contrarily to agriculture, that is to corn - because of bilateral 
trade agreements. This is not fully correct because the few treaties that were 
signed implied the concession of the most favoured nation clause leading to 
tariff reductions. For an analysis of trade regime see Lains (1987) and 
Justino (1988).
2. Castro (1979, p. 175) points to a share of exports to the colonies in 
Portuguese GNP in 1910-15 of 2%.
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manufactures.1 But these two authors clearly do not agree on the 
timing, and consequently on the importance of the changes brought 
by the 1890-1891 crisis. Serr&o (1978) prefers to see the cause 
of such industrial spurt in a so-called "voluntarism" of the 
state, which was compelled to protect industry because of a 
certain commercial recession. SerrSo follows the model of 
Godinho, according to which, in Portuguese history, 
industrialization "always" followed commercial depressions.2
The historians mentioned up to now agree on the existence of 
some kind of trade-off between industrial and agricultural output 
growth, specially in the aftermath of the 1892 tariff. According 
to them, this trade-off was the result of two sets of factors: 
(1) an intimate and positive relationship between agricultural 
exports and agricultural output, on the one hand, and, on the 
other, a negative relationship between imports of manufactures 
and industrial production; and (2) constraints related to the 
balance of payments. Accordingly, higher agricultural output 
growth would be associated with higher growth of agricultural 
exports, which would provide foreign currency to pay for 
industrial imports and, as a consequence, industrial growth would 
be reduced. Inversely, a slacker agricultural sector would imply 
lower foreign currency earnings and a shift towards import
1. Cabral (1981, pp. 282-92) characterizes the main industrial branches 
reported in the industrial census of 1881. For the 1890s see Cabral (1979, pp. 
87-91).
2. SerrSo (1978, p. 27) and Godinho (1975, p. 118). See Reis (1986b, pp. 68- 
69) for comments on these authors.
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substitution.1
Reis' (1986b) analysis of industrial growth, based on his 
new index of industrial output, sheds new light on this 
discussion. He concludes that industrial output should have 
increased more rapidly than agriculture (given plausible growth 
rates for aggregate output) and at a relatively smooth trend. The 
relation between cycles in exports and industrial growth 
hypothesised by the authors we have previously discussed did not 
show up. Furthermore, as one would have expected from the 
conclusions on changes of protection levels, the 1892 tariff did 
not affect significantly the path of industrial growth. 
Industrial cycles, according to Reis, were affected by 
international cycles through short-term capital movements.2
Reis has redirected our attention to domestic constraints on 
Portuguese economic growth, both on the demand and supply sides. 
According to him, industrial growth was hindered not by lack of 
protection, but by the small size of the Portuguese domestic 
market. For him growth potential and not economic policy is at 
the root of the low pace of Portuguese industrial development. As 
a matter of fact, the size of Portuguese market for some
1. See the summary of these works in Reis (1986b, p. 209). As stated there, 
the industrial spurt mentioned by Cabral (1981, pp. 280 and 293) during 1873- 
1886 would have been an exception to the mentioned trade-off, given that it 
would have been based in the enlargement of the internal market due to export 
revenues. It is worth noting how this interpretation contrasts with Pereira's 
(1983).
2. See Reis (1987, pp. 215-16).
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industrial sectors was definitively too small to reap economies 
of scale not only at the industry level but also at the firm 
level. For instance, total iron consumption in Portugal by 1900 
was equivalent to total output from an average European factory; 
while Ransomes (an English producer of agricultural machinery) 
had an output equivalent to total Portuguese imports of machines 
by the same date. Some industrial sectors that in other countries 
increased considerably, generating important benefits, were 
virtually unexplored in Portugal.1
In spite of the attention given to domestic demand, Jaime 
Reis (1986b) stresses above all supply constraints. He starts by 
pointing out the unfavourable natural resource basis for 
Portuguese industry - lack of coal and iron - which meant weak 
intersectoral relations within the sector. But the major 
bottleneck had its origins in the competitive disadvantages of 
Portuguese industry, which hindered its capacity to export. In 
fact, as he notes, the advantage provided by lower wages in 
Portugal compared with its trade partners, was offset by 
estimated low value added per industrial worker. Thus he 
concludes that the basic problem of Portuguese industrial 
development could have been a lack of general education -
1. For the discussion of the importance of the size of the market for 
economies of scale see Fabricant (1960), Denison (1967, p. 225-35) and Mokyr 
(1977). Its noteworthy that Mokyr*s argument, according to which there are no 
small markets because the number of firms can be reduced until the optimal 
scale is reached, does not hold in these examples given for Portugal where not 
even one firm can be installed. Small markets may also hinder gains from 
externalit ies.
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essential for improving labour productivity levels, and thus 
competitiveness.
According to Reis (1989), the lack of instruction of 
Portuguese industrial workers was just an expression of the 
overall large degree of illiteracy of the whole population.1 
Illiteracy rates in Portugal were considerably higher than in 
other Western European countries, including the Mediterranean 
countries. The reasons adduced for this lag are not related to a 
low investment capacity from the State, the only entity that 
could provide for more education, given that private demand for 
education was low. In fact, to attain the level of Spain and 
Italy by 1913 it would imply an increase of 1 to 2% of annual 
public expenditure.2 In conclusion, the low investment of the 
Portuguese State in education, and the associated high illiteracy 
rates, is not explained by economic factors but instead by 
political factors. In other words, the State in Portugal never 
felt the need to promote education as a means to achieve 
"national" integration, in contrast to what happened in most 
European countries that in some point in history were laggers,
1. For a contrasting perspective see Mônica (1987, p. 854-55), who argues, 
following (Sérgio, 1924), that the educative bottleneck resided only at the 
level of specialised industrial workers. See also Reis (1989, p. 96n). Saraiva 
(1972, p. 27), in agreement with Reis (1989), argues that the general level of 
literacy mattered the most, and not whether there was or not a leading élite. 
However he recognises, as Mônica (1987) does, that Portugal's low level of 
literacy was related to the country's level of development: a population badly 
feed, badly paid, and badly equipped in technology "cannot have high cultural 
standards".
2. Reis (1989, p. 108).
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namely Germany, Italy and Spain.1
Given the low magnitude of the needed public investment 
effort on education, one important inference we can draw from the 
analysis above is that a small additional financial effort from 
the Portuguese State would have promoted general education, as 
well as industrial education, and thus would lead to increasing 
labour productivity. Higher levels of labour productivity would 
in consequence lead to increasing capacity to export industrial 
goods and thus to an increasing rate of structural change.
However, Reis (1984) argues that the overall potential of 
growth of the economy was limited. After showing through 
counterfactual analysis the low impact on economic growth of the 
alternative paths proposed by the Portuguese historiography, 
namely import substitution of industrial goods or export 
promotion of manufactures, Reis (1984) goes on exploring the 
consequences of one "plausible" alternative path of growth, which 
would have been a higher specialization in agricultural exports. 
At this stage his analysis concentrates on the counterfactual of 
increasing the exports of what was already Portugal's major 
export item, wine. He concludes that this higher specialization 
was feasible in terms of the domestic productive capacity, and
1. This view on the role of the Portuguese state can be related to Olson's 
(1983) argument according to which societies with a longer history of 
stability develop special interest groups that may resist "socially efficient 
readjustments" and thus develop "institutional sclerosis". Thus, the long 
period of Portugal’s continuity as a political unit may be a factor favourable 
to the survival "institutions that control entry and innovation” (Olson, 1983, 
p. 31).
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would have brought a 14% increase in the GNP in one year. 
However, by analysing the position of Portugal in the 
international wine market, he further concludes that such an 
alternative would imply an improbable increase of the share of 
Portuguese wines in the European markets from 10% to 47%, by
1910.1 Thus, growth potential was limited by Portuguese 
productive specialization and the conditions in the international 
markets. It has to be taken into account, though, that this 
counterfactual involves just one of the agricultural products in 
which Portugal had, at least at some points in time, some 
comparative advantage. More importantly, however, as shall be 
made clear in chapter 3, and as Reis (1984) himself recalls, the 
increase in market share in terms of volume would be 
significantly lower if the terms of trade for wine improved. One 
way in which such an improvement could arise is through increases 
in the quality of wine, namely a reduction in the alcoholic 
content, and better commercialisation.2 As such, if the 
counterfactual proposed by Reis was not feasible, this would have 
been due not only to adverse external market conditions, but also 
to lack of ready capital to increase quality and productivity 
levels.
The discussion on the importance of domestic factors to the 
growth of industry is also present in the conclusions in Justino
1. Reis (1984).
2. See Reis (1984, pp. 23-24).
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(1988-1989), an extensive monograph on Portuguese agriculture and
industry. Based on the analysis of the Reis' index and on his own
indirect estimates for GNP growth, Justino concludes that
industrial growth closely followed the growth of national income,
except for the periods 1886-1890 and 1905-1910. Consequently,
industrial growth would have depended on the growth of internal
demand.1 This conclusion, however, is based on too hasty a
comparison of the above mentioned growth rates. A closer look at
the evidence adduced shows that it does not hold for the whole
period of 1885-1910:
Per capita growth of (% per year)
GNP Ind.Out. GNP
1870-1875 2.3 2.5 1890-1895 -1.5
1875-1880 -1.1 -1.0 1895-1900 1.5
1880-1885 3.2 3.1 1900-1905 1.4
1885-1890 0.5 2.5 1905-1910 -0.5
Source: Justino (1989, pp. 101 and 129)
In any case the conclusion about the relation between 
industrial growth and GNP growth put forward by Justino is based 
on estimates for GNP which cannot be used for detecting short or 
medium-term cycles in Portuguese economic growth, because they 
are too much dependent on the fluctuations of the proxy variables 
on which they are based: exports, imports, and government finance 
and revenue.2 Despite these problems, to which we shall return
1. Justino (1989, pp. 128-29). For GNP estimates see also Justino (1987).
2. See Justino (1987).
Ind.Out.
0.8
2.8
0.7
1.8
60
below, Justino's estimates for GNP growth call our attention to 
the possibility that the Portuguese economy expanded from 1850 to 
1913, in per capita terms, in clear contradistinction to Bairoch 
(197 6a), according to whom there was almost no growth at all 
during that period.
Recently Justino's GNP estimates have been refined by Nunes 
et al. (1989), who present a first overall picture of long-term 
Portuguese economic growth throughout 1833-1985. These authors 
define for the second half of the nineteenth century two 
distinctive periods of about 25 years each: from 1860 to 1888, 
when total real GNP increased rapidly, at 2.8% a year, followed 
by a period of near stagnation, in 1889-1913, when GNP growth 
fell to 0.9% a year.1 This sudden drop in GNP growth is seen as a 
consequence of financial difficulties of the State, reinforced by 
problems in the balance of payments, following the crisis during 
1889-1891. It is not difficult to agree that the financial and 
political disturbances during those years had some sort of 
negative effects on Portuguese economic growth. Nevertheless, 
suspicion should arise from the depth of the effects deduced from 
the estimates from Nunes et al. (1989): a contraction of the 
annual total GDP growth rate from 2.8% to 0.9%, that would have 
lasted for a whole quarter of a century (1889-1913). To explain 
such contraction, Nunes et al. (1989) give extreme importance to
1. For a comment on the reliability of these estimates see Lains and Reis 
(forthcoming). In terms of periodization, these estimates do not differ 
significantly from those of Justino's.
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the direct effects of the public investment on social overhèad
capital. As they put it, the year of 1889 marked
"the end of the structural economic policy directed towards 
the building of transportation facilities and of the social 
infrastructures in consequence of the financial problems of 
the State."1
This conclusion implies that the direct effects of public 
investment prevailed over the indirect effects, otherwise they 
would be lagged in time. This second hypothesis, in fact, is 
supported elsewhere by two of the authors, who have argued, based 
on earlier estimates of GNP growth from Valério (1986), that "the 
institutional and investment effort of the State" had a "delayed 
success".*
A further explanation for this drastic downturn in 
Portuguese economic growth in 1889 is, according to the same 
authors, the stagnation in agricultural growth. This is inferred 
from the comparison of their estimates of total GNP growth to the 
industrial output growth given by the Reis' (1986b) index.3 Nunes 
et al. (1989) do not quantify the implicit contraction in the 
agricultural sector but, by simple algebra and not too heroic 
assumptions, we may conclude that their GNP growth estimates 
imply a contraction of the agricultural growth rate from 4% in
1. Nunea et al. (1989, p. 301).
2. See Valérlo (1986) Mata (1988) and Nunes et al. (1989, p. 300). The view 
according to which investment in social overhead capital had delayed effects 
on the rest of the economy as been proposed by Romeo for the case of Italian 
investment on railroads, as referred by Penoaltea (1968, pp. 8-9).
3. The periodization here is different from that of Justino above, because 
Justino takes average yearly growth rates for periods of five years.
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the period from 1860 to 1888, to 0.4% in the following period, 
1889-1913. This is rather implausible taking into account the 
evidence from agricultural output statistics, to be analysed 
below.1 It is worthwhile recalling that such a conclusion about 
trends in agricultural output growth is in agreement with what 
has been argued by Pereira (1983). The convergence between the 
conclusions of these authors can be explained by the fact that 
both use indirect estimators for output growth: Pereira (1983) 
uses export statistics, whereas Nunes et al. (1989) use 
statistics from foreign trade and government accounts.
As pointed out in Lains and Reis (forthcoming), the use of 
two sets of proxies related to government and foreign trade is 
not a major hindrance in what concerns the estimate of secular 
growth, although even here there are unsolved problems. The 
greatest problem concerns in fact the reliability of the short­
term fluctuations that were found. A closer look to the two 
rather steep upswings shown by the index in the years 1867-1875 
and 1879-1888, when real total GDP growth rates reached 4.9% and 
5.2% per year, respectively, helps detecting where the indices
1. To estimate the above rate, I assumed that the service sector expanded at 
the rate of population growth. Estimates for sectoral composition of output 
are based on population distribution and hypothesised labour productivity gaps 
between the sectors, for 1890. They are as follows: agriculture, 50%; industry 
and services, 25% each (see appendix A). The change in agricultural output 
growth inferred in the text is not too sensitive to these assumptions.
2. Lains and Reis (forthcoming) have tested the reliability of the indices by 
comparing equivalent indices estimated for other countries, with the available 
GNP indices for the same countries computed directly.
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from Nunes et al. (1989) may have gone wrong. One determinant 
clue is given by noting the close relationship between the 
fluctuations of the GNP index and those of the two proxy 
variables from the government sector, the weight of which add up 
to more than 4/5. Public expenditure, the variable that 
fluctuated the most, had two periods of intense growth precisely 
between 1865 and 1876 (increasing at 4.8% per annum) and between 
1876 and 1889 (2.9%). From 1889 onwards its trend growth declined 
to 1.5% per year. In conclusion, too much importance is given to 
the financial sector, in particular to public finances. As such 
it is not surprising that, despite their quantitative approach, 
the conclusions from Nunes et al. (1989) are in close agreement 
with the conclusions of the economic historians referred to 
above, who basically worked on qualitative sources. Financial 
problems were certainly an important determinant of the path of 
growth of the Portuguese economy, but probably not as much as 
historical analysis of contemporary discussion has led us to 
think. The next section is an attempt to redirect the discussion 
on Portuguese backwardness, by paying more attention to the real 
economy.
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2.3 - The growth of agricultural and industrial production
The discussion of the many issues raised in the previous 
presentation of the historiography on Portuguese economic growth 
(or backwardness) can be clarified by adding quantitative 
evidence on output trends to the discussion. The statistical 
basis, drawn mainly from official sources, on which the indices 
for agriculture and industry were computed is incomplete and 
doubts must be cast on its reliability. By constructing indices 
with that data instead of using it sparsely as has been done 
until know, however, we may check their consistency. As such, it 
is possible to draw better founded conclusions on the patterns of 
physical output growth discussed in the previous section.
According to the index for Portuguese agriculture set up in 
appendix A, the growth of output in the period from 1850 to 1913 
registered quite severe fluctuations. This is an important 
feature of the sector, and it explains to a great extent the high 
trend growth rate found for the three decades till the peak years 
at the end of the century. In fact, Portuguese agricultural 
output increased in real terms at 1.7% per annum from 1870 to 
1903, a rate that does not compare badly to those of other 
European countries in periods when agriculture registered more 
intensive growth. For instance, the maximum growth rate for 
British agriculture, between the 1820s and the 1850s, was 1.8% 
per year; in France, agriculture had its highest rate of growth
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around the same period at 1.2% per year; finally, in Germany, 
agricultural (net) output increased between 1850 and 1913 at 1.2% 
per year.1
As shown in table 2.3 and graph 2.1, there are two moments 
of absolute decline in the agricultural output index: 1852-1858 
and 1900/03-1912. The main cause for the bad years in the 1850s 
was the oidium vine disease, which drastically reduced the 
output of wine (including all kinds of common and liquor wines) 
by two thirds.2 As a consequence, total agricultural output 
decreased by roughly 25% in less than one decade; and its real 
value relative to 1852 was only attained once again three decades 
later. It should be noted that in these years the markets for 
wines, either domestic or foreign, were not affected by exogenous 
shocks in demand. The sharp decline in agricultural production 
observed in the first decade of the twentieth century (1900/03- 
1912) was due to decreasing wine and cereal output. This second 
negative trend clearly shows how fragile were the increases in 
the level of agricultural output still by the eve of World War I.
1. See further evidence in Eddie (1968, pp. 213-15) and Toutain (1987, p. 57) 
According to the figures for (male) labour productivity in Hayami and Ruttan 
(1980, pp. 327-31) the growth of output per worker in Portugal between 1870 
and 1903 (see table 3.2 below) also compares favourably. The rates there 
mentioned are: 0.3% per year in U.K., 0.8% per year in Prance and 1.7% per 
year in Denmark. For productivity figures see also Bairoch (1965, p. 1099). 
See also a comparative table in Simpson (1987, p. 273) and Van Zanden (1991, 
p. 229).
2. See Justino (1988-89), and further evidence on appendix A.
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Table 2.3
Growth of Agricultural Output, 1846-1912 
(%; per year)
Period Cereals Wines Ani.Prod. Total
1846-1852 0.92 3.05 0.16 1.441852-1870 0.14 -1.33 0.45 -0.271870-1885 -0.40 3.08 1.36 1.401885-1903 2.03 1.37 0.98 1.441903-1912 -0.49 -1.86 0.19 -0.79
1846-1885 0.05 1.02 0.75 0.631885-1912 1.18 0.28 0.71 0.69
1846-1912 0.51 0.72 0.74 0.66
Notes: Periodization chosen according to main 
fluctuations of the indexes. The years refer to 
three year averages.
Source: appendix A.
Table 2.4
Sectoral Contributions to Agricultural Output Growth
Sectoral contributions for growth (C(ti))
Period (t) Cereals Wines Ani.Prod. Total
1846/52 - 1867/73 63% -219% 57% 100%*
1867/73 - 1882/88 - 3% 68% 34% 100%
1882/88 - 1897/1903 24% 58% 19% 100%
1897/1903 - 1906/12 90% -233% 43% 100%*
1846/52 - 1906/12 23% 44% 33% 100%
1866/73 - 1897/1903 14% 62% 25% 100%
Notes and sources:
* negative growth
Computed from appendix A. Relative weights of each sector 
(i=l,2,3) from table 2.5, excluding "others".
Sectoral contributions for growth (C(ti)) computed as:
C(ti) - a(i) x [Y(ti)-Y(ti-l)] / [Y(t)-Y(t-1)] x 100 where,
C (ti) = Contribution of the i product for output growth of the
sum of the three sectors considered.
Y(t) = Total output index number for period t
Y(ti) = Partial index number for period ta(i) * Relative share of the i product in the sum of the three
products.
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Fluctuations in Portuguese agriculture were to a large 
extent due to variations in wine production, which accounted for 
a large share of total output (see table 2.7). In Europe, only 
Italy was so dependent on a crop exposed to such wide variations 
in output. While wine accounted for roughly 25% of Portuguese 
agricultural output (between the 1860s and the 1900s), French 
wine output reached a proportion of 14% of agricultural output in 
1865/74, decreasing to 8% in 1905/14; in Spain the corresponding 
values decreased from 16% in 1891/95 to 10% in 1910. In Italy 
wine output accounted for 22.5% of agricultural output in 1911. 
It is worth noting that the higher concentration of Portuguese 
agriculture on wine is partially due to the size of the country. 
There are regions in Spain with a smaller size than Portugal in 
which wine accounts for larger shares of total agricultural 
output. As such, the large concentration of agricultural 
production was to a certain extent determined by natural resource 
endowments favourable to the vineyards.1
If on the one hand the rapid growth of agricultural output 
from 1870 until 1903 supports Pereira's view of Portuguese
1. In the absence of readily available statistics on regional output, we may 
compare the soil distribution in Portugal (in 1902) and in the Spanish regions 
(in 1910) (wine area under crop, %): Portugal 10.1% (from total area of 
3,111,000 ha); Spain 6.8% (18,827,000), of which: Pais Valenciano 26.3%
(906.000), Catalonia 20.3% (1,071,000), Murcia 18.8% (310,000), Aragon 7.9%
(1.236.000), Estremadura 1.9% (1,412,000), and Andalucía 2.2% (3,644,000). See
Table A.12 and Garrabou (1988, pp. 72, 117, 124, 158, 177). For the
composition of agricultural output see O'Brien and Keyder (1978, p. 113) for 
France, G.E.H.R. (1987, p. 412) for Spain, and Federico (1990, table 1) for 
Italy. I am grateful to Giovanni Federico for his permission to use his 
unpublished results.
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agriculture as a "dynamic" sector, it has on the other hand to be 
taken into account that agriculture by 1870 had just recovered 
the output levels of twenty years earlier. Agriculture was 
growing rapidly because it was recovering. It is thus not 
surprising that the growth of agricultural output was not 
accompanied by increases in land productivity for main crops such 
as wheat and maize (see appendix A). Furthermore, by 1900 
Portugal still had one of the most backward agricultural sectors 
in terms of labour productivity. Table 2.5 presents estimates of 
labour productivity in agriculture for Portugal and other 
countries in Europe.1 The figures on that table show that there 
is a decline of Portuguese relative labour productivity levels, 
in comparison to all countries except Spain.
1. Bairoch (1965 and 1989) and Silveira (1986). The figures given for Portugal 
by these studies have been revised in order to take in to account the new data 
(see appendix A).
Table 2.5 
Labour Productivity in Agriculture 
(Portugal as a % of)
Country 1852* 1870* 1906*
Belgium 58.8% 43.3% 38.8%Sweden 68.6% 47.3% 44.1%
France 47.4% 36.5% 39.4%Italy 137.2% 94.5% 102.4%Spain 56.1% 57.8% 80.0%
Germany 68.6% 41.6% 27.2%U.K. 32.9% 23.9% 27.8%
Notes and sources:
These estimates have been computed according to 
Bairoch (1965), using data on appendix A. The 
results differ from those for Portugal given by 
Silveira (1986) and Bairoch (1989, p. 329). (Cf. 
with chapter 1).
(*) Compared to the averages of 1840/60, 1860/80 
and 1900/10, respectively, from Bairoch (1965, p. 
1096).
Estimates for the contribution of the production factors 
land, labour and capital to agricultural growth in the three 
decades up to 1900 provide further support for the conclusion on 
the extensive character of output growth in that period. Such 
estimates can only be approximate, because the necessary 
statistical information is obviously far from satisfactory, in 
particular regarding the capital formation in agriculture. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to get some concrete results on the 
basis of lower and higher bound estimates.1
1. For a discussion of these estimates see appendix A.
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Table 2.6
Sources of Growth in Agriculture, 1867-1902 
(%; per year)
Labour Land Capital Prod.
6Y/Y - 6L/L X a + ÔT/T X ß ♦ ÔK/K X V + Z
A 1.57% * .45% X .60 + .69% X .30 + •65% X .10 + 1.03%
B X .50 X .35 X .15 1.01%
C X .40 X .40 X .20 .98%
A 100% - 17% + 13% + 4% + 66%
B 14% 16% 6% 64%
C 12% 18% 8% 62%
Notes and sources:
Y * Gross agricultural income; L * Agricultural male labour force;
T * Agricultural land; K * Agricultural capital.
The above ratios are annual growth rates in % (6 stands for 
variation between 1867 and 1903). a, /9, p are, respectively, 
shares for labour, land and capital incomes in agriculture. Z is 
total factor productivity growth.
Income shares are from: Lines A and B: Mateus (1986, pp. 22, 
36); Line C: Crafts (1985, p. 84), corresponding to Britain in 
1760-1831. For the constancy of these shares over time and across 
countries see Vanek (1969, p. 149). See alBO Van Zaden (1991, p. 
219n). Results are not much sensible to plausible differences in 
these values.
For capital stock growth, I assumed as a proxy the growth of 1 
the stock of working animals. A more optimistic growth rate for K 
is given by the hypothesis of a constant capital-land ratio 
considering not only agricultural land but also forestall land, 
i.e. .85% per year. This would imply a maximum contribution of 
capital to agricultural output growth of 11%. See also Crafts 
(1985, pp. 78-84) and Lains (1990).
Table 2.7 
Composition of Agricultural Output
1853/62 1861/70 1884 1898 1900/09
Cereals 29.6% 34.2% 29.3% 32.9% 31.6%
Wine 44.9% 23.1% 27.4% 27,4% 22.7%
Animal Products 13.0% 22.1% 25.1% 18.9% 24.3%
Other 12.5% 20.6% 18.2% 20.8% 21.4%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: Table A.7
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According to the results on table 2.6, capital had a limited 
role in explaining agriculture growth in Portugal. This may be 
better seen if the figures in the same table are compared with 
the figures from a similar calculation carried out by Crafts 
(1985) for the period 1760-1831 in Great Britain. According to 
these calculations, the contribution of capital to agricultural 
growth in Britain was 28% (compared to 4-8% in Portugal), while 
labour and land inputs only contributed a total of 10% (compared 
to 30% for Portugal). In conclusion, Portuguese agriculture 
growth was mainly extensive in its period of maximum growth, 
between 1867 and 1903, making a greater use of idle labour and 
land resources, without great improvements in techniques of 
production or in the use of capital goods. Moreover, as table 2.7 
depicts, there were no important shifts in the composition of 
agricultural production, except the drastic drop in the share of 
wine following the disease that spread in the 1850s. In 1900/09, 
according to the contemporary estimates, agricultural output was 
evenly distributed by cereals, wine and animal products, a 
situation that practically did not change from 1861/1870.1
One reason for that, is that Portuguese agriculture had to
1. This conclusion is in agreement with Cabral (1974, pp. 60-61), although his 
periodization of growth is based on Pereira (1983). For the particular case of 
the wine sector see Martins (1991, p. 655). As we could expect from Boserup 
(1965), extensive agricultural growth featured in countries with different 
levels of development: Belgium prior to the late 1860s (Gadisseur, 1973, p. 
21); Australia prior to the 1890s (McLean, 1981, p. 6); and Spain prior to the 
turn of the century (Tortella, 1985a, pp. 82-83).
It should be pointed out here that the other important wine desease in 
the nineteenth century, the phylloxera, did not have such serious consequences 
in overall wine production in Portugal (see appendix A).
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employ an excessively large labour force, which would imply a
lack of incentive to invest in relatively dearer capital goods.
Reis (1982) presents sufficient evidence on this regarding the
introduction of the threshing machine in the large grain
producing properties in the Portuguese south, where the large
labour force, low wages and insufficient scale economies hindered
investment in machinery before the increase in cereal output from
1890.1 However, investment in capital goods does not depend
solely on the cost of its substitute, labour, but also on the
absolute cost of capital or, in other words, on the availability
of financial resources for the purchase of machinery. In some
cases, the reduction of production costs of machinery is
sufficiently large to compensate for the existence of low wages.
In the case of Denmark, a country where apparently the problems
of capital investment were not so acute as in Portugal, it has
been noted that:
"such implements as the mower, the reaper and especially the 
binder were labour saving to such a large extent in 
comparison to hand methods used before that it paid 
exceedingly well to introduce these implements, not only in 
the United States where the labour which was thereby saved 
was costly, but also in other regions where considerably 
lower wages prevailed".
The conclusion set above regarding the contribution of land,
1. Cabral (1974, p. 62) gives a radically different view. According to him, 
larger land-owners would have invested in labour-saving productions to reduce 
the demand for labour and thuB wages. The economic soundness of this 
interpretation is not clear to me, though.
2. Jensen (1937, pp. 168-69 and 219). On Spain see Simpson (1987).
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labour and capital to agricultural growth has a major 
specification problem, which is the fact that the residual in the 
estimates is quite large. That residual, which measures total 
factor productivity growth, probably reflects some improvements 
in Portuguese agriculture such as the legislative reforms 
following the liberal revolution and the civil wars; the 
extension of the internal market through better transport 
conditions (railways and new roads); and the availability of 
scale economies due to the increase in total production. He need 
to recall, however, that the residual also includes the increase 
in output per productive factor, which does not depend 
exclusively on productivity growth. For example, the land/labour 
ratio increased in Portugal from 1870 to 1903, while in Great- 
Britain it decreased from (at least) 1815/24 until 1865/74.1 The 
probable intensification of the agricultural labour effort, due 
to the fact that the increase in the land/labour ratio was not 
accompanied by an increase in working animals, which actually 
decreased slightly between 1870 and 1906, is not measured either. 
Furthermore, the margin of error for total factor productivity 
growth is large since it is computed as a residual.
The low investment effort in Portuguese agriculture is also 
shown by the constantly low ratio of animals per labourer, and 
the stable share of animal products in agricultural output. Wheat
1. For Portugal see Lains (1990); for Britain see O ’Brien and Keyder (1978, 
105)
74
protection from the 1880s helped to sustain this unfavourable 
production structure, since the terms of trade within agriculture 
turned in favour of wheat. The trade-off between the increase in 
wheat production and cattle raising (and probably wool 
production) is made clear by a close look at the agricultural 
conditions of the Portuguese South, the main area for the 
expansion of wheat output.1 The lack of an increasing share of 
animal products and other products, may be linked to this shift 
of resources towards the cereal sector, due to the protective 
regime imposed in 1889 and reconfirmed in 1899.2 The ultimate 
consequences of this shift in the terms of trade within 
agriculture was to check the upward trend in agricultural 
productivity after the turn of the century.
In clear contrast to what happened in agriculture, the index 
of industrial output shows that industry expanded quite smoothly 
and regularly throughout 1854-1913, with growth rates close to 2- 
2.5% per year (see table 2.8). The only exception was the decade 
from 1861-1865 to 1875, when output increased at about 4% per 
year. But some doubts must be cast on this spurt because before 
1865 the series is not continuous and we do not know where the 
peak year previous to 1875 lays. In any case, the rate of growth
1. See Reis (1979) and Lains (1987; 1990). Based on import statistics for 
wheat, given the lack of sufficient official statistics, Justino (1989, p. 
Ill), concludes that wheat output decreased in the last third of the century. 
However, if consumption rises with population, as it seems to have happened 
(see appendix A), increasing imports do not imply decreasing domestic output.
2. See Reis (1979)
75
attained by Portuguese industry was not sufficient to change the 
predominance of agriculture. According to contemporary estimates, 
by 1900 industrial output was still only one half of the 
agricultural output. For industrial output to reach the value of 
agricultural output by the beginning of the twentieth century, it 
would have been required a rate of industrial growth about twice 
as large as the actual rate during 1870-1913.
Table 2.8
Growth of Industrial Output, 1854-1911 
(%; per year)
1854-1861 1.78
1861-1875 4.17
1875-1890 1.87
1890-1900 2.66
1900-1911 2.43
1854-1890 2.68
1890-1911 2.54
1854-1911 2.57
Source: Table A.14, last column.
The smooth pace found for industrial growth contradicts the 
pace predicted by the historians of Portuguese industrialization 
reviewed in the previous section. The industrial booms 
hypothesized for the mid-1870s or after 1892 did not happen. 
Moreover, the industrial growth neither reflects the cycles in 
agriculture, in particular in agricultural exports, nor is 
affected by changes in tariff schedules. This last conclusion 
goes in accordance to the finding that de facto tariff policy did
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not change considerably throughout the period, as we have already 
noted (see tables 2.1 and 2.2, above).
The absence of industrial spurts cannot be attributed to the 
way the indices were constructed. The Reis' index is an 
aggregation of partial indices weighted by value added per worker 
employed by industrial sectors, based on less then comprehensive 
industrial labour census. Because of the difficulty in collecting 
information on smaller scale and more dispersed industrial 
activities, these census are biased towards more modern 
industries, precisely those that we would expect to increase more 
rapidly (see appendix A).1
Consequently, the absence of industrial spurts could well 
reflect the character of Portuguese industry. Reis (1986b) has 
proposed two sorts of reasons, directly related to the structure 
of Portuguese industry, that may explain why industrial growth 
was smooth. The first reason concerns the high import content of 
industry. In cotton manufactures, for instance, roughly half of 
the value of its gross output was imported, meaning that a large 
part of the rewards for industrial growth would leak away. As 
such, the impact of upward movements in particular industrial 
branches would be cushioned by weak intersectoral linkages. A 
token of this import dependence is given by the following list of
1. On the bias of these indexes see also Reis (1986a, p. 927). According to 
this author the fact that industries related to the building sector - that is 
cement, stone, clay and glass - are not included in the industrial output 
index, leaves out an important source of cyclical movements. It is unlikely, 
however, the occurrence of an industrial spurt based on the building sector 
(such an hypothesis has never been put forward by the historiography).
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inputs that had to be purchased abroad by the Portuguese industry 
made by the British Consul in Oporto. According to him:
"The raw material on which the principal industries are dependent are:
Wine growing and export - Sulphur (from Italy), 
sulphate of copper (from the United Kingdom) as deterrents of 
wine disease, staves (from Russia and the United States) for 
casks, hoop iron (from the U.K. and Germany).
Cotton mills - Cotton (from the U.S., Brazil and 
Egypt), chemicals (from various countries).
Wool mills - Wool, partly, say one-half, artificial 
(shoddies) (from the U.K.), chemicals and dyes (from various countries).
Tanneries - Hides (from Brazil and River Plate), bark 
(from Algeria and Italy), chemicals (from various countries).
Soap Works - Coconut and seed oils (mostly from the 
U.K. and also from Portuguese Africa) , castor beans (from 
British India via Antwerp).
Tinned goods - Tin plates (from the U.K.), some olive 
oil (from Italy).
Hatters - Rabbits' fur (from Belgium and the U.K.), 
leather linings (Belgium), wool (specially prepared), dyes 
(from various countries).
Hosiery mills - Cotton and wool (all foreign)."1
The second reason why there were no significant industrial spurts 
is that the Portuguese industry was mainly producing for a small 
and protected internal market, which permitted only limited room 
for expansion. Consequently, industrial spurts were hindered by 
the size of the market, given that Portuguese industrial goods 
could not compete in the external markets, and thus could not 
surpass the constraints imposed by the smallness of the domestic 
market. To give another example from the cotton sector, the 
growth of cotton goods industry by import substitution was
1. Diplomatic and Consular Reports [...) (1910, p. 6).
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limited by the fact that by the end of the century imports 
accounted for just 20% of domestic consumption.1
The common factor behind the high import content and the 
inability to export of the Portuguese industrial sector is, of 
course, protection. By definition, industrial protection meant 
that output shifted towards the substitution of manufactures that 
were imported from countries where natural resource endowments 
and the technological apparatus differed from those of Portugal. 
Given that resources such as coal and iron were not produced at 
competitive prices in Portugal and had no direct substitutes, and 
given the transfer costs of technology (and capital), imports 
took place. But what is important to stress is that the major 
factor behind the need to import industrial inputs was 
protection. And that is the true origin of the divorce between 
Portuguese industry and the country's resource basis, or between 
the secondary and primary sectors.2 In other words, more 
important than natural resources endowments is probably the fact 
that Portuguese industrial structure was shaped not on the 
country's comparative advantages, but on tariffs.
Thus, the scarcity of the natural resources that were 
available to the first industrializers could explain why Portugal
1. According to Pedreira (1991, p. 555) this limitation was already to be seen 
in the cotton printing industry as early as in the 1870s.
2. This problem is probably just a descriptive element of backwardness. 
Gerschenkron (1962), when discussing Bulgarian industrialization from 1878- 
1930, concludes that "the hope that industry in a very backward country can 
unfold from its agriculture is hardly realistic." (Idem, p. 216).
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did not enter this first wave of modern economic growth. Most 
probably, however, it does not explain why Portugal did not 
experience the rapid growth of the second wave of 
industrialisers, formed essentially by the countries of the 
north-western European periphery during the third quarter of the 
nineteenth century. The difficulties for Portugal to 
industrialize on the basis of mass-production of cotton goods, 
iron or steel seems evident, but the same does not apply 
regarding industrialization based on the exploitation of 
agricultural or forest resources, or water, as happened to the 
second industrializers. The fact that this relationship between 
industry and agriculture was weak in the case of Portugal, does 
not imply that Portugal had an unfavourable resource basis. It 
could signify that that resource basis was not sufficiently 
exploited. In the specific case of land, for instance, Schultz 
argues:
"Farm land has two components, a natural endowment component 
and a capital structure component. The latter is a 
consequence of past investments. Theorists implicitly often 
mean by land only its natural endowment. But it is for the 
most part an empty concept because so many of the differences 
in productivity of farm land are man-made. Investments in 
land over time do matter."
Thus in a backward country the actual pattern of land (or other
1. Schultz (1983, p. 17). See the same point in Boserup (1965, p. 13). This is 
what Kelley and Williamson (1973, p. 451) labelled the "'new view* of 
agricultural development", which helps explaining explains how a resource 
(i.e. land) poor country as Japan achieved fast growth of agricultural labour 
productivity (1887-1915), precisely through the "accumulation of technical or 
purchased inputs per farm worker" (idem, p. 456).
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natural resources) use does not disclose its potential use, and
in particular its potential integration with the industrial
sector. In close agreement with Schultz, Kuznets (1953) asks why
some societies did not overcome their problems by appropriate
changes in technology, while others did so:
"(...) the have-not societies are poor because they have not 
succeeded in overcoming scarcity of natural resources by 
appropriate changes in technology, not because the scarcity 
of resources is an inexorable factor for which there is no 
remedy."1
Thus, more important than the availability of natural resources 
is the capacity to exploit them, that is, the capacity to finance 
the needed investment. Natural resources and capital investment 
can be complementary.2
Table 2.9 depicts the main transformations of the structure 
of Portugal's industrial value added between circa 1850 and circa 
1910. The data on which that table is drawn is incomplete and
1. Kuznets (1953, p. 12). For the same line of argument regarding Portugal see 
Justino (1989, pp. 242-23).
2. According to Vanek (1969, p. 152) natural resources and capital have a 
"strong degree of complementary” in the United States. This fact could 
explain, according to him, the "Leontieff paradox" (that is that the United 
States exports are intensive in the scarce production factor, labour). Baldwin 
(1971, pp. 128-29, 142), agrees with the Vanek’s first point but not with its 
implications.
OvBrien and Keyder (1978, pp. 154, 162) conclude that natural resources 
are important in shaping the agricultural and industrial structure of the 
countries they studied (Britain and France), but not in explaining different 
levels of aggregate (labour) productivity. Thus the conclusions from those 
authors regarding the importance of natural resources in explaining different 
agriculture productivity levels in Britain and France cannot be applied to a 
comparison between countries with different composition of physical and human 
capital stock. A conclusion that is most relevant for the case of Portuguese 
industry. See also Schultz (1983, p. 12).
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different sources point to different weights around 1910, 
specially for cottons and metallurgy. In any case, a decline in 
the share of textile industries, in particular woollens, is 
noticeable. Besides that, the major features in the table are the 
increase of the food industry, due to flour milling, a possible 
increase in metallurgy, and the emergence of the fast growing 
canned fish industry.1
Let us now try to understand the extent to which Portuguese 
industrial structure was biased in respect to its comparative 
advantages - a bias that may go far in explaining the pace of 
industrial growth. Although the share of textiles in total 
industrial value added decreased, by 1910 Portugal still had one 
of the largest shares of industrial labour in the sector, close 
to those of France, Italy and Spain, as well as Switzerland 
(table 2.11). Despite that, Portugal did not have a comparative 
advantage in textiles. In fact, whereas Portuguese value added 
per industrial worker was on average less than 1/2 of British 
value added, in the cotton and woollen industries it was just 25% 
and 15%, respectively.2
1. The canned fish industry is not a modern industry in Portugal because, once 
again, a large share of its inputs were imported, in particular the tin 
plates. See below chapter 4.
2. Reis (1986b) gives a ratio of 50% for Portuguese/Britain value added per 
worker, including tariffB in the Portuguese case. If we assume an average 
level of tariffs of 30% and an import coefficient on the 30-50% range, that 
ratio would be reduced to 45%. The ratios given in the text for cottons and 
woollens do not include tariffs either. See Lains (1897, p. 498).
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Table 2.9
Structure of Industrial Value Added (%)
Sectors C.1850 c.1910
I II
Cottons 25.9 22.0 17.5Woollens 34.9 19.9 18.6Linens 3.5 4.8 4.0
Food indus. 6.7 13.8 11.4Cork indus. 1.1 5.8 6.9
Tobacco 9.3 10.5 7.0Metallurgy 8.2 8.9 17.5Paper 3.4 2.1 2.2Ceramics 6.7 3.0 3.9
Soap indus. 0.3 2.1 1.7
Canned fish — 7.1 9.3
TOTAL 100% 100% 100%
Source: Table A.12.
Table 2.10 
Structure of Industrial Exports
Sectors 1880/89 1890/99 1900/13
Cottons 6.4 27.8 26.9
Woollens 2.6 2.6 1.0
Linens 0.7 0.5 0.1
Food indus.(*) 17.8 14.8 16.7
Cork indus. 33.2 19.9 17.5
Tobacco 0.0 0.0 0.0
Metallurgy 6.7 3.7 2.9
Paper 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ceramics 0.4 0.4 0.3
Soap indus. 0.0 0.0 0.0
Canned fish 32.1 30.3 34.7
TOTAL 100% 100% 100%
(*) Olive oil, flour, and fruit preserves.
Source: appendix C.
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Table 2.11
Structure of Industry: selected European Countries {%) 
A - Composition of Labour Force (c.1910)
Mining Food Texti. Wood Pulp Stone Metals Chemi­ Other
Bever. Cloth. prods Paper Clay Machi­ cals
Tobac. Leath. Print. Glass nery
Portugal
1891 5.6 22.2 43.6 8.4 2.6 5.0 11.5 1.0 -
1917 — 25.0 37.0 14.0 7.0 12.0 5.0 -
Belgium 16.6 11.0 30.2 10.0 2.8 5.9 15.7 3.8 3.0
Denmark - 22.5 19.7 - 7.6 15.1 23.0 6.0 6.1
Finland - 11.8 15.9 27.1 10.0 8.0 19.1 2.4 5.6
Norway 4.8 14.5 19.1 19.6 3.4 9.5 24.6 4.6 -
Sweden 3.8 10.1 15.9 16.2 10.5 12.4 27.2 4.0 -
Switzer. — 8.0 38.2 7.3 5.9 5.6 32.3 2.7 -
France 5.2 9.6 47.8 12.9 3.2 3.9 15.1 1.4 0.8
Italy 4.6 14.2 37.1 10.3 4.0 8.5 18.1 2.7 0.5
Spain 11.5 13.1 50.0 9.0 - 7.8 1.4 7.0
G.Britain 14.7 13.5 35.0 3.9 4.8 2.3 23.3 2.4 _
B - Composition of Production (1913)(*)
Food Texti- Basic Metal chemi­ Other
Bever. tiles metals pro- cals
Tofe&c.
Portugal 18-24 40-47 0 9-18 2 18-22
Belgium 23 19 18 24 7 9
Denmark 44 12 0 12 5 27
Norway 27 7 1 20 7 38
Sweden 16 7 8 29 3 37
France 11 19 11 31 6 22
Italy 16 38 7 12 7 20
U. Kingdom 20 19 7 19 6 29
W. Europe 19 18 10 24 6 23
(*) Manufacturing industries only.
Sources:
Part A: Portugal: Moura (1974, p. 115) and Reis (1986a, p. 920); Belgium: 
Brabander (1981, p. 82); Denmark and Finland: Jorberg (1976, p. 476); Norway: 
Hodne (1975, p. 290); Sweden: Montgomery (1933, p. 178); Switzerland: D.F.E.P. 
(1927, p. 155); France and Great Britain: Bairoch (et al.) (1968, pp. 173 and 
189); Italy: Zamagni (1987, p. 78); Spain: C.E.N. (1945, p. 224);
Part B: Paretti and Bloch (1956, pp. 212-14) and table 2.9 for Portugal.
84
The comparison of the structure of industrial exports with 
that of industrial value added (tables 2.9 and 2.10) leads to the 
same conclusion regarding the competitiveness of the textile 
industry. During 1880/89, that is before cotton exports to the 
African colonies were protected, the proportion of cottons in 
total industrial exports was considerably lower than their 
proportion in total industrial value added, 6.4% against 26% 
(1850) or 18-22% (1910). Following the protection of the colonial 
markets, Portugal's exports of cotton goods went up to more than 
a quarter of total industrial exports. Woollens' exports, on the 
other hand, were rather limited because they were not protected. 
Again we may see that its importance in the structure of 
Portuguese industry is largely inflated. By 1910 woollens 
contributed with 19-20% for total value added whereas they only 
contributed with 1% for industrial exports. Portugal, a small, 
low wage country, had high tariff barriers protecting sectors 
where capital/output ratios and economies of scale were 
presumably large: cotton yarn and cloth, for instance. That 
economies of scale were difficult to attain in these sectors, 
where tariff barriers were at the 30-50% level, may be shown by 
the following example: in 1891 one of the largest Lisbon cotton 
plant was producing 67 different kinds of yarn, because the 
market was too small for it to specialise in just a few counts of
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thread.1 Within the cotton industry, protection was also granted 
to printing, since at least 1837. This protected industry was a 
relatively intensive user of capital and energy, compared to 
cotton spinning and weaving, or to the industries of wool, metal 
and tobacco.2
By comparing tables 2.9 and 2.10 we may depict comparative 
advantages for Portugal in only a few industries, namely food, 
cork and canned fish. The comparatively low degree of 
diversification of the industrial sector appears even more 
clearly in table 2.11. Natural resources based industries, such 
as wood products, pulp and paper, stone, clay and glass did not 
develop as in some other European countries. Metallurgy also had 
a relatively low importance in comparison to the other countries 
in the table, except Spain.
The argument according to which industrial development was 
hindered by a biased industrial structure as a consequence of 
tariffs should not be pushed too far, though, because it leaves 
open the question of why in the first place tariffs were imposed. 
In fact, it has to be taken into account that tariffs might be 
imposed for economic reasons, and may not be just the result of 
wrong choices of economic policy. When the potential for 
productive investment is narrow, it may be economically 
reasonable at the individual level to lobby for tariff
1. See Reis (1986b, p. 85). On the case of Italy see Fenoaltea (1968, p. 420).
2. Pedreira (1991, p. 537).
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protection; on the other hand, when the range of investment 
opportunities is wider, protection may be unnecessary. The 
discussion of the Italian case is most enlightening in this 
respect. Contradicting Gerschenkron's view, Fenoaltea does not 
"disapprove'' of the protection granted to the Italian textile 
industry because textiles are a consumption good the production 
of which is labour intensive and requires unsophisticated capital 
equipment. Why then was protection successful in Italy and not in 
Portugal?1 - Moreover, there may be sound economic reasons for a 
country poorly endowed in capital to invest in capital intensive 
industries if capital substitutes for another scarce resource: 
skilled and "reliable" industrial labour. This is a basic 
argument in Gerschenkron's typology of industrialization.2 It is 
true that industrial exports may be hindered by protection if 
protection has negative effects in the country's industrial 
structure. However, if tariff protection reflects low domestic 
investment opportunities, then the ultimate cause of low 
industrial exports are low investment opportunities and not 
protection. As in many issues in economic history causes and 
effects are hard to isolate, but that does not mean that we do
1. Fenoaltea (1968, pp. 428-29). Risking to raise questions much beyond the 
scope of our present analysis, it has to be noted that much of the questions 
raised by Portuguese nineteenth century economic history could be solve by 
comparing to developments later in the 1950s and the 1960s, when, precisely, 
Portuguese cotton industry developed considerably.
2. Gerschenkron (1962, pp. 8-9). See also Baldwin (1971, pp. 130-31) who 
argues that one of the reasons why in many twentieth century LDCs foreign 
investment went to a large extent to export-oriented, large scale, and capital 
intensive natural resource industries was because of lack of skilled labour.
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not take into account the possibility that causality may run in 
both directions. If one is looking for causes of decadence, then 
policy choices (protection) and not growth potential (investment 
opportunities) tend to appear as the crucial factor. In any case 
the low trade share of Portugal's GNP should appear only as a 
distinctive element of the country, and not as an explanation of 
slow growth.
2.4 - Growth and exports
By Western European standards, the share of foreign trade in 
Portuguese national income in 1913 was relatively low, comparable 
only to the shares exhibited by larger countries such as Italy 
and Spain (table 2.12). But size does not go far in explaining 
differences in trade shares across countries, as chart 2.1 
renders evident. Chart 2.2 shows that the trade shares in 
national income are instead significantly and positively 
correlated to the level of income per capita. In chart 2.3 the 
height of import tariffs appears as significantly and negatively 
correlated to trade shares. Finally, chart 2.4 depicts a negative
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correlation between tariffs and income per capita.1
Table 2.12
Income, Country size, Trade, and Tariffs in Europe (c. 1910)
GDP Popu­ Total x/ M/ Tariff
per cap. lation GDP GDP GDP level
($1980) (000) ($000) (%) <%> 1902 (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Portugal ( 728) 6 061 4 412 13.6 13.2 56
Belgium 2748 7 605 20 899 (30.3) (51.4) 13
Denmark 2525 2 833 7 153 30.3 32.0 18
Finland 1434 3 027 4 341 25 31 na
Norway 1845 2 447 4 515 29.5 27.6 12
Sweden 1794 5 621 10 084 21.7 16.8 23
Switzer. (3105) 3 864 11 998 (18.0) (32.1) 7
France 2192 39 770 87 176 15.7 19.1 34
Italy 1429 35 192 50 289 9.3 14.0 27
Spain (1526) 20 345 31 046 11« 8 10.3 56
Germany 2045 66 978 136 970 19.5 21.5 25
G.Britain 3015 41 289 124 487 23.0 29.3 na
Notes and Sources:
Columns (1)-(3): table 1.1 and Mitchell (1975, pp* 19-24).
Columns (4) and (5): Bairoch (1976a, pp. 79-80), Heikhinen and Hjej
(1987, p. 228), Justino (1987, p. 460), Lévy-Leboyer and Bourguignon 
(1985, p. 332), Maddison (1962, p. 14; 1987, p. 695) and Prados (1988, 
p. 207). Except for Finland and Spain, trade ratios were corrected 
according to Federico and Tena (1989), their indexes being adjusted by 
freight rate factors. The values in these columns should be compared to 
Deutsch and Eckstein (1961, p. 275), Grassman (1980, p. 131), Hanson 
(1986, p. 93), and Kuznets (1966, pp. 312*13),
Column (6): Parliamentary Papers (1905, p. 354), corrected as in Lains 
(1987, p. 487).
1. Tariffs are related to trade and not to import shares for the sake of 
homogeneity in the charts. The simple correlation coefficient between tariffs 
and import shares is of course larger (-0.740 vs. *0.684).
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Chart 2.1 - Trade and Size Chart 2-2 - Trade and Income
GDP GDPPC (*)
<*)
Chart 2-3 - Trade and Tariffs Chart 2-4 - Tariffs and Income
TARIFF («) GDPPC <*)
Notes:
TRADE’= (X+M)/GDP; GDP = total GDP;
GDPPC = GDP per capita; TARIFF = Tariffs/Imports 
Source: Table 2.12
These relationships do not help us understand the reasons 
for and the consequences of Portugal's low share of international 
trade. Income per capita affects trade shares through 
differentials in productivity, for instance, as well as trade 
shares affect income per capita. Trade shares may also be 
hindered by tariffs and tariffs may depend on the level of income 
per capita. In fact, historically poorer countries have more 
difficulty in raising fiscal revenue by direct taxation on income 
or property and thus depend to a larger extent on tariff 
revenue.1
Inferences regarding the determinants of low shares of 
foreign trade in national output can be quite inconclusive. 
However, there is a considerable amount of literature in history 
and development economics assuming foreign trade, that is 
exports, as an exogenous variable in economic growth. These 
export-led growth models were put forward in order to explain 
British industrialization during the eighteenth century, or the 
industrialization of Scandinavia in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, or third world development after World War
1. Regarding the case of Portugal see Justino (1988) and Lains (1987). One 
possible inference from this complex set of inter-relationships is that the 
level of GOP per capita affects trade shares via its effect on tariffs. This 
circle has been identified by Saraiva (1972, p. 27) who is mainly concerned 
with the role of education and literacy. According to this author, a small 
country like Portugal cannot solve its economic problems in autarky, and has 
to foster trade with other countries, what could be promoted by foreign 
policy. But then he question the capacity of Portuguese politicians to do so, 
who are not backed by a literate population, which in turn is not literate 
because the country is poor and badly equipped.
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II.1 In the case of Portugal, references regarding the role of 
exports during the second half of the nineteenth century have an 
ambiguous character. Exports would have led growth only in 
agriculture and only up to a certain point in time. Referring to 
the role of foreign markets in the development of the country, 
Pereira (1983) concludes that they were "simultaneously a factor 
of progress and retardation."2
The controversy over the role of exports in economic growth 
is far from satisfactorily solved in spite of the vast domestic 
and foreign literature on the subject. The disagreement regards 
not only the intensity of the relationship of exports and growth 
but also the direction of causation. In their relation to growth, 
exports are considered as an engine by Robertson (1938) and 
Nurkse (1961), a handmaiden by Kravis (1970), a sputtering engine 
by Williamson (1980), or just as a trailer of growth by Findlay 
(1985).
The engine of growth model, as Nurkse (1961) presented it, 
was in motion during the nineteenth century, when international 
markets were buoyant because of the growth of demand for primary 
products in Europe, and in particular in Great Britain. According 
to the same author, the possibilities for the demand push of
1. For a first critique of the export-led growth model during British 
industrial revolution see Saul (1965). Short summaries of this debate are 
given by McCloskey (1981, pp. 140-42) and Crafts (1985, pp. 129-37). Regarding 
the Scandinavian countries see next chapter.
2. Pereira (1983, p. 10). See also Cabral (1979, p. 69) and Sideri (1970).
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exports weakened in the twentieth century when adverse income 
elasticities for primary products emerged in the industrialised 
World. This view was first contested by Kravis (1970), who shows 
that export growth does not differentiate successful from 
unsuccessful countries in the nineteenth century. International 
trade conditions were not significantly different for twentieth 
century developing countries, as opposed to successful nineteenth 
century countries of recent European settlement. Besides, 
successful exporters in the post World War II period (1948-1966) 
increased their shares in world markets for their traditional 
exports without necessarily enjoying the "good fortune in world 
demand for their particular exports". Accordingly, success in 
exports is more probably related to internal supply conditions of 
each country and not to conditions on international markets.1
Emery (1967) analyses the correlations between rates of 
growth of exports and GNP per capita. He recognises that simple 
correlation is not a test for the export-led growth model because 
the direction of causation is not tested, although at some stages 
he assumes that causation runs from exports to growth.2 I have 
replicated his exercise in table 2.11 by estimating time-series 
regressions of real GNP per capita growth on real export growth, 
for a sample of 9 countries during 1865-1913.
1. Kravis (1970, p. 868). Hanson (1977) draws a similar conclusion for a 
sample of 12 less developed countries during the 1860-1900 period. For the 
case of Portugal see Laine (1986).
2. Emery (1967, p. 478).
92
Table 2.13
Regressions of Real GNP per capita on Export Growth 
(Dependent variable: YG)
Time-series, 1865-1913
Country C XG R2 DW F SER Q N
Portugal 0.014 0.209 0.204 1.72 4.86 0.044 4.81 16
(0.771) (2.203)
Denmark 0.012 0.097 0.196 2.33 12.46 0.016 10.02 48
(4.601) (3.530)
Finland 0.020 -0.001 -0.022 1.20 0.00 0.057 7.99 47
(2.128) (0.016)
Norway 0.005 0.248 0.372 1.34 28.22 0.015 18.66 48
(2.095) (5.313)
AR( 1) 0.006 0.226 0.428 1.99 00»r*rH 0.014 10.09 47
(1.758) (5.375)
Sweden 0.016 0.205 0.094 2.59 5.89 0.050 17.55 48
(1.975) (2.427)
France 0.018 -0.024 -0.020 2.05 0.08 0.039 13.58 48
(2.881) (0.281)
Italy 0.012 -0.048 -0.003 2.57 0.87 0.041 28.77 48
(2.031) (0.934)
Germany 0.012 0.067 -0.013 2.36 0.42 0.036 13.45 48
(1.555) (0.646)
UK 0.004 0.234 0.181 2.23 11.39 0.023 7.35 48
(1.011) (3.375)
Pooled
Sets C XG R2 DW F SER Q N
All 0.009 0.172 0.077 2.22 4.27 0.009 23.28 40
(2.739) (2.066)
Small 0.004 0.338 0.286 1.87 8.62 0.008 3.80 20
(0.828) (2.935)
Small+UK 0.004 0.318 0.291 2.01 10.86 0.008 5.07 25
(1.065) (3.295)
Notes: YG, XG stand for yearly real growth rates for income per capita 
and exportB, respectively, t-statistics between brackets. R2 adjusted 
for degrees of freedom. Chi-square statistics (Q) computed with 20 lags 
(for N-40-48), 15 lags (N*25), 10 lags (N*16-20). The pooled series are 
composed of 10 years trend yearly rates of growth for GNP per capita and 
exports, for each country, except Portugal, for lack of yearly data. 
Small countries: Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, and large
countries: France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom.
Sources: Portugal: appendixes A and C. Denmark: Johansen (1985, pp. 113- 
14, 190-98, 217-218, 390-97); Finland: Hjerppe (1989, pp. 195-96, 259- 
61), Vattula (1983, pp. 18, 232, 458).
Sources for table 2.13 (contd.)
Norway: Maddison (1982, pp. 180, 183, 249), Mitchell (1975, pp. 511, 
516, 818, 824), Hodne (1975, pp. 501).
Sweden: Johansson (1967, pp. 138-45, 150-61). France: Levy-Leboyer and 
Bourguignon (1985, pp. 329-32, 344-47), Maddison (1982, pp. 180, 182), 
Mitchell (1975, pp. 773-74). Oenurny: Hoffmann (1965, pp. 454-55, 530-
31), Lewis (1981), Mitchell (1975, pp. 817, 821, 510, 514). Italy: 
Ercolani (1975, pp. 421, 427-28, 432-34), Mitchell (1975, pp. 510, 515, 
773, 775, 817, 823). United Kingdoa: Imlah (1958, pp. 96-98), Feinstein 
(1972, pp. 120-21), Mitchell (1975, pp. 818, 826).
All data converted into indexes (1900*100).
Table 2.13 shows exports to be correlated to growth in one 
large and four small countries, respectively the United Kingdom, 
Portugal, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The value of the 
coefficient of the real export growth rate (XG) for Denmark 
(0.097), although significant, is rather lower than those of the 
other countries for which we have obtained regressions with a 
good fit. If this is correct, then we have to conclude that there 
were significant differences of the role of exports within the 
Scandinavian countries. In fact, the estimated coefficients for 
Norway and Sweden are roughly double the size of the Danish 
coefficient, whereas in the case of Finland exports are not 
correlated to growth. The coefficient found for Portugal (0.209) 
appears in a plausible range of those for Norway (0.226), Sweden 
(0.205), and the UK (0.234).1
These results set up the basis for the study of Portuguese 
exports that follows in the next chapter. However, we have to
1. It should be noted that the rate of growth of Swedish GDP has been recently 
revised downwards (see Krantz, 1988). This revision is not available in a 
yearly series and, as such, cannot be used here. However it is clear that it 
would imply a larger coefficient for Sweden.
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bear in mind the fact that the conclusion according to which a 4% 
increase in exports is associated with an increase in income per 
capita of about 1% in the case of Portugal and other countries, 
should be interpreted carefully. This is so because increases in 
exports may not be exogenous but dependent on general economic 
growth - the causal relation does not necessarily run from 
exports to growth. It is generally expected that export growth 
bring benefits of a different kind than growth of any other 
segment of aggregate demand of equal size.1 However it may be the 
case that the unresponsiveness of supply, resulting from factors 
such as low investment rates, hinders the production of 
exportables and thus export growth.
Moreover, the supply of exportables can be related to the 
structure of the domestic demand. According to Linder (1961), the 
export potential develops if only substantial domestic demand to 
the product exists.3 Saul (1965) and Crouzet (1980) argued that 
the "Linder hypothesis" holds for British exports growth during 
the Industrial Revolution. That hypothesis is further confirmed 
by noting that the export goods that expanded rapidly in the 
international markets during the second half of the nineteenth 
century were sold in the domestic markets of the countries of 
origin at shares never below 50%, before or during the periods of
1. See for instance Caves (1970, p. 244).
2. See Beckerman (1965, p. 65)
3. See also Tharakan (1985, p. 73).
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more intense export growth for each product. That was the case of
wheat exports from the United States, meat exports from
Argentina, wool exports from Australia, butter exports from
Denmark, or timber exports from Sweden.1 Exports should not be
considered a priori as an exogenous variable that can be
controlled by economic policy in order to promote growth, because
it may be the case that, as Bairoch (1976a) argues:
"(...) ce sont les mouvements de la croissance économique qui 
précèdent ceux du commerce éxterieur et non l'inverse. (...) 
en règle générale nous pensons que c'est la croissance 
économique qui a été le moteur de l'expansion du commerce 
extérieur en Europe au XIXe siècle (...) "^
A joint analysis of the trends of export growth, of shifts 
in their product composition, and shifts in the composition of 
domestic supply, may help to understand further the relation 
between growth and exports, and to conclude whether exports can 
be considered as exogenous to growth or not. If export growth is 
associated to shifts in export composition, and if these shifts 
follow similar shifts in domestic supply, the case for export-led 
growth is unlikely. If export growth is more dependent on overall 
economic growth, the ability to develop export promoting policies 
is reduced.
1. See Butlin (1984, pp. 29, 33), Crouzet (1980, p. 77), Jorberg (1976, pp. 
396, 470), Lipsey (1963, p. 52), and Platt (1972, p. 262).
2. Bairoch (1976a, pp. 159-160). This conclusion is based just on the analysis 
of the fluctuations of the export and national output curves over three 
cycles. I have endeavoured on a more complex analysis of the causal 
relationship between exports and growth for 9 European countries (1865-1913) 
by testing causality according to Granger’s (1969) definition and method. See 
Lains (1991).
CHAPTER 3
GROWTH AND SLOWDOWN OF EXPORTS, 1842-1913
3.1 - Introduction
3.2 - Trends and fluctuations: the external scenario
3.3 - Adaptation in export trade: lessons from Scandinavia
3.4 - Export structure and the market: cork and wines
3.5 - Portugal and the European System
3.1 - Introduction
This chapter presents trends and cycles in the values, 
volumes and prices of Portuguese exports during the period from 
1842 to 1913. From the discussion in the previous chapter, it 
should be clear by now that the analysis of export trends should 
not be considered as an element of particular importance in 
understanding Portuguese economic backwardness. My aim here is 
just to understand the problems that this particular sector had 
to expand, and those problems should be understood in the general 
framework of a poor country with overall growth limits imposed by
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its unfavourable starting position.
Export growth is analysed here in relation to fluctuations 
in international markets. Comparisons with other small countries 
with better export performance and with Mediterranean competitors 
will help to explain why Portugal's export growth slowed down as 
it did by the mid-1880s. The review of the experience of 
Scandinavian exports will reveal how flexibility in adapting to 
changing conditions in foreign demand may be determinant for 
export growth. It will be shown that such flexibility was related 
to shifts in domestic supply.
The analysis of Portuguese exports will go deeper in respect 
to two important export branches, cork and wines. In this field 
Portugal's experience will be compared to that of Spain and 
Italy. Supply constraints will appear at least as important as 
the capacity to secure international markets through commercial 
negotiations.
Official statistics for foreign trade started in 1842 but 
provide a continuous series only from 1865. Thus more attention 
will be paid to the years 1865-1913, although some comments for 
previous decades, in which the basis for the rapid expansion of 
foreign trade were laid, will also be given. These statistics are 
revised in an appendix to this chapter, where their values will 
be compared to those registered in the statistics of Portugal's 
main trade partners. Official figures for exports are much less 
reliable than those for imports, and it has been estimated that 
exports were undervalued by as much as 50% by 1900. The accuracy
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of official export volumes is satisfactory, and the errors in 
valuation can be basically imputed to variations in export 
prices. The major difference between the new figures presented 
here and the official data for Portuguese foreign trade relates 
to the years post 1891. Portugal left the gold standard in that 
year and, despite the large exchange rates fluctuations that 
followed, export values continued to be registered at par 
exchange rates. Since imports continued to be registered at 
"market" exchange rates, the revised balance of merchandise trade 
becomes radically different. For example, deficits on the balance 
of merchandise trade are no longer persistently negative. The 
analysis in this chapter is consistently based on the revised 
series, although growth rates from official sources are also 
presented to allow for comparisons. Correction coefficients for 
the official data are presented in appendix B, and appendix C 
presents the main official series of Portugal's trade.
The structure of the chapter is as follows: section 3.2
presents a periodization of export growth and relates it to 
shifts in international trade for foodstuffs and to general 
conditions in European agriculture; section 3.3 discusses the 
export experience of Scandinavia as a comparative framework that 
will prepare to the discussion in section 3.4 concerning the 
constraints of Portugal's export growth; finally section 3.5 
analysis the difficulties for Portugal to take advantage of the 
complex net of commercial negotiations within Europe.
99
3.2 - Trends and fluctuations: the external scenario
Throughout Europe foreign trade expanded rapidly over the 
half-century to 1913. Portugal was no exception. Between mid- 
century and the outbreak of the War, the revised values for 
exports and imports increased roughly four-fold, that is at trend 
growth rates of approximately 2.5% per year. The corresponding 
figure for volumes is only slightly higher at 2.8% per year.1 
Fluctuations in Portuguese exports, in nominal and constant 
prices are depicted in graph 3.1. Table 3.1 shows the yearly 
growth rates estimated from peak to peak, defined as those years 
in which the deviations of exports and imports from their 
respective trend lines are greatest. As the figures before 1865 
are not continuous, and the trend could not be estimated, the 
reference years in the tables are just best guesses. Turning 
points for cycles for values and volumes coincide, except for
1. Unit value indexes for export and imports were computed according to the 
Fisher "ideal" formula (a geometric average of Paasche and Laspeyres indexes). 
The coverage of these indexes is on average 83.3% of total export value, 
comprising a list of 39 items, and 74.9% of total import value, comprising 34 
items (see Lains, 1986).
Among the many references for nineteenth century foreign trade growth 
rates see Bairoch (1976b). For countries not considered in that book, see 
Lampe and Jackson (1983), Pamuk (1982), and Prados (1988). For a detailed 
overview of Anglo-Portuguese trade for the first half of the nineteenth 
century see Bonif&cio (1987) and (1989b, pp. 35-116).
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slight differences. Export prices fluctuated severely, 
particularly after Portugal left the gold standard in 1891. These 
price fluctuations show up as sharp differences in medium-term 
trend growth rates for the values of Portuguese exports. 
Fluctuations in value in the last two periods in table 3.1 are 
thus largely due to fluctuations in Portugal's exchange rate 
against the currencies on the gold standard, namely the pound 
sterling.
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Graph 3-1 — Exports (revised)
XC ------XFCÌ___________ /
Table 3.1 
Growth of Exports 
(yearly peak to peak growth rates, %)
Periods Value Volume
Official Revised
1842-1856(1)
1856-1866
1866-1875
1875-1886
1886-1898
1898-1910
6.09
2.04
3.62
1.37
1.48
1.16
0.02
6.72
1.47
6.61
-0.41
2.86 
1.64(* ) 
4.89(#) 
3.44(+) 
1.62 
1.57
1856-1910 1.84 2.75 2.49
1865-1913
(trend)
1.52 2.85 2.34
(1) Up to 1865 the series are not continuous and 
the years chosen as peaks for the first two periods in 
the table are best guesses.
(*) 1856-65;(#) 1865-74; (+) 1874-86
Notes: The corrections apply only to official
values (i.e., prices), and not the volumes. Peak years 
were estimated in relation to a trend linear regression 
of the type, Log X « c + a.time + ut
Last row in the table is the coefficient "a" for the 
regression for the relevant periods. The complete series 
start in 1865, thus until that year the peak years in 
the table are only proximate.
Source: Computed from appendix C.
The growth in export volume is divided into six sub-periods 
of nearly one decade each. The relatively high growth rate for 
1842-1856 is probably overstated because 1842 may be a low point 
in the cycle.1 During the following decade (1856-1866), export
1. As there are no trade statistics for Portugal between 1831 and 1842, as 
well as no price indexes for the earlier period, the conclusion that 1842 was 
a low point is inferred from partial evidence in, for instance, Justino (1988- 
1989). See also Bonifacio (1987).
102
volume growth registered a slowdown, which was reversed in the 
years from 1866 to 1886. These were decades of exceptional 
growth. After 1886 and till 1913 the growth rates for export 
volumes returned to the levels of the initial decade of 1856- 
1866. In spite of the high growth rates of the years 1866-1886, 
the Portuguese performance for 1855-1913 stood around the median 
for Europe as a whole (table 3.2). Compared to more successful 
small countries the growth of exports from Portugal lagged in the 
periods following 1886 and in particular after 1895. The changing 
rhythm of the period after 1886 was associated with important 
shifts in the composition and direction of Portuguese exports.
The purpose of the selection of the countries to which 
Portugal's export growth is compared is twofold. Firstly it was 
found insightful to compare Portugal with countries of similar 
size but with more success in international trade. By looking 
into the experience of the Scandinavian countries we may try to 
understand how they managed to keep high growth rates of exports 
by shifting export composition and adapting to changing 
conditions in world markets. Given their small size and 
consequent greater dependence on exports, such capacity of 
adaptation revealed as an important distinctive element of 
economic growth in these countries. The second set of countries, 
France, Italy and Spain, has been chosen to include those 
countries with which Portugal competed in the markets for 
Mediterranean products.
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Table 3.2
Growth of Exports: selected European Countries 
(peak to peak growth rates, %)
Portugal
(1856-65) 
value 0.02 
volume 1.64
(1866-75)
6.72
4.89
(1875-86)
1.47
3.44
(1886-98)
6.61
1.62
(1898-1910)
-0.41
1.57
(1865-80) (1880-94) (1894-1913)
Denmark value 4.47 1.63 5.35
volume 4.55 2.80 3.20
(1868-80) (1880-95) (1895-1913)
Finland value 8.35 1.00 5.96
volume 7.52 1.61 4.20
(1866-73) (1873-82) (1882-96) (1896-1913)
Norway(*) value 8.34 0.19 1.33 5.92
volume 4.03 1.59 2.11 4.53
(1851-62) (1861-70) (1870-82) (1882-96) (1896-1913)
Sweden value 6.42 3.96 2.25 4.98
volume 6.57(*) 7.98 2.64 3.24 3.35
(1860-66) (1866-75) (1875-89) (1889-1913)
France value 5.73 2.20 -0.32 2.61
volume 8.07 4.46 0.80 2.22
(1863-72) (1872-84) (1884-99) (1899-1913)
Italy value 6.98 -0.68 1.95 4.06
volume 4.26 0.48 1.56 2.80
(1855-64) (1864-73) (1873-82) (1882-97) (1897-1912)
Spain value 1.26 5.85 2.96 2.30 0.43
volume 2.67 6.29 3.43 4.61 0.01
(1856-65) (1865-74) (1874-83) (1883-1901) (1901-13)
U.K. value 4.95 3.12 0.56 1.01 5.23
volume 2.4 4.5 3.3 1.6 4.3
Trend growth (1865-1913)
value volume value volume value volume
Portugal 2.85 2.34 Norway 2.80 2.61 Italy 2.13 1.89
Denmark 3.78 3.86 Sweden 3.50 3.35 Spain 2.55 3.28
Finland 4•12 3.84 France 1.31 1.99
(*) goods only
Sources: Mitchell (1981). Denmark: Johansen (1985). Finland: Hjerppe (1989), 
Vattula (1983). Norway: Maddison (1982). Sweden: Johanson (1967). France: 
L6vy-Leboyer (1985), Maddison (1982). Germany: Hoffmann (1965), Lewis (1981). 
Italy: Ercolani (1975). 0. K.: Imlah (1959), Feinstein (1972), Feinstein and 
Pollard (eds.) (1988), Pollard (1989, p. 4). Portugal: appendix C.
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Turning now to table 3.2, we may note that the countries 
with a superior record to Portugal for 1865-1913 include: 
Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Spain. Norway’s long run growth rate 
is similar and the record of France and Italy is inferior.1 
Export performance among countries was significantly different 
not only in terms of turning points in the cycles, but also in 
growth rates experienced within each cycle. The relatively slow 
growth of the volume of Portuguese exports in the initial decade 
(1856-1865), was specific to Portugal. Only the cycles 1865-1875 
and 1895-1913 were common to all countries included in the 
tables, although peak years do not coincide perfectly. The 
Portuguese cycle 1865-1875 had its counterpart in Norway, France, 
Italy and Spain. But the next upswing cycle in Portugal's 
exports, from 1875 to 1886 was not replicated in the rest of 
Western Europe, except in Italy, where the peak year came in 
1884. The important turning point at 1886 was specific to 
Portugal, and has thus to be explained endogenously in terms of 
the internal conditions of the country or in terms of particular 
markets.2
1. By comparing growth rates computed between peak years, our conclusions may 
differ from other inter-country comparisons of export growth such as Bairoch 
(1973). Note that figures for Norway do not include exports of services, and 
thus growth is undervalued because Norwegian services exports increased 
steeply in this period.
2. This turning point was determined by wine exports to Prance. Although for 
different reasons, this was also the case with Italy. See Federico (1979, p. 
396) and (1987, pp. 6-7).
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In the 1890s most countries experienced more or less common 
turning points in export volumes (ranging from 1894 in Denmark, 
to 1899 in France). If similar turning points are indicative of 
market integration, then it is legitimate to conclude that it was 
only in this decade that the countries in our sample became 
integrated into an international cycle.1
Portugal's insertion in world markets was relatively weak as 
shown by a comparison of cycles in its exports and cycles in 
indices for economic activity in the core countries of 
international economy. Table 3.3 shows that, in disagreement to 
what has been said for other countries in the European periphery, 
the core countries did not act as a direct stimulus for the 
Portuguese economy, through exports.2 Otherwise, one would expect 
that the cycles of Portuguese exports would match those for the 
core industrial production or the core economic activity. Yet, 
the peaks and troughs of Portuguese exports do not generally 
coincide with those in the core, and there were some peaks in the 
core economies which were not reflected in Portuguese exports, 
such as 1882-1883, 1890-1891 and 1906-1907.
1. By correlating GDP deflators, McCloskey and Zecher (1981, pp. 197-98) 
conclude that the economies of Britain, United States, Germany, France, and 
Sweden were already well integrated in the period after 1880. This is of 
course not incompatible with our finding regarding export volumes given that 
terms of trade and supply elasticities for exports differ from country to 
country. According to Klovland (1989, pp. 34-37) Norwegian economic cycles 
were also similar to the European cycles.
2. See Lewis (1978, pp. 164-68), Berend and Ranky (1982, pp. 113-14). Based on 
the same kind of analysis, Prados (1982, pp. 34-38) gives a similar conclusion 
regarding Spain, as we have concluded here for Portugal.
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Table 3.3
Cycles for Portugal's Exports and for the Core Economic Activity
Exports Core Economic activity of
from industrial ----------------- --------------------------
Portugal production G. Britain Prance Germany U.S.A.
(T:1842)
P:1845 P:1846
P:1850 T:1848 T:1848
T:1852 P:1854 P:1853 P:1852
P:1856
T:1858 T:1858 T:1858 T:1858 T: 1858
P:1866 P:1866 P:1866 P:1867 P:1863 P:1863
T:1867 T:1871 T:1868 T:1868 T:1866 T:1867
P:1875 P:1872 P:1873 P:1873 P:1872 P:1873
T:1879 T:1877 T:1879 T:1879 T:1879 T:1879
P:1882 P:1883 P:1882 P:1882 P:1882
P:1886 T:1885 T:1886 T:1887 T:1886 T:1885
P:1890 P:1890 P:1891 P:1890 P:1890
T:1891 T:1894 T:1895 T:1895 T:1895 T:1894
P:1898 P:1899 P:1900 P:1900 P:1900 P:1899
T:1900 T:1904 T:1904 T:1905 T:1904
P:1906 P:1907 P:1907 P:1907 P:1907
T:1908 T:1908 T:1909 Ts1909 T:1909 T:1909
P:1910 P:1913 P:1913 P:1912 P:1913 P:1913
Notes: Peaks (P) and Troughs (T) are estimated as deviations from trends given 
by linear regressions.
Sources: Lains (1986, p. 385), Lewis (1978, p. 275), and Rostow (1980, pp. 
324-25).
Pereira (1983) was the first historian to point out to the 
difficulties for Portuguese exports by the mid-1880s. It is 
important to stress, however, that those difficulties arose 
mainly from domestic economic conditions and not as much from 
external markets, as she argues. It is true that since the 1870s 
conditions for international trade in agricultural products 
changed, as a consequence of increased competition from non- 
European agricultural exports, such as wheat from the United
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States, meat from Southern America and fruit from South Africa.1 
These shifts in international trade were associated with large 
structural shifts in the agricultural sectors of most European 
countries, which are generally ambiguously defined as the 
"agricultural depression". The analysis given by Pereira (1983) 
for the decline in agricultural exports and the inferences made 
on Portuguese agricultural output growth have to be set in this 
context. It is thus important to review the evidence on the so- 
called agricultural depression in Europe from 1873 to 1896 and 
its relationship to the changing conditions in international 
markets stemming from the emergence of the United States as a 
wheat exporter.
If by depression is meant either falling relative prices, 
rents, total output or employment, the available empirical
evidence shows clearly that agricultural depression is too strong
\
a term to characterise European agriculture in the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century. This is best shown by Jensen (1937), a 
monograph on Danish agriculture which analysis evidence on 
relative price trends, a type of study difficult to find in the 
related literature.2 As a matter of fact, relative prices of
1. See for instance Stern (1958, p. 22).
2. For similar conclusions for the case of Britain, but drawn on a less 
detailed analysis, see Fletcher (1973). See also Kindleberger (1951) and Saul 
(1985, p. 34). It is interesting to note how Bairoch (1989, pp. 46-51) has 
attempted at reviving the "agricultural depression" in Europe: "In 1860-80, 
grain accounted for some 35-40% of all agricultural production in the 
industrialized countries of continental Europe. In such a system, the 
substitution of 22% of grain production by imports in the space of 26 years 
represents in very simple terms a decreases of 0.33% per annum in the volume
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agricultural imports in Denmark declined almost as much as 
relative prices of industrial imports, and the cumulative 
difference for the period 1873 to 1896 was just about 10%. The 
slight increases in relative prices that occurred in same cases, 
namely the price of butter in respect to that of wheat, are 
explained by the increase of the quality of the manufactured 
good.1 Furthermore, there are no clear signs of overproduction of 
foodstuffs in Europe or of reductions in the income elasticity of 
demand, which could justify a crisis in the sector. In Jensen's 
words:
"It would seem that too much attention has been concentrated 
on the growth of the supply of agricultural products, and not 
enough on the demand which, as the price data seem to 
suggest, must have increased correspondingly."2
According to Jensen (1937.), the "agricultural depression" in 
Europe was thus another facet of the general deflationary trend,
contd.
of total agricultural production, assuming there was no exceptional increase 
in consumption due to availability of supplies." He then proceeds pointing out 
that in France per capita consumption increased by 0.27% per year (1855/64 to 
1875/84), which contradicts the last assumption. However, the major problem 
with such conclusion is that Bairoch does not allow for substitution within 
agricultural output, from corn towards animal products for instance, as 
happened in Scandinavia and elsewhere in Europe.
1. See Jensen (1937, 193-213). For industrial goods prices, Jensen (1937, p. 
198) uses the Sauerberck price index after excluding food prices. According to 
Jorberg and Kranz (1989, p. 1061), who also dismiss the existence of an 
agricultural depression, Sweden had a similar trend in its terms of trade 
between agriculture and industry. See also Kindleberger (1951, p. 31). For the 
case of France see Chevet (1989) who shows that French wheat imports and wheat 
prices are positively correlated, meaning that imports were determined by the 
level of the domestic wheat output, and not the other way round.
2. Jensen (1937, p. 207).
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due to the fixed world stock of gold in a period in which the 
number of countries entering the gold standard, and thus the 
demand for gold, was increasing.1 Agriculture suffered probably 
more from this deflation because it is typically less supply 
elastic - a farm cannot be shut or reconverted as easily as most 
industrial premises. Referring in particular to Denmark, Jensen 
(1937) concludes that wages, household expenses, upkeep of the 
farm and real state taxes only slightly decreased, and mortgage 
interest and amortization did not decrease at all, whereas farm 
gate prices were reduced.2 When trends in agriculture prices are 
deflated by the general price trends, the period from 1873 to 
1896 appears in quite a different light. Moreover, the shift in 
relative prices of grain and livestock, which ultimately led to 
more butter and less corn in Danish agricultural output, was a 
trend already seen in the 1850-1873 period.3 Furthermore, it is 
hard to support the existence of an agricultural depression in
1. Jensen (1937, pp. 202, 205-6). Only when new gold mines came into
production in South Africa - as well as Australia and Alaska - by mid-1890s, 
could prices start rising again . This "global monetarist" theory has first 
been proposed as early as 1904 by Gustasv Casel (see Jonung, 1984, Appendix), 
and it is revived in Bordo and Schwartz (1981). Such a view is apparently in 
contradiction to the fact that interest rates decreased throughout the period
- the Gibson Paradox. For this discussion see Saul (1985, pp. 16-19 and 59-61) 
and Harley (1977).
2. Jensen (1937, pp. 221-22).
3. Jensen (1937, pp. 209-10). Jensen (1937, pp. 221-22) also argues that the
growth of United States wheat output is not particularly steep in that period,
having already started in the 1850s, continuing after the turn of the century.
However world wheat exports doubled between 1884/88 and 1909/13. The countries 
responsible for that increase were Russia, the Danube countries, Canada, 
Argentina, Australia and India. See Stern (1960, pp. 6, 15, 31).
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this period with the evidence on trends of (labour) productivity 
in agriculture such as that given in the previous chapter. 
Agriculture lost gradually its weight in national output of most 
Western European countries, but productivity levels did not 
decrease. Thus, there is not sufficient evidence on an European 
agricultural depression that could justify the one that Pereira 
(1983) argues that happened with Portuguese agriculture.1
It is worth noting that agricultural exports from countries 
such as Denmark, in which the transformations of output structure 
just described took part, fared better in the international 
markets. These shifts may be associated with a changing structure 
of domestic demand, if the income elasticities of demand for meat 
and butter were higher than for wheat. Thus, it seems plausible 
to assume that the favourable shifts in export structure were 
related to changes in the domestic economy. The analysis of the 
causal relation between these two movements should take into 
account the timing of changes in the rhythm of export and output 
growth. Apparently the domestic output structure was changing 
already before 1873.
1. See above the discussion on chapter 2.
Ill
3.3 - Adaptation in export trade: lessons from Scandinavia
Adaptation to new conditions in the international markets 
formed the basis for continued export growth by the Scandinavian 
countries. This section attempts to explain this process of 
adaptation. Some general conclusions regarding the importance of 
domestic factors will be drawn, laying the basis for the study of 
Portuguese exports. Our main purpose with such a comparison is to 
see to what extent the success in external markets is related to 
factors such as natural resource endowments or, in other words, 
how export specialization was formed. The Scandinavian countries 
exported goods with favourable international demand, whereas 
Portugal's main exports had a sluggish demand. But, Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden and Finland, managed to shift export 
specialisation away from sectors suffering from sluggish 
international demand (or strong competition from overseas) to 
products with expanding markets. And these shifts were achieved 
to a large extent within what may be defined as similar branches 
of production, by increasing either the quality of the products 
or by augmenting their industrial value added. To understand how 
these shifts were made possible in Scandinavia is half-way to the 
understanding of whey they were absent from Portugal.
Let us start by reviewing the case of Denmark. After the 
arrival of cheaper American wheat at the European ports in 1870s, 
Danish farmers increasingly shifted from grain to animal exports,
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namely pork, fed with imported grains. It is most important to 
note, though, that this shift did not take place overnight: by 
1873 the value of animal and dairy products exports already 
surpassed the value of grain exports by a margin of 50%.1 These 
trends are of course in agreement with the finding already noted 
in the previous section that relative prices did not change as 
much as absolute prices after 1873. Pork was exported mainly to 
Germany and when the German government protected its home market 
for pork, first in 1881 and then altogether prohibiting imports 
of live hogs in 1887, Denmark shifted to butter exports, in the 
process climbing up in the chain of agricultural production.2 
Danish exports shifted not only in composition but also in 
distribution. By 1905/09 three quarters of Danish exports were 
directed to the only large free-trade country in Europe, Great 
Britain - a jump from 46% in 1875/79.3 Although export growth 
contracted after the peak of 1880 Denmark still managed to 
maintain high growth rates during the period 1880-94, and higher 
still during 1894-1913.
A similar shift from cereal to butter exports also occurred 
in Finland, although to a much lesser extent than in Denmark,
1. See Jensen (1937, pp. 59-60), Kindleberger (1951, p. 44). Bairoch (1976a, 
p. 264) associates the success in export markets with the earlier reconversion 
of Danish agriculture.
2. See Jorberg (1976, pp. 397-98).
3. See Mitchell (1981, pp. 509, 514, 535) and Bairoch (1976a, p. 264).
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probably because soil conditions were not as favourable.1 With 
under exploited forest resources and an agricultural population 
larger than elsewhere in Scandinavia, Finland found a vital 
source of export growth in timber products.2 The transformation 
in the structure of Finnish exports was not so dramatic as in 
Sweden, as shown below, because capital was not abundant. Also 
because Finland, as part of the Russian empire, with which she 
had no trade barriers from 1859 to 1885, exported to a country 
with a less than dynamic economy. These disadvantages slowly 
diminished, however. By 1913 the place of Russia in Finnish trade 
had shrunk to 30% of total exports, compared to roughly 50% in 
1860, while Britain and other countries increased in importance. 
The kind of exports directed towards Russia and the other 
destinations in Western Europe became quite different. To Russia
went paper pulp. Whereas to Britain and Denmark, Finland exported
, 1 . . .  • timber. Lower quality Finnish butter lost its Danish market by
the 1880s, but then switched to the Russian market. To Russia the
Finns also sold textiles and iron. Finland took advantage of
belonging to the Russian Empire and continued to enjoy a special
treatment in the Russian market relative to other countries, even
1. See Jorberg (1976, p. 470). Jensen (1937, p. 24) notes that Danish 
territories constitute the largest area of good agricultural ground in the 
three Scandinavian countries, to which we may certainly add Finland.
2. According to Jorberg (1976, p. 401), there was an excess labour supply in 
agriculture, or "over-population", in Finland.
3. The shift from timber products to the next step in the production chain of 
forest products, paper pulp, only took place after the 1930s. See Hjerppe 
(1989, p. 161).
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though in 1885 a regime of fixed quotas was imposed. Although 
Finnish exports remained on a level of technical sophistication 
below that of Denmark and Sweden, the Finish story is one of 
success despite the lack of capital and ready access to the 
European markets at the start of its long upswing.1
Norway too is a success story. Initial conditions again 
differed from other parts in Scandinavia, and again alternative 
solutions were explored. Although Norway traditionally exported 
timber and iron products, her exports became increasingly 
concentrated on shipping services. In spite of that, Norway took 
advantage of her still large forest resources, which had been 
long exploited, at least from the sixteenth century, meaning that 
forest depletion was under way and that the available timber was 
not as valuable because that of larger dimension, for masts and 
beans, had already been extracted. Although legislation for 
forest conservation was only applicable to state owned forests, 
the building first of canals and then of railways reaching the 
more remote forests, the increasing use of sawing machinery, 
conferring new uses for building material, as well as the 
expanding pulp and paper industry, which could also employ timber 
of smaller dimension, permitted a convenient exploitation of
1. See Jorberg (1976, pp. 420, 471) and Pihkala (1964). In hie provoking 
analysis of the Finnish case as a "subordinate nation" of the Russian Empire, 
Spechler (1989, pp. 8-10) does not attempt to explain why and how Finland 
managed to "switch" metropolis (from Russia to Sweden).
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forest resources, and a correlated growth of exports.1 
Furthermore, Norwegian timber products exports were facilitated, 
as compared to those of the Baltic area, due to the proximity to 
the most important British market.
The country’s other large source of export revenue was 
fisheries, although its importance decreased from a peak of 45% 
of commodity exports in 1860 to 30% in 1913.2 Norwegian (non­
forest) agriculture is generally seen as rather backward, thus 
unable to "act as a source of export incomes that could be used 
to finance investment in other sectors".3 But Norwegian 
comparative advantages emerged in second-best technologies; for 
example in shipping services using sailing vessels or second-hand 
steam vessels bought from Britain. This made Norway less 
vulnerable to its special relationship with Sweden, and to the 
ending of the Customs Union with that economy which had lasted 
from 1873 to 1897, as part of the dual monarchy. These shifts are 
contemporaneous of the increase in the growth rate of exports 
over the 1896-1913 period.4 Of these two activities related to 
the Ocean, Portugal only developed that of canned fish, and to an 
extent that compares well with Norway. In 1865 each country 
exported less than 20 tons of canned fish; by 1913 Norwegian
1. See Hodne (1975, pp. 42-43, 57).
2. Jorberg (1976, pp. 402-3).
3. Hodne (1975, p. 139); see also Jorberg (1976, pp. 402, 426).
4. On these issues see Hodne (1975, pp. 103, 113) and Jorberg (1976, pp. 431).
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exports had attained 18,000 tons, and Portuguese exports 20,000 
tons.1 The Portuguese canned fish industry was promoted by French 
direct investment which was faced with decreasing stocks of 
sardines in the French coast. The reason why a shipping industry 
did not develop in Portugal as it did in Norway may be related to 
insufficient incentive for foreign capital to invest in the 
sector, together with the general lack of domestic resources for 
investment.
In the case of Sweden, we may start by noting that the 
Swedish industrial share in GNP was stable throughout the decades 
1860-1890 at about 15%, and increased rapidly thereafter, as 
opposed to what happened in Denmark, where the share of industry 
in GNP increased until 1890, remaining stable thereafter.2 
Moreover, in what the availability of natural resources is 
concerned, Sweden was clearly closer to Norway than to Denmark:
Land in use, 1901
Arable Permanent 
grass
Denmark 69% 6%
Norway 2% 1%
Sweden 9% 3%
Source: Pollard (1982, p. 234)
However, the shifts in the composition of exports mirror those 
described for Denmark. From the mid-1880s onwards Swedish staple
1. See Hodne (1975, p. 76) and chapter 4.
2. See for Sweden, Jorberg (1976, p. 441), and for Denmark, Kristensen (1989, 
pp. 19-20).
Forest Other and 
unused
8% 17%
22% 75%
52% 36%
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exports of oats and forest products were replaced by meat and 
dairy products, mainly butter, and pulp and paper. The success in 
adapting to changing conditions in external markets brought about 
by increased competition from American wheat, Russian oats and 
Finnish timber, replicated the pattern of the eighteenth century. 
During that century, Sweden was the leading exporter of iron ore 
and bar iron to Britain. When iron exports were faced with 
increased competition from British home metals, they shifted to 
higher quality ores and irons.1
From 1851 to 1870 Swedish exports increased at high rates, 
close to 7% per year. By Scandinavia standards, the 1870s were 
years of slack export growth. According to Jorberg (1961), this 
was due to insufficient "production resources to satisfy a 
powerful increasing international demand".2 This conclusion is 
drawn by comparing price fluctuations in Sweden and her main 
export market, Britain, as a means of grasping rigidities in 
Swedish supply. In the subsequent period this productive 
restriction was progressively overcome, and by 1913 Sweden had 
the more diversified export structure within the region. Cycles 
in export growth are not mirrored by the cycles in industrial 
expansion. In fact, the 1870s were years of "industrial
1. See Jorberg (1976, p. 446) and Fridlizius (1963, p. 19). For a detailed 
analysis at the firm level of how the transition from oats exports to other 
exports in the early 1880s was carried on without major difficulties, see 
Fridlizius (1957, pp. 278-81).
2. Jorberg (1961, pp. 340-41).
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breakthrough".1 It is interesting to point out how Sweden managed
to diversify her export basis. Soderlund (1951) gives a list of
reasons which may be interesting to confront to what happened in
Portugal. According to this author,
"It was necessary to win and keep the market in hard 
competition with the exporters of the other countries; to 
obtain detailed knowledge concerning the general conditions, 
with which many and perhaps most of the exporters had never 
before had any contact; to build up a trade organisation that 
guaranteed an assured raw material supply at competitive 
prices; to finance a new industry in a country poor in 
capital and whose capital market was organised in an utterly 
primitive manner. It was also necessary to introduce 
technical improvements and innovations, with whose help goods 
could be produced which also, regarding quality, could 
measure up to those of competitors, and to collect and foster 
a skilled labour force.”2
Following this line of argument, Fridlizius (1963), mentions
that the problem of financing export industries was at least
partially overcome by British importers, who provided short term
loans to Swedish producers of export goods.3 It is interesting to
point out, however, that the help of British capital was
important in feeding the business but not in overcoming the
difficulties in starting it. In other words, only well
established firms with a certain size were able to finance fully
their export trade through British capital. Fridlizius (1957)
calls our attention for the difficulties for a new firm to have
1. Jorberg (1969, p. 259).
2. Quoted in Fridlizius (1963, pp. 13-15).
3. Fridlizius (1963, p. 17). The role of British merchant houses on exports 
of two major Swedish staples, timber and corn, is studied in Soderlund (1951)
- quoted in Jorberg (1961 and 1969, pp. 267-68) and Sandberg (1978, p. 655) - 
and Fridlizius (1957).
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its first shipments to Britain financed by the importing house: 
only after the firm had given proofs that it was established in 
the market, and had assured a regular flow of exports, did the 
British merchant gradually venture to satisfied the required 
financing. The needs for capital were "considerable", to such an 
extent that Swedish corn exporting firms were gradually 
concentrating: at the end of the period of oats export boom 
(1850-1880), the 3 largest firms exported 31% of total oats 
exports. 1
After the early 1890s, things had changed in the Swedish 
economy. By then industry had already reached a "stage where its 
income-forming effect was so strong that fluctuations in other 
sectors of the economy, and even in respect of exports, were no 
longer so important."2 Despite that, exports of engineering 
products to the other Scandinavian countries, Germany, Britain, 
and later to Russia, increased considerably. The investment 
effort of the first phases was not different from that of the 
second phase, in spite of different industrial structures. 
Although the Swedish rate of investment increased significantly 
in the 1890s, peaking in 1901/05 at 12.5%, this last level was 
only slightly higher than the level in 1871/75 (11.3%).4 In
1. Fridlizius (1957, pp. 143, 224-31).
2. Jorberg (1961, p. 363).
3. See Kuuse (1977).
4. Johansson (1967, pp. 154-55).
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conclusion, during the period of slower industrial growth, there 
was already enough capital to finance the new export industries, 
part of it of foreign origin.1 The positive factors pointed out 
in the citation from Soderlund above were not working on their 
own.
The diversity of experiences with exports between 
Scandinavian countries shows that there was no single path to 
consistently high rates of growth, and a variety of obstacles and 
difficulties were surmounted. For example, when natural resources 
became relatively less abundant (as in Denmark and Norway) 
exports became less resource dependent. In Norway, where funds 
for investment were constrained by a backward agrarian economy, 
exports shifted to less capital intensive sectors and 
commodities. Similarly, in the two countries where natural 
resources were more abundant, Finland and Sweden, export 
specialisation differed on account of different availability of 
investment capital. It should be added that the process of 
adaptation was not peculiar to Scandinavia. In the particular 
case of world food exports, according to Stern (1960), "no single 
country has consistently maintained its relative and absolute 
position as a food exporter during the entire century."2
It may be useful to understand why Scandinavian countries 
managed to exploit the changing opportunities in international
1. See Karlstrom (1985, fig. 2.3).
2. Stern (1960, p. 55).
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markets, while Portugal lagged behind. Perhaps investment 
conditions, even in the relatively poorer Scandinavian countries, 
were better than in Portugal. Yet, in the second half of the 
nineteenth century lack of readily available domestic capital 
could be substituted by imports of foreign capital. In fact all 
the Scandinavian countries were large capital importers which was 
mostly directed towards financing investments in social overhead 
capital that benefited export trade that is, railways from the 
producing areas to ports of shipment, as well as ports. But 
Portugal also attracted foreign capital for its railways which 
helped in promoting exports.1 It seems clear that those capital 
imports were not sufficient to substitute domestic investment, 
either because investment conditions were not sufficiently 
attractive, or because the needs were too large to be met, or 
because the period was not long enough to allow for the needed 
transformations. In any case it is not clear that foreign and 
domestic capital have to be substitutes. In some instances they 
may be complementary, if nothing else because they react to the 
same market signals.
One important aspect that stems from this section is that 
the flexibility shown by the Scandinavian countries in adapting 
to changes in international demand was a process already rooted 
in the past, developing before 1870 or even 1850.2 Danish exports
1. See Alegria (1988, pp. 770).
2. See Milward and Saul (1973).
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of dairy products did not start overnight: by 1870 Danish exports 
of animal and dairy products already surpassed grain exports by a 
50% margin, as noted above. Norwegian exports of wood and 
derivates products was based on a traditional exploitation of 
forest resources, which were historically protected from 
depletion, at least in the State owned forests. Swedish export 
growth was backed by an economy where the rate of investment was 
significantly high since the earlier decades of the period here 
studied. Related to this, we have to note that one of the few 
success stories of Portuguese exports in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, port wine, had a gestation period of more 
than one century, rooted in the late seventeenth century.
As Berend and R&nky (1982) also point out, natural resources
and other geographic factors, do not suffice to explain the
flexibility to adapt to the "stimulus" from the centre countries.
In their own words:
Above and beyond this (...) we find the other domestic 
factors determining the possibility, degree, and kind of the 
response to the external stimuli: the level of development or 
degree of backwardness of the economy; the country's social 
structure, educational system, ideology and value system; its 
international political status; and the government policy 
directing the independent state."1
The authors proceed their conclusions by choosing one of these
factors as the most important:
"There can be no doubt that it is in government policy that 
we must seek the clue to a country's ability to react to the
1. Berend and R&nky (1982, p. 139).
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challenge of the industrialized West."1
Such a conclusion, however, may only displace the argument. 
If government policy marked in fact the difference between the 
Scandinavian countries and Portugal, for instance, we cannot 
exclude a priori the hypothesis that that was so because overall 
economic conditions were more favourable to host the apparently 
more sound economic policies. Taking into account that 
possibility, the conclusions from the analysis of commercial 
negotiations, for instance, may appear in quite a different 
light: after all the success of such negotiations could depend on 
the capacity of the country to provide goods to export. In the 
end, it may be the case that the most important element in 
explaining the lack of "response" is in fact the "level of 
development or degree of backwardness" of the country.
3.4 - Export structure and the market: cork and wines
Portuguese exports were sold in very large proportion to one 
market, the United Kingdom, and were concentrated upon one 
product, wine. The historiography on the Portuguese economy of 
the period associates sluggish national income growth with export
1. Berend and R&nky (1982, p. 141).
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specialization. But the experience of the Scandinavian countries 
throws some doubt on this line of interpretation. For example, 
the increasing importance of the British markets as an outlet for 
Danish exports is not associated with stagnation either for 
exports or in the rest of the economy. And the concentration of 
exports was even higher in Denmark and Sweden, where by the 1900s 
the share of the three major export items amounted, respectively, 
to 73% and 62% of total exports, whereas in Portugal the 
equivalent share was 50%.1
1. Lain« (1986, p. 393). Throughout his book Sideri (1970) provides 
information regarding the structure of Portuguese foreign trade. His analysis 
has some affinities with that of Pereira's (1983) and its purpose is to 
"demonstrate that Portugal's specialization in wine (sic) did not enhance her 
development and resulted in the corner stone of that country's dependence on 
England." (Sideri, 1970, p. 12).
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Table 3.4
Composition of Exports (X)
1840/49 1850/59 1860/69 1870/79 1880/89 1890/99 1900/09 1905/14
Wax 1.3 1.9 3.9 3.1 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.4
Hides and skins 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9
Wool 1.4 1.6 2.1 1.4 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.4
Cork 2.1 2.5 3.6 4.4 8.9 9.3 8.8 9.4
Wood - - 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.4 3.6 2.6
Minerals - - 7.1 7.8 5.4 5.3 3.9 3.4
Raw materials 5.1 6.2 17.7 18.1 17.0 16.9 18.1 17.1
Cattle 0.4 1.3 4.1 7.1 5.2 1.7 1.8 1.6
Other live animals 0.0 0.0 1.4 1.6 2.2 5.6(*) 11.2(*> 9.00
Fresh and salted fish 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.9
Fruits and vegetables 8.3 7.9 8.8 9.3 6.7 7.8 8.0 7.2
Grains 1.0 1.2 1.0 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1
Salt 2.3 2.7 1.8 1.5 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.3
Foodstuffs 12.7 13.8 17.9 21.1 16.3 17.2 22.9 20.1
Canned fish - - - 0.1 2.1 4.3 5.5 6.4
Flour 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.0
Olive oil 2.8 5.1 4.3 2.5 0.7 1.2 1.8 1.8
Port wine 37.7 37.7 37.1 35.3 26.6 24.4 17.7 17.8
Madeira wine 7.1 3.7 1.3 2.1 2.6 2.8 2.3 1.9
Common wine 6.6 10.5 6.5 7.9 22.8 16.4 13.5 14.7
Processed foodstuffs 54.2 57.8 49.5 48.0 55.0 50.1 41.6 43.6
Cottons 11.2(#) 5.0(#) 2.2 1.4 0.4 4.0 4.8 4.2
Other textiles 2.0 1.1 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.1
Footwear 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.9 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.3
Cork manufactures 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.8 2.2 2.8 3.0 3.0
Iron manufactures 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4
Manufactures 14.2 7.1 4.1 4.1 4.0 8.0 8.8 8.0
Other 13.8 15.1 10.8 8.7 7.7 7.8 8.6 11.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(*) Includes live animals transit to Spain from 1890/99.
(#) Includes smuggling of British cottons to Spain in 1840/49 and 1850/59.
Until 1865 there is data for the years: 1842, 1843, 1848, 1851, 1855, 1856, and 1861 
Sources: Computed from appendix C.
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Table 3.5
Distribution of Exports (X)
1840/49 1850/59 1860/69 1870/79 1880/89 1890/99 1900/09 1905/14
United Kingdom 48.4 49.2 58.2 55.9 35.7 29.8 25.6 23.1
Spain 17.1 9.1 8.4 7.3 5.8 9.7 16.1 16.1
France 1.0 1.5 3.1 3.6 20.4 3.7 2.7 3.1
Italy (*) 1.2 0.8 1.3 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.3 1.6
Germany (*) 2.5 3.1 1.2 2.4 5.5 8.3 7.6 8.6
Belgiui 0.4 0.7 0.7 1.0 1.4 2.6 2.9 3.1
The Netherlands 2.0 0.9 1.2 1.2 0.8 1.6 1.5 1.7
Sweden and Norway 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.2
Russia 3.3 1.3 1.6 1.5 1.6 2.4 2.7 2.6
U.S.A. 2.3 3.7 0.9 1.5 2.7 2.5 2.1 2.5
Brazil 19.1 24.7 18.6 19.5 19.7 24.3 17.6 18.2
African colonies 1.0 2.4 3.1 3.7 2.9 10.8 15.3 15.1
Other 0.7 1.5 0.7 0.7 1.6 2.1 2.5 3.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(*) Borders as in 1871.
Source: Computed from appendix C.
In any case, the 1880s witnessed some degree of product and 
market diversification of Portugal's exports. Market 
diversification was achieved by increasing sales to Germany and 
the United States. This is a normal trend, as these two powers 
were getting an increasing importance in world trade. Portugal 
also exported a larger proportion of its exports outside Europe, 
namely Brazil and the African colonies, than any other country in 
Western Europe, except the United Kingdom. The relative 
importance of South America for Portugal is comparable only to 
Spain. The relative importance of Africa is the largest within 
Europe, followed at some distance by France.
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Table 3.6
European Exports by Main Areas, 1913 
(% of total exports)
Destination
Origin Europe N.America S.America Asia Africa Oceania------- -- --------- -------- --------- --- ---- — ------ ----- —
PORTUGAL 59.8 3.0 •GOH 2.2 16.3 0.0
Denmark 97.6 1.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
Finland 98.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 2.0 0.0
Norway 80.8 8.5 4.3 1.9 1.4 3.0
Sweden 86.9 5.2 1.3 2.6 2.7 1.0
France 69.8 7.4 6.9 3.5 12.3 0.1
Italy 65.8 13.3 11.6 4.4 4.3 0.4
Spain 70.6 6.5 18.2 1.4 3.2 0.1
U.K. 35.2 11.6 12.6 24.5 7.4 8.6
Source: Bairoch (1974, p. 573).
The importance of Brazil as an outlet for Portugal's exports 
shows little change since the 1840s, while the significance of 
the African colonies, jumped in the 1890s, as a direct 
consequence of the new colonial tariff schedule of 1892, which 
guaranteed the markets on the west coast, namely, S. Tomé e 
Príncipe, Cabo Verde and Angola, to Portuguese cottons and wines. 
The export of cotton goods to the colonies went up by a factor of
5.3 between 1891 and 1910, reaching 51% of total exports to the 
area. African markets accounted for almost all of the increase in 
the weight of cotton goods within total exports after 1890/99. 
Yet it must be noted that cotton goods exports were but a small 
portion of total exports (peaking at just 5% in the early 1900s). 
Thus too great importance has been attributed to these exports. 
Pereira's (1983) statement that they "saved the country from the
128
near total collapse between 1889 and 1900." is exaggerated 
because they accounted for such small percentage of national 
output (about 10%), and had a high import content that is, a low 
domestic value added.1 These exports of cotton goods were little 
else than cloth imported from Britain, dyed, packed, and shipped 
to the presumably very poor native African population.2 Sales to 
the colonies were very sensitive to the revenues it could earn 
through their exports. By the turn of the century, Angola, the 
main market in Africa, cut its imports because of the fall of its 
own exports of wild rubber, due to a decrease in the 
international prices and the exhaustion of the available rubber 
reserves.3 All in all, the cotton export boom lasted only from 
1892 till 1900.
Another facet of the changing structure of exports is some 
diversification towards northern European countries, such as 
Germany and Belgium, and a slight increase of the importance of
1. Pereira (1983, pp. 320-21). Although Cabral (1979, pp. 148-49) links an 
expansion of the cotton goods industry to the colonial markets, he notes that 
exports to Africa accounted but for around 10-15% of cottons' total domestic 
output.
2. Vieira (1905, p. 465), a firm believer of Portugal's good agricultural 
potential, after recalling that most of inputs for the cotton industry had to 
be imported, including cloth, writes: "havemos de concordar que só por um 
esforfo de boa vontade podemos dar a està pequena opera£ào de estamparia foros 
de urna indùstria”. According to Castro (1978, p. 77), 95% of total consumption 
of cotton piece goods was bought from Britain.
3. See Clarence-Smith (1985, pp. 91-92). It is interesting to point out that 
the wild rubber extraction and export was an activity which was in the hands 
of native Africans, and did not depend on Metropolitan investments. See 
Heywood (1987, pp. 356-58). For an outlook of wine exports to Africa see 
Capela (1973) and Clarence-Smith (1985, pp. 92-94).
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the Scandinavian countries and the United States. This market 
diversification was associated with a product diversification 
towards raw and manufactured cork, and canned fish. The growth of 
these two export industries was largely dependent on foreign 
investment, namely from Britain and Spain (Catalonia) in the case 
of cork stoppers, and France in the case of canned fish.1 But it 
is important to note that the change in the structure of 
Portuguese exports (in contrast to Scandinavia), was associated 
with a decline in the trend rate of growth. In fact, the earlier 
period, dominated by wine exports to Britain and later to France, 
witnessed far greater rates of export growth. Diversification was 
nowhere near enough to compensate for the near stagnation of wine 
exports after 1886. We have shown ‘in the previous section that 
Scandinavian exports were to a large extent based on the natural 
resources of those countries. Let us now try to ascertain if 
exports from Portugal were somehow hindered by lack of resources 
which could provide for a basis to produce goods that could be 
sold abroad. For that purpose we shall be looking at a particular 
branch of Portuguese exports, cork stoppers.2
Manufactured cork exports increased considerably over the 
entire period and by 1910/13 corks for bottles accounted for 23% 
of the total value of cork exports. Apparently, there were no
1. See Cabral (1979, pp. 344-45).
2. Portuguese cork exports are studied by Pereira (1983, pp. 234-37) and 
Miranda (1991, cap. V).
130
supply constraints upon any increase in the exports of 
manufactured cork. Furthermore, the large difference in the 
export prices of raw cork compared to manufactured cork depict 
the existence of a considerable potential for adding value to the 
raw material. For example, if 75% of Portuguese cork had been 
exported in the form of manufactures, instead of roughly 25% (at 
the same price), the value of cork exports, raw and 
manufactured, could have more than doubled, and the value of 
total exports from Portugal would have risen by 14%, over the 
years 1905/09. It should be noted that Spain exported as much as 
95% of its cork in manufactures. One possible explanation for the 
relatively low share of Portugal's cork manufactures exports is 
that they were sold at less competitive prices than Spain's. But 
this does not seem to be the case, at least in the British 
market. As a matter of fact, the price of Portuguese cork 
stoppers imported into Britain was even slightly lower than the 
average price of imports.1
1. This is inferred from the fact that the value market share was slightly 
lower than the volume market share of Portuguese corks in Britain, 45% vs. 48% 
(average for 1902/06 and 1909). See Cabreira (1914, pp. 7-9). It may be noted 
that cork manufactures from Portugal were considered of high quality, due to 
the specially favourable natural conditions for cork trees. See Costa (1908, 
pp. 231-32).
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Table 3.7
Cork Exports: Portugal and Spain
Portugal Spain
------ -------- ------- ------- -------- -----------
Total Manufactured Total Manufac.
Value Volume Value Volume Value Value
(contos) (tons) <%> (%) (contos) <%)
1855/64 432 (6.1) (4.0) 1119 89.1
1865/69 617 11255 6.7 3.4 1540 94.5
1870/74 1144 15779 11.7 5.4 2191 93.8
1875/79 1476 14301 19.2 8.7 1993 89.4
1880/84 2683 21514 17.1 6.7 2399 90.3
1885/89 3608 23884 22.3 7.1 3315 93.7
1890/94 4723 25102 24.1 9.1 4376 94.3
1895/99 6409 31059 22.6 9.4 6332 86.9
1900/04 6046 33427 25.7 10.6 6964 94.4
1905/09 5592 39493 25.7 10.1 7034 94.8
1910/13 7773 48978 22.8 8.2 9311 93.6
Notes: Portuguese exports by value corrected according to 
appendix B; Spanish exports were converted at market 
exchange rates.
Sources: appendix C; and Carreras (1989, pp. 113-14); see 
also table in Zapata (1986, p. 253).
Britain was the only market where Portugal had a large 
share, close to one half by 1900. Interestingly enough, it was 
also the only market which did not impose tariffs on the product, 
following its general free-trade regime. In Germany and the 
United States, things were rather different for Portuguese corks. 
In 1908/10 Spain provided 86% of the total value of US imports of 
the product, whereas Portuguese cork stoppers accounted for just 
4% of that market. Portuguese exports also accounted for only 15% 
of the volume of cork manufactures imported into Germany. 
According to Cabreira (1914), Portugal had potential markets not
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only here, as well as in France, Scandinavia, and even Argentina, 
Australia and Japan, but the difficulties in expanding markets 
were immense because most countries were protecting their native 
industries. However, the market was there: Spain exported to the 
protectionist United States as many cork stoppers (by volume) as 
Portugal exported to free-trade Britain.1
To overcome difficult international conditions, it was 
several times proposed in Portugal that raw cork exports be 
prohibited. Cabreira (1914), who did not believe in the 
effectiveness of such a measure, hypothesised that this would at 
least have attracted foreign investors. But, unless there was a 
true monopoly from the producing countries around the 
Mediterranean basin, the measure would have been ineffective: 
alternative sources could still be sought. France and Spain were 
not interested in forbidding their exports of the raw material, 
though, because their industries were competitive enough. In his 
small pamphlet, Cabreira (1914) summarizes a series of 
alternative measures that he thinks could have led to a change in 
Portuguese international competitiveness: export incentives and 
tariff reductions for machinery; organization of commercial 
credit to the industry; constitution of a commission of producers 
to "study and conquer the foreign markets", with the help of the 
consular services and private delegates; cooperation between 
producers for working in a "modern fashion"; negotiation of
1. See Cabreira (1914, p. 9).
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commercial treaties; as well as prizes for exporters of cork 
stoppers.1 Such a list shows how wide and general the problem 
was: organization, modernization and easy credit seem to be the 
key words, together with commercial treaties. To these we now 
turn.2
After 1892, when most commercial treaties within Europe were 
to end, and a new net of agreements would have to be negotiated, 
increasingly on a bilateral basis, Portugal clearly lost its 
grip. Three decades before, that is after the 1860 Anglo-French 
treaty, Portugal had managed to keep with the system. From 
February 1892 Germany increased its general tariff on cork 
manufactures from 10 to 30 marks per 100 kilograms. As opposed 
Contrarily to Portugal, Spain managed to prorogue her previous 
treaty with Germany by a modus vivendi, keeping the old tariff. 
By July 1896 Spain and Germany signed a new treaty, after four 
years of difficult negotiations. Portugal was left out. Quoting 
from a Frankfurt newspaper, Portugal's special envoy to the 
Berlin court, Viscount of Pindella, called the attention of 
Hintze Ribeiro, the minister of foreign affairs, to the 
possibility of Portugal taking advantage of the tariff war that 
went on between Spain and Germany in 1892-1896. By signing a
1. Cabreira (1914, pp. 15-16).
2. In respect to organisation problems of producers, it is interesting to 
point out that the Scandinavian paper pulp producers and exporters only 
reached some kind of cooperation as late as 1891, by founding of the 
Scandinavian Paper Pulp Association, after and not before the export business 
was well on its feet (Hodne, 1975, p. 58).
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treaty with Portugal, "Germany (...) could stop the consequences 
of the tariff war with Spain, and at the sane time make pressure 
on Spanish policy". According to the same source, the treaty was 
not signed because the Portuguese government was unwilling to 
give concessions on the new 1892 tariff schedule, and imposed too 
many difficulties.1 However, after Germany had signed the treaty 
with Spain, her interest in Portugal clearly diminished. The 
Portuguese government made an attempt to revive the negotiations 
from December 1900 till March 1901, but now the answer from the 
German government was that it was necessary to wait for the full 
revision of the Caprivi treaty system which was to end in January
1903.2
In 1905, the same Viscount of Pindella was still alerting 
Portugal's minister of foreign affairs to the dangers of the 
"commercial isolation" from Germany. Following three years of 
negotiations, Germany was going to sign new treaties with 
Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Italy, Rumania, Russia, Serbia, 
Switzerland, and confirm old commercial agreements with France, 
Bulgaria, Turkey, Greece, Holland and Spain. Only in 1908 did 
Portugal finally signed a treaty with Germany, which meant that 
for sixteen years Portuguese products did not have the most 
favoured nation treatment, and had to pay duties in Germany
1. Neg6cios Externoa (1909, I, 41-42).
2. Neg6cios Externoe (1909, I, Appendix II).
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according to the higher general tariff.1
Why did it take so long to reach an agreement? It is hard to 
formulate a clear answer to this question from the diplomatic 
correspondence. That correspondence shows, however, that at 
several points in time the interest on the agreement was larger 
in Germany than in Portugal. Moreover, the only product with 
which the Portuguese government seemed really concerned was wine, 
more precisely the more heavy Port and Madeira wines. In 1905 the 
then minister of foreign affairs, Ant6nio Eduardo Villaq:a, 
instructed the Portuguese envoy to Berlin to follow the treaty 
negotiations that were going on between Germany and the rest of 
Europe, but advised him that
"the limited number of products exported by Portugal, as 
well as their peculiar origin and specificity, or their price 
competitiveness, or even their quality and acceptability are, 
however, circumstances that render less indispensable the 
entremce of Portugal in that concert.”2
Portugal was unwilling to give too many concessions to sign a 
treaty with Germany. Were Portuguese officials bending to 
pressure groups from industrial interests, or were they really 
aware that the ability to increase exports was not large enough 
to justify taking risks?
The difference in the size of the manufactured cork 
industries of Portugal and Spain was enormous already by mid­
century, when Spanish output of cork stoppers was 38 times that
1. Neg6cios Externos (1909, II, 11) and (1909, II, 44).
2. Neg6cios Externos (1909, II, 4) (my italics).
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of Portugal. The beginning of the cork industry in Spain can be 
traced back to the end of the eighteenth century, when Catalonia 
started producing cork stoppers for the French market. By the 
1830s, Catalonian producers, faced with a scarcity of the raw 
material, descended to Andalucia and Extremadura for new sources 
of raw cork, and then to Portugal. From this early period 
Portugal was exporting raw cork to Spain, and was a relatively 
modest producer of manufactured cork.1 By 1910/13 Portugal 
exported the equivalent of 20% of Spanish cork manufactures, 
implying an increase in output of 67 times in the case of 
Portugal and slightly less than 9 times in Spain, between the 
1850s and the 1910s.2 Increasing further exports of cork 
manufactures to the Spanish relative level would have required 
large amounts of capital investment, and considerable gains in 
world market shares. This conclusion may help answer the question 
put at the end of the previous paragraph.
The lack of trade agreements with major importers as Germany 
or France, certainly hindered exports of cork stoppers. However, 
it also has to be taken into account that the possibility that 
the increase of domestic supply was constrained by the 
availability to invest in the sector. This constraint could be
1. For the Spanish cork industry see Zapata (1986, p. 254). See also Fonseca
(1992, p. 60) and Matos (1991, pp. 570-73). For a different view, according to
which the Portuguese cork industry was not an offspring of the Spanish
industry, see Miranda (1991, p. 79).
2. It is assumed that in both countries output was totally exported. See
references in the previous note.
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partially surpassed by foreign investment. That was precisely 
what happened: since the early days of the industry, British 
capitalists invested in the Portuguese cork industry, controlling 
the sector until the 1890s.1 It may be assumed that British 
producers in Portugal at least were not too concerned in lobbying 
for better treatment in the German and French markets, given that 
they could sell to free-trade Britain. This hints to the 
conclusion that tariffs were not negotiated because the capacity 
to increase exports to Germany and France was limited, and not 
the other way round.
We now turn to the analysis of wine exports, which dominated 
Portuguese exports to a degree experienced by no other wine 
producing country. The overall importance of the three types of 
wine that Portugal exported (port, madeira and common wines) 
decreased, though, from more than 50% of total exports in the 
1850s, to roughly 35% in 1910/13, with a peak in the 1880s (see 
table 3.4). This "blip" in the 1880s was due to the large 
increase of exports to France, whose vineyards had been severely 
affected by the phylloxera. The main market for port wine was 
Britain, which by 1850/54 imported 75% of the export volume. This 
proportion decreased to 58% by 1910/14. The second best market 
for this particular type of wine was Brazil, to where exports 
peaked at 40% of total volume in the years 1880/86. Brazilian 
imports accounted for most of the fluctuations in port wine
1. Fonseca (1992, p. 76). See also Miranda (1991, p. 80).
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exports; Britain was a more stable market. By 1910/14 the market 
had been somehow diversified towards Northern Europe, in 
particular to Scandinavia and Germany, which purchased 27% of 
total port wine exports (by volume).1 Exports of common wine were 
marked by the enormous increase in exports to France in the 
1880s. Until then the main markets were Britain and Brazil. After 
the boom of exports to France, total common wine exports did not 
fell back and eventually increased after 1900/04, while exports 
to France fell back to their earlier level. This was due to the 
favourable trend of exports to Brazil and to the Portuguese 
African colonies, the latter protected after 1892.2
To what extent did these shifts between markets imply an 
optimal exploitation of the conditions offered by the external 
markets, in particular European markets? Again a comparison with 
Spain shows that Portuguese exports lost momentum. And again 
there are grounds to presume that this was at least in part due 
to supply constraints. Furthermore, a comparison with the Italian 
experience as a wine exporter, shows that the conditions for 
Portugal were also adverse in terms of its bargaining position in 
the international markets. First of all, Portuguese wine exports 
did not respond fully to the increase in French demand, so that 
by 1888 the share by volume of Portugal's wine in the French
1. See Pereira (1983, pp. 217-32), Martina (1990, pp. 248-51), and Miranda 
(1991, cap. IV).
2. Martins (1990, pp. 252-53).
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market was 8%, down from 15% in 1876. After 1889 wine sales to 
France were reduced not only because of the recovery in the 
vineyards which had been affected by the phylloxera, but also 
because of the increase of Algerian wine production sent to 
France. The boom in foreign (not colonial) wine imports into 
France was short lived.1
Meanwhile, the share of Portuguese wines sold on the British 
market decreased successively from 37% of total volume imports, 
to 21% in 1891/96.2 The main reason for this declining trend was 
a shift in taste in Britain from the consumption of more 
alcoholic to less alcoholic wines. The structure of the British 
tariff schedule did not help either. In fact, wine was one of the 
few items (which amounted to just four after 1854) taxed by 
customs in Britain. These were mainly fiscal taxes and the wine 
tariff was considered as a particular case of a tax on alcohol. 
As such, Britain introduced in 1860 tariff differentials imposing 
higher tariffs on heavier wines, port and sherry, discriminating 
in favour of the lighter wines from France. In the abundant 
consular correspondence between Lisbon and London on this 
subject, the British Government defended this discrimination on 
the account that it was a tax on the alcoholic content of the 
wine. Diplomatically it was however important to improve 
relations with France, and the 1860 Cobden-Chevalier treaty led
1. Lains (1986, p. 401). For data on wine imports into France and from Algeria 
see Lachiver (1988, pp. 442-44, 447-48).
2. This share had peaked at 50% in 1811/20 (see Sideri, 1970, p. 336).
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to positive discrimination in favour of French wines, which 
happened to have lower alcoholic content, compared to those of 
Portugal (and Spain).1
Wine duties in Britain were successively reduced in 1876 and 
1886. Nevertheless Portuguese wines were still "too alcoholic" to 
benefit from these reductions.2 So the market for port wine in 
Britain became constrained. That was not the case for common 
wines, but Portuguese exporters did not take the same advantage 
of access to Britain as Spanish exporters. In 1876 96% of Spanish 
wines exported to Britain fell within the higher duty scale. 
Twenty-two years later this proportion had fallen to 25%. Spanish 
ordinary wine exports increased from practically nil (0.3 m 
gallons) to 3.3 m gallons. The comparable trend for Portugal was: 
96% of heavy wines in 1876 and 94% in 1898, and it is thus not 
surprising that Portuguese wine exports to Britain hardly 
increased in the period (from 0.2 to 0.3 m gallons).3
1. See Parliamentary Papers (1872), (1874) and (1876), and Neg6cios Externos
(1872) and (1882). On the analysis of this negotiations regarding Spain, see 
Saul (1960, pp. 135-41).
2. The minimum tariff rate in Britain applied to the wines with less then 26 
degrees in the Sykes scale, which is equivalent to 17.1 degrees in the scale 
used in Spain and Portugal: , whereas the official minimum alcoholic content 
of port wine was reduced to 16.5 degrees only in 1907, and still today it is 
hard to find a good Port with less then 18 degrees. See Simpson (1985, p. 173) 
and Martins (1990, p. 116). In the 1870s things were not much different: the 
alcoholic content for common wines was as high as between 14 and 16 degrees, 
whereas in the Vila Heal district (a major producer of port wine) it reached 
19 degrees (Figueiredo, 1873, pp. 269-70).
3. See Lains (1986, p. 403).
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U.K. Wine Imports UK according to Alcoholic Content (%)
Year Portugal Spain France
< 26 26-30 > 30 < 26 26-30 > 30 < 26 26-30 > 30
1876 1.6 2.7 95.7 3.2 1.6 95.7 96.3 2.9 0.8
1887 1.2 4.5 94.3 15.5 34.8 49.7 99.1 0.4 0.5
1898 0.8 5.2 94.0 16.9 58.3 24.8 99.4 0.4 0.2
Note: The intervals are defined according to the Sykes alcoholic scale. 
Sources: Parliamentary Papers (1878-79, pp. 636-37), (1888, pp. 612-13) and
(1899,pp. 754-55).
The large increase of Spanish exports of lighter wines was 
permitted by the signature of a treaty with Great Britain in 1886 
that reduced the scale in favour of Spanish wines.1 However, the 
fact is that Spain produced such wines and Portugal did not: in 
1886 Portugal already had back from Britain the most favoured 
nation treatment, and as such it was not barred from exporting 
the same kind of wines, if only they were produced at competitive 
prices. There was a potential demand for light wines in Great 
Britain and Continental Europe that Portugal did not manage to 
exploit by switching to exports of lighter wines. The solution 
to overcame this problem was evident to everybody, including to 
the British consular service. According to the commercial attaché 
at the legation in Lisbon:
1. See Nadal (1978, p. 60). This treaty, which lasted until 1892, increased 
the minimum alcoholic content to 30 degrees for the lower duty rate. From 1882 
Spain also benefited from special treatment in France (Carnero, 1986, p. 292).
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"To place a new class of wine on the market requires 
considerable enterprise, and might be undertaken by well- 
known firms who can supply their regular customers with 
samples for trial. If this were done, and the prejudice 
against unknown articles of consumption were overcome, there 
can be no doubt that these light wines would have a ready 
sale in England."1
We have concluded from the example of the Scandinavian countries
that these kind of solutions involved considerable investments
and a productive capacity able to feed trade flows regularly. Can
we try to ascertain if this loss of potential foreign markets was
due to an entrepreneurial failure among growers and exporters, or
constraints on productive capacity?
Even if the Portuguese response to increases in 
international demand was not fully satisfactory, there were two 
instances in which wine exports were rather responsive. Firstly, 
in spite of the wine disease that affected the Douro port wine 
production area in 1867/68, wine producers of the region, taking 
advantage of the freedom to export all kinds of wines from Oporto 
granted in 1865, managed to keep their exports up by mixing the 
genuine port wines with wines from the Southern regions of 
Portugal, not yet affected by the phylloxera.2 The mixture of 
wines led to a decline in quality. Nevertheless, despite the
1. Diplomatic and Consular Reports [...] (1902, p. 7).
2. Pereira (1983, p, 225). The phyloxera was first detected in the Douro 
region in 1867 and not in 1872, as Pereira (1983, p. 127) mentions. The latter 
date was when the disease was first recognized by the authorities. See Martins 
(1990, p. 345) and (1991, p. 655). Surprisingly enough, phyloxera reached 
Spanish vineyards only afterwards, in 1878-1879, first in the province of 
Malaga and then in Gerona (Nadal, 1978, p. 61); in Prance, phyloxera was first 
detected in 1863 (Lachiver, 1988, p. 412).
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complaints from British importers, exports were not affected 
either in terms of volume or in terms of price, which declined 
only after 1870, following a general fall in international 
prices.1 The maintenance of export levels has to be contrasted 
with the drastic decrease of port wine production. According to 
official estimates, in 1880 output had decreased by 240,000 
hectolitres, and a further decrease of 536,000 hectolitres was 
registered in 1888.2 Exports went through the phylloxera crisis 
without drastic decline: by 1880 the export peak of 1875/77 had 
already been reached, and they increased further till 1886. 
Brazil accounted for most of this increase, which may reflect the 
decrease in quality of port wines after the phylloxera.
But the increase in wine exports could not depend on port 
wine, given that its strong alcoholic content pleased neither 
the British consumer nor the custom officer. Furthermore in 1892 
the Méline tariff was implemented which also discriminated 
against heavier wines; and from 1906 Germany discriminated 
positively the Italian Marsala wine a strong competitor for port 
and Madeira wines.3 The alternative would have been to export 
more common wine. Again a comparison with Spain shows that the
1. See Martins (1990, 244).
2. See Pereira (1983, p. 130). Although it is not mentioned, it is probable 
that these losses are cumulative given that the levels of production before 
the phyloxera ■ more precisely in 1860/64 last period for which we have 
information - was just 228,000 hi. See Martins (1990, p. 229). In any case the 
figures in the text point to a drastic fall in output.
3. For France see Smith (1980, Appendix 2), and for Germany see NegÔcios 
Externos (1909, II, 44).
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market was there, but that Portuguese producers either did not or 
could not take full advantage of the growing demand. Portuguese 
common wines were known to be too strong, almost as strong as 
port wine. For the boom in the French market this happened to be 
an advantage because France imported wine to distil and mix with 
her own wines. Nevertheless, Spanish exports increased in 
absolute terms considerably more than exports from Portugal. 
Besides, the boom period in Spain lasted at least fifteen years 
from 1880, whereas in Portugal it lasted for just five years 
(1880/84).1
But we must distinguish between the productive capacities of 
the two countries to see to what extent their export effort can 
be compared. Although for the period 1880/84 the export effort of 
Portugal was relatively high, in that 4 0% of total output was 
exported, in the following period this proportion was reduced to 
levels below those of Spain.2 Thus, it appears that there was in 
Portugal a sufficiently large productive basis for augmenting 
wine exports. And international demand was there. If the 
proportion of exports to output in Portugal had been similar to 
that of Spain in say 1895/99, wine exports by volume would have 
increased by 65%, that is by 516,000 hi, which only represent
1. For Spain see Prados (1982, p. 44).
2. The export effort of port wine was of course much larger. According to the 
available figures gathered by Martins (1990, p. 229), the share of exports in 
port wine output was 79% in 1860/64 and 105% in 1909/13 (showing some stock 
depletion).
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circa 9% of total wine exported from Spain in the same years. If 
higher shares of the total domestic output of wine were not sold 
abroad, it was because of the intrinsic quality of the common 
wines. Thus to increase exports the structure of the domestic 
output would have to change. Once again, the example of the 
Scandinavian countries given in the previous section points out 
to the hypothesis that changes in production would have to have 
occurred before changes in exports.
Table 3.8
Wine Exports: Portugal, Spain and Italy (000 hi)
Portugal Spain Italy
Common Other(1) Total Common Other(2) Total Total
1855/64 294
1865/69 96 207 303 1048 319 1368 292
1870/74 144 266 410 1485 401 1886 335
1875/79 183 308 490 2200 275 2475 569
1880/84 411 341 752 6610 268 6878 2062
1885/89 1285 342 1627 7794 235 8029 2141
1890/94 508 316 825 7563 187 7750 1774
1895/99 474 310 784 5622 99 5722 2139
1900/04 510 284 794 2466 113 2575 1585
1905/09 615 267 882 1353 214 1567 1159
1910/13 822 315 1137 3081 158 3239 1235
(1) Port and Madeira wines; (2) Sherry; (3) 1861/1864
Sources: appendix C; Carreras (1989, pp. 113-14) and Coppa (1970,
pp. 755, 764).
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Table 3.9
Wine Output and Export Shares: Portugal, Spain and Italy
(000 hi)
Portugal Spain Italy(a)
— — — — — — — — —— — — — — —
Output Ex/Out Output Ex/Out Output Ex/Out
1855/64
1865/69 1678 0.18 23533 0.012
1870/74 2199 0.19
1875/79 2274 0.22 26934 0.024
1880/84 2528 0.30
1885/89 3707 0.40 26092 0.32 31273 0.063
1890/94 3400 0.24 24394 0.32
1895/99 4300 0.18 18808 0.30 31959 0.064
1900/04 5225 0.15 18772 0.14
1905/09 4692 0.19 16587 0.09 44123 0.044
1910/13 4008 0.28 14900 0.22
(a) Decennial averages starting in 1861.
Sources: appendixes A and C; Carreras (1989, pp. 107-8); and Coppa 
(1970, p. 765).
Apart from the incapacity to switch to less alcoholic wine 
exports, the relative failure of Portuguese wines in keeping at 
pace with the markets is certainly also due, at least in part, to 
the failure to maintain trade agreements with its major partners, 
specially after 1892. The commercial treaties between Portugal 
and France successively signed in 1866 and 1882, were not 
reconfirmed by France during the French tariff reforms of 1890- 
91. In 1892 France applied to Portuguese wines the general 
tariff, whereas Spain was exporting wines to France at the lower 
minimum tariff.1 According to Cordeiro (1896), the situation in
1. See Smith (1980, pp. 204-10) and Martins (1990, p. 116).
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1894 was the following: France imposed its higher general tariff 
on Italy, Switzerland and Portugal; Germany on Spain and 
Portugal; Italy on France and Portugal; Russia on Rumania and 
Portugal; and finally Switzerland imposed on Norway and 
Portugal.1
However, despite the importance of tariff policy, it is hard 
to think that had the capacity to export better quality wines, 
Portugal could not have managed to secure better trade 
agreements. People in power did not fail to recognize that, when 
it was necessary to justify what they were doing - or not doing. 
Francisco Veiga Beirao, the minister of foreign affairs, 
responding in parliament to the criticism on the successive 
failures of the negotiations for trade treaties, made by Jo§o 
Arroio (who would substitute him less than five months later), 
did not fail to argue that the lack of commercial treaties was 
not a cause of the decrease or stagnation of Portugal's exports.2
In this respect it is interesting to compare here Portugal 
with Italy, the third major wine exporter in Europe. In 1886, 
during the tariff reforms that led to the new generally more 
protectionist tariff schedule of 1887 (in effect in 1888), the 
Italian government renounced the trade treaty with France of 
1881. Relations between the two countries had not been good since
1. Cordeiro <1896, p. 233). For an analysis of the wine markets see Congresso 
Vinicola I...] (1902, pp. 120-59).
2. Di&rio da C&mara (...) (5-2-1900).
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1877, when the French Chamber rejected the new treaty that would 
substitute for the one of 1863. As a consequence France waged a 
"tariff war" on Italian wine imports, which shrunk from a peak
97.3 million francs in 1887 to 1.3 million in 1890.1 In the 
aggregate the economic effects of this war were not large because 
wine exports accounted at most for 6% of Italy's wine output (see 
table 3.8). Furthermore, Italy rapidly secured other markets for 
its wine and agricultural produce, by signing preferential trade 
agreements with its neighbours, Switzerland, Austria, as well as 
with Germany, in 1891-1892.2 Thus Austria fully substituted for 
the French market, and Germany became Italy's most important 
trade partner. These trade agreements, later confirmed m  the 
years 1901-03, meant that Italian duties on industrial products 
from its trading partners were substantially reduced.
The duration of the trade agreements was generally short (up 
to ten years) and could be unilaterally renounced at any moment. 
When Austrian vineyards recovered from phylloxera by 1902 (ten 
years after France), the Austrian Government rescinded the 
special treatment it had conceded to Italian wines. According to 
Coppa (1970), Giolitti's government (1896-1913) managed to change
1. Smith (1980, pp. 197, 201).
2. Besides silk goods, Italy was a successful exporter of agricultural goods 
such as hemp and olive oil, what was also due, according to Federico (1987, p. 
18) to the superior quality of the products.
3. See Coppa (1970, pp. 753, 763), Zamagni (1990, chap. 3), and Milward and 
Saul (1977, pp. 232-33). For an alternative view, according to which Italy 
would have lost from this one decade long tariff war with France, see Pollard 
(1982, p. 261).
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the special treatment accorded to wines, into preferences for 
other agricultural produce. This had positive consequences for 
Italian agricultural exports overall. After 1904 they returned to 
the previous growth trend.1 Regarding the case of Italy, it is 
also interesting to note that in Rossi and Toniolo's (1991) 
analysis of the changes brought by the Giolittian era, the 
opening up of the economy, through commercial agreements, is 
listed together with a series of other economic and institutional 
contemporary changes: the creation of the Bank of Italy (1893- 
1895), the reduction of the state debt, exchange rate stability, 
and the increase in the inflow of emigrant remittances.2
We have given evidence here showing that the failure to sign 
trade agreements for Portugal could be a consequence of lack of 
capacity to increase further exports.3 The example of Italy has 
shown too, that more important than securing trade agreements, it 
was necessary to keep in pace with the changing game of 
negotiations between countries: treaties lasted for short periods 
of time and it was necessary to redirect attentions and to be 
able to supply different kinds of exports to different markets. 
In this context, supply conditions appear of paramount
1. Coppa (1970, pp. 63-64, 764). See also Eddie (1989, p. 839). For a view of 
Italian agriculture in general as efficiently exploiting its comparative 
advantages see O’Brien and Toniolo (1986).
2. Rosssi and Toniolo (1991, pp. 8-10).
3. The idea that exports were not a vent-for-surpluB is implicitly recognized 
by Teles (1903, p. 239), who argues that exports, as well as urban 
consumption, raised prices of essential goods in the rural areas.
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importance.1
And distance also mattered. The table below depicts the 
pattern of the wine trade within Europe for the years around 
1898, and it shows clearly that wine was predominantly exported 
to neighbour countries, or to countries to which nationals had 
emigrated. That was the case of wine imports into France, for 
instance, that came mainly from Spain and the French colony of 
Algeria; Germany imported wines mainly from Italy (through 
Austria or Switzerland) and France.
Patterns of wine trade (1896-1898)
Imports from (% of total wine imports)
Destination Portugal Spain Italy Prance Aus.Hun. Algeria
Aust.Hung. (1898) 0.0 0.3 98.6 0.3 — _
Belgium (1898) 0.8 11.1 0.1 72.4 - 0.8
Prance (1898) 0.0 60.2 0.8 - - 37.2
Germany (1897) 4.6 11.4 15.4 49.2 11.7 ?
Switzerland(1896) — 31.5* 40.3 11.8 6.6 —
(*) A print error in the source was detected by comparing with the total. 
Note: Data from the statistics of the importing country.
Source: Congresso Vinicola [..•] (1902, pp. 135, 143, 151, 155, 157),
When exposing his skepticism regarding the 1866 commercial 
treaty signed between France and Portugal, the protectionist 
minded Martins (1954) argued that the treaty would be ineffective 
because it could only bring benefit to wine exports, what
1. After recognizing the growth of output over the six decades to 1913, in the 
aftermath of World War I, Gomes (1920, pp. 114-16) had a different perception 
of the Italian potential to increase the output of exportables. According to 
this author, and in disagreement to what we have argued in the text, that 
potential was as low in Italy as in Portugal.
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according to him, was not sufficient. In his characteristic style 
of mixing impressions with very precise figures, Martins argues 
that:
"A difference of 20 or 30 kilometres in railroad is 
sufficient to compensate for the differential duty [given by 
the treaty]: and, when the average distances in Spain and 
Portugal are compared, it is concluded that even with a 
higher duty we would have the preference."1
Despite the conclusions set above, it has to be pointed out 
that the domestic costs for signing trade agreements was high. 
First - and mainly for fiscal reasons - Portugal maintained 
throughout a protectionist regime, and internal political forces 
did not favour its dismemberment. Portuguese politicians were not 
in a position to trade tariff reductions with its partners. 
Politicians earned a revenue for government, and private 
investors kept their mark-ups. Moreover, British Foreign Office 
officials complained about Portugal being a difficult partner to 
deal with, because its negotiators were always changing due to 
the succession of unstable governments. However, if that was 
true, in view of the constraints here pointed out, we have to 
cast some doubt on whether this was due to incapacity to change 
towards a more consistent foreign policy, or just unwillingness
1. Martins (1954, p. 123). It is implicit in this sentence that exports of 
common wine were mainly seaborne, what may not be exact, if it is considered 
that Spanish exports of common wine to Portugal (though relatively 
unimportant) were carried by land, as it may be seen in the Spanish trade 
statistics for the years 1880 and 1890 (for the source see appendix B).
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to do so.1
Another line of argument that might explain the lack of 
commercial treaties after the mid-1880s is linked to the relative 
unimportance of the Portuguese market, a far distant poor 
compensation for preferential treatment from the larger importers 
in Europe or North America. This is evident from the British 
reaction to Portugal discriminating against her products as a 
retaliation of the preferential treatment that Britain had given 
to French wines after the Cobden-Chevalier treaty of 1860. 
Despite the complaints from British merchants who were paying 
higher import duties in Portugal from 1866, Britain kept wine 
duties according to the alcoholic content, providing a de facto 
preferential treatment for French lighter wines. There was not 
much Portugal could do about it, and in 1876, after 10 years of 
negotiations with Britain and after at least three years 
discussion in the parliament, Portugal finally gave the most 
favoured nation clause to Britain without compensations in 
return.2
1. Bonif&cio (1989b), in a most comprehensive recent work centred on the 
analysis of the negotiations of the 1842 Anglo-Portuguese treaty, shows 
clearly the difficulties of a small power’s diplomacy. However, her 
description of the negotiations shows that Portuguese diplomacy managed to 
take advantage of the new favourable international context, that it was 
consistent despite changes in government, and that it managed to obtain 
important political concessions from Britain, and to give in return less than 
Britain was asked. See in particular Bonif&cio (1989b, pp. 429-46).
/
2. See Parliamentary Papers (1876, pp. 759, 782, 792), and Lains (1986, pp. 
402-3). Spain also suffered from this discrimination and reacted in the same 
fashion. See Saul (1960, pp. 137-41).
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3.5 - Portugal and the Europe^ System
Most commercial treaties within Europe were signed between 
countries with more intensive trade links, meaning in most cases 
neighbouring countries. For example, the protectionist upsurge in 
the late 1870s was partially overturned by the concession of the 
most-favoured-nation clause in a succession of treaties fostered 
by the new German Chancellor Caprivi, lasting twelve years from 
January 1892 to December 1903, among the countries of the so- 
called Central European System that is, Belgium, Germany, 
Switzerland, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, to which later adhered 
also Russia, Rumania and Serbia.1 Two fundamental elements 
facilitated this network of treaties, both of which were 
potentially absent for Portugal: geographical proximity and, most 
importantly, different levels of economic development and 
correspondent trade specialization.2 Although Belgium, Germany, 
and Switzerland were mainly manufacturing exporters, they 
specialised in different types of manufactures, with different
1. Eddie (1977, p. 333) and Pollard (1982, p. 259).
2. For the importance of development levels in determining trade patterns see, 
among others, Learner (1974, p. 372). The literature concerned with the effects 
of distance on trade patterns is far from abundant. See as a good exception 
Beckerman (1956). The model in Learner (1974) also includes distance as an 
independent variable.
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levels of capital intensity. In exchange for their exports, these 
countries bought Mediterranean crops from Italy, and cereals from 
Russia and Rumania. The Habsburg Monarchy, having this kind of 
specialization within her borders, competed neither with the 
Northern industrialists nor with the Southern or Eastern 
agricultural producers. With this "system" the benefits of 
commercial treaties were evident, and would readily be signed 
once the hegeamonic ambitions of the involved powers, namely 
Prussia and Russia, were safeguarded.1
With half of her borders facing the cold Atlantic waters, 
Portugal had as her only contiguous potential trading partner 
Spain. The potential benefits agricultural exporters from Italy, 
Hungary or Russia could gain from their bordering countries, 
Portugal could expect to gain from trading with Spain. In this 
context the example of the Austrian-Hungarian customs union may 
be rather insightful, if we consider that the utmost success of 
Portugal's commercial policy would be a similar union with Spain, 
bringing Portugal into the French and German market by a Spanish 
hand. A political union of the two Iberian countries was in fact 
proposed by Spain when, following the monarchic Restauración of 
1869 Spain's prime minister Prim was looking for a King for his 
country. He proposed, to the great joy of the iberistas, a union 
under the Portuguese king, D. Luis, or his father, D. Fernando,
1. An example of the links between geo-strategic preoccupations and commercial 
links may be given by the history of the independence of the Balkan states in 
the late 1870s (see Jelavich, 1984).
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with a capital in Lisbon or in Santarem, one hundred kilometres 
from Lisbon. This project faced the opposition of many of those 
used to take with suspicion any move, in any direction, from 
Madrid. The historical weight of the several conflicts and wars 
between the two countries was certainly determinant.1 But in 
spite of the importance of the events of political history, we no 
doubt have to consider that the potential economic benefits of 
such an union were relatively reduced, as may be demonstrated 
through the experience of the Austria-Hungarian customs union.2
Having lost the Independence War in 1848/49, Hungary was 
incorporated in Austria, leading to the fall of all trade 
barriers by "constitutional imposition".3 By 1851, trade was
1. See Martins (1979, pp. 292-97) for a short review of the attempts to build 
an Iberian Union, to which an anonymous author in the book Iberia named the 
Iberian Zollverein. The fear that simple commercial negotiations with Spain 
would be used as an excuse of the oppositions and newspapers to accuse the 
government as wanting a political union within the peninsula is patent in the 
blue books of the ministSrio dos negdcios estrangeiros. See Neg6cios Externos 
(1885, II, 1). The fear of a customs union endangered the negotiations of 
commercial treaties at least in the late 1880s. The Portuguese ambassador to 
Madrid warned his minister of the consensus among free-traders and 
protectionist in the Spanish parliament regarding a customs union with 
Portugal, which could endanger the ongoing negotiations. See Neg6cios Externos 
(1893, II, 100)• See also Vazquez (1975) for a study of the political 
relations between Spain and Portugal by the end of the century.
2»The Habsburg Monarchy is here taken as an example because it is the 
experience of economic integration between two countries in nineteenth century 
Europe which is best documented in statistics*
3. Eddie (1977, pp. 330-31). The ultimate reason was certainly not a formal 
one, but the political will to do so (see Komlos, 1983, pp. 4-5). The 
elimination of tariffs within the two countries had already started in the 
last quarter of the eighteenth century. According to Komlos (1983, p. 4), by 
1775 a part of the Habsburg Monarchy constituted already the largest free- 
trade area in Europe.
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completely free, not only within the Monarchy but also in respect 
to third countries. When the treaty of compromise was signed in 
1867, the Habsburg Monarchy was as a free-trading country as most 
Western European countries. Tariffs were increased successively 
in 1878, 1882 and 1887, and in 1906. Commercial policy did not 
impose the actual trade patterns between the two countries, 
instead "protectionism [towards third countries] worked to 
preserve traditional patterns".1 Austria provided a secure market 
for Hungarian agricultural exports, whereas Hungary imported a 
considerable part of Austrian manufactured exports. From 1885 to 
1910 Austria bought 72-75% of Hungarian exports, and sold to 
Hungary a large though slightly declining share of her exports, 
83% in 1885 and 74% in 1910. Trade outside the Monarchy was 
rather differently shaped: whereas Hungarian imports from Austria 
were consistently composed of manufactures (86% throughout 1885- 
1910), her imports from other countries were mainly of 
agricultural products (declining from 70% in 1885 to 68% in 
1910). On the other side, Hungary exported mainly grains, 
animals, and animal products to Austria, whereas to third 
countries the share of manufactured goods (mainly flour) peaked
1. See Eddie (1977, pp. 332, 335). Por an analysis of trade patterns before 
and after the war see Kotnlos (1983, pp. 112, 116-18). This author provides a 
thorough analysis of cost and benefits of the Habsburg customs union. See also 
Spechler (1989, pp. 7-9).
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This brief description of trade within the Habsburg Monarchy 
is sufficient enough to show how exports from Austria and Hungary 
had specialised. The contrast with the trade patterns of the two 
Iberian countries is evident, and more is it so if we take into 
account, as already mentioned, the possibilities of further 
specialization near the borders. The complementarity between 
Austria and Hungary was evident at all levels: Bohemia, in lower 
Austria, was a traditional cotton producer which she could 
exchange for Hungarian wheat. In a happy parallelism to Germany's 
"marriage of iron and rye", Eddie (1977) has named the 
complementarity over the Austria-Hungarian border as the 
"marriage of textiles and wheat".2 More importantly, where 
complementarity between the two countries was weak, a major push 
could come from capital exports from Austria to Hungary. In fact, 
according to Komlos (1983), Austrian capital allowed Hungary to 
develop a "modern large-scale" flour milling industry, which was 
to become by 1913 one of the main sources of exports from Hungary 
to Austria.3
If the structures of Portuguese and Spanish economies as
at 48% by 1910.1
1. This pattern of trade specialization was certainly present within other 
large countries such as Germany and Italy, but only for the case of the 
Habsburg Monarchy were trade flows recorded (although systematically only 
after 1882). Information on trade shares is from Eddie (1977, pp. 333-36, 
349). For trade patterns in the 1840s, see Komlos (1983, pp. 116-18).
2. Eddie (1977, p. 351).
3. Komlos (1983, pp. 112, 141-42). For the role of capital in the relations 
between Germany and Italy see Hertner (1984).
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shown by actual trade patterns, are compared, the weak economic
drive for a customs union appears as evident. When in June 1887
the commercial treaty with Spain signed in 1883 came to an end,
Casal Ribeiro, the ambassador to the Spanish court, regretting
that the public opinion did not have a say on the grand themes of
Portugal's foreign policy, argued that there were no reactions in
Portugal because
"[...] considering just the economic interests, there were no 
reasons to regret the end of the conventional regime 
established by the 1883 treaty."1
He then proceeds by contesting the idea that the identity of the 
conditions of production between Spain and Portugal limited the 
possibility of mutual tariff concessions that could be 
advantageous for both, and he goes on his extensive report 
listing the products upon which reciprocal trade could be 
promoted: fisheries, minerals, olive oil, cork, wine, wool, and 
cattle.2
Despite the optimism of such writers, the fact is that 
nineteenth century international trade was seldom intra-industry 
trade and even less so was it trade within the same range of
1. Negócios Externos (1893, II, 109, p. 209). ("[...] considerando apenas os 
interesses económicos, n&o havia motivo de lamentar a desaparÍ9&0 do regime 
convencional estabelecido pelo pacto de 1883. E, quanto a outra ordem de 
considerag&es, que se prendem com as linhas gerais de uma boa política 
portuguesa, essas nSo sio entre nós frequente assumpto de cogita$&o de grande 
número [...]"]
For the trade patterns between Spain and Portugal see Pinheiro (1987).
2. Negócios Externos (1893, II, 109, pp. 213-25).
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agricultural goods. Both Iberian countries were exporters of the 
same range of agricultural goods. The few manufactures exported 
were of lower quality grades and thus presumably not competitive 
in neighbour markets. Other important imports, such as coal and 
wheat came in both cases from Britain and the United States, and 
none of them were exported at competitive prices from either 
Spain or Portugal. The lack of economic complementarity is even 
more evident when closer attention is given to the possible 
interactions in the border regions, which had similar ecological 
conditions, either in the North or the South-West part of 
Portugal, and thus similar agricultural specialization.1
As already referred to above, capital exports may be seen as 
some kind of substitute for lack of complementarity between two 
countries or regions. Most of nineteenth century capital exports 
were directed to social overhead capital, namely transport, that 
direct or indirectly help promoting exports. From 1869 to 1914, 
the net flow of capital in the US was dominated entirely by the 
movement of foreign funds into the American railroad. France 
financed the construction of Spanish railways, which carried 
Spanish wine and fruits to France. Also in the case of the 
Ottoman Empire foreign capital was invested mainly in railways
1. Neither the construction of railway lines promoted trade between the two 
countries. Spanish railways were designed mainly to reach Spanish ports, what 
implied that an "iron belt" was built in a line parallel to the border. 
Pinheiro (1987, p. 73), stressing political factors, concludes that such belt 
was the cause of the limited commerce between the two countries, and that it 
derived from the Spanish "refusal" to increase Iberian economic integration in 
the late century. This argument implies that railways could have created 
trade, what remains to be proved.
160
and ports, favouring export expansion.1 As such, if the economies 
of Portugal and Spain had few possibilities of complementarity, 
one may assume that these could be increased by capital flows 
between the two countries. But this possibility only helps 
stressing further the lack of complementarity between the two 
countries, because both were net importers of capital.
Foreign capital in Portugal came necessarily from major 
capital exporters, namely Britain and France. When it helped 
export expansion, it was directed to those exports that could 
concern these countries. This is also the pattern that we find in 
the Habsburg Monarchy, as elsewhere in what we could designate 
the third European periphery, namely the Balkans, the Ottoman 
Empire and of course Spain.
In conclusion, export growth in Portugal (and elsewhere) 
depended both on the capacity to invest in new products with 
better markets and on the capacity to secure markets by political 
negotiation. The success of the negotiations of commercial 
treaties, on the other hand, depended on the capacity to attract 
the interest of the potential partner. Portugal was not in a 
particularly good condition to attract the interest of the large 
industrial European countries that could buy the products that 
Portugal was offering from other nearby agricultural exporters. 
To compete in this unfavourable environment, Portugal would have 
to provide other type of goods, or to specialize in particular
1. See Williamson (1964, p. 124 and chap. 4) and Pamuk (1987, p. 72).
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markets. This was done in part, but it was evidently not enough 
to the extent that export growth by volume was reduced after the 
mid-1880s. Yet, such specialization would have required 
structural changes in the economy, as it had happened in 
Scandinavia. In that case the "failure" of the export sector is 
related to the "failure" in fostering structural changes in the 
domestic economy. And even if no clear conclusion can be drawn on 
the direction of causality between exports and economic growth, 
it is hoped that this chapter has shown that the causal link is 
not necessarily from the former to the latter.
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CHAPTER 4
IMPORTS, THE BALANCE OF TRADE AND GROWTH, 1842-1913
4.1 - Introduction
4.2 - Trends and fluctuations
4.3 - Changes in the composition of imports
4.4 - The balance of trade and economic growth, 1865-1913 
Econometric appendix
4.1 - Introduction
In the literature on Portuguese economic history, imports 
appear in many instances as a crucial variable. In fact, they 
have been used to identify cycles of industrial and agricultural 
growth, or to infer about trends in capital formation. This is 
basically correct. Economic growth in a small country such as 
Portugal, in the context of expanding international trade, is 
increasingly dependent on imports as source of supply for 
consumer goods and industrial inputs. Trends and fluctuations of
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imports are thus indicative of trends in national consumption, 
production and investment. On the other hand, changes in the 
product composition of imports reveal the structural changes in 
the economy at large. But this is only part of the story. Instead 
of studying import trends to draw conclusions on output, we shall 
look here for the major determinants of their growth and 
fluctuations, in terms of domestic demand for imported goods, as 
well as in terms of the capacity to pay for imports. Because the 
new data on output growth set in chapter 2 is used in 
interpreting import trends - and not the other way round - some 
of the doubts raised by the historiography on the relation 
between output growth and imports will be clarified.
This chapter deals with trends in the balance of merchandise 
trade too. The revision of trade statistics has led to an 
important revaluation of the trade balances, in particular for 
the period after the abandonment of the gold standard. As opposed 
to exports, imports were valued at market exchange rates. Thus, 
in the periods after 1891 when the Portuguese currency was 
depreciating, import values increased in correspondence, but 
official values for exports did not. Consequently, the official 
statistics incorrectly registered a deterioration of the balance 
of trade in those periods. The attention devoted to the 
"official" trade deficits by contemporaries and historians will 
appear as unfounded in many instances. The revised values for the 
balance of trade will give a diverse picture of the constraints 
imposed on Portuguese economic growth by the capacity to pay for
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the needed imports. Aggregate import figures were also revised to 
take into account smuggling and the incorrect record of transit 
of animals over the Spanish-Portuguese border as trade flows. The 
details are presented in appendix B.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 
presents trends and fluctuations of imports and analyzes its 
determinants, firstly in terms of domestic production and, 
secondly, in terms of the capacity to import provided by exports, 
and by other sources of foreign earnings; section 4.3 outlines 
the major changes in the composition of imports, and shows how it 
was affected by difficulties felt in the external balances; 
section 4.4 analysis how the balance of trade acted as a 
constraint on Portuguese economic growth, by way of estimates of 
demand functions for imports and exports; these estimates are 
presented in an econometric appendix at the end of the chapter.
4.2 - Trends and fluctuations
From the mid-1850s to World War I the trend growth rate of 
imports was close to 2.5% per year, in both volume and value 
terms. The value of imports increased most rapidly from 1843 to 
1867 and again from 1900 to 1913, at annual rates close to 3.5%. 
The three decades in between, from 1867 to 1900, registered
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slower yearly growth rates in the 1.5-2% range.1 Import trends in 
terms of volume were quite different. In fact, the growth of 
import volumes was slower until 1867, and from 1867 to 1890 it 
jumped to rates between 3.6% and 4% per annum. After the peak in 
1890, the growth of the volume of imports dropped considerably, 
recovering after the turn of the century. That extraordinary 
break on the curve of imports has been the source for some 
discussion, already mentioned in chapter 2, and it needs to be 
further explained. It should be noted, however, that the 
attention given to the depression in the 1890s has blurred the 
attention deserved by the recovery that followed in the first 
decade of the twentieth century.
l.The analysis carried on here is based on the revised import series, although 
official figures are given in the relevant tables to allow for comparison. It 
should be recalled as well that the series is incomplete from 1842-1865, and 
thus growth rates were computed between years that are not necessarily peaks, 
as after 1865.
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Table 4.1
Growth of Imports 
(yearly peak to peak growth rates, %)
Periods Value Volume
Official Revised Official Revised
— --- -- ----- — ------- -- -— — ---- — -
1843-1856(1) 3.58(*) - 1.80 [1.80]
1856-1867(1) 2.67(#) 3.53 1.15 1.89
1867-1875 3.34 1.72 5.34 3.98
1875-1890 1.76 1.66 3.58 3.58
1890-1900 3.03 1.98 0.95(+) 0.60(+)
1900-1913 3.11 3.32 3.22(") 2.910
1856-1913 2.69(&) 2.46 to • o> o CM•CM
1865-1913
(trend)
2.38 2.07 2.60 2.29
(1) Up to 1865 the series are not continuous and the years chosen 
as peaks for the first two periods in the table are best guesses.
(*) 1843-57; (#) 1857-67; (♦) 1890-1905; (") 1905-13;
(&) 1857-1913.
Notes: These corrections apply to official values (i.e., 
prices), and also to volumes because of smuggling. Peaks were 
estimated in relation to a trend linear regression of the type,
Log M * c ♦ a.time + ut
Last row in the table is the coefficient "a" for the regression for 
the mentioned period. The complete series start in 1865, thus until 
that year the peak years in the table are only proximate (cf. table 
3.1).
Source: Computed from appendix C.
Import prices (including tariffs) went up to 1869, decreased 
to 1888, and recovered thereafter, with a peak in 1900 followed 
by a flat trend during the first decade of the twentieth century. 
At the end of the period, however, the import price index was at 
a level inferior to the previous peak in 1869. These trends 
somehow reflect the great depression in international prices from 
1873 to 1897, and in particular the fall of British export
167
Graph 41 -  Imports (revised)
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prices.1 The different turning points in domestic and 
international price curves is of course explained by changes in 
Portugal's nominal tariffs and by the specific composition of 
Portuguese imports as compared to world exports.
Portugal was mainly an exporter of primary products, while 
its imports were essentially composed of manufactured goods and 
industrial inputs. This fact has induced historians to draw 
conclusions about agricultural or industrial growth directly from 
trends of aggregate exports or imports, respectively. This is of 
course a rough simplification, which excludes the possibility of 
substitution effects. A contraction in exports is not necessarily 
associated with decreasing output, if sales for the internal 
market substitute for sales abroad. By the same token, increasing 
imports may reflect higher competition from foreign producers, as 
well as an increase in domestic consumption. This is not a 
trivial remark. Nunes et al. (1989), as we have noted in chapter 
2, take aggregate imports as one of three proxies for estimating 
GDP growth. In consequence the sharp decline in imports that 
occurred in the early 1890s is proportionally reflected in their 
estimates for national output growth. The possibility of import 
substitution is not considered. The same problem arises with 
Pereira's (1983) conclusions on the development of agriculture, 
which are basically drawn on export statistics. It is worth 
noting that these approaches have a tradition that goes back at
1. See Zmlah (1958, pp. 101-3).
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least to Martins (1958) who, writing in the early 1880s, asks "is 
not foreign trade the safer yardstick to assess a nation's 
progress?"1
To account for import substitution, the relation between 
imports and output has to be studied in a disaggregated form: a 
part of total imports is for industrial use, and as such we may 
expect these imports to grow with industrial output; other 
imports, mainly of consumer goods, are substitute for either 
agricultural or industrial domestic output, and in this case 
imports and output may be negatively correlated.
As one could expect having in mind what has just been 
mentioned, the comparison of output indices and import trends do 
not show any constant pattern linking growth rates of aggregate 
export and import, to the growth of agricultural and industrial 
output. As a matter of fact, the first cycle of rapid expansion 
of imports, between 1867 and 1875, is contemporaneous to high 
growth rates for industrial output. During that period, import 
demand induced by the growth of the industrial sector offset the 
depressing effect of the stagnation in agriculture, which lasted 
for almost two decades from 1852 to 1870. In the period from 
1867-1875 import growth derived mostly from the import of inputs
1. Martins (1958, vol. 1, p. 71). ["£ ou nSo 6 o com6rcio externo o metro mais 
seguro para se avaliar o progresso de uma nag&o?"]. See also Pery (1979, p. 
89), who writes in the 1880s. An historian that uses incorrectly export 
statistics is Schwartzman (1989, pp. 83, 85) who concludes that the largest 
sector of Portuguese economy was the "agro-export" sector, by giving the share 
of agricultural exports on total exports, without taking into account the 
share of exports in national output.
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required by the Portuguese industry, as will be shown in more 
detail in next section. During the subsequent period, from 1875 
to 1890, the volume of imports continued to rise, whereas the 
rate of growth of industrial output decreased. Demand for imports 
could be now responding to the increase in aggregate demand 
generated by agricultural growth, particularly high from 1870 to 
1903, and to general favourable economic conditions. 
Consequently, the composition of the imports changed and consumer 
goods increased their share after 1875.
Table 4.2
Growth of Foreign Trade and Physical Output in Portugal 
(peak to peak growth rates in real terms, %)
Foreign trade Physical Output
Exports Imports Agriculture Industry
1842-1856 2.86 1843-1856 1.80 1846-1852 1.44 na
1856-1865 1.64 1856-1867 1.89 1852- 1854-1865 1.78
1865-1874 4.89 1867-1875 3.98 -1870 CM.O1 1865-1875 4.17
1874-1886 3.44 1875-1890 3.58 1870-1885 1.40 1875-1890 1.87
1886-1898 1.62 1890-1900 0.60 1885-1903 1.44 1890-1900 2.66
1898-1910 1,57 1900-1913 2.91 1903-1912 -0.79 1900-1911 2.43
Sources: Tables 3.1, 4.1 and appendix A.
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Table 4.3
Exports Imports and Trade Balances 
(contos)
Official Values Revised Values
Period Exports Imports BOT Exports Imports BOT
1842/1843 6 189 11 066 - 4 877 na na na
1848/1854( *) 9 099 11 087 - 1 988 na na na
1855/1856 13 343 17 647 - 4 304 16 078 19 641 - 3 563
1857/1860( *) 13 528 19 422 - 5 894 na na na
1861 13 249 24 717 *11 468 14 343 29 038 -14 695
1865/1869 15 502 25 064 - 9 562 15 786 27 961 -12 175
1870/1874 20 680 26 715 - 6 035 23 849 28 086 - 4 237
1875/1879 19 614 31 961 -12 347 25 339 31 558 - 6 219
1880/1884 22 169 32 801 -10 632 24 263 30 876 - 6 613
1885/1889 22 356 37 413 -15 057 32 346 35 132 - 2 786
1890/1894 22 976 37 723 -14 747 37 317 34 664 2 653
1895/1899 28 068 43 805 -15 737 55 367 39 154 16 213
1900/1904 29 792 58 798 -29 006 53 713 54 876 - 1 163
1905/1909 29 846 62 905 -33 059 44 811 59 386 -14 575
1910/1913 34 848 75 307 -40 459 64 945 73 060 - 8 115
(*) Estimated from partial data on trade through Lisbon and Oporto.
Notes: The major revisions are the following. Until 1870/74 the revision of 
imports is due to smuggling from Spain. Between 1890/94 and 1910/13, imports 
are revised downwards because the transit of live animals to and from Spain 
was subtracted. From 1890/94 exports were revised upwards because official 
statistics valued them (but not imports) at the par exchange rate, lower than 
the market rates.
Sources: appendixes B and C.
But imports were not determined only by demand for 
industrial inputs, foodstuffs, or manufactures, but also by 
changing conditions in the domestic supply. In particular, the 
break of import growth in the early 1890s is hard to explain in 
terms of demand, because there was an increase in the rate of 
industrial growth after 1890, and agriculture continued to expand 
until 1903. Import trends were also affected by import
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substitution, in particular in the case of cottons and wheat. 
Following the trough in 1892, however, imports increased again at 
a fast pace and the previous peaks were reached in 1897 in terms 
of import values and in 1900 in terms of import volumes.
It is often the case, in particular in less developed 
economies, that demand for imports depends not only on national 
income and relative import prices, but also on the capacity to 
finance import flows. This issue will be addressed here by 
looking into the available evidence on two major sources of 
revenue of foreign currency: exports and emigrant remittances. 
Evidence on emigrant remittances is scanty, and there was no 
attempt to estimate the flows of capital imports, because that 
would involve a full research project, given that there is no 
readily available information.1
The importance of exports in relation to imports is evident 
in table 4.3. The revised balances of trade show persistent trade 
deficits until the 1890s, surpluses in the 1890s, and deficits 
again after the turn of the century. This picture is in clear 
contrast with that drawn by contemporaries and historians based 
on the official data.2 Graph 4.3 compares the growth of the value 
of imports to the growth of the capacity to import provided by
1. Mata (1984, pp. 10-17) provides an attempt at estimating the balance of 
payments for 1891-1913, and for the earlier period (1865-1890) there is a more 
recent provisional estimate from Reis (1991b). The two series cannot be linked 
because of the differences in methodology.
2. For more details regarding the correction of the statistics see appendix B.
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export earnings, defined as the value of exports deflated by the 
import price index or:
CAP * QX x PX/PM
The capacity to import (CAP) increased considerably from 1865 
till 1877, as a consequence of the increase in export volumes 
(QX) and the improving terms of trade (PX/PM), that peaked 
respectively in 1874 and 1877. In the following years there is a 
flat trend, and it was reversed after 1884 when, despite the 
contracting growth in export volume, the capacity to import 
increased again. This favourable period, lasting for 14 years 
(1884-1898), was largely due to the upward movement in the terms 
of trade, with export prices increasing more than import prices. 
The exact turning points in the prices of exports, imports and 
the terms of trade are shown in graph 4.2 above. After 1898 the 
capacity to import was still affected by fluctuations in the 
terms of trade, in particular of export prices, due to variations 
in the exchange rate.1
It is worth noting in graph 4.3 that the curve for imports 
lies below the curve for capacity to import for most of the 
period from 1885 to 1903. In consequence, the contraction in 
imports during the 1890s, which is one of the most important 
features of imports to be explained here, could not be a 
consequence of unfavourable changes of the purchasing power of 
exports. A conclusion to retain is that fluctuations in imports
1. The terms of trade are from Lains (1986). Sideri (1970) estimated Anglo- 
Portuguese terms of trade which are discussed in Lains (1986, p. 388n).
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Graph 4-3 — Imparts and import capcity
were not always determined or conditioned by fluctuations in the 
capacity to import provided by exports.
Emigrant remittances are the other main source of foreign 
revenues which could have conditioned imports. There are no 
reliable and consistent estimates for the flow of remittances 
sent home by Portuguese emigrants and, consequently, we can only 
draw tentative conclusions regarding the matter. The largest 
colony of Portuguese citizens abroad was by far in Brazil, and 
the importance of the funds they send directly or indirectly via 
London to Portugal is often mentioned in the literature. In fact 
they reached amounts that could easily surpass the value of 
Portugal's trade deficit.1 Fortunately enough, we have partial 
information on remittances that can help us draw some conclusions 
on their relation with import fluctuations, during three 
particular moments, which are: the import peak in 1875, the fall 
in the early 1890s, and the recovery after the turn of the 
century.
In the early 1870s, according to Vieira (1983), the 
remittances from Portuguese emigrants in Brazil went up 
extraordinarily to about £ 2 million per year (or 9,000 contos at 
the current par exchange rate). This was an immediate consequence 
of the return to peace in Brazil after the end of the Paraguayan
1. The most complete study of the effects of emigrant remittances on 
Portugal's balance of payments after 1891 is still Salazar (1916, Chap. 7). 
For a brief review of the large contemporary literature see Pereira (1981) and 
(1983, pp. 253-61). See also Cabral (1979, pp. 53-55), Vieira (1983, p. 9), 
and Justino (1989, pp. 88-93).
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wars (1865-1870). The estimated inflow of funds roughly 
corresponds to twice the size of the average yearly trade deficit 
for 1870-1875.1 Its effects in the economy were certainly large, 
and in particular in the financial sector. According to Pereira 
(1983) this great inflow of money led to a boom in the creation 
of banks, whose total number in Portugal increased from 15 to 51 
in the short period between 1873 and 1875, the new banks being 
all established in the areas of major emigration from the north 
of Portugal.2 It is tempting to relate the import peak observed 
in 1875 to this particular inflow of foreign revenue. 
Furthermore, if the banking boom is somehow related to the pace 
of industrial growth in the first half of the 1870s, then we can 
conclude that remittances provided the funds to finance an 
industrial upsurge, which was largely dependent on imported 
inputs. In 1876 this short-lived boom burst into a financial 
crisis which Martins (1956) relates to the adverse speculation 
with Portuguese and Spanish funds, the latter being severely 
affected by the disturbances in Spain following the 
Restauración. 3 Because of the crisis associated with the
1. Justino (1989, pp. 88-89) concludes that remittances accounted for little 
more than the trade deficit in 1872. Our values do not agree with Justino's 
because he erroneously uses a different exchange rate (£1=3$500), and compares 
with the official trade deficit.
2. Pereira (1983, 257-60). See also Cabral (1981, p. 267) and Justino (1989, 
pp. 87-90 and 211-17).
3. According to Martins (1956) the 1876 crisis is an example of the 
inconveniences derived from competition in bank-note issuing, which was the 
regime in vigour in the north of Portugal.
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extraordinary sums of money sent from Brazil, some authors like 
Martins (1956) and Pereira (1983) do not hesitate to conclude 
that remittances had a negative impact on the Portuguese 
economy.1 This is probably exaggerated, given the important role 
of remittances in the credit side of the balance of payments. 
However it has to be recognized that the funds imported from 
Brazil did in fact cause disturbances in the economy.
In the late 1880s emigrant remittances had again a disturbing 
role. For this occasion Pereira (1983) gives yearly values for 
transfers from the Brazilian agencies of the Banco de Portugal to 
London (see table 4.4), which, according to contemporary 
estimates, could account for up to half of total remittances.2 
The decline in those transfers, starting already in 1889, is 
noticeable. Again these movements are explained by fluctuations 
on the Brazilian exchange rate, which according to Fishlow 
(1989), was affected by the disturbances caused by the end of 
slavery in 1888 and the difficult installation of the Republic 
from 1889.3 The associated contraction of remittances and the 
contraction of imports in the early 1890s is striking. First on 
timing: both remittances and imports peaked in 1888 and were
1. See Martins (1956, pp. 48-51) and Pereira (1983, pp. 257-61).
2. See Pereira (1983, p. 255) and (1981, pp. 36-37). Mata (1984, pp. 13-14)
gives a summary of contemporary estimates of remittances.
3. See Fishlow (1989, pp. 22-23). Between 1890 and 1899 the index for the
exchange for Brazilian milreis to the pound went up from below 50 to about 140 
(Cardoso, 1989, figure 3C.2).
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severely affected in 1890. Second between 1888 and 1891 the known 
transfers fell by more than 80%, that is by 3,531 contos, and the 
contraction of imports in the 1890s was almost fully concentrated 
in these same years, falling by about 30% or 11,014 contos. If it 
is assumed that the fall in the transfers through the Banco de 
Portugal was proportional to the total, we may hypothesise a 
decline in remittances of circa 7,000 contos. The fall in imports 
could thus be largely explained by the decrease in emigrant 
remittances. Table 4.4 also shows that remittances sent to 
Portugal through the Ag&ncia Financial do Rio de Janeiro, the 
bank created in 1887 and that would became the main financial 
channel for remittances from Brazil, were more than twice as 
large in the 1900s than in the 1890s.1 Again, we cannot use this 
figures to depict yearly fluctuations because we do not know 
their relative importance year by year, but they do point out to 
the conclusion that remittances eased the pressure on the balance 
of payments after the turn of the century.
1. See Pereira (1981, pp. 39-44). According to this author transfers of money 
through that agency accounted for 1/4 of total remittances.
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Table 4.4 
Transfers from Brazil to Portugal
Banco de Portugal
Year Pounds Contos(*)
1877 743 217 (3 365)
1878 568 150 (2 557)
1888 967 856 (4 355)
1889 719 267 (3 237)
1890 425 640 (1 915)
1891 183 213 (824)
Agènda Financial 
Year Contos
1892
1893
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
19021903
1904
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1
1
1
2
3
3
4
4
5
3
4 
3 
3 
2 
3 
3
751
820
391
729
769 
971 
434 
212 
381 
264 
832
705
770 
902 
724 
935 
662 
909
(*) Converted at the par exchange rate.
Sources: Pereira (1983, p. 255) and (1981, p. 44).
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Long-term trends in the growth of imports were probably more 
dependent on the growth of the domestic economy. Nevertheless, 
the two important swings of imports in the mid-l87 0s and the 
early 1890s, and the upsurge after 1900, were to a great extent 
due to fluctuations in emigrant remittances. As has been noted by 
Pereira (1983), among other authors, the flow of emigrant 
remittances was intimately related to Portuguese capital imports. 
It is difficult however to know what part of the capital imported 
from London was in fact derived from funds originated in Brazil.1 
Capital imports might have followed the trends in emigrant 
remittances, falling in the years after Portugal left the gold 
standard, and then recovering during the decade that preceded the 
outbreak of the war. These trends would agree with those shown by 
capital exports from Britain and, to a lesser extent, from 
France, the two major nineteenth century capital exporters for 
which there is data (the other is Germany). British capital 
exports peaked in 1889-1890, decreased until 1901, and increased
1. See Vieira (1982, 177-80). Cabral (1979, p. 53) argues that emigrant 
remittances were in the whole more important than capital imports. One element 
that might have had some importance in this context is the flow of domestic 
capital abroad. It is not possible to predict what happened after 1889-91, 
because this financial crisis was not only domestic. So, capital might have 
flown the country for higher security, or might have been repatriated because 
of less investment opportunities abroad. In any case, it should be recalled 
that contemporaries considered Portuguese exports of capital as considerable 
in same occasions. See, for instance, Andrade (1918, pp. 229-30). Capital 
exports from poor countries should be studied. In another context, Carreras 
(1990, pp. 155-56) argues that the repatriation of capital following the loss 
of Cuba and Puerto Rico was of considerable importance for the Spanish 
recovery in the last decade of the century.
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steeply thereafter. According to Simon's (1968) curve for new 
portfolio foreign investments, there was some recovery during the 
decreasing period in the years 1895-1899.1
But the ascendant section of the import curve started in 
1892 (in both value and volume trends), before the change in the 
trend of foreign funds referred to above, meaning that some other 
elements were in action. In fact, the rise of imports after that 
year was sustained not only by the increase in exports' capacity 
to import, following devaluation, but also by the revenues in 
foreign currency earned by reexports from the African colonies, 
to which analysis we now turn.
The reexport trade from the African colonies through the 
mother country in the direction of northern Europe and the United 
States, increased considerably after 1892 because the colonial 
tariff of that year imposed a preferential treatment for 
reexports carried out through Portugal.2 The reason why reexports
1. See Simon (1968, p. 38), Imlah (1958, pp. 70-75), Edelstein (1982, pp. 313-
14) and for France, L6vy-Leboyer (1973, p. 80). This same argument regarding 
Portugal is made in Marques (1991, pp. 27-29). According to the scanty 
available evidence, Spain's capital imports had a trend similar to imports 
into Portugal. For instance, according to Tena (1987, p. 12), foreign direct 
investment declined in 1891-1900, and increased in 1901-1913. In the case of 
Italy, capital imports also fell after 1890. However it is worth noting that 
after that year, according to Toniolo (1988, p. 36), capital imports were no 
longer fundamental to finance the balance of payments, and that in 1907 Italy
was already a net exporter of capital, albeit in small amounts.
2. From 1892 Portuguese exports to Africa paid in most cases between 10 an 20%
of the duties, reexports of foreign products through Lisbon paid 80%, and 
foreign direct imports paid 100%. See, for instance, Pautas vigentes (...) 
(1892). The importance of colonial reexports earnings in the Portuguese 
balance of payments after 1891 has been pointed out by Cordeiro (1896, p.
400), Vieira (1905, p. 473) and Salazar (1916, pp. 193-99).
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from Africa earned foreign currency to the Metropolis, was that 
Portugal paid to the colonies in the domestic currency, and 
retained the revenue in foreign currency. Moreover, direct trade 
between Portugal and its African territories was also carried in 
the domestic currency and consequently Portuguese exports to 
Africa did not earn foreign currency. We have not engaged in a 
detailed analysis of colonial finances in order to ascertain what 
were the mechanisms of payments between Portugal, the colonies 
and the rest of the world. For instance, the persistent deficit 
of the colonial public sector meant an additional inflationary 
pressure to the Metropolis which could counterweight to an 
unknown extent the benefits derived from reexports.1 Although 
quoting a public servant does not substitute for further research 
on the matter, it is indicative that, according to the Minister 
of the Navy and the Colonies, reexports provided
"an important help (...) during the worst period of the 
financial crisis, attenuating the need to export gold to 
balance cur financial commitments in foreign capital 
markets."2
1. It should be noted, though, that government expenditure with the colonies 
accounted for around 3-8% of total expenditure (the average for 21 years in 
the period 1883-1914 is 4%). See Mata (1985, p. 133).
2. Vilaga (1899, p. 5). [ "o importante auxllio que tal facto veio trazer-nos
durante o periodo mais agudo da crise financeira, atenuando a necessidade de 
exportagio de oiro para saldar os nossos encargos nas pragas estrangeiras."] 
This author also considers "unfair” to evaluate the importance of the colonies 
to the Portuguese economy only by the fact that colonial public finances were 
in deficit (idem, p. 7).
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Portugal's total merchandise trade balance in foreign 
currency can be defined as follows:
Credits Exporta from Portugal to foreign countries
- Exports from Portugal to the colonies
+ Reexports from the colonies to foreign countries
Debits Imports into Portugal from foreign countries
- imports into Portugal from the colonies
+ Reexports from foreign countries to the colonies
Total reexports and in particular reexports from Africa increased 
four times from the mid-1880s. In 1910 reexports from Africa 
which comprised essentially cocoa, wild rubber and coffee, 
represented about 3/4 of total reexports. Nonetheless, as 
happened with the other items of the foreign trade statistics, 
the official data has to be checked. No attempt was made to 
estimate specific correction coefficients for the reexport trade, 
but a test to check whether reexports after 1891 were registered 
at par or at market exchange rates is presented below. It is 
recalled that, in contrast to imports, exports were recorded by 
the official statistics at par exchange rates, and thus 
undervalued in most of the period from 1891 to 1913. As such, we 
can hypothesize that reexports from the colonies were incorrectly 
recorded, but reexports into the colonies were correctly 
registered. A simple test is to compute the correlation 
coefficients of the different trade series with an index for the 
fluctuations in the exchange rate. If the correlation coefficient 
is significant and has the correct sign, then we conclude that
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the series is correctly valued at the market exchange rate. If 
the series is not correlated with the index for the exchange 
rate, we conclude that the series was valued at the par rate. The 
results are the following:
Simple correlation coefficient with the exchange rate index (1890-1913)
Official data Revised data
Credits
Exports from Portugal to foreign countries 0-037 0.547
Exports from Portugal to Africa 0.155 0.424
Reexports from Africa to foreign countries - 0.106 0.181
Debits
Imports into Portugal from foreign countries - 0.298 - 0.340
Imports into Portugal from Africa - 0.314 n.a.
Reexports from foreign countries to Africa - 0.385 - 0.098
Despite its simplicity the test is conclusive. We may see 
that the correlation coefficients of the official data for both 
total exports and exports to Africa, and the exchange rate index 
are considerably lower than those from the revised series. On the 
other hand, according to the official data, reexports from Africa 
are negatively correlated to the exchange rate, whereas the 
revised series gives a correct positive sign for the correlation 
coefficient. On the side of the debits, we note that, as happens 
with total imports, reexports from foreign countries to the 
African colonies given by the official statistics are negatively 
correlated with the exchange rate, as we should expect. In 
conclusion, outward trade, both direct and indirect, is recorded 
at the par exchange rate in official statistics; inward trade, 
both direct and indirect, is recorded at the market exchange
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rates. The reexport figures were accordingly corrected.1
Table «.5 
Average Trade Balances (contos)
Direct trade Total balance in foreign
...... -........... —  Colonial currency
Total Africa Others Reexports X of Imp,
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1865/1869 -12 175 - 166 -12 008 12 -11 997 - 42.9%
1870/1874 - 4 237 30 - 4 268 551 - 3 717 - 18.2%
1875/1879 - 6 219 376 - 6 594 695 - 5 900 - 18.7%
1880/1884 6 613 na na na na
1885/1889 - 2 786 446 - 5 254 2 201 - 3 053 - 8.2%
1890/1894 2 653 1 826 827 5 614 6 441 18.6%
1895/1899 16 213 6 727 9 486 13 182 22 668 57.9%
1900/1904 - 1 163 6 599 - 7 763 15 563 7 800 14.2%
1905/1909 -14 575 4 981 -19 555 13 721 - 5 834 - 9.8%
1910/1913 - 8 115 7 204 -15 318 21 445 6 127 8.3%
(1) Total exports minus total imports
(2) Exports to the African colonies minus imports from the African colonies
(3) Exports to foreign countries minus imports from foreign countries C(3)*(1)-(2)J
(4) Reexports from the African colonies to foreign countries minus reexports from foreign 
countries to the African colonies.
(5) * (3) ♦ (4)
(6) * (5) / total import values
Notes: Trade in coliwn (2) is carried in Portuguese currency, whereas in columns (3) and (4) 
are it is carried in foreign currency. All values in Portuguese currency.
Sources: Computed from appendix C.
1* See appendix B.
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But let us go back to the analysis of the contribution of 
reexports to the balance of trade in foreign currency. Table 4.5 
depicts the deficits of total direct merchandise trade in every 
five years period from 1865/1869, with the exception of the 
1890s. Yet, an increasing share of export revenues was earned in 
domestic currency, corresponding to the sales to the African 
colonies. As such, the deficits of direct trade in foreign 
exchange (column 3) were considerably higher, and the surpluses 
were considerably lower. Taking into account the foreign currency 
earned by reexports from the colonies, however, the picture 
changes considerably. After 1890/1894, the foreign currency 
earned by exports and reexports from Portugal and its colonies 
was more than enough to pay for imports except in the years 
1905/1909. The total trade deficit in foreign currency 
represented in 1905/1909 only 9.8% of total imports, and in 
1865/1869, for instance, it represented 42.9%. The real 
importance of the colonies for the Portuguese economy is revealed 
by these figures.1 After the 1890s, reexports accounted for a 
larger share of total inward trade into Portugal, compared to the
1. Despite the attention paid by contemporaries, the importance of reexport 
earnings has been seldom recognized by historians. An exception is Clarence- 
Smith (1985, p. 87). However, based on the official data, this author 
concludes that reexports covered less than half of the deficit between 1905 
and 1915, the rest being covered by emigrant remittances. The revision of the 
official data gives a quite different picture, and we have to conclude that 
either emigrant remittances were substantially lower, or that they injected 
money in the economy. For an equivalent role of India and China in the case of 
Britain see Saul (1960, pp. 62-63) and Latham (1978, pp. 68-72).
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United Kingdom, as well as to France:
The Relative Importance of Reexports(*)
Periods Portugal United Kingdom France
1861-1870 9.4% 17.2% 3.2%1871-1880 9.7% 15.5% 1.2%1881-1890 11.6% 15.9% 1.2%1891-1900 21.3% 13.6% 1.4%1901-1913 21.1% 13.9% 1.4%
(*) Reexports/(reexports+imports)
Sources: appendix C, Imlah (1958, p. 170) and L6vy-Leboyer (1973, 
p. 86).
The most important conclusion to retain from this section is 
that the long-run demand for imports in Portugal was met by 
successive alternative sources of foreign revenue. With varying 
degrees of importance throughout the period, export revenues, 
emigrant remittances (as well as capital imports), and reexports 
from Africa provided the revenue to pay for imports. Emigrant 
remittances and capital imports were probably more important 
until the late 1880s, whereas the capacity to import provided by 
exports increased up to 1897. The difficulties that could have 
been felt by the contraction in these two sources of foreign 
revenue were avoided by the rapid increase of the earnings from 
reexports of African goods after the mid-1880s. The only serious 
break in imports was in the years 1889-1891 but it was short 
lived and import growth resumed rapidly afterwards. As we shall 
see in the next section, this break affected differently imports 
of industrial inputs and other goods.
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4.3 - Changes in the composition of imports
The most striking feature revealed by the analysis of 
disaggregated data for imports is the difference between import 
trends of inputs for industrial use, that is raw materials and 
intermediate goods, and imports of foodstuffs and of 
manufactures. Imports were disaggregated in four major classes 
according to their presumed final use.1 The curves for the four 
aggregates are shown in graph 4.4. Imports of raw materials and 
intermediate goods depict relatively smooth trends, in accordance 
to what has been found for industrial growth as mentioned in 
chapter 2.
In contrast to imports of industrial inputs, imports of 
manufactures had sharp fluctuations, which increased in two 
waves, from 1865 to 1875, and from 1875 to 1890, falling 
thereafter. The sharp drop in 1890-1892 was followed by a period 
of rather steep increase. Imports of textile goods were the major 
cause of the increase in manufactured imports until the peak in
1. These two classification overlap, except for the case of butter (a 
foodstuff with a high degree of transformation) and presumably kerosene for 
lightning (a consumer's good with a presumed low degree of transformation). 
The claBS of manufactures is an hybrid of consumer and capital goods, yet the 
only two items of this class that are clearly capital goods are industrial 
tools and machinery and railway equipment, which accounted for a small albeit 
increasing share of imports of manufactures. See below.
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Graph 4.4 - Imports by classes of goods
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the mid-1870s. During the 1870s and the 1880s, imports of metal 
manufactures, industrial tools and machinery, as well as railway 
equipment accounted for most of the increase in this class of 
imports. It may be extemporaneous to draw any conclusions 
regarding fluctuations in industrial investment from the 
observation of trends in imports of industrial tools and 
machinery, the larger single class of investment goods that is 
discriminated in the trade statistics, because of the low amounts 
involved.
Except for railway equipment, all the items in the class of 
manufactures peaked in 1889. Between 1889 and 1892 total 
manufactured imports declined by 58%, accounting for circa one 
half of the total decrease in imports in the same span of years. 
The decrease in manufactured imports in these years was 
concentrated in the following products: cottons, woollens, silks, 
paper, metals and railway equipment. Machinery imports also 
declined after 1890 although to a much lesser extent. The other 
class that fell sharply in these years was the residual class 
which is largely composed (to an undetermined extent) by 
manufactures. The decrease in these two classes accounted for 
about 80% of the decrease in total imports. Thus we may conclude 
that the difficulties felt in Portugal's balance of payments as a 
consequence of the reduction in emigrant remittances and capital 
imports, referred to in the previous section, affected almost 
exclusively imports of manufactured goods.
As far as imports of foodstuffs are concerned, we may note
188
three different cycles. A first period of rapid growth until
1879, which is followed by a period with a relatively flat trend, 
from 1880 until mid-1890s, and then again by a period of raising 
imports. The increase of foodstuffs imports between 1842 and 1865 
was caused mainly by wheat imports, which took place in spite of 
the regime of protection of cereals, abandoned in 1865.1 Prior to 
that year, cereals were imported under special legislation when 
necessary, showing that domestic supply was insufficient even 
under protection. The sharp fluctuations in the imports of 
foodstuffs from 1895 onwards were caused by the irregular path of 
imports of wheat. Wheat production was under a protective regime 
established in 1889, and reinforced in 1899, of which trade 
tariffs were only a small part. This regime fixed a minimum 
guarantee price for domestic wheat, at which producers could sell 
all their output through a state central market. Only after that 
could imports of wheat take place.2 Such a regime - that can be 
identified as a regime of yearly fixed quotas - may well explain 
the sharp fluctuations of wheat and corn imports. Wheat imports 
were drastically reduced when domestic output was abundant, as 
happened in 1902 and in 1911. In the years of bad crops, imports 
could increase in correspondence to the needs of domestic demand.
There are no common patterns for import growth among the
1. According to Cabral (1979, p.29) the major distinctive element of the 
Regeneragio period was free trade in corn, which lasted de facto from 1854 to 
1889.
2. For an analysis of the protectionist regime for wheat see Reis (1979).
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other goods included in the class of foodstuffs, because they are 
of an heterogeneous kind and thus responding to different 
phenomena. Imports of colonial goods such as tobacco, coffee and 
sugar have their own waves. In the case of coffee, for instance, 
those waves are intimately related to fluctuations in import 
prices, showing a high price elasticity of coffee imports. The 
decline in the imports of butter after 1890 is quite dramatic, 
and followed the path of imports of manufactures. Also in this 
case there was import substitution.
In the case of raw and manufactured tobacco and sugar there 
was no place for import substitution because production was 
prohibited in Portugal to protect colonial output - a policy that 
can be considered as one of the costs of the colonies. This was 
so in spite of the good natural conditions for the production of 
tobacco in the Douro region, as demonstrated by the experiments 
that took place during the 1880s, by the time of the phylloxera 
crisis, and in spite of the advantages for the increase in soil 
productivity brought by the sugar beet, the production of which 
was increasing throughout Europe.1
Imports of inputs for industrial use, both of raw materials 
and intermediate goods, registered two absolute peaks in 1873- 
1875 and 1900. These peaks were to a large extent dominated by
1. See Pereira (1983, pp. 138-41) and Santos (1974, pp. 199-203) for the case 
of tobaccos. Regarding the sugar beet, see Campos (1913, pp. 410-25) and 
Andrade (1918, p.177), who noted that Portugal was the only country in Europe 
where the plant was not grown. The importance of sugar beet for the European 
agriculture is largely recognized. See for instance the many references in 
Milward and Saul (1977).
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imports of coal and coke. However, as opposed to what happened in 
1875, the steep rise in the value of imports of coal from 1897- 
1900 was due to the anomalous increase of import prices as a 
consequence of the British wars in Asia and Transvaal.1 And in 
terms of volumes, coal imports increased at a smooth path after 
1875. The other major raw material purchased abroad was cotton 
the volume of which increased constantly and also without major 
fluctuations up to 1900. Probably by the turn of the century the 
cotton industry, which developed by catering for the protected 
domestic and colonial markets, reached a saturation level.
Imports of raw materials for the woollen, linen and silk 
industries can be read in a less clear cut way than those for 
cottons because they were but a part of domestic consumption, and 
could be substituted for by domestic output. Imports of raw silk, 
for instance, followed up to 1871 the increase of domestic silk 
production. Pereira (1983) refers to a spurt in the plantation of 
mulberry trees and raising of silkworms in the period from 1852 
to 1876.2 Domestic output of raw silk was however partially 
exported. In the case of raw wool, purchases from abroad also 
coexisted with exports. The reason for this lies in the 
different quality of the goods, the domestic output being of 
lower quality and thus probably not fit for some industrial uses.
1. See Vieira (1905, p. 446) and Benson (1982).
2. See Pery (1875, pp. 150-52), Pereira (1983, pp. 119-26), and Justino (1988, 
68-71).
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Although the conclusions drawn from this fact should not be 
pushed too far, given the magnitude of the trades involved, it 
should be noted that the production of lower quality agricultural 
goods for industrial use may have rendered difficult the 
integration between the agricultural and industrial sectors, and 
the development of industrial sectors based on domestic raw 
materials.1 In any case, the analysis of imports of raw textiles 
other than cotton does not help much in characterising Portugal's 
industrialization.
Most of the intermediate products imported into Portugal 
also had domestic substitutes, in particular textile yarns, 
leather, and timber. As such, it is difficult to draw any 
conclusions from their fluctuations either. However, we may note 
the similarity of fluctuations of the aggregate curve of 
intermediate imports and that of raw material imports. The peak 
in 1875 was shaped by imports of iron and, to a lesser extent, by 
timber. During the two decades prior to the war, the major 
increases in intermediate goods were due to iron, chemicals and 
tin plate. Tin plate was imported for the canned fish industry, 
an export industry that boomed from the 1880s onwards. Between 
1880/84 and 1910/13 exports of canned fish increased 16.5 times, 
from 258 contos to 4,266 contos, which implied an increase of 
imports of tin-plate of 1,3 52 contos, showing the high import 
content of this particular export industry.
1. See the discussion of this point in chapter 2.
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Table 4.6 depicts the changes in the structure of Portuguese 
imports. The major structural change is the sharp relative 
decline of the share of manufactured goods after the 1890s, which 
had already started by mid-century. The decreasing share of 
manufactures is associated with increasing shares of raw 
materials, indicating that manufactured imports were being 
substituted for by domestic industrial output.1 These changes in 
the composition of imports show clearly that industrial growth 
after 1890 was of a different kind of industrial growth of the 
previous period. The changes in the other categories set out in 
the same table were not as dramatic. The share of intermediate 
products increased slightly from the 1860s onwards, first 
recovering and then surpassing the higher shares in the first 
decades of the period. The weight of foodstuffs increased until 
the 1870s, and decreased thereafter. Lastly, the residual share 
was also relatively constant, particularly after 1880/89.
1. The fact that a small but increasing part of the class of manufactures is 
composed of capital goods, the import substitution effect described in the 
text is underestimated.
193
Table 4.6 - Composition of Imports (X)
1840/49 1850/59 1860/69 1870/79 1880/89 1890/99 1900/09 1905/14
Live animals 0.7 1.7 3.3 3.6 3.1 4.3 5.2 3.8
Butter 3.4 2.7 2.0 1.9 1.6 0.6 0.0 0.0
Cod* f i sh 7.5 5.9 5.0 4.6 4.6 4.7 5.7 5.8
Corn 0.8 7.0 8.6 11.8 13.6 12.4 7.3 8.6
Rice 2.3 1.9 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.4 2.5
Sugar 5.9 8.2 8.0 6.8 5.2 4.8 4.0 3.9
Coffee and tea 2.3 3.2 2.8 2.6 2.0 2.1 1.6 1.4
Tobacco 1.0 0.8 2.4 2.2 1.7 1.3 1.2 1.3
Foodstuffs and tobacco 24.0 31.4 33.7 35.2 33.7 32.1 27.4 27.3
Raw cotton 0.8 2.0 2.3 1.9 2.7 6.1 6.7 6.9
Raw wool 0.2 0.6 1.2 2.1 2.4 2.9 2.1 1.8
Raw silk 1.2 1.3 1.1 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Raw flax and hemp 5.3 2.8 2.2 1.8 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.5
Raw hides and skins 3.2 2.1 1.7 2.4 1.9 1.9 2.0 1.8
Oil seeds 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.3 1.1 1.8 2.0
Chemical fertilisers 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 1.6 1.9
Oyestuffs 0.9 1.2 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8
Sulphur 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.5 1.1 0.7 0.5 0.4
Coal and coke 1.2 2.2 2.6 4.3 4.3 5.2 7.0 6.3
Raw materials 11.6 11.4 11.8 14.1 14.7 20.0 23.2 22.4
Textile yarns 2.2 1.5 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.6 1.4 1.3
Leather 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.7 1.0 1.2
Cement 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Chemical products 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.8 1.3 2.0 2.0
Timber 3.2 2.8 2.0 2.5 2.9 3.0 2.8 2.6
Cast iron and steel 4.0 4.1 2.9 3.4 2.7 3.0 3.1 3.2
Copper,brass,tin plates 0.8 1.1 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.7 2.0
Intermediate goods 11-3 10.8 7.7 9.1 9.2 10.7 12.1 12.1
Cottons 26.2 18.8 15.7 12.5 8.7 5.3 4.5 4.5
Woollens 7.7 6.2 5.6 5.7 4.4 2.4 1.7 1.3
Silks 0.6 1.9 1.8 2.2 2.4 1.8 1.5 1.5
Kerosene 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.9 0.8 1.3 0.9 0.7
Paper 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.3
Metal manufactures 1.9 1.5 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.5 1.6
Ind. tools and machinery 0.5 0.9 0.7 1.6 1.7 2.4 3.2 3.5
Railway equipment 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.4 2.2 1.1 1.2 1.3
Manufactures 36.9 29.3 25.8 25.3 21.4 14.6 15.4 14.0
Other 16.2 17.1 21.0 16.3 21.0 22.6 21.9 24.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Until 1865 data includes only: 1842, 1843, 1848, 1851, 1855, 1856, and 1861 
Sources: Computed frow appendix C.
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With the help of the foreign trade statistics we can 
describe the process of import substitution for the case of the 
cotton industry, in order to illustrate the limited effect import 
substitution could have had for industrial growth in general. 
Table 4.7 compares imports of raw cotton to imports of cotton 
yarn and manufactures and exports of cotton manufactures (exports 
of cotton yarn were negligible). Between 1885/89 and 1910/13 the 
quantity of raw cotton imported increased by 12,372 tons, and 
imports of cotton goods declined by 3,023 tons. If we assume that 
there are no significant losses of weight from the raw material 
to the final output, then import substitution could have 
accounted for a minimum of 24% of the increase in total cotton 
output. In the case of yarn, import substitution might have 
accounted for the check of the rising trend of its imports 
observed from 1865/1869. On the other hand, the large spurt of 
exports of cotton goods to the colonies, which amounted to an 
increase of 2,000 tons, accounted for 16% of the increase in the 
domestic production. Not surprisingly the largest contribution 
came from the expansion of the domestic market, accounting for 
60% of the total increase of cotton output. These estimates, 
approximate as they are, give nevertheless an indication of the 
importance of the phenomena. After all, import substitution and 
the increased protection of the colonial markets accounted for 
less than one half of the increase in cotton output in the two
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decades prior to the war.1 It should be recalled that the 
benefits of the increase of output leaked away in the proportion 
of inputs that had to be imported. In fact, for each 1$000 
exported to Africa, it was necessary to import on average $300 of 
raw cotton. This is compatible with an estimated domestic value 
added of cotton production of circa 50%, if we take into account 
that cotton production also depended on imported coal.2 Moreover, 
as previously noted in chapter 2, this import substitution effect 
was sudden but a finite one. By 1900 the domestic and colonial 
markets for the coarser kinds of cottons were already glutted 
with the domestically produced goods.
1. For further discussion of this see Pereira (1983, p. 278) and Cabral (1979, 
p. 148).
2. Vieira (1905) gives an interesting analysis of the consequences of the 1892 
tariff in terms of import substitution in cottons and woollens. In the case of 
cottons our conclusions agrees with his, although he does not correct export 
statistics for undervaluation, even if admitting it to be around 30%. For the 
case of woollens the author concludes that import substitution was negligible. 
See Vieira (1905, pp. 428n and 441-44). See also Reis (1986).
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Table 4.7 
Trade in Cottons
¡■ports Exports
Raw cotton Ya m  Cottons Cottons
Years Value Voluee Value Voluae Value Volume Value Volume
1865/1869 593 1331 193 160 3979 3796 314 216
1870/1874 538 1823 248 280 4067 4938 350 336
1875/1879 596 2398 218 296 3271 5819 332 361
1880/1884 847 3548 223 268 3073 5366 111 107
1885/1889 1050 5151 293 359 3009 5738 133 91
1890/1894 2023 8857 292 314 2083 3120 574 455
1895/1899 2910 13425 403 340 2216 2837 3412 2545
1900/1904 4202 14681 433 311 2640 2665 2670 2166
1905/1909 3975 15292 393 330 2777 2472 2066 2116
1910/1913 5668 17523 265 239 3520 2715 2600 2091
Notes: Values in contos and volumes in tons. Export values were corrected by the 
average correction coefficient.
Sources: Computed fro® appendix C.
Changes in the composition of imports are reflected in 
import trends disaggregated by countries. Thus imports from 
Portugal's major suppliers of manufactures, the United Kingdom, 
France and three northern European countries followed closely the 
curve of total manufactures imports, peaking in the mid-1870s and 
in 1890, and with a sharp fall after this year. Imports from 
Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands increased at a very quick 
pace. Imports from these three countries are taken in aggregate 
to take into account the deficient record of country origin in 
the statistics. In certain periods, particularly in the earlier 
years, imports from Belgium, for instance, could have come 
through the Netherlands. By the same token, some German goods 
could have been imported trough France and thus registered as
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goods of French origin. For this reasons we should take into 
account that the increasing importance of such countries as 
Belgium and Germany could be overvalued by the official 
statistics.1 In any case, whereas by mid-century most 
manufactures were purchased from Britain as well as from France, 
at the outbreak of the war, Germany and Belgium were supplying 
about the same value of manufactured goods as Britain. Britain 
was Portugal's major supplier of coal, and coal accounts for the 
increase of imports from that country after 1897.
Table 4.8 
Distribution of Imports (X)
1840/49 1850/59 1860/69 1870/79 1880/89 1890/99 1900/09 1905/14
United Kingdom 59.5 55.4 46.0 44.0 34.6 30.0 29.3 28.3
Spain 2.2 5.0 8.4 7.9 6.2 8.1 8.2 6.3
France 3.7 8.0 13.0 14.4 13.2 10.7 9.7 9.2
Italy (a) 2.1 1.0 0.5 0.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8
Germany (a) 2.5 2.4 1.2 2.8 10.5 13.0 16.2 16.4
Belgium 0.1 0.2 0.1 1.4 3.4 3.7 3.9 4.3
The Netherlands 1.4 0.9 1.1 1.4 1.0 0.8 1.4 1.9
Sweden and Norway 2.6 2.1 2.1 2.7 2.5 2.8 2.6 3.2
Russia 5.0 1.5 4.9 2.5 1.6 2.4 1.8 1.8
U.S.A. 2.4 3.4 3.1 7.7 14.1 14.8 9.8 10.0
BraziI 14.9 14.6 12.3 8.9 5.9 4.9 3.5 2.4
African colonies 0.5 1.9 2.5 2.4 2.0 2.4 2.9 3.3
Other 3.1 3.6 4.7 3.2 3.4 4.7 8.9 11.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(a) Borders as in 1871.
Sources: Computed from appendix C.
1. These country statistics are of no help to correct for these errors, 
because they also did not always recorded correctly the countries of 
destination of their exports. For more details see appendix B.
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Imports from the other countries have their own specific 
trends. It should be recalled that the official data for imports 
from Spain are quite misleading, particularly at the beginning 
and at the end of the period here analysed. Spain was a major 
supplier of cereals during the 1840s and 1850s, but some of that 
trade was smuggled and thus not recorded. As such, imports from 
Spain in those years are probably undervalued. Smuggling of 
British cotton goods from Portugal went in the opposite 
direction. Until the passing of the Spanish tariff of 1869, some 
imports of cotton goods into Portugal were ultimately directed to 
Spain. A British consul in Cadiz estimates that that form of 
smuggling accounted for up to 2 0% of total imports of cottons 
into Portugal.1 The amounts involved were so large that they 
inspired the following words of a British secretary at the Lisbon 
embassy:
"The legal trade on the land frontier may be said to be 
extinct. There are thirty custom-houses, and a large staff of 
officials at each of them employed in collecting the 
revenues. Yet the whole revenue collected by them in 1857- 
1858 was only £ 6,109, a sum hardly sufficient to maintain 
the establishments themselves.1,2
Following the treaty signed between Portugal and Spain in 1894,
1. See Prados (1984, pp. 129-30). In Neg6cios Externos (1885, II; 1886, I; 
1893, III) there are several references to smuggling between the two 
countries, but no attempt to quantify it. For the opinions of contemporaries 
regarding smuggling from Spain see also Justino (1988, pp. 213-22). See also 
appendix B. Pinheiro (1986, pp. 54-62) provides an analysis of Portuguese- 
Spanish trade, but the importance of smuggling is not quantified.
2. Parliamentary Papers (1860, p. 387).
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the transit of animals between the two countries was registered 
as direct trade because live animals ceased to pay duties in both 
countries. Consequently the increase in imports from Spain after 
that year shown by the statistics is highly inflated.
Finally mention should be made of the decreasing importance 
of Brazil, which from the second largest supplier of imports 
shifted to a less important position; and the increasing 
importance of the African colonies, which however by 1913 
accounted only for a very small share of Portuguese imports. The 
evolutions of these two curves are inversely related because 
Portuguese imports from Brazil were of the same kind as those 
imported from Africa namely, sugar, coffee and cacao.1
Portugal run trade surpluses with Brazil and Africa for most 
of the period. These surpluses helped paying the principal 
deficits with France, Germany, Belgium and the United States. 
Table 4.9 shows these trade balances together with those of the 
other major trade partners, according both to Portuguese and 
foreign trade statistics. As has been referred previously,
1. This was evident since the earlier times of the "third Portuguese empire". 
From the 1850s there was already the notion that Africa had the potential to 
supply the tropical goods that Portugal purchased from Brazil. See Clarence- 
Smith (1985, pp. 65-67). This author gives a comprehensive analysis of trade 
relations between Portugal and Africa. In agreement with Alexandre (1979), he 
argues that Portugal's interest for Africa was also economic.
On trade between Portugal and Brazil for 1900-1914, see also Salgado (1927). 
By comparing trade statistics of the two countries, Salgado (1927, p. 38) 
concludes that Portuguese exports to Brazil were undervalued (as we also show 
in appendix B). However, contrarily to what he infers, that does not mean that 
Brazil's share is also undervalued because the error in the statistics is 
general.
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Portuguese official trade statistics give misleading information
on trade balances after 1891 because of the different criteria
with which imports and exports were valued in the domestic
currency. As such it is necessary to compare these official
values with the correspondent values from foreign statistics.1
However, even these countries' statistics raise difficulties. For
example the United States' customs recorded the origin of imports
as the country of the last port of shipment. Thus reexports of
African goods from Portugal were taken as imports from Portugal
proper. The consequence of this is a more favourable trade
balance for Portugal registered in the American statistics after
the burst of African reexports, as shown in the same table. The
lack of regular shipping routes between Portugal and the United
States led trade to be carried indirectly and the fact that trade
was badly recorded was only a minor consequence of that. The
following words of the American consul in Lisbon illustrate how
trade could be hindered for lack of communications, although we
have to take into account that lack of regular transport could
also be the result of lack of a minimum flow of trade to feed it:
"The great drawback to trade between Portugal and the United 
States is the lack of regular communications. During the year
1880, 147 vessels arrived in Lisbon from the United States, 
but most of these vessels were chartered for full cargoes, 
and it is rare for a vessel to be put on for general cargo. 
The result is that many articles are imported via England at 
an increased expense, as well as being generally classed in
1. Portuguese official trade statistics were corrected precisely by comparing 
them with foreign trade statistics (see appendix B).
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the custom-house returns as being of English origin."1
Because of problems of this kind, table 4.8 has to be read 
carefully. However, there is an important finding shown in that 
table, which is that Portugal had a positive balance of trade 
with Britain throughout the second half of the nineteenth 
century.2 Only from the beginning of the twentieth century 
onwards did the balance turn negative. The basis of that surplus 
was of course port wine exports. Apart from Britain, Portugal's 
balance of trade with the other European countries was generally 
negative, the major exception being the balance with France 
during the wine export boom in the 1880s.
1. Commercial Relations (1881).
2. A feature that, according to Milward (1981, p. 59), was common to other 
"developing economies" of Europe.
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Table 4.9
Trade Balances (contos)
Prance Belgium Germany
Por. For • Por • For. Por. For .
36 -19 na
U.K.
Por. For.
1865/69 94 104
1870/74 862 900
1875/79 457 658
1880/84 824 948
1885/89 -727 192
1890/94 -533 487
1895/99 -419 582
1900/04 -1528 -103
1905/09 -1903 -382
1910/13 -2125 -916
-548 -593 26
-403 -159 42
-814 -529 -1 1 2
-59 13 -134
333 1023 -205
-615 -462 -179
-492 -188 -137
-763 -446 -254
1063 -615 -261
-920 -573 -489
22 -20 na
-89 -72 na
-116 -352 na
-317 -580 na
-330 -402 -40
-97 -567 43
-224 -1147 -320
-152 -1509 -788
1 11 -1668 -859
Spain U.S. Brazil African col.
Por. For. Por. For. Por. For. Por. For
1865/69 -1 1 0 -1843 -136 -120 70 na -175 na
1870/74 -46 -138 -242 -209 281 na -71 na
1875/79 -169 -1006 -627 -615 584 na 144 na
1880/84 -37 -645 -1024 -762 700 na -57 na
1885/89 -250 -829 -892 -602 576 na -2 1 na
1890/94 -267 39 -969 -582 819 na 768 na
1895/99 -17 -210 -906 -187 777 na 2803 na
1900/04 70 55 -947 -33 533 1368 2968 na
1905/09 174 215 -1043 655 870 1865 2672 na
1910/13 246 51 -1284 707 1083 2635 2710 na
Notes: "Por." and "For." stand respectively for Portuguese and
foreign sources for export and import values. 
Source: Appendixes B and C.
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Despite the distortions that the tariff regimes may impose, 
the fact is that foreign trade patterns are related to a 
country's comparative advantages. Portugal had comparative 
advantages in agricultural goods such as wine, and some 
Mediterranean products. In terms of manufactures, however, the 
comparative advantages revealed by the export patterns were 
rather more limited. Cottons and other manufactures like footwear 
or metal tools were exported to Africa and Brazil largely because 
they benefited either from tariff protection (in Africa after 
1892), or from the preferences of Portuguese emigrants in Brazil. 
In exchange for wine and sales to Africa and Brazil, Portugal 
imported manufactured goods and industrial inputs. This pattern 
is the closest we can find to the pattern of trade within Europe 
and between Europe and the rest of the world, linking more and 
less technologically developed countries, through merchandise 
trade and capital flows. Accordingly, each country imports higher 
technological content goods from more advanced countries, in 
exchange for goods with less technological content, and it 
exports lower grade industrial goods to less developed areas, in 
exchange for primary products. The Mediterranean countries, for 
example, imported cotton and linen yarn from Britain, but their 
imports of either wool yarn or piece goods were practically non­
existent, because these are more labour intensive goods. Instead, 
Britain exported piece goods to less developed countries outside 
Europe. On the other hand, France, Belgium, Germany and
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Switzerland - the major importers of textile yarn, as well as pig 
and bar iron and machinery sold by Britain - exported to Austria, 
Poland, Italy and Russia lower technological content goods. 
Austria and Italy had the same specialization towards Hungary and 
the Balkans. Italy sold low quality textiles, mainly silks, to 
the Balkans and to Latin America.1 Industrialized countries such 
as France and Britain also exchanged between them goods according 
to their resources endowments: Britain sold coal, wool, iron, 
copper and semi-finished woollens to France and bought in 
exchange silk, leather and cotton manufactures, wine, spirits, 
refined sugar and flour.2 Portugal participated in this complex 
net of world trade in the particular position given by its 
imperial status.3
Portuguese trade with Africa and Brazil has to be read in 
the light of these general patterns of bi-directional trade. 
Portugal exported manufactures to the less developed areas 
closest to its position at the edge of Europe and made accessible 
by its past or present Empire. Such pattern of specialization had
1. See Pollard (1982, pp. 174-84 and 225). Pollard also mentions a similar 
pattern of specialization between the Western and Eastern parts of the German 
Empire. See also for Austria, Eddie (1989, pp. 827-28), and for Italy, 
Federico (1987, p. 12) and Fenoaltea (1968, p. 417).
2. See O'Brien and Keyder (1978, p. 162). Intra-industry trade did not have in 
the nineteenth century the importance that it achieved after 1945. The 
economic literature on the determinants of the commodity composition of trade, 
that is, regarding the discussion of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson theorem, is 
rather wide. See for a survey, Tharakan (1985).
3. See the best description of this "pattern of settlements" by Saul (1960, 
chap. 3).
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evident political causes. And in this sense we may agree with 
Wallerstein's classification of Portugal as a country belonging 
to the semi-periphery of the world economy, if it is taken into 
account that, according to this author, semi-periphery is a 
concept that does not refer to an economic process, but to a 
'•political choice". Following Wallerstein, a given country 
assumes a semi-peripheral position because of deliberate policy 
action towards shifting resources in a "core-like" direction. 
However, when Portugal's trade is seen in the context of the 
patterns found for other countries from the geographical 
periphery of Europe, one is led to conclude that economic factors 
(related to the structure of the Portuguese economy) were also in 
action because, as was pointed out above, similar patterns were 
common to other late-comers that did not have colonies.1
1. It should be noted that Wallerstein's typology is of limited use because it 
is not fully consistent. In fact, although semi-periphery is defined in terms 
of political choice (much in the lines of an author discussed in chapter 1 , 
Ant6nio S6rgio), the related concepts of centre and periphery are defined in 
economic terms. See Wallerstein (1985, pp. 34-36). In contradistinction, 
Schwartzman (1989, pp. 77-82), who follows closely Wallerstein in her analysis 
of Portugal, argues that the concept of semi-periphery is essentially 
economical. In a brief review of the concept Federico (1988, pp. 166-667) 
concludes that the classification criteria is essentially historical rather 
than "structural”. In other words, it is an ex-post concept.
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4.4 - The balance of trade and economic growth, 1865-1913
Economists and historians expect import dependence to be a 
major feature of economic growth of small nations, during the 
period of growing and comparatively free international trade that 
lasted from mid-nineteenth century to World War I. If that is the 
case, economic growth is then constrained by a given country's 
capacity to pay for imported goods. Consequently, export earnings 
can be of paramount importance for balanced growth, because of 
the foreign currency they earn. But export earnings can of course 
be supplemented and substituted by other sources of financial 
inflows which may include, as we have seen for the case of 
Portugal, emigrant remittances (and foreign capital), and 
revenues from colonial reexports.
The way imports are financed may not be indifferent in terms 
of their consequences to the economy or in terms of the range of 
choices of economic policy. If imports are mostly financed by 
autonomous capital inflows, for instance, the economy will be 
more affected by fluctuations in world financial markets. On the 
other hand, if imports are mainly financed by export (or 
reexport) revenues, the dependence on the international economy 
changes in nature: now foreign demand for exports and the terms 
of trade are the main paths of transmission for external 
fluctuations.
The relative importance of the different sources of foreign
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revenue varied throughout time in the case of Portugal. In 
certain periods, such as that that immediately followed the 
crisis of the late 1880s, alternative sources of foreign revenue 
had to be found, because the old ones had broken down. Precisely 
during the late 1880s and early 1890s, contemporaries were most 
worried about the country's capacity to equilibrate its balance 
of payments, as well as its capacity to maintain economic and 
political independence. Some historians have reproduced these 
fears, to such an extent that they have unduly concluded that the 
difficulties felt in the balance of payments by 1890 were 
translated in a deep and generalised economic crisis.
The analysis carried in this section will show that there 
were in fact major structural changes in respect to the capacity 
to finance import growth through exports after 1890. Indeed, 
after 1890 Portuguese economic growth got more dependent on 
sources of import financing other than exports. However, these 
shifts did not affect in any fundamental way the smooth path of 
economic growth that by that year had already lasted for four 
decades.
To analyse the constraint imposed by the balance of 
merchandise trade on economic growth we shall estimate here 
import and export demand equations. The main objective of these 
estimates is to obtain income elasticities for the demand of 
imports into Portugal, and for foreigner demand of Portuguese 
exports. By comparing these income elasticities we can say 
something about the extent to which Portugal could depend on
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exports to pay for the imports needed for economic growth. This 
issue is crucial for balanced growth. With constant terms of 
trade, a country that has an income elasticity for imports higher 
than the income elasticity for exports, will experience a 
deterioration in its trade balance, and a pressure on either its 
gold reserves or its exchange rates. In that case, capital 
imports and other foreign financial flows can be crucial to 
sustain economic growth.1
To compute the elasticities for Portuguese trade I estimated 
linear demand functions for imports and exports, according to two 
different functional forms. The first is a standard Keynesian 
demand function, according to which demand of period t is a 
function of relative prices and income of the same period; the 
second is an extended version of the first form with a lagged 
dependent variable which accounts for an adjustment process in 
demand. The extended form was preferred because, in contrast to 
what happens with the standard one, the residuals of the 
regressions are not autocorrelated.2 As it is discussed in the 
appendix to this chapter, where the models are described in more 
detail, autocorrelation of the residuals can be the result of 
model misspecification. In that case we conclude that the
1. See Johnson (1958), Houthakker and Magee (1969, p. 111). For a review on 
this issue see Magee (1975, pp. 201-2) and Goldstein and Khan (1985, pp. 1083-
84).
2. The extended equations were also preferred on grounds of consistency. See 
below.
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addition of a lagged dependent variable has increased the 
specification of the demand functions because it has eliminated 
the autocorrelation on the residuals. The economic rational 
beyond the lagged variable is that it depicts the effect of 
adjustment in demand for imports. Accordingly, the level of 
imports in period t is conditioned by the level of the previous 
period, because of the consequent variation in net foreign 
liabilities. Our previous discussion in this chapter shows that 
this adjustment process could be particularly relevant for the 
case of Portugal.1
Two major conclusions may be drawn from table 4.10, where 
the results of the estimates of the two forms for the demand 
functions are shown (the values for the standard equation are 
reported in this and the following tables for the sake of 
comparison). The first conclusion is that demand for exports from 
and for imports into Portugal are both price inelastic, the 
respective coefficients not being significantly different from 
zero. The second conclusion is that the income elasticity for 
imports is larger than the income elasticity for exports, this 
differential having increased in the period after 1890.
1. For further details see the econometric appendix to thiB chapter. Demand 
elasticities for imports disaggregated in three classes of goods, using the 
two models are presented below. According to the standard model, which is also 
affected by autocorrelation in the residuals, the income elasticity for 
imports of manufactures turned negative in the 1890-1913 period, what explains 
to a large extent the reduction of the aggregate elasticity. This is a result 
hard to accept, giving an additional reason to reject the model.
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Table 4.10
Import and Export Demand Elasticities: Portugal
Standard equation
Import
Price Income
Export 
Price Income
(1865-1890) al a2 bl b2
-0.534 1.374 -0.074 0.790
(3.60) (6.26) (0.40) (7.12)
(1890-1913) al a2 bl b2
0.347 0.786 0.060 0.834
(0.97) (2.10) (0.26) (7.37)
(1865-1913) al a2 bl b2
-0.394 1.117 -0.074 0.727
(3.92) (14.46) ((0.79) (20.32)
Extended equation
(1865-1890) cl/k c2/k di/q d2/q
(k*0.445; q*0.690) -0.515 1.553 -0.172 0.819
(1.53) (2.49) (0.64) (2.72)
(1890-1913) cl/k c2/k dl/q d2/q
(k=0.407; q*0.417) -0.592 2.260 0.259 0.861
(0.83) (2.89) (0.53) (2.09)
(1865-1913) cl/k c2/k dl/q d2/q
(k*0.282; q*0.586) -0.287 1.174 -0.010 0.730
(0.93) (2.54) (0.70) (4.11)
Notes:
Standard equation
lnT(t) * aO + al.ln[PT(t)/PA(t)] + a2.1nA(t) ♦ u(t) 
al < 0; a2 > 0 
Extended equation
lTn(t) * cO + cl.ln[PT(t)/PA(t) ] + c2.1nA(t) + c3.1nT(t-l) +
u’(t)
cl < 0; c2, c3 > 0
T stands for imports or exports and A stands for world or domestic 
activity* t-statistics between brackets. All data converted into 
indexes (1900=100).
Sources: World activity and world prices: Lewis (1981, pp. 38-59, 
62-65); Portugal: appendixes A and C. See regression results 
summarized in tables 4.13 and 4.14.
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The finding that the demand for imports is inelastic with 
respect to prices is indicative of the fact that Portugal 
purchased abroad essential consumption goods and raw materials, 
and that the domestic import competing industries were not enough 
developed to provide for substitutes.1 The fact that export 
demand is inelastic in relation to prices cannot be interpreted 
in such a clear-cut way. The goods that Portugal exported had 
close substitutes from many parts of the world. Portugal was also 
a small exporter in most markets, except for that of raw cork.2 
Thus we could expect a large price elasticity for aggregate 
export demand. Yet, two sorts of factors may have influenced the 
elasticity in the other direction. Firstly, some of Portuguese 
export markets could have certain rigidities. For instance, 
exports of port wine and corks were tied to British investment in 
Portugal, whereas exports of canned fish were tied to French 
investment, and thus probably less responsive to price changes. 
Another reason could be that Portuguese export prices relative to 
those of its competitors were on average falling, probably not 
because of increases in productivity, but because of other 
factors such as decrease in relative quality standards. Demand 
could be elastic in relation to increasing prices but not so in 
relation to decreasing prices. This is also why price
1. This is a classical text-book case of less developed countries. See for 
instance Sodersten (1980, pp. 319-20).
2. See for instance Costa (1908).
212
elasticities of the demand for most farm products in high income 
countries tends to be low.1
The differences in income elasticities shown in table 4.10 
mean that, given the initial situation of a trade deficit in 
1865, the rate of economic growth in Portugal was limited by the 
capacity to cover an increasing trade deficit, and the growth 
rate of world imports (world income). In other words, the growth 
of the Portuguese economy could not differ systematically by a 
large measure from the growth of world imports unless a deficit 
in the balance of trade could be maintained either by external 
financing or by compensation through other items of the balance 
of payments. In this context, the magnitude of the income 
elasticity of export demand appears as a crucial constraint of 
economic growth. At constant terms of trade, and capital imports 
apart, Portugal could either grow at the same rate as its trading 
partners, accepting a secular deterioration in its balance of 
trade, or to opt to external balance and accept a slower growth 
rate than its partners.2
1. See Schultz (1983, p. 11). For empirical evidence on export price 
elasticities for the twentieth century see Goldstein and Khan (1985, pp. 1084-
85) and Stern (et al.) (1976, pp. 12-26). According to this evidence export 
price elasticities for primary products are generally smaller than for 
manufactured goods, and in some cases not significantly different from zero.
For the nineteenth century we have evidence from Nye (1989, pp. 11-15), 
whose estimates for the demand for French exports are also price inelastic in 
the 1820-1850 period (-0.5), yet increasing in the following period from 1860- 
1890 (-1.9). The price elasticity of Spanish exports is also inelastic for the 
1850-1913 period (-0.2), according to Prados (1982, p. 31), although not so 
for the period 1815-1880 (-0.7) according to Prados (1988, p. 186).
2. Goldstein and Khan (1985, pp. 1083-84).
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Yet, if the external imbalances are adjusted through changes 
in prices and capital movements, the constraint of the trade 
deficit on growth is relaxed. In fact, growth in the case 
described above leads to a deterioration in a country's balance 
of payments only if domestic credit creation exceeds the growth 
in the domestic demand for money. Otherwise, the outflow of money 
due to the external deficit would reduce domestic money supply, 
and thus raise interest rates to a new equilibrium, and imports 
would be reduced via the contraction in investment and, given 
certain conditions, in consumption. It is generally held in the 
literature that money creation under the curso forgado was 
largely inflated.1 However, contemporary authors such as Freitas 
(1898), Teles (1903), as well as Salazar (1916), argued that 
money creation after Portugal left the gold standard was not 
excessive and as such did not affect prices. This is further 
confirmed by the quantification of the money stock from Reis 
(1991a).2
Although capital imports and other inflows are not strictly 
necessary to allow for growth when the income elasticity for 
imports is larger than that for exports, they ease the pressure 
on the economy by lowering interest rates. This is of course 
another way of expressing the absorption view of the balance of
1. See Magee (1975, pp. 201-2).
2. See Freitas (1898, p. 47), Teles (1903, p. 415), Salazar (1916, pp. 156-60) 
and Reis (1991a).
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payments, according to which the observed imbalances are a 
consequence of a disequilibrium between domestic savings and 
investment.1 As the determinants of financial inflows include 
exogenous variables, economic growth may become more dependent on 
the conditions of the international capital markets.2
It has already been mentioned that emigrant remittances, 
probably Portugal's main source of foreign revenue, were a major 
source of instability, as well. As Salazar (1916) has pointed 
out, after Portugal left the gold standard, remittances had a 
strong influence on the rate of exchange, as shown by the high 
correlation of the value of the pound in Lisbon and Rio de 
Janeiro.3 This author also points out that part of the 
fluctuations in remittances and capital imports were due to 
domestic factors. According to him, capital imports were not as 
much sensitive to the creditworthiness of the state, as to the 
level of interest rates, taxes, or the perception of the foreign 
investors regarding the country's safety and stability. More 
precisely, Salazar (1916) argues that capital movements were 
related to changes in the confidence of the foreign creditors 
derived from certain historical events. According to him, the 
1891 financial crisis led capital to leave the country; the
1. See Alexander (1956).
2. See for a the general case Sodersten (1980, p. 356).
3. The most complete study on this relationship is Salazar (1916, p. 189),
although it had been previously recognized by Cordeiro (1896, p. 181) and
Teles (1903, pp. 414-15). See also Mata (1984) and Pereira (1983, pp. 260-61).
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convention with foreign creditors in 1902 led to the return of 
capital because confidence would have increased; and finally the 
dictatorial government of Jo3o Franco in 1907 would have again 
frightened investors.1 The conclusions we may draw for Portugal 
on this matter cannot be but tentative because we lack yearly 
estimates for the balance of payments, and because it is 
difficult to establish the true causes of changes in capital 
imports. For instance, the 1902 convention could have been signed 
because the balance of payments improved (due to better 
conditions in Brazil, and thus higher remittances), and not the 
other way round, as Salazar argued.
Under specific conditions, rapid growth, even when it 
implies an increase in the trade deficit, may generate balance of 
payments surpluses, and sluggish growth may generate balance of 
payments deficits, even if it leads to trade surpluses. This was 
the case with the United States, a net capital importer, as well 
as Britain, a net capital exporter, during most cycles in the 
period from 1820 to 1913.2 During the Italian industrial upsurge 
of the Giolittian era (1903-1913) a similar process occurred. 
According to Fenoaltea (1968), that boom benefited from a 
"sufficient inflow of foreign capital to keep the legal tender at 
par". In agreement, Federico (1979) argues that the success of 
these years was precisely due to the capacity to substitute for
1. See Salazar (1916, pp. 169-71, 174-75).
2. See Williamson (1964, pp. 159-60 and 206). On this "virtuous cycle of 
growth” see also Caves (1970, pp. 236-43).
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diminishing exports, in a period of increasing imports, by 
importing capital, as had already happened during the previous 
boom in 1883-1887.1 These examples illustrate the fact that 
income elasticities of imports larger than those of exports is a 
structural feature of the economy that is not negative per se.
The experience of the Scandinavian countries may further 
illustrate how similar structural features led to different 
results in general economic performance. Table 4.11 reports the 
estimates of import demand elasticities for Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden, together with the United Kingdom, computed in the same 
way as those for Portugal.2 For the same reasons as before, the 
extended form of the demand equation has been preferred.3 In what 
Scandinavia is concerned, the first interesting fact is that 
taking the whole period from 1865 to 1913, income elasticities 
for each country's imports are larger than the correspondent 
export elasticities. We may thus conclude that the capacity to 
finance an increasing deficit of the balance of trade was
1. See Penoaltea (1968, p. 418) and Federico (1979, p. 403). This mechanism
was of course also active during the short industrial boom in Portugal by mid-
1870s, as it has already been pointed out.
2. The case of the United Kingdom is just mentioned as indicative. Given the
predominant position of this country in world markets, its elasticities of 
imports may be compared to those of exports from the other countries. Zt 
should be mentioned too that UK's merchandise deficit was covered by net 
exports of services and interest payments from capital exports. See Imlah 
(1958).
3. As in these cases the outcome of the standard and extended equations do not 
have significant differences, those for the standard equation are reported 
only in the appendix to this chapter.
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important not only for Portugal but also for Scandinavia. Table
4.11 also shows estimates for Spain from Prados (1982, 1988) for 
1850-1913, and the conclusions for this country are similar.1 In 
the context of demand analysis carried out in this section, the 
initial conditions by 1865 appear as crucial: the larger the 
trade deficit accumulated in the first half of the century, the 
worse the conditions of economic growth in those countries. Yet 
the capacity of each country to borrow on capital markets in 
order to close the gap is more important.
1. Prados (1982, p. 31) and (1988, pp. 186-87). For Italy, Glazier et al. 
(1975) provides estimates for foreign trade demand functions, but only for 
trade with Britain.
Table 4.11 
Import and Export Demand Elasticities: 
Selected European Countries
Import Export
Price Income Price Income
(1865-1890)
Portugal -0.515* 1.553 -0.172* 0.819
Denmark
Finland
Sweden
0.283*
1.735*
0.150*
2.872
1.157*
2.221
-0.380*
0.945*
-0.453*
1.187
0.313*
1.263*
United Kingdom -0.207* 1.614 -0.295* 0.828
(1890-1913)
Portugal -0.592* 2.260 0.259* 0.861
Denmark
Finland
Sweden
-0.883*
0.791*
0.138*
0.870
1.610
0.867
-0.870
0.276
-1.218
1.106
1.042
0.945
United Kingdom 0.352* 1.304 -1.267 0.853
(1865-1913)
Portugal -0.287* 1.174 -0.010* 0.730
Denmark
Finland
Sweden
-0.059*
1.698
-0.250*
1.563
1.439
1.355
-0.405*
0.114*
-0.848
1.206
1.111
1.204
United Kingdom 0.020* 1.468 -0.920 0.718
Spain (1850-1913) -1.176 1.478 -0.191* 1.001
Notes:
Elasticities computed as in the previous table, except for Spain 
which are taken from Prados (1982, p. 31, eq. 2) and (1988, p. 
186).
Sources: World activity and world prices: see previous table. 
Denmark: Johansen (1985, pp. 190-98, 217-218, 390-97). Finland: 
Hjerppe (1989, pp. 195-96, 259-61), Vattula (1983, pp. 18, 232, 
458). Sweden: Johansson (1967, pp. 138-45, 150-61). United
Kingdom: Mitchell (1975, pp. 818, 826), Imlah (1958, pp. 96-98). 
All data converted into indexes (1900*100).
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In the shorter period from 1890 to 1913 the story for 
Denmark and Sweden is different from that of Portugal, because 
their income elasticity demand for exports is larger than that of 
imports, implying that the growth of income did not lead to an 
adverse balance of trade. Finland was in the same conditions as 
Portugal, but it would be interesting to look for the differences 
in the conditions for Portugal and Finland with respect to the 
payment of their trade deficits, in particular the rate of
interest paid on foreign capital.1 What is important to stress is
that in the two decades after 1890, economic growth in Portugal
became more sensitive to the capacity to provide for the means to
cover the deficit on the balance of trade, in contrast to Denmark 
and Sweden.
The factor behind that change was of course import 
substitution.2 Table 4.12 shows clearly that the increase of the 
income elasticity of imports in 1890-1913 was due to the increase 
of the elasticity of imports of industrial inputs (raw materials 
and intermediate goods). The income elasticity for imports of 
manufactures, on the other hand, was slightly reduced. The 
disaggregation of the import demand schedule reported in table
1. In 1873 the rate at which the government from Portugal could borrow in 
London was 6.7%, whereas for Britain and Denmark it was 3%, for Sweden, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Germany, it was 4% (Pollard, 1989, pp. 76-77). Of 
course Portugal was still in a relative advantageous position. The ottoman 
Empire, for instance, had to borrow on average at 10-12% throughout 1860-1913. 
See Pamuk (1987, p. 59).
2. It is recalled that this effect is underestimated by the fact that the 
class of manufactured goods includes a small but increasing share of capital 
goods, namely industrial tools and machinery and railway equipment.
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4.12 shows additionally that the standard regression does not 
give consistent results, contrary to the extended regression, 
further supporting our choice (see the appendix to this 
chapter).1
1. We have tested the influence of tariffs on imports by estimating a 
regression in which the domestic price of imports was divided in three 
components: international import prices expressed in pounds (PM'), the 
exchange rate (E) and the ad valorem tariff rate (Tariff). The coefficient for 
tariffs is not statistically significant. The results for the extended 
equation for 1865-1913 are:
InM(t) * 4.943 - 0.396 InCPMUO/PYCt)] • 0.866 InE - 0.490 InTariff ♦ 0.753lnY(t) ♦ 0.441 lnMCt-1)
(3.12) (2.74) (3.86) (1.36) (4.54) (3.66)
R2 « 0.955; DU « 2.24; SCR * 0.07 
Absolute t~values between brackets.
PM’ and Tariff are computed from Lains (1987)* E is from appendix table B.6. 
The statistical significant elasticities are the following (cf. with appendix 
to this chapter)
Price elasticity * -0.398/(1-0.441) - -0.711 
Income elasticity * 0.753/(1-0.441) * 1.347 
Exchange rate elasticity « -0.868/(1-0.441) * -1.553
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Table 4.12
liiport Demand Elasticities by Sectors: Portugal
Standard Equation
1865-■1890 1890- 1913 1865' 1913
Sectors Price Income Price Income Price Income
Foodstuffs -1.133 0.285 -0.178 0.397 -0.766 0.555
Intermediate goods -0.235 2.222 -0.002 1.827 -0.269 1.968
Manufactured goods -0.001 1.471 1.315 -0.455 -0.100 0.277
TOTAL (from tab.4.10) -0.534 1.374 0.347 0.786 -0.394 1.117
Extended Equation
1865- 1890 1890-1913 1865- 1913
Sectors Price Income Price Income Price Income
Foodstuffs -1.271 0.031* -0.470* 0.717* -0.793 0.520
Intermediate goods -0.050* 2.547 -0.160* 2.145 -0.200 1.979
Manufactured goods 0.157* 1.908 0.027* 1.641 0.336* 0.496*
TOTAL (from tab.4.10) -0.515* 1.553 -0.592 2.260 -0.287* 1.174
Notes: Elasticities computed as in the previous table. 
Sources: see table 4.10.
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The 1890s were difficult years for Portugal because of 
changes in the international economy, in particular disturbances 
in the international capital markets. Due to difficulties in the 
balance of payments, Portugal left the gold standard. This 
decision brought in turn currency depreciation (see appendix 
table B .6). This mechanism of adjustment had the ultimate 
consequence of promoting import substitution, leading to another 
source of pressure on the balance of payments. Contemporary 
writers and historians had the clear perception of these 
problems. Yet, either because they were living the drama and 
engaged most of the times in politics, or because they were 
looking into misleading directions, what they could not envisage 
was that such difficulties could be overcome. We have described 
in this chapter how problems in the balance of payments were 
successively solved, to such an extent that the 1891 financial 
crisis, in the end, was not reflected on the indexes of physical 
output growth. What is left to be demonstrated is whether the 
solutions found to solve the balance of payments difficulties 
were fortuitous or not. The hypothesis that the Portuguese 
economy was by the 1890s sufficiently "mature" to have the power 
to overcome such a crisis of development, whatever the 
circumstances, should be considered too.
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Econometric appendix
Elasticities for the demand of Portuguese imports were 
estimated according to a function defined in agreement with the 
classical Keynesian formulation in which imports depend on the 
level of nominal national income, on foreign prices, and on the 
prices of the competing home produced goods:
(1) Mt = f (NY(t), PM(t), PY(t))
fl >0, f2 < 0, f3 > 0 
where, M stands for the volume of imports, NY for the value of 
national income, and PH and PY denote the respective price 
indexes in a common currency, and t stands for time. Dividing the 
right-hand side of equation (1) by PY, that is, assuming that 
there is no money illusion, and taking logarithms, we get,
(2) lnM(t) = ao + al.ln[PM(t)/PY(t)] + a2.1nY(t) + u(t)
al < 0; a2 > 0
where Y is the deflated national income, aO is the intercept, al 
and &2 stand for the import demand elasticities in respect to 
prices and income, respectively, and u is the error term.
By taking equation (2) it is assumed that markets are not 
fully competitive, that is that imported and home produced goods 
are not perfect substitutes. This assumption implies that 
whatever the changes in the relative prices of both domestic and 
imported goods, neither of them fully dominates the market, an 
assumption that is true for most goods and certainly for imports
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taken in aggregate.1
The import demand function was estimated for the years 1865- 
1913 for which we have a continuous series for import volumes and 
prices and a proxy for the national income. This proxy is an 
index for physical output growth presented in the appendix B.2 
All variables are in index form.
The functional form for the export demand function is derived 
in a similar way. In this case exports are taken as a function of 
a world economic activity, and export prices relative to world 
prices. To take into account changes in world income 
elasticities, I have used a proxy for world imports - an index of 
world exports - as the world activity variable. The movement in 
prices, though, may differ given that import prices contain a CIF 
factor, which had a secular decline from 1865. This is a minor 
distortion, nevertheless.** The equation for export demand is the 
following:
1. See Goldstein and Khan (1985, p. 1045). For the "law of one price” to hold 
for aggregate imports, it would be necessary that imports were totally 
composed of standardized products.
2. The index for physical output, a composite index of agricultural and 
industrial growth, is smoothed because the index for agriculture consists of 
three year non-overlapping averages, and thus it had to be interpolated for 
the intermediate years* To convert this index into an index of G*N*P* in 
current prices, I assumed that services evolved at the same pace as physical 
output, and used Justino (1988-89) price deflator. For more details see 
appendix A.
3. In terms of volumes the World exports and imports should be equal except 
for accounting errors*
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(3) lnX(t) = bO + bl.ln[PX(t)/PMW(t)] + b2.1nMW(t) + v
bl < 0, b2 > 0
where X is the volume of Portuguese exports, MW is a volume index 
for world imports and PZ and PMW are the respective prices, in 
the home currency. Coefficients are read as in equation 2. The 
results of the estimates for equations (2) and (3) are reported 
on tables 4.13 and 4.14 below.
The greatest problem of the estimated demand functions is 
that they present serial correlation of the first order, as shown 
by the Durbin-Watson statistics. All the other statistics are 
good, and the signs of the statistically significant coefficients 
are as expected. The observations we use to estimate demand 
functions are equilibrium points defined by a demand and a supply 
schedule. If a single equation model is used, it might happen 
that the resulting estimates for the elasticities are in fact 
weighted averages of the true demand and supply elasticities, 
leading to undervaluation of demand elasticities. According to 
Orcutt (1950) single equation estimates for demand are valid only 
when the supply elasticity is infinite.1 The assumption of 
infinite supply elasticities is stronger in the case of aggregate 
export supply, even in the long-run, because exports are drawn 
from limited domestic resources; while the supply elasticity of 
aggregate imports (in particular of imports into a small country 
such as Portugal) is most probably close to infinity, because
1. See Learner and Stern (1970, pp. 28-36).
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imports are drawn from world resources. Serial correlation may 
thus be a consequence of a simultaneous equation problem in 
estimating demand functions.1
It is common practice to correct autocorrelation by using 
the Cohcrane-Orcutt method. This method is however subject to 
criticism because it imposes a restrictive assumption on the 
estimates, namely, that the dependent and independent variables 
in the equation evolve in time through a common factor, and in 
consequence a common root formulation is valid. Only in that case
can the residuals of the estimates be expressed as:
(4) z(t) « a.z(t-l) + w(t)
It has been argued by Hendry and Mizon (1978) that the error
term autoregression [a.z(t-l)] catches the effects of omitted 
lagged variables in the regression. In that case, autocorrelation 
is attributed to dynamic misspecification of the model. 
Consequently, by adding a lagged variable to the demand functions 
we can eliminate serial correlation and avoid the simultaneous 
equation bias.2 Following Hendry and Mizon's point, it is worth
1. Orcutt's assumption according to which single-equation estimates undervalue 
the true elasticities has been contested by Magee (1975, pp. 205-7 and 214-18) 
who - criticising what he calls the "Orcuttazition of empirical studies" - 
points out to a series of other factors that may lead to over-valuation of 
the elasticities estimated from single equation models. In his empirical study 
based on simultaneous equations estimates, though, Magee found large supply 
elasticities for both imports and exports (idem, p. 204).
2. In that case, autocorrelation is attributed to dynamic mis-specification of 
the model. For details regarding this matter see Hendry and Mizon (1978, pp. 
550-52). In any case, according to Magee (1975) and in disagreement to Orcutt 
(1950) it should not be expect that the dynamic model gives higher demand 
elasticities.
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while to try to better specify the functional form for import 
demand, by adding a lagged variable, and to eliminate the 
correlation in the residuals, instead of using the more 
restricted Cochrane-Orcutt method.
The dynamic model I estimated is inspired in Houthakker and 
Taylor (1970). It assumes that demand has the following 
adjustment process:
(5) /\ lnM(t) = k . [In Md(t) - In M(t-l)]
where Md(t) is demand for imports in period t, M(t-l) is actual 
imports in the previous period, k is the coefficient of 
adjustment (0<k<l), and /\ is a first-difference operator,
/\ lnM(t) = In M(t) - In M(t-l)
Equation (5) implies that the actual level of imports into a 
given country adjust to excess demand for imports. If, for 
instance, imports in period (t-1) lead to an outflow of foreign 
exchange reserves or gold, or to reduced net foreign liabilities, 
imports in period (t) would fall below demand, implying a 
coefficient of adjustment k<l. This assumption may be 
particularly valid in the case that the level of imports is 
constrained either by the size of the market (for a given 
imported good) or by the availability of foreign revenues. These 
two factors are most probably relevant in the case of Portugal: 
as shown in the previous sections, at least in two moments of 
Portuguese economic history - the mid-1870s and the early 1890s -
228
were imports affected by the availability of foreign revenues.1
By substituting equation (2) into (5), we get the following 
extended equation:
(6) lnM(t) ■ cO + cl.ln[PM(t)/PY(t)]+ c2.1nY(t)
+ c3.1n M(t-l) + u' 
cl < 0; c2, c3 > 0
where cl=k.al, c2=k.a2, c3=l-k. The basic parameters equivalent 
to those of equation (2) are thus given by dividing the 
parameters of equation (6) by the coefficient of adjustment k 
(k=l-c3) . The mean time lag in the adjustment for imports is 
given by 1/k.2 The correspondent function for exports is:
(7) lnX(t) = do + dl.ln[PX(t)/PMW(t)] + d2.1nMW(t)
+ d3.1nX(t-l) + v* 
dl < 0; d2, d3 > 0
where dl=q.bl, d2=q.b2, and d3=l-q; q is defined as k in the 
import function.3 The results for the extended equations (6) and 
(7) are reported in tables 4.13 and 4.14 together with the 
results for the standard equations (2) and (3). I estimated 
demand functions for the whole period 1865 to 1913, as well as 
for the two sub-periods from 1865-1890 and 1890-1913, in order to
1. See Goldstein and Khan (1978, p. 277), and Khan and Knight (1988).
2. See Goldstein and Khan (1978, p. 277).
3. For exports the lag in the equation may also be seen as an adjustment in 
demand. Although his formulation is slightly different from the one in the 
text Hatton (1990, p. 584) also allows "for a geometric lag between the 
determinants of demand and actual exports which would be expected to arise 
through the time taken to communicate demand and ship goods to docks."
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account for the disturbances after Portugal left the gold 
standard (1890 to 1913).1
1. Hatton (1990) checks for a "structural break" around the same year, on 
account of raising tariffs in Italy, U.S.A., and France, and of the financial 
shock following the Baring crisis in 1890 (see p. 585).
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Estimated Parameters^Import Demand C L* j
Standard equation
(1865-1890) 
aO
1.029
(0.68)
al
-0.534
(3.60)
a2
1.374
(6.26)
- R2
0.91
DW
1.17
SER
0.09
(1890-1913)
aO
-0.476
(0.55)
al
0.347
(0.97)
a2
0.786
(2.10)
- R2
0.59
OW
0.71
SER
0.10
(1865-1913)
aO
1.398
(2.00)
al
-0.394
(3.92)
a2
1.117
(14.46)
-
R2
0.89
DW
0.62
SER
0.11
Extended equation
(1865-1890)
cO
0.110
(0.85)
cl
-0.229
(1.53)
c2
0.691
(2.49)
c3
0.555
(3.51)
0.94 2.45 0.07
(1890-1913)
cO
-1.178
(1.83)
cl
-0.241
(0.83)
c2
0.920
(2.89)
c3
0.593
(3.14)
0.80 2.51 0.07
(1865-1913)
cO
0.202
(0.38)
cl
-0.081
(0.93)
c2
0.331
(2-54)
c3
0.718
(6.67)
0.94 2.18 0.08
Notes:
Standard equation
lnM(t) * aO ♦ al.ln[PM(t)/PY(t) ] + a2.1nY(t) + u 
al < 0; a2 > 0 
Extended equation
lnM(t) « cO + cl.In[PM(t)/PY(t)]+ c2.1nY(t) ♦ c3.1n M(t-l) ♦ u’ 
cl < 0; c2, c3 > 0
cl«k.al, c2-k.a2, c3*l-k; k is the coefficient of adjustment for 
imports (see text).
t-statistics between brackets; R2 is adjusted for degrees of 
freedom.
Full regression results given at the end of the chapter.
Sources: see table 4.10.
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Table 4.14 c * i
Estimated Parameters^ Export Demand L f -v 3
Standard equation
(1865-1890)
bO
1.227
(2.05)
bl
-0.074
(0.40)
b2
0.790
(7.12)
- R2
0.77
DW
1.42
SER
0.11
(1890-1913)
bO
0.331
(0.22)
bl
0.060
(0.26)
b2
0.834
(7.37)
-
R2
0.84
DW
0.89
SER
0.08
(1865-1913)
bO
1.466
(4.02)
bl
-0.074
(0.79)
b2
0.727
(20.32)
-
R2
0.92
DW
1.20
SER
0.10
Extended equation
(1865-1890)
dO
1.073
(1.71)
dl
-0.119
(0.64)
d2
0.565
(2.72)
d3
0.310
(1.38)
0.76 1.96 0.11
(1890-1913)
dO
-0.278
(0.20)
dl
0.108
(0.53)
d2
0.359
(2.09)
d3
0.583
(3.14)
0.88 2.08 0.07
(1865-1913)
dO
0.942
(2.42)
dl
-0.062
(0.70)
d2
0.428
(4.11)
d3
0.414
(3.04)
0.93 1.99 0.09
Notes:
Standard equation
lnX(t) - bO + bl.In[PX(t)/PMW(t)] + b2.1nMW(t) + v 
bl < 0, b2 > 0 
Extended equation
lnX(t) « dO + dl.ln[PX(t)/PMW(t) ] + d2.1nMW(t) + d3.1nX(t-l) + v* 
dl < 0; d2, d3 > 0
dl*q.bl, d2*q.b2, d3=l-q; q is the coefficient of adjustment for 
exports (see text).
t-statistics between brackets; R2 is adjusted for degrees of 
freedom.
Full regression results given at the end of the chapter.
Sources: see table 4.10.
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As expected from better specification, the extend equation 
no longer has serial correlation of the first order, as it is 
shown by the values of the Durbin-Watson statistics. Furthermore, 
the R2 and the standard errors of the regressions (SER) point to 
the better fit of the extended regressions in comparison with the 
standard regressions, the improvement being of greater importance 
in the case of the regression for the period after 1890. Finally 
the coefficients for the lagged variable (c3) are all significant 
at the 1% level. The income elasticities (a2=c2/k) are also 
significant, though with the extend equation the level of 
significance is somehow reduced. The price elasticities (al=cl/k) 
are not statistically significantly different from zero, except 
for the case of import demand in the standard regression for 
1865-1913.1
1. For further consents on the results see text, Section 4.4.
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As expected from better specification, the extend equation 
no longer has serial correlation of the first order, as it is 
shown by the values of the Durbin-Watson statistics. Furthermore, 
the R2 and the standard errors of the regressions (SER) point to 
the better fit of the extended regressions in comparison with the 
standard regressions, the improvement being of greater importance 
in the case of the regression for the period after 1890. Finally 
the coefficients for the lagged variable (c3) are all significant 
at the 1% level. The income elasticities (a2-c2/k) are also 
significant, though with the extend equation the level of 
significance is somehow reduced. The price elasticities (al=cl/k) 
are not statistically significantly different from zero, except 
for the case of import demand in the standard regression for 
1865-1913.1
1. For further comments on the results see text, Section 4.4.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
Quantitative research on Portuguese economic history is in 
its infancy, which means that it is not possible at this stage to 
give a full macroeconomic analysis for the 1850-1913 period. The 
present study is a first attempt to quantify the growth of 
physical output and labour productivity, and to establish the 
main trends in foreign trade (after revising the official 
figures). I have not provided, for instance, estimates for the 
evolution of the services sector, for changes in the rates of 
unemployment or, in the specific case of the foreign sector, 
estimates for the balance of payments. Investment has not been 
treated here either. At this stage we know nothing about the 
share of investment in national output, or the rate of growth of 
gross or net capital formation. Notwithstanding, it has been 
argued in chapter 3 that investment rates could have been a
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crucial factor marking the difference between success and failure 
in the export markets. The following summary of the basic facts 
of the Portuguese economy is thus necessarily incomplete.
In the years that immediately preceded the War, up to 60% of 
the (male) labour force was occupied in the agricultural sector. 
The industrial and the services sectors divided among them about 
equally the rest of the working force. According to contemporary 
estimates, by 1913 the value of agricultural output ascended to 
twice the value of industrial output. Such a proportion implies 
quite a narrow labour productivity gap - defined as the ration 
between the shares of output and labour in each sector - between 
the two sectors (approximately 86%). This narrow gap should be 
understood as a consequence of the fact that labour productivity 
in industry was low, and not that it was high in agriculture. It 
also indicates that the shift of resources towards the industrial 
sector could not have large short-run effects on overall labour 
productivity.
By 1850 the Portuguese economy looked quite different, 
because industry and agriculture increased at different rates. 
From 1850 to 1913, industry expanded at a trend rate of growth, 
in real terms, of about 2.5% per annum, whereas agricultural 
output increased at less than 1% per annum. Portugal clearly 
industrialized in the second half of the nineteenth century. Yet 
industrial development was rather smooth and no evidence was 
found on industrial spurts. In contrast to industry, we depict 
strong fluctuations in the output of the agricultural sector.
235
Agricultural production decreased in absolute terms during the 
1850s and again after the turn of the century. In between we 
identified a period of fast growth which was partially due to the 
fact that agriculture was recovering from depression. 
Fluctuations in agriculture are explained, it is recalled, by the 
fact that a large part of the farm output (up to 25%) was 
dependent on wine, a plant crop which was severely affected by 
the oidium in the 1850s and the phyloxera later in the 1870s and 
1880s.
The growth of output over the half century to 1913 was not 
accompanied by significant increases in factor productivity 
either in the agricultural or the industrial sector. As far as 
agriculture is concerned, growth was achieved mainly by the 
incorporation of additional labour and land into production. 
There were no important increases either in the productivity of 
land, or in the ratio of capital (i.e. working animals) per 
worker. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the growth of the farm 
output barely surpassed the increase in population. Thus, 
increases in consumption levels had to be met by increases in the 
import of foodstuffs. The industrial sector, which was throughout 
protected by tariffs and in some periods after Portugal left the 
gold standard, by a depreciated currency, developed in part by 
substituting imports. Growth by import substitution can be 
identified as the industrial expression of extensive growth, if 
it does not require structural changes leading to labour 
productivity increases, precisely as happened in the agricultural
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sector. But a few comparative advantages in industry emerged, 
leading ultimately to the development of industrial exports. 
These developments were based to an unknown but probably 
significant extent, on direct foreign investment, namely in cork 
manufactures and canned fish. To these export industries we can 
add a few others that catered for the colonial and the Brazilian 
markets.
The patterns of extensive growth just described could 
reflect the fact that in Portugal capital was relatively dearer 
than labour and land. This could in turn reflect the fact that 
continuous economic growth was a relatively recent phenomenon in 
the country and thus that capital had only accumulated up to a 
low share of national output.
The structure of foreign trade is in agreement with the 
description just made of a recently developing agricultural 
country. Exports were predominantly composed of agricultural 
goods, and imports were dominated by foodstuffs, manufactured 
consumer goods and an increasing share of industrial inputs. The 
growth of the volume of exports was relatively intense in the 
years up to 1886, and stagnated during the following period. This 
stagnation in exports is not associated with stagnation in 
agricultural output which occurred, as mentioned, more than one 
decade later. On the other hand, import volumes evolved over an 
upward trend throughout the whole period, except for the short 
but deep depression during the early 1890s. One fundamental 
finding shown by the disaggregation of import trends was that
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about three quarters of the decline of imports in these years was 
due to the decline of imports of manufactured goods. Thus, the 
heavily import dependent Portuguese industry was not affected by 
this blip in aggregate imports.
Our analysis of the decline in the trend of exports led to 
further conclusions regarding the relationship between growth and 
trade. We have surveyed several possible reasons for this 
decreasing rate of growth in the volume of exports, ranging from 
the alleged government failure to secure trade agreements, the 
failure of entrepreneurs to secure their markets when faced with 
increased competition from other competing agricultural 
exporters, or a bad natural resources basis. These elements were 
certainly present, but we have argued that they do not suffice to 
explain export trends. Let us briefly review these arguments here 
again.
After 1860, international trade - and not only within Europe 
- was increasingly framed by bilateral agreements by which 
countries exchanged special treatment. This is so despite the 
generalization of the most favoured nation clause in trade 
agreements, because the clause was given to goods specific to the 
signatory countries. During the 1860s and the following decade, 
Portuguese foreign policy managed to keep up with the 
negotiations going on throughout Europe. A trade agreement was 
signed with France in 1866, and between that year and 1876, when 
the difficult negotiations with Britain culminated in a treaty, 
Portugal signed agreements with most European countries. However,
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when the complex net of agreements started to be revised in the 
late 1880s, Portugal was somehow left outside. Until 1908 no 
treaty was made with the countries that constituted Portugal's 
major markets. People in the country and abroad involved in the 
negotiations complained about the attitude of the Portuguese 
government, accusing it of inefficiency. According to some 
foreigners, governments changed too often, impeding a consequent 
commercial policy, and leading to the breakdown of negotiations. 
In a similar perspective which is basically an ex-post analysis, 
and in disagreement with some of the conclusions of the present 
study, I have argued elsewhere that the fact that Portugal was a 
protectionist country hindered the capacity of governments to 
negotiate commercial treaties because they were unwilling or 
unable to exchange tariff reductions. Unwillingness could have 
stemmed from the fact that tariff revenues weighed heavily in the 
government budget; and inability would be the result of the 
action of the interested pressure groups, that is industrialists 
and farmers.1
The second kind of reasons for the failure of Portugal to 
keep up with the negotiations going out throughout Europe, could 
be related with entrepreneurial failure to secure their markets, 
when faced with increasing competition from abroad. Again 
contemporaries have argued that Portuguese exporters did not keep 
up with international quality standards. In the case of
1. See Lains (1987).
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Portugal's most important export good, wine, contemporaries and 
historians have pointed to the negative consequences of a 
supposedly excessive concentration on the stagnant British 
market, which would have hindered motivations to diversify the 
destination of exports to other expanding markets, such as those 
of Northern Europe, Brazil and Africa.
A third possible explanation for the slowdown of export 
growth is related to the availability of natural resources. It 
has been argued that Portugal could not compete satisfactorily on 
the export markets because its resource endowments led to the 
specialization in goods that had low demand income elasticities 
abroad. The international demand for Portuguese wines, cattle and 
fruits, for instance, did in fact increase less rapidly than 
world trade and world income. Portugal did not develop other kind 
of export branches, the argument goes on, because it was poor in 
mineral resources, in forest resources, or because its soil was 
relatively poor for scarcity of rainfall.
The discussion of the export experience of Spain and Italy, 
carried out in chapter 3, led to a revision of the causes of the 
slowdown of the growth of export volumes. Although demand 
factors, natural resource endowments and commercial policy were 
elements that helped to shape the curve of Portuguese exports, 
the fact is that supply constraints, related with the capacity to 
invest in the export sector, appeared as an important factor. 
Export growth is not necessarily exogenous to overall economic 
growth, to the extent that exports can be promoted by policy
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measures independently of domestic supply conditions. It is hard 
to tackle the causal relationship between exports and growth, in 
particular if there is not enough information to construct a 
complete macro-economic framework. That framework could 
illustrate the basic assumptions of the export-led growth models, 
namely that of a higher marginal factor productivity in the 
export-oriented sectors or, less restrictively, the existence of 
unexploited resources.
To surmount these difficulties I have concentrated my 
attention on exploring the hypothesis of the presence of supply 
constraints of exportables, by making successive comparisons with 
other European agricultural exporters, in order to ascertain how 
they managed to keep or even increase their market shares in 
international trade. Due to the diversity of cases, I have 
concluded by inference that neither the configuration of 
international demand nor the structure of resource endowments 
seemed of paramount importance. Successful countries also had to 
overcome difficulties. Furthermore, I have also concluded that 
when those difficulties were overcome by policy measures, those 
were dependent not only on the supply capacity of each country, 
but also from its strategic position in the geography of Europe. 
Under this later perspective Portugal's position was 
disadvantageous because of its peripheral position.
A more detailed analysis of two major Portuguese export 
goods (corks and wine) has shown how the assumption that exports 
could be promoted by policy measures can be misleading. In corks,
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Spain had a much higher productive capacity already by mid- 
century, catering for the nearby French market. Moreover, the 
Catalonian investments in the sector were complemented by French 
investments. In the case of vine, Portuguese exports in Europe 
had to compete with the Spanish in France and the Italian in 
Germany. The British market was glutted for Portuguese common 
wines, thus calling for the reconversion of exports which would 
require the reconversion of output and thus investment. Labour 
costs, as well as the cost of the raw material would have to make 
the whole difference between the two countries, so that 
Portuguese produce could compete with and eventually overcome 
Spain's.
Having this background in mind, Spain's success in exporting 
large quantities under tariff differentials to the otherwise 
protected markets of Germany and the United States appears in 
quite a different light. These comparisons show how difficult it 
was to promote exports through trade agreements which after all 
only secured markets for short periods of time, given that 
treaties were made and unmade according to changing conditions of 
domestic production in each country and according to changing 
strategic alliances. This does not mean that the role of foreign 
commercial policy should be dismissed as unimportant. Active 
commercial policy may have had an important role, but I have 
argued that its effectiveness would depend on the capacity of a 
given country to produce the goods to sell abroad. In this 
perspective, commercial policy would act as a complementary
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factor of successful exports, rather then as a promoter of export 
growth.
These conclusions were reinforced by the comparison with the 
experience of the Scandinavian countries. In this case I have 
tried to show that success in export markets from these countries 
was due to their successive adaptation to the changing conditions 
in international demand, mainly provoked by the emergence of 
other non-European competing exporters. A survey of the major 
aspects of economic growth in Scandinavia pointed to the 
conclusion that the capacity to adapt was associated to general 
favourable conditions of domestic growth. This was so especially 
during the period usually associated to the so-called 
agricultural depression throughout Europe from 1873 to 1896, 
characterized by falling international prices, during which the 
structure of agricultural exports from Scandinavia changed 
considerably. These shifts were associated with transformations 
in the agricultural structure of these countries, which, as we 
have shown, were already drawn during the first half of the 
nineteenth century. Any inferences on export-led growth models 
regarding these countries should take into account the chronology 
of such structural shifts. Apparently changes in the structure of 
domestic output preceded those in exports.
As previously mentioned, our conclusions regarding the 
possibility that exports were hindered by misleading policy 
measures was based on inferences drawn from international 
comparisons, and we did not undertake the attempt to build a
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counterfactual model of export growth, for lack of the necessary 
macro-economic data. However, the fact is, that the slowdown in 
the growth of exports after 1886 was not followed by a 
contraction of overall economic growth. In the case of 
agriculture this was so because exports did not account for such 
a large share of output and because agriculture benefited from 
cereal protection and the increase in domestic demand.
The analysis of import trends in chapter 4 revealed 
important features of the growth of the Portuguese economy and 
confirmed some of the findings drawn from the analysis of 
exports. Fluctuations in import were dependent more on 
fluctuations of other sources of foreign revenues, rather than 
exports, namely capital imports, emigrant remittances and, later, 
colonial reexports. Although emigrant remittances fell steeply 
after 1888, the fact is that the industrial sector was 
sufficiently developed in order that relative price changes 
derived from balance of payments disequilibrium, under the gold 
standard, were favourable to industry. Besides, other sources of 
foreign revenue, namely the earnings from colonial reexports, 
substituted for exports.
Moreover, leaving the gold standard in 1891 had positive 
effects on the commercial balance. All in all the financial 
crisis in the turn of the 1880s to 1890s was resolved by the 
contraction of imports of manufactures. After all, as has been 
hypothesized by other historians, this "crisis" could have had 
some positive effects for the Portuguese economy. However, the
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truth is that after 1891 Portuguese economic growth became more 
dependent on imports than before. This can be understand as the 
inevitable reflex of the growing weight of the industrial sector, 
which, as already mentioned, employed imported inputs such as 
coal, cotton and chemicals. Import substitution had little to do 
with tariff policy. Imports of manufactures drop by 3/4 in just 
two years, before the 1892 schedule, generally considered as more 
protectionist. Moreover, increases in nominal tariffs were 
cancelled out by the increase in the price of imports.
Slack export growth and import dependence meant that 
Portuguese economic growth depended on the different sources of 
foreign revenue. This need was met to a large extent by emigrant 
remittances (and capital imports whose fluctuations were 
presumably related). When remittances increased, the Portuguese 
economy was positively affected through the effects on industry. 
Thus higher remittances in the early 1870s were immediately felt 
in the index of industrial output. The sharp drop of remittances 
following the disturbances in Brazil after the end of slavery and 
the subsequent troubles in the international financial markets of 
which the Baring crisis was just an element, were also reflected 
in industry.
What is most interesting to note in relation to the early 
1890s is that, economic growth followed its pace of slow but 
continuous growth, despite the fluctuations in foreign revenues, 
and despite the fact that the industrial sector turned more 
dependent on imports. This increasing import dependence was a
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consequence of growth by import substitution, which implied the 
production of manufactures based on inputs the country did not 
have, or had not yet developed. The agricultural sector also 
survived quite well the 1890s. This was partially due to the 
expansion of wheat and wine output, the former under protection 
since 1889. However, the output from agriculture reached a peak 
by 1900, stagnating thereafter. The absence of productivity 
increases might have hindered further expansion. By the same 
token, the industrial sector did not develop the capacity to 
export, except for the restricted protected colonial markets, as 
well as Brazil, and thus probably growth was also limited in 
industry.
The overall performance of the Portuguese economy was not 
brilliant, if nothing else because the gap that existed between 
levels of labour productivity or per capita income between 
Portugal and most of the other Western European countries was not 
bridged. The bottle was about half empty.
But it was also half full. The growth of the economy was 
smooth and the difficulties in the balance of payments derived 
from slow export growth and mainly from fluctuations in emigrant 
remittances, were overcome. This was indubitably due to the fact 
that large segments of the economy were isolated from the rest of 
the world, either for structural reasons or because of protective 
policies. It has to be recalled that the presence of industrial 
protection throughout the period meant that this particular 
measure of economic policy could not be, and was not, used to
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curtail imports in face of balance of payments constraints. 
(Increments in protection levels were possible only for the 
agricultural sector).
The lessons we may draw from the 1890s are most interesting. 
The crisis in the balance of payments was solved by the drastic 
reduction of imports of manufactured goods. Industrial output, 
despite its high import content, kept its pace. In other words, 
the shift in relative prices that stemmed from external 
imbalance, under the gold standard, was favourable to the 
industrial sector. Moreover, the sector also reacted positively 
to the changes derived from flexible exchange rates, although in 
this case uncertainty might have brought additional costs. The 
rapid response from the industrial sector shows that it was 
sufficiently strong by the 1890s. Probably the investment in the 
sector over forty years of relatively slow but smooth growth 
meant that by the 1890s there were resources enough to respond to 
adverse conditions. Otherwise it would be difficult to understand 
how imports of industrial inputs did not contract in the late 
1880s and the early 1890s, as opposed to imports of manufactured 
goods.
It is also noteworthy that by the 1890s the overall system 
was sufficiently flexible to the extent that substitutes were 
found for the contracting imports of capital and remittances, 
namely foreign revenue earnings from colonial reexports, which 
boomed after 1891. This fact shows the importance that the 
colonies had for the Portuguese economy, and in particular for
247
its finances. But the positive contribution of the colonies 
should not be overemphasized. What is important to stress, 
according to what has been argued here, is not the particular 
role of the colonies, but the fact that a solution was found for 
the difficulties in the balance of payments.
These conclusions are much in disagreement with the writings 
of some nineteenth century authors and many of today's historians 
of Portugal, in the sense that even those who recognized the 
achievements of the economy would expect that they would be even 
more widespread, arguing that, after all, Portuguese potential 
was immense. Here we have proposed an alternative view, according 
to which the Portuguese economy fared relatively well, given the 
constraints derived from its unfavourable starting level of 
development and its position at the periphery of Europe. Despite 
the large social, political and other functional problems, the 
hypothesis that in the long-run the economy expanded close to its 
potential, seems worth taking into account, despite the possibly 
wrong and thus costly choices of economic policy. The space for 
manoeuvre for alternative policies was probably low.
To conclude that individuals after all acted in the best 
way, despite the institutional backwardness of the country is to 
argue that a competitive paradigm was in force. According to that 
paradigm each individual maximizes his welfare and thus will 
attain a certain level of output where no one can be better-off 
without decreasing the welfare of someone élse, or in other
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words, a Pareto optimum.1 The acceptance of this paradigm does
not imply that one agrees with one of its basic assumptions,
according to which individuals act rationally in such a way that
they manage to overcome institutional or other obstacles in order
to achieve their maximum possible welfare, and thus that their
competitive behaviour would yield Pareto efficiency.2 As Pollard
and Kennedy argue, regarding the British "climatericw, a period
when the British economy apparently "failed":
"(...) the issue is not whether the Victorians obeyed the 
rules of game, but whether 'the rules of the game [were] 
actually drawn up in such a way as to ensure that individual 
competitive behaviour would yield, at least approximately, 
Pareto optimal results for the economy as a whole.'"3
We can thus redirect our attention from the role of individuals - 
whom we may assume to act rationally - to the analysis of the 
"rules of the game". The question thus is whether these rules 
were built in such a fashion that they would ensure that private 
and public interest coincided. Nineteenth century analysts had 
clear ideas of what was wrong in the organization of the 
Portuguese economy, and society in general, principally when they 
were politicians standing in opposition to the government. Many 
of the solutions proposed were so attractive that they reached
1. See Kennedy (1987, p.3).
2. Rational competitive behaviour can of course lead to non competitive 
solutions. Protectionism, for instance, may be seen as the outcome of the 
action of individuals acting rationally and under competition among 
themselves.
3. Pollard (1989, p. Ill), quoting Kennedy. See also Kennedy (1987, chap. 1).
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our tines as the correct panaceas. Let us then conclude by 
analysing what they said and by checking whether their proposed 
solutions were soundly grounded.
The background of those analyses were dominated by a
critique of what was identified with the Regeneradores, the
political party born with the Regeneraçào in 1851 and that was
in power for 2/3 of the time since then until 1890. This party
was in turn identified with its leader, Fontes Pereira de Mello,
who died in 1887. Fontes, as he was popularly known, was the
politician who best personalized what Sérgio has called the
"transport policy", meaning in this case the construction of road
and railway networks, paid by foreign loans.1 Politicians
fighting the fontismo were not in total disagreement with the
system it would have created. They just argued that more could
have been done, precisely by state intervention. The criticism of
what we have called above the competitive paradigm, and which was
identified by some authors with the fontismo, was present in
contemporary minds, as it may be inferred from the following
words of Bazilio Teles (1903):
"(...) several thousands of individual incompetence (...) 
shall never form intelligence and thus find a satisfactory 
solution. (...) In other words: spontaneous solutions are 
always in delay in relation to the natural facts that provoke 
them: they do not prevent, they remedy. The State has to
1. On Sérgio see chapter 1.
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intervene.m1
The most prolific analyst of all was undoubtedly Oliveira 
Martins who, although above the party system - his preferred 
institution was the monarchy -, can be identified with the 
oppositionist Progressista party. It should be noted that 
Martins, together with Sérgio, was one of the authors that most 
influenced Portuguese economic historiography concerning the 
nineteenth century. Martins' influence is even more clear on what 
concerns those historians who tend to propose alternative policy 
choices that, according to them, would lead to more favourable 
paths of growth. That is to say, those historians who, according 
to what has been set up in chapter 1, fail to take into account 
the possibility that growth was hindered by the growth potential 
of the country, and not as much by the action of Governments, 
industrialists, large land-owners, exporters, bankers, railways 
speculators, or whatever.
A cursory analysis of Martins' views on the role of the 
State may help to understand how difficult it would have been to 
change the rules of the game and thus to follow an alternative 
path of economic development in Portugal. It is not surprising 
that after waiting for so long for a place in government, he was 
finally made Minister of Finance in January 1892, but managed to
1. Teles (1903, pp. 270-71). "(...) muitos milhares de incompetencias
individuáis (...) jamais chegarao a constituir inteligéncia e portanto a 
encontrar-lhe solugáo satisfatória. (...) Noutros termos: as solug&es
espontáneas váo sempre em atraso relativamente aos factos naturais que aB 
provocam: n&o previnem, remedeiam. É o Estado que deve intervir.”
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keep the job just for 4 months. In 1885 Martins (1954) wrote that 
the major structural problems of the Portuguese economy were 
concentrated in three sectors: the public deficit, the tax 
regime, and the "organization of circulation". The list of 
measures proposed by Martins to alter the situation was long and 
it is worth while to present it here in order to understand how 
far reaching those problems were.1 The list is the following:
a) To introduce an income tax and to reform the industrial 
and property taxes (which were not proportional taxes but lump 
sums on the capital stock).
b) To reduce indirect taxes that burdened the poorer classes 
given that they were mainly imposed on essential goods.
c) To reduce the financial autonomy of the regional 
administrations, in order to reduce their ability to raise taxes, 
to spend, and to run into deficits.
d) To census public property in order to sell it and reduce 
the central government deficit.
e) To declare the "principle of nationalization" of the 
railroads, and to proceed according to the financial capacity of 
the state.
f) To organize money supply, in order that the emission of 
banknotes reaches an optimum level.
g) To reform the public service in order to reduce costs.
But Martins (1954) also proposes other kind of measures that 
would direct and indirectly affect production. The list is again 
long, and includes the following measures:
a) To increase the area under crop by irrigation and to 
promote forestation of the areas not suited for agriculture.
b) To fixate the people that emigrated to Brazil from the 
north of the country in the underpopulated areas of the south by 
forming "agricultural centres".
c) To reform tariffs on imports, in order to promote 
industry.
d) To introduce a legal code for the industrial labour and
1. Martins (1954, pp. 14-16).
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to reform the commercial code.
e) To promote professional education.
f) To promote the fisheries and the fish and shipping industries.
g) To promote the economic development of the colonies.
A profound analysis of the pertinence and applicability of 
these measures is of course out of the scope of this concluding 
chapter, and we can even doubt if that would be at all possible: 
its like analysing a government programme in our days. However I 
have exposed them here to show that the role proposed for state 
intervention was rather complex. And one could wonder how 
resources could be found to simultaneously reduce the government 
deficit, which after all was not astronomic in Europe, and invest 
in railways, irrigation, forests, agricultural centres, 
education, the colonies, and so forth. Moreover, some of the 
measures would probably be incompatible. For instance if the 
means were found to reduce emigration to Brazil that would have 
created problems in the balance of payments due to the consequent 
reduction of remittances, and that in turn would endanger 
industrial growth that had to purchase inputs abroad. Industrial 
growth could have been based on the exploitation of domestic 
resources, by processing agricultural goods. That would of course 
imply investments in agriculture but, most importantly, it would 
have implied the reduction of tariffs that distorted prices in 
favour of import substitution. The consequences for state 
finances would then be serious given that about half of the 
government revenue was collected by tariffs on industrial and 
agricultural imports. Tariffs could of course be substituted by
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an income tax, which could have distributive effects and 
consequences on investment rates (and set Portugal out of tune of 
the rest of the European countries where government revenues were 
derived from tariffs in a similar proportion). Moreover, after 
1891 import substitution was pushed not by tariffs but by 
currency depreciation, following the abandonment of the gold 
standard.
Martins does not include in the above lists measures related 
to the foreign sector, but other authors filled the gap. An 
extreme example of that is the project to build a duty-free port 
in Lisbon, paid by foreign capital, and which was proposed by 
Mariano de Carvalho, the Minister of Finance right before 
Oliveira Martins (1886-1891). Portugal could attract Brazilian 
private capital to invest in a regular shipping route between the 
two countries - if a trade agreement were signed between the two 
countries -, as well as attract American capital to invest in the 
necessary port facilities.1 According to the ex-minister's friend 
that reports the project, Mariano de Carvalho managed to call the 
attention of his American interlocutor when he argued that 
American wheat, timber and oil exports to the Mediterranean 
countries could pass through Lisbon, where it would be stored in 
the warehouses (to be built), in order to get better prices and 
thus compete favourably with the Russian produce. The reaction of 
the "American" was enthusiastic. His final comment was: "(...)
1. Pin« (1983, pp. 74-77).
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Fantastic! It looks as an American idea! But that could change 
the world's commercial channels!"1
This comment leads to the main conclusion I would like to 
draw from the present study: it is hard to envisage how realistic 
policy measures could have induced higher economic growth in 
Portugal. The counterfactual world of a wider integration of the 
Portuguese economy in the international markets appears as 
attractive. Economic theory can tell us what tools could be used 
to foster that integration. Moreover, we know from the historical 
experience of other countries that it would have bring wider 
benefits. Yet the domestic constraints of the Portuguese economy 
and the outer world would have to look quite different. The half 
century up to World War I was too short for the accomplishment 
of the needed changes.
1. Pina (1893, p. 77). ["Com a brecal Dir-se-ía ideia americana» Mas isso 
poderia mudar as correntes comerciáis do mundoI")
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APPENDIX A
INDICES OF AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT
Data resources for the Portuguese economy in the period here 
considered include, among other minor sources, a fairly 
reasonable set of statistics for main agricultural products and 
prices, three livestock census and three partial census for 
industry. Most of this information has recently been worked out, 
in different formats, by Reis (1986a) , who estimated a first 
index of industrial production for 1870-1913, and David Justino 
(1988-1989), who exhaustively compiled and published the 
available statistics on Portuguese agriculture.
This statistical appendix is a first attempt to put together 
all this quantitative information in the form of estimates for 
output growth and labour productivity trends in Portuguese 
agriculture and industry and to discuss the reliability of these
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estimates. This discussion will be based on checks for the 
consistency of the main body of the data. This data will also be 
cross-checked against additional evidence on agricultural prices, 
land productivity and land distribution among crops. I will start 
by presenting the estimates for agricultural output growth, and 
then I will proceed to the industrial sector. Industry will be 
dealt with in a less detailed fashion given that my work relies 
on Jaime Reis' previous estimates. Finally, in the last section 
of this appendix, estimates for labour productivity trends will 
be presented.
A.1 - Agriculture
The data on which agricultural output indexes are based 
consists fundamentally of official statistics. These official 
figures are usually contested on the grounds that they 
underestimate real production, although some authors have 
admitted this under-evaluation as being constant throughout the 
period.1 To check the reliability of that data I will rely on 
assumptions regarding either consumption trends or market 
behaviour of the products. Furthermore, some of those assumptions
1. See, among others, Justino (1989, pp. 32-33), Pery (1875, p. 113), Reis 
(1979, p. 755) and Soares (1873, pp. 6, 12, 20).
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will be tested according to information from independent sources. 
Finally, my estimates will be compared with the quantification of 
agricultural output attempted by contemporary authors. This will 
not be considered as a test of reliability given that these 
authors, although disregarding official statistics, make their 
"guessestimates” with official statistics as background. The aim 
of these comparisons will be to show the extent to which my 
conclusions agree with current contemporary opinions.
The official statistics available for Portuguese agriculture 
cover its three major productive sectors: cereals (i.e. wheat, 
maize and rye), animal products and wine. The total value of 
these sectors adds up to a relative stable share of roughly 80% 
of total agricultural output (excluding forestry products).
Official production statistics for cereals cover one half of 
the number of the years of the 1850-1913 period. To this we can 
add some unofficial estimates for the first decade of twentieth 
Century. Wine production statistical coverage is not as good, as 
far as official data is concerned, but we have further 
information of specialised journals. Finally, animal products 
were estimated on the basis of the figures for meat consumption 
in Lisbon and Oporto, the two main cities, and three livestock 
census produced in 1852, 1870 and 1906.1
1. For further details see Lains (1990) and Justino (1988-1989). According to 
the latter, the 1906 census is based on the 1870 census with some further 
adjustments. The next livestock census (1925) cannot be used for backward 
extrapolations because it was greatly affected by World War I.
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Two main problems were posed in the use of these resources: 
how to complete the information to construct continuous series 
and how to test the accuracy of the data. In the case of cereals 
the solutions to these problems converged. I assumed that per 
capita consumption of the principal food staple of the population 
could not suffer severe fluctuations, because there were no 
important food crises in the period studied. This fits with the 
fact that the population increased steadily in this period at 
rates between 0.7% and 0.9% per year. With the above assumption 
in mind, I estimated per capita consumption levels for the years 
for which I had data, and extrapolated to nearby years of unknown 
production. Production was estimated after taking in account 
foreign trade and seed and animal uses of cereals. Three year 
averages were used to account for adjustment time lags in 
consumption, stocking and foreign trade levels (see table A.l at 
the end of the appendix).
To ascertain the quality of the above index, I checked the 
plausibility of the long-term trend of the cereal per capita 
consumption on which it is based. This was done by computing the 
implicit income elasticities for cereal consumption, and by 
comparing the results against the available evidence for other 
countries or for other periods (see table A.2). These 
elasticities were computed in a rough way by comparing rates of 
growth of income and cereal consumption. For the growth of income 
I used two sets of figures which show similar growth rates: 
Justino's (1987) indirect estimates for per capita income; and
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the final results of the output indexes here estimated. The use 
of my figures for output growth will also be a test of their 
internal consistency.
In these comparisons it is worth taking into consideration 
an alternative estimate for per capita cereal consumption trend 
presented by Mateus (1986). Elasticities for the three different 
kinds of cereals were considered given that their consumption 
patterns were quite different as a consequence of substitution of 
higher quality wheat bred for poor types of bred (maize and rye). 
The structure of cereal consumption was inferred from official 
production statistics, assuming that the possible accounting 
error is equal for each kind of cereal, which is not a very 
strong assumption. For each hypothesis concerning per capita 
cereal consumption, I had to compute a new final output index.
From the values presented in table A.2 it may be seen that 
the trend for cereal per capita consumption considered in the 
present estimates - i.e. the trend implicit in the official 
statistics - leads to plausible results for the elasticities. As 
a matter of fact, although the total elasticity for cereals is 
rather low, it may be noticed that the one relating to wheat is 
compatible to estimates for other countries in the same period or 
for Portugal in recent times.1 Portugal was a country with a
1. Nineteenth century income elasticities for the demand of foodstuffs is 
usually between 0.5 and 1. Crafts (1980, pp. 154-59) estimated a value of 0.74 
for Britain in the years 1820-40. Colin Clark (1951, pp. 378-79) gives 21 
values for that elasticity of which 19 fall in the 0.65-0.90 interval. It is 
more difficult to obtain nineteenth century consumption cereal elasticity
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relatively high consumption of bread made of cereals other than 
wheat. The consumption trends depicted in table A.2 seem in 
accordance with an expected shift from poorer bred cereals to 
wheat bred.
It is worth noting that the agricultural output index does 
not vary significantly with the elasticity considered. As a 
matter of fact, if we take the higher value for the cereal 
consumption income elasticity of table A.2, that is if we take a 
value of 182kg per head for 1900, the estimated rate of growth 
for agricultural output changes only slightly. The value 
considered in the present text, if anything, under-evaluates the 
rate of agricultural growth. For the conclusions put forward in 
chapters 1 and 2, this is the best choice.
We may turn now to the index for animal products. This index 
is estimated through meat output given that the available 
evidence points to similar productivity trends in meat, wool and 
milk per animal (cattle, pigs, sheep and goats).1 Meat output was 
estimated through two different sources that were cross checked:
contd.
estimates, specially for different kinds a cereals* See also Prados (1985, p. 
17). Evidence for twentieth century Portugal show a wheat consumption income 
elasticity of 0.14 in the 1961-80 period (Soares, 1985, pp. 80-81)); and for 
consumption of "products made of cereals" in the years 1963-73 of 0.4 (Martins 
e Oliveira, 1979, p. 63)). It is difficult to proceed further in these 
comparisons because we only have at our disposal income elasticities estimates 
for aggregate food consumption. Nevertheless we may conclude that the long­
term growth of my estimates is under-evaluated once the implicit elasticity 
value is rather low. If this proves to be true, my conclusion that long-term 
agriculture output growth surpassed that of population seems rather safe.
1. For meat and wool productivity trends see Lains (1990).
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statistics from the slaughter houses of the two main Portuguese 
cities, Lisbon and Oporto, and three cattle stock censuses made 
in 1852, 1870 and 1906. To provide for meat production after the 
census figures it was necessary to resort to contemporary writers 
and official evaluations for the share of slaughtered animals and 
their respective weights. These evaluations do not show important 
dissimilarities.1
In table A.3 estimates for meat consumption according to the 
two different sources are presented. The trends estimated from 
the different sources are similar, although consumption levels 
were higher in the urban areas than in the whole country.2 As a 
last possible check for these values, we may compare the trend of 
meat consumption with the trend of the consumption of the second 
most important source of animal protein in Portugal, cod fish 
(taken from import statistics). Between 1840/50 and 1895/99 cod 
fish per capita consumption rose at a rate similar to the on e of 
meat, from 3.6kg/head to 4.0kg/head. From 1895/99 it increased 
slightly faster, to 5.4kg/head in 1910/13, while meat consumption 
decreased. From this trend it appears that protein consumption
1. See Lain« (1990).
2. Meat output from slaughter houses of these towns was certainly a small 
proportion of total meat output. An estimate for the 1950s still puts that 
proportion between 50 and 60% (Mexia, 1956, p. 41). It is possible that that 
proportion increased over time due to the construction of municipal slaughter 
houses and due to the improvement in standards of hygiene. If this is so, the 
use of slaughter house statistics would lead to an over-estimation of meat 
output growth.
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rose slightly until the end of the century, being stable from 
then on; and it depicts a substitution effect between meat and 
cod fish in the first decade of the twentieth century.1
The wine output index could not be computed through 
consumption patterns, as was the case for the other two indexes, 
because there is no straightforward relationship between them. As 
a matter of fact, part of the wine output is stocked, either to 
improve its quality or for other marketing purposes. This being 
so, I had to resort to official production statistics, which 
provide the only continuous series. It should be stressed that 
this might not be a severe limitation given that official 
statistics proved reliable in showing trends for cereal and meat 
output.
Yet, official statistics for wine output do not cover the 
whole period. For the years between 1863 and 1897 there are only 
output values for the average of the years 1863/70 - the original 
series having been probably lost - and for the years of 1873, 
1880 to 1885, 1892 and 1893; from 1903 until 1915 there is
another gap. For this last period we also have statistics 
computed by a business newspaper, which may be linked to the 
scattered official sources given that there is agreement of 
overlapping three year averages.
To fill in the gaps for the period previous to 1903, I
1 . xhe trend of per capita meat consumption from table A.4 seems to concur 
with the evidence related to meat consumption tax statistics presented in 
Pereira (1979, p. 81).
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resorted to evidence regarding the quality of the crops of the 
years for which statistics are available, to ensure that the 
scattered quantitative information is representative of the 
trends of the respective periods. For instance, both 1893 and 
1898 were considered by contemporaries authors as years of low 
wine crop at, respectively, 3500 and 4300 million hectolitres. 
Consequently, the rate of growth of wine output given by the 
comparison of these two figures may be considered as 
representative of the growth in the period given that years of 
similar crop conditions are being compared (see table A.5).
To ascertain the reliability of my estimates for wine 
output, mainly in what trends and output fluctuations are 
concerned, I compare in graph A.l the output index with an index 
for prices estimated by Justino (1988-1989). The general patterns 
presented in that graph are quite clear: wine output and prices 
had inverse movements which present similar turning points. This 
general pattern is interrupted, though, in the period from 1873 
to 1885 (and it is also less clear from 1846 to 1852, 
hypothesising a larger output fro 1846).
The fact that wine prices and output have divergent trends 
may be a consequence of inelastic demand.1 Being this so, output 
increases would lead to price decreases, and vice-versa. It 
remains for us to explain, then, why in the 1873-1885 period
1. For estimates of income elasticities of British demand for imported wines 
see Lains (1986, pp. 400-401). The evidence there presented points out to 
negative values for that elasticity. This result is only indicative given that 
it cannot be extended to a wine producing country like Portugal.
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prices and output had the same positive trend. This would imply 
that demand was expanding and dominating market conditions. Due 
to the large import market opened in France in the aftermath of 
the invasion of its vines by phylloxera, demand conditions were 
in fact particular from the early 1870s to the mid 1880s. This 
would somehow validate my index, although not in a definite way. 
To be more positive about these assumptions it would be necessary 
to estimate internal and external demand functions for wine. 
Furthermore, we have to bare in mind that exports accounted for a 
small, although increasing, share of output.1
Of the three partial indexes here computed, the wine index 
is the less homogeneous given that its prices show a greater 
variety of wine types. Portugal was a producer of mainly three 
kinds of wine: port wine, madeira wine and common wine (a fourth 
quality appeared later on: "vinho verde"). While, for instance, 
price differential for cereals (wheat/rye) and for meat in 
1861/70 reached a coefficient of 1.53 and 1.01, respectively, the 
same ratio for wine was 3.64. In the year of 1884, which will be 
used here as the base-year for the agricultural output index,
those differences were, respectively, 1.38, 1.24 and 3.21.2
I
1. The ahare of wine exports on production given by official statistics 
increased from 14% in 1871/73 to 49% in 1886/88. If the underestimate of 
official output statistics is considered, according to contemporary estimates, 
these rates would be 9% and 34%, respectively.
2. Based on prices from Justino (1988-1989). The wines considered are wine 
sold in Oporto (not only port wine) and the cheapest wine, sold in Penafiel.
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These differences in wine prices cause an index number 
problem given that the structure of wine output changed in 
Portugal after the 1880s as a consequence, first of all, of the 
phylloxera wine disease, and, secondly of the wide increase in 
demand for wine exports. It may happen that the increase in wine 
output after those years pictured by my index were partially 
offset by a decrease in prices, given that the share of common, 
lower-priced, wines increased.1 And in fact the available 
contemporary estimates for the structure of agricultural output 
further used point to a slightly lower wine proportion in 1900/09 
compared with 1884, although output has risen by 33.6%, between 
those dates.
For the aggregation of the three indexes here estimated I 
considered evaluations 6f agricultural output, according to major 
contemporary works on Portuguese agriculture, presented in table 
A.7.2 It may be noticed from the same table that there are no
1. See Pereira (1983, pp. 127, 151) and Lains (1990).
2. Considering gross and not net output as a measure of agricultural growth in 
a country like Portugal in the second half of the nineteenth century is not a 
major shortcoming. As a matter of fact it may be inferred form the available 
evidence that gross and net output evolved in the same way, that is, 
agriculture was not purchasing more products from other sectors, which is 
characteristic of a backward agricultural sector. For the years 1957/62, 
Hayami and Ruttan (1980, p. 319) estimated a proportion for net/gross output 
in Portuguese agriculture of 90%. The secular evolution of that proportion may 
be inferred from the French evidence presented by Clark (1951, p. 216). From 
the second half of the eighteenth century until the 1880s the net/gross output 
ratio was estimated at 95% decreasing since then in the following way: 90% in 
1895/99; 85% in 1910/13; and 80% from 1920/24 until 1940/46. According to 
these figures, Portugal in the early 1960s appears to be at a position similar 
to the French one in 1895/99, leading to the assumption that in the century 
before 1860 there was a reduction of 5 percentage points in that ratio. This 
would give a difference between rates of growth for gross and net output of
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considerable disparities among these contemporary estimates: 
Portuguese agricultural production appears to have had a quite 
regular structure throughout the period considered. Among other 
things, this regularity allow us to take the aggregation of the 
three indexes as a proxy of overall agricultural growth 
(excluding forestry), given that the residual share was quite 
constant in value.
From the values set in table A.7 we may also conclude that 
my estimates are somehow consistent with the contemporary 
estimates shown there. Conclusions from these similarities should 
not be pushed too far, though, because the contemporary estimates 
are not truly independent from the statistical basis I used here. 
Although most of the authors disregarded the official data as 
being under-evaluated, their estimates were to a large extent 
based on presumed correction coefficient for those statistics. 
Furthermore, the different estimates were not truly independent 
of each other, given that the different authors were implicitly 
or explicitly influenced by each other. Finally, I had to made 
some assumptions when the authors did not give values or when 
those values were unacceptable. For instance, the estimated share 
for fruits and vegetables in 1900/09 was arbitrarily considered 
at 7% (close to the other evaluations) given that the 
contemporary source for that decade gives a share of 50%, i.e. a
contd.
0.05% per year throughout the century 1860-1960.
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not reliable value for fruits and vegetables equal to the rest 
of agricultural output. These assumptions are nevertheless of 
minor importance as is evident from the notes on table A. 7.
The contemporary evaluations of agricultural output are here 
presented in a concise fashion in order to draw conclusions on 
the growth trend for agriculture implicit in those estimates, 
which were never compared in a inter-temporal basis. In table A.8 
the implicit rates of agricultural growth from those sources are 
computed and compared with my own estimates. It is clear from 
this table that, despite some important discrepancies, there are 
some points of agreement between the two approaches, namely as 
regards the overall rate of agricultural growth. Although the 
conclusion we may infer from these comparisons is quite positive 
for my estimates, it has to be again stressed that it is not 
legitimate to conclude that the present estimates are confirmed 
by contemporary estimates, given that they are not truly 
independent, as already mentioned. What may be concluded is that 
my output growth indexes do not conflict with contemporary 
opinions on agricultural conditions.
Tables A.9 and A.10 show the available data on land 
productivity trends and land use, as given by official statistics 
and contemporary observers. These statistics were used on the 
main text, together with assumptions on capital formation, to 
estimate the contribution of land, capital and labour for 
agricultural output growth, according to the classical method of
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assuming a Cobb-Douglass production function.1
Soil censuses for Portugal are usually disregarded by 
economic historians for being inaccurate. However changes in crop 
areas between the census of 1867 and 1902 are compatible with my 
estimates for output growth in wine and cereals and the evidence 
on soil productivity trends of these two sectors. As a matter of 
fact, according to these census, cereal and wine areas increased 
by 24% and 53%, respectively, while their soil productivity 
increases were about 10% for cereals and about 50% for wines.2 
The rates of output growth for the same period (1870-1903) 
respectively, 35% and 100% (see chapter 2).
The patterns of growth for cereals and animal products 
presented here may be compared with absolute and relative price 
trends in graphs A.2 through A.4 (wine output/price trends were 
discussed above). Graph A.2 pictures a decreasing trend for the 
relative prices of cereals and meat (a proxy for animal products 
prices) from 1855 to 1885; cereal tariff protection since 1886
1. This function iB in the form (K, L and T stand for agricultural capital, 
labour and land; A for technical progress; and the subscripts for agricultural 
income bhares):
a b c
Q « A x K x L x T  , a + b + c * 1
Among the vast bibliography on theoretical and practical issues concerning the 
use of this production function see Nadiri (1970) and Carré et al. (1976), 
McLean (1981), Matthews et al. (1982, chapt. 7), Crafts (1985); and the short 
review provided by Gould (1972, pp. 118-19). A discussion of the use of this 
function to measure and compare countries’ per capita growth of productivity 
is given in Martina (1977).
2. The increase in soil productivity is computed from table A. 9. In the case 
of cereals I considered average productivities, weighted by the shares of 
maize, wheat and rye in cereal output.
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implied an inversion of this trend. This is in accordance with 
output growth given by my indexes. First of all, throughout the 
1846-1912 period, animal products output increased more than 
cereal output (57% against 37%), in accordance with price trends. 
This correspondence is also evident from the fact that the 
difference in the rates of output growth for these sectors was 
lower in the period of rising cereal prices (in absolute and 
relative terms). Graphs A.3 and A.4 show how output in these 
sectors responded to rising prices.
A.2 - Industry
The industrial production index here estimated is based on 
the procedure proposed by Reis (1986a) in a similar estimate for 
the 1870-1913 period. I limited myself to extending the same 
index back to 1851 (with some gaps), to fill the gaps for the 
years 1882 and 1883 in the first index and, more importantly, to 
check the basic assumptions underlining his calculations.1 
Briefly, the method of Jaime Reis consisted of estimating 
technical coefficients for the use of imported industrial inputs
1« These gaps are due to the gaps of the Portuguese import statistics used to 
construct indexes for most of the industrial inputs (see further).
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in the following sectors: woollens, cottons, linens, metallurgy, 
paper and tobacco. The index for food industries was taken as the 
increase in total population. The production of two other 
industries, mining and canned fish, was estimated through export 
volumes, given that more than 90% of their production was 
exported. Price indexes were computed through import prices (plus 
tariffs), assuming that trends were similar to the internal 
industrial prices. This assumption does not seem too strong if, 
as will be seen, we consider that the present indexes are mainly 
representative of the most modern industrial branches, 
concentrated in Lisbon and Oporto, major foreign trade centres. 
The aggregation of the various partial indexes thus estimated was 
based on fixed sectorial shares, referring to the end of the 
century, and computed through industrial population census and 
estimated value added per worker in each sector.
The main task of the present work consisted in ascertaining 
the hypothesis of fixed coefficients for the entire 1850-1913 
period, and finding another set of aggregate weights for an 
earlier period. My sources were partial industrial census made in 
the 1860s, mainly of a regional character, and another census of 
the number of industrial workers for 1852.1 This research into
1. For further details see Lains (1990). The census are: Coelho (1860), 
Colago (1863), Oliveira (1867), S& (1863), S& (1857), Silva (1861) and 
Silveira (1864). It is worth noting that these censuses, as well as the one of 
1891, were produced in periods when major discussions over tariff policy or 
commercial agreements were being held, such as the 1852 tariff schedule, the 
1866 commercial treaty with France (which was the base of further tariff 
reductions), and the 1892 tariff schedule. For a description of industrial 
census in this period see Matos (1991, pp. 562-68).
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early Portuguese industry shows an unfavourable trend for the 
growth of the industrial productivity, in the sense that most 
technical coefficients remained at similar levels, with the 
important exception of wool industry (and probably cotton).
The sample of available information with which to estimate 
technical coefficients is quite different from sector to sector. 
Wool and linen industries are quite satisfactorily represented, 
while for cotton, metallurgy and cork industries the information 
is quite scarce. The paper index prior to 1870 was estimated by 
contemporary estimates, while Reis' figures regarding tobacco and 
food industries were maintained, for lack of other sources. 
Estimates for value added per worker are better for woollens and 
paper; for linens and metallurgy I had access only to information 
related to large size industries, where it was observed that 
value added per labour was lower, compared with smaller plants. 
Instead of taking the average, I considered the value added of 
the smallest factory in each sector.1 For tobacco no information 
regarding value added was available and so an arbitrary value was 
taken (with a margin of error presumably equal to the range of 
the values for the other sector, i.e. 30%). Food, ceramics and 
soap industries estimates for value added were also based on 
scarce information.
The quality of the estimates briefly described above is
1. For differences in labour productivity in larger and smaller industrial 
units see the discussion in O'Brien and Keyder (1978, Chap. 6) and Crafts 
(1984, pp. 59-67).
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lower than the correspondent estimates produced by Jaime Reis. As 
such they have to be used with even greater care. Nevertheless 
the present estimates serve to test the confidence interval of 
the industrial production indexes regarding the values for 
technical coefficients and value added per worker. As will be 
evident, these indexes are not as much dependent on the 
assumptions concerning the estimates for partial indexes as on 
the weights chosen for their aggregation.
As previously stated, the aggregation shares were computed 
by multiplying the value added per worker by the total number of 
workers in each sector. Given that Jaime Reis used estimates for 
labour shares for the end of the period (circa 1910) , it was 
necessary to estimate correspondent shares for an earlier period. 
Information from two census produced in 1845 and 1852 was used. 
They are presented in table A.11 together with the shares for 
1910. It may be noticed that, except for food industries, the 
values given by the 1845 and 1852 censuses are quite similar, 
although the latter concerns only industrial units with more than
10 workers-equivalent.1 Furthermore, the pattern given by the 
comparisons of the shares at the beginning and at the end of the 
period here considered seems plausible. Jaime Reis' hypothesis II 
depicts a more modern type of industrial growth, given that
1. For 1852 the figures are taken from an official report, published in 1857, 
where the equivalence 1 horsepower * 7 workers is used. Although this criteria 
is arbitrary, it does not distort the results, as may be inferred from the 
comparison of the data on this report and the same data published by Justino 
(1988-1989).
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metallurgy and canned fish, two more modern industries, attain 
higher values. It may be noticed that, from the sectors presented 
in table A.11, ceramics and soap industries are left out.
The major shortcoming of using the values of table A.11 for 
aggregation purposes stems from the fact that its coverage of the 
total industrial labour force is rather low and biased towards 
those industries which had a higher concentration in production. 
As a probable consequence of this, there is a bias towards the 
more modern industries. This would explain the low shares 
attributed to sectors like the linens, food, ceramics and soap 
industries which are presumably less concentrated industrial 
sectors. The low representativeness of the sample may be inferred 
by comparing the totals for the workers on these census with the 
estimated total labour force in industry taken from table A. 18 
(cf. notes on this table).
The representativeness of the sample for the labour force 
(12% of total labour force in industry) is quite lower than the 
one of the 9 partial indexes for industrial production (60% of 
gross output, using contemporary estimates).1 Consequently, 
partial industrial growth rates are probably quite reliable, 
while the overall estimated rate of growth of total industrial 
output is biased toward the growth of presumably over-represented 
sectors such as cottons, woollens, metallurgy and canned fish. 
Consequently, the resulting growth rate of industrial output is
1. See Reis (1986a).
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probably biased upwards.1 It may be noted that most of the 
industrial production indexes estimated for other countries 
suffer from similar problems, i.e., a larger coverage for more 
modern sectors, and a large dependence on the shares used for 
aggregation. This would imply that the index for Portugal is 
comparable with the first versions of industrial production 
indexes for other countries.2
The observed variations in the composition of industrial 
labour force are the following: an increase in food industries 
and metallurgy, while woollens share decrease. Mining and canned 
fish are sectors which are only relevant from the 187 0s, and so 
they are not considered in the first system of weights. 
Consequently, the weights for circa 1850 should be used until 
1870-1875, and from then on, shares for circa 1910 (see table 
A. 14). It should be pointed out that long-term rates of growth 
given by the different indexes are quite similar, although the 
cumulative effect is obviously considerable. But the major 
differences concern growth rates for the various cycles, which 
happen to have roughly the same peaks and troughs.
1. For the discussion of the probable index biases see Reis (1986a, pp. 926- 
28). As counter-weights for the bias toward the more modern industrial 
branches, that is, as probable sources of industrial growth under-estimation, 
Reis points to the exclusion of presumably more dynamic industries as 
cements, chemical fertilisers and electricity; and, more importantly, the fact 
that fixed technical coefficients were used.
2. See the same point in Reis (1986a, p. 904). The dependence of the results 
on the aggregate shares is shown, for instance, by the discussion of Deane and 
Cole's (1962) estimates by Harley (1982), or Carreras' (1984) index by Prados 
(1988, pp. 163-67) and Carreras (1990, pp. 89-95).
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A test of the consistency of the overall results is given in 
table A.15 and is provided by the comparison of total industrial 
output growth given by table A.14, that is, using total value 
added, and the growth given by the estimated indexes for gross 
output. To estimate the growth of total value added at fixed 
prices it is necessary to take into account that value added per 
worker for the beginning of the period relate to circa 1865 
(although labour force distribution is from 1852), and those for 
the end of the period relate to 1891 (while labour shares are 
from 1910). The implicit real growth rates, that is after 
subtracting price trend compare favourably with the rates given 
by the indexes here estimated. These computations are totally 
independent of each other, and so they provide a test for the 
consistency and reliability of the estimates for industrial 
growth. Note, nevertheless, that this test does not imply that 
the estimated indexes are representative of the whole of 
Portuguese industry (and not only of the more modern branches), 
because no information whatsoever about the non-observed sectors 
was added: it only allows us to conclude that, for the sample of 
industries considered, the results are consistent.
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A.3 - Labour productivity trends and physical output growth
To estimate labour productivity trends it was necessary to 
provide some estimates for labour force growth and its 
distribution among agriculture, industry and services. Labour 
productivity here estimated is, in fact, output per worker, and 
so no variations in the number of hours per year and per worker 
were accounted for. These estimates are presented in tables A.16 
through A.18.
Population census giving the required information are 
available only for the years 1890, 1900 and 1911. For the
previous years it was necessary to approximate total labour force 
by the number of males in the 15-59 age group.1 Estimates for 
the composition of labour force prior to 1890 are more precarious 
but their reliability is rather satisfactory, given that this was 
not a period of important structural changes in Portugal and, 
consequently, the range of possible values is rather narrow. As 
a matter of fact, the 1890 census figure still gives a quite 
large share for population in agriculture, so the same share for 
previous years could not have been much larger, if a regression 
in agricultural production conditions in the period is excluded, 
as output estimates present in the first section allow.
1. Only male labour force was considered because of errors in measuring female 
labour force, especially as far as sectorial distribution is concerned. See 
Maddison (1982, Appendix C).
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More importantly, the width of labour shares may also be 
given by international comparisons. These are provided by 
comparing the Portuguese case with the average for European 
countries, at similar levels of GDP per capita. One of the 
established regularities of modern economic growth concerns the 
shift of labour from agriculture to other sectors, specially the 
industrial. For the nineteenth century this regularity has been 
made explicit by Crafts' (1984) regressions for 17 countries (as 
well as for a separated sub-set of 9 later-developers) of GDP per 
capita and population on the agricultural labour share. These 
regressions provide a way of estimating the expected labour share 
for given levels of GDP per capita and country population size. 
From the two values for the European "norm" I used the one which 
fits better the available information for Portugal for benchmark 
years of the period 1890-1960, according to the available 
information on Portuguese GDP per capita, discussed in chapter 1 
(see table A.19). The estimated values for labour force structure 
are quite rough, and special caution is required in using the 
1850 figure.
Estimates for physical output growth are given in table
A.20, and compared with estimates for GDP growth from Justino 
(1987) . Physical output growth was computed by averages for 
growth rates in agriculture and industry, weighted according to
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contemporary estimates for gross value of these sectors.1 As may 
be seen, these estimates picture similar trends in what long-term 
growth is concerned. Nevertheless, cyclical fluctuations are 
quite different, especially for the sub-periods 1850-1870, 1890- 
1900 and 1900-1911. These differences stem from the fact that 
Justino1s estimates are less sensitive to fluctuations in 
national income because two of the four variables on which they 
are based (Government expenses and fiscal revenue) are
11 institutional” (the other two variables are Portuguese exports 
and imports). Contrarily, as stated before, my indexes are more 
sensitive to fluctuations in output, especially from the 
agriculture sector.2
The similarity between long-term growth pictured by the 
different estimates above, that is between physical output and
1. For 1900, Jaime Reis (1984), based on Castro (1978), uses a ratio of 
agricultural to industrial output of 2:1. This ratio is compatible with the 
productivity gaps between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors (SPG) 
estimated by Crafts (1984) for some European countries, based on a regression 
of SPG on GDP per capita and population. Crafts distinguishes between a set of 
17 European countries and a sub-set of 9 later-developers. The value of SPG 
for later-developers correspondent to Portuguese GDP per capita in 1890 is 
2.08. Given the distribution of labour in the same year, that gap would imply 
a share of agricultural income in total income of 49.3%. If agricultural 
income was twice as large as the industrial, as Castro and Reis propose, the 
share of industry in Portuguese income would be 24.7%, implying a plausible 
residual share for services in 1890 of 26.0%.
2. By institutional variables I mean economic variables that are dependent on 
institutional factors. For instance, Portuguese nineteenth century tax revenue 
included an industrial tax which was paid according to the existent machinery 
and not according to output, as well as import tariffs which depend on 
modifications of tariff schedules. By the same token, Government expenses 
included fixed expenses like interest payments on public debt, and military 
expenses, among others. These are factors which tend to smooth out Justino's 
estimates for GDP growth trends. For a critique of the methodology see Lains 
and Reis (forthcoming).
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GDP growth estimates, would imply that the long-term output 
growth of the service sector was similar to physical output 
growth. The proportionality between service and physical output 
growth is also evident from the pioneering works for 
international comparisons of income growth of Clark (1951) and 
Kuznets (1956). Portugal would then be another case to include in 
this general pattern of growth, prior to World War II.1 This 
would not imply that proportion of services output was not 
increasing: it would only mean, as O'Brien (1978, pp. 28-32) has 
argued, that that increase was embodied in the measured growth of 
physical output (at least for the nineteenth century). An 
industrial good produced in, say, 1910 would then include a 
higher contribution from services - as transport, banking and 
marketing - than the equivalent good produced in 1850.2
It is possible to test the above assumption concerning the 
contribution of services to output growth in the case of Portugal 
by estimating: (1) the implicit growth rate for the labour
1. See also the review of the evidence for the United States by Carré (I960, 
pp. 15-18)* Empirical evidence produced since the contributions of Colin Clark 
and Simon Kuznets confirm their findings. In fact, the proportion of the 
service sector in countries like Germany, Great Britain, France or Spain 
remained roughly stable throughout the second half of nineteenth century, up 
to 1910. See Mitchell (1975, p . 811); Toutain (1987, p. 58) and Prados 
(1988). See also Lee (1986, p. 76).
2. In a critique of O'Brien and Keyder’s (1978) work on the comparison of 
British and French commodity output, Crafts (1984, p. 56) argues that the 
exclusion of the service sector hides important differences in economic 
structures of these countries. Nevertheless he does not contest the fact that 
rates of income growth may be approximated by physical output growth. On this 
debate see further O'Brien (1983, pp. 80-84).
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productivity — more precisely, for the output per worker — for 
the service sector; and (2) the resulting growth rate for the 
service output.1 The first rate of growth may be given by the 
following equivalences:
Y ■ Y (a) + Y (i) + Y (s)
y = Y / L = 1(a) x y(a) + l(i) x y(i) + l(s) x y(s)
<*y = l(a) x dy(a) + l(i) x dy(i) + l(s) x dy(s) where,
Y = total income; L = total labour force
¥(a)f Y(i), Y(s) = income in agriculture, industry and servicesy = total income per worker
y(a), y(i), y(s) = sectorial incomes per worker 
l(a)» l(i), l(s) * sectorial shares of labour force Si is for rates of growth
Using 1890 as base year as in table A.20, dy(s) is computed from:
Period 1850-1900:
1(a) = 0.669; l(i) = 0.183; l(s) = 0.148 
dy = 0.80; dy(a) =0.34; dy(i) = 1.72 and, dy(s) = 1.76
Period 1870-1910:
1(a) « 0.669; l(i) = 0.183; l(s) = 0.148 
dy = 0.84; dy(a) = 0.60; dy(i) = 1.40 
and, dy(s) = 1.22
These estimates for labour productivity growth in the service
sector imply growth rates for the service sector output of 2.54%
and 2.50% per year, respectively in the periods 1850-1900 and
1870-1911. If the shares given above for the composition of
physical output are considered, the above rates would imply GDP
growth rates of 1.75% (1850-1900) and 1.78% (1870-1911), slightly
1. This 8ante test could have been done backwards, that is, by estimating first 
the implicit growth rate of services output, and then the resulting rate of 
labour productivity. This alternative is nevertheless less reliable because 
shares for output distribution are more approximate than shares for labour 
distribution.
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higher then the estimates for physical output growth.
These exercises are not supposed to substitute for further 
research on physical and service output growth. They are only 
attempts at providing yardsticks to give an idea of the probable 
margin of error of the estimates given in the present work. From 
the above evidence it may be concluded that the use of my 
estimates for output growth as a proxy for GDP growth tends to 
underestimate the latter.
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Table A.l
Consumption and Production of Cereals, 1846-1912
Year Consumption Population Total Net Production
Consumption Imports
----
(kg/head)
(1 )
(000)
(2)
(ton)
(3)
(ton)
(4)
(ton)
(5)
1846 149 3458.9 606 325 - 5 000 611 3251849 148 3471.3 604 415 -12 000 616 415
1852 156 3485.1 639 618 - 6 000 645 618
1855 153 3520.3 633 654 1 000 632 654
1858 159 3589.5 671 448 - 2 000 673 448
1861 152 3696.2 660 968 10 000 650 968
1864 151 3821.9 678 949 38 000 640 949
1867 150 3898.2 687 918 34 213 653 705
1870 150 3968.0 700 325 37 889 662 346
1873 [149J 4039.1 708 030 26 337 681 693
1876 [149] 4111.4 720 704 91 863 628 841
1879 [148) 4199.9 731 277 126 982 604 295
1882 150 4320.8 762 494 115 210 647 284
1885 145 4445.1 758 282 134 080 624 202
1888 [150] 4573.0 807 000 114 216 692 784
1891 [155] 4694.6 856 074 123 436 732 638
1894 [155] 4799.5 875 203 141 008 734 195
1897 155 4906.7 894 751 128 009 766 742
1900 160 5019.4 944 828 165 359 779 469
1903 160 5156.1 970 560 75 087 895 473
1906 158 5299.7 985 121 117 567 867 554
1909 155 5447.3 993 331 150 841 842 490
1912 152 5598.9 1001 215 144 873 856 342
Notes and sources: 
In this table and the following Azores and Madeira are exclude
years refer to the centre of three year averages.
(1) Consumption per capita is from official statistics from Justino 
(1989, p. 268); for wheat output see also Reis (1979, pp. 756-57). To 
convert capacity measures in weights, I used the following values: 
maize: lhl*77kg; wheat: lhl=76kg; rye: lhl=72kg. See Soares (1875, p. 
3), Costa (1900, pp. 579-82) and Justino (1989). Per capita consumption 
estimates between brackets are linear extrapolations for years for which 
there are no official data.
(2) The population series is based on linear extrapolations from the 
census of 1864, 1878, 1890, 1900 and 1911, and Pereira (1983, p. 19).
(3) Total cereal consumption is the sum of human and animal consumption, 
plus cereal used for seeds ((l)x(2)/0.85). See Soares (1875, p. 5).
(4) For 1842, 1843, 1848, 1851, 1854-56, 1861 and from 1865 onwards 
imports are from offical statistics (Lains, 1986). For the other years, 
I used additional information from Ribeiro (1864, pp. 97-99).
(5) Production is total consumption less net imports.
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Table A*2
Estimates for Income Elasticities of Demand for Cereals
(A) (B)
Total Maize Wheat Rye Total Maize Wheat Rye
Consumption 1850 148 87 36 25 149 88 36 25
per capita
(kg/head) 1900 160 80 58 22 182 91 66 25
Growth, 1850-1900
(%, per year) .15 -.16 .94 -.25 .40 .07 1.22 oo.
Elasticities I (NCM• -.23 1.40 -.37 .55 .10 1.67 .00
II .21 - .2 2 1.29 -.34 .55 .10 1.67 .00
Notes and sources:
Total * total human cereal consumption.
Consumption per capita of column A is taken from table A.l (1849- 
1900); column B is from Kateus (1986). To estimate the consumption 
shares of maize, wheat and rye I used official figures for 
production shares. See Lains (1990). Income elasticities for 
cereal consumption are computed by dividing growth rates of cereal 
consumption by estimated income growth rates. These last estimates 
are the ones given by the indexes of physical output (agricultural 
and industrial) growth of the present work (line I); or the 
estimates for GNP growth from Justino (1987) (.73% per year) (line 
II). My estimates for physical output growth are dependent on the 
assumption regarding the growth of cereal per capita consumption 
(see text). Accordingly the output rates for columns A and B are 
different: .67% and .73% per year, respectively.
The similarity between the estimates for income growth shows that 
my estimates are not too dependent on the assumptions regarding 
the growth of per capita cereal consumption.
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Table A.3
Estimates for Meat Consumption
Lisbon and Oporto Portugal
Year Kg/head 1870*100 Year Kg/head 1870*1!
1848/52 28 108 1852 21 124
1868/72 [26] 100 1870 17 100
1873/77 27 104 - - -
1903/06 30 115 1906 20 118
Notes and sources:
The sources for Lisbon and Oporto are the statistics of 
municipal slaughter houses (Justino, 1986: 268), and for the 
whole country the sourceare from the livestock census. 
Livestock was converted into meat by fixed coefficients for 
official and non-official estimated shares of animal 
slaughtered, and their respective weights (see Lains, 1990). 
The figures used for the final meat output index are the ones 
relative to Lisbon and Oporto, given that the other figures 
are to a greater extent dependent on assumptions relative to 
conversion into meat: if instead of fixed coefficients, 
estimates for 1852 by Soares (1655, pp. 11-20) were used, for 
example, the value for the meat consumption would be 19 
kg/head to which an value of 112 would correspond.
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Table A.4
Consumption and Production of Heat, 1846-1912
Year Consumption
(kg/head)
(1 )
Total
Consumption
(ton)
(2)
Net
Imports
(ton)
(3)
Production
(ton)
(4)
1846 [18.2] 62 952 494 62 458
1849 [18.2] 63 178 300 62 878
1852 18.2 63 429 391 63 038
1855 [18.0] 63 365 881 62 484
1858 [17.9] 64 252 1 000 63 252
1861 [17.7] 65 423 3 427 61 996
1864 [17.5] 66 883 5 473 61 410
1867 [17.4] 67 829 3 445 64 384
1870 17.2 68 250 - 76 68 326
1873 17.7 71 492 3 790 67 702
1876 17.7 72 772 5 639 67 133
1879 18.4 77 278 4 052 73 226
1882 18.4 79 503 1 844 77 659
1885 19.9 88 457 4 808 83 649
1888 19.8 90 545 3 512 87 033
1891 19.8 92 953 2 229 90 724
1894 19.8 95 030 760 94 270
1897 19.4 95 190 2 508 92 682
1900 19.4 97 376 165 97 211
1903 19.7 101 575 1 963 99 612
1906 19.7 104 404 -245 104 649
1909 18.2 99 141 9 120 90 021
1912 18.2 101 900 543 101 357
Notes and sources:
(1) Consumption per capita is taken from Lisbon and 
Oporto slaughter house statistics published by Giraldes 
(1946) and Justino (1988-1989) (cf. table A.3).
(2) Total consumption is estimated as in table A.I.
(3) Net imports of meat are estimated from net imports of 
cattle (cf. table A.l for the statistics) assuming that the 
average weight of imported and exported animals was identical 
and that all net imports were for slaughter. This assumption 
does not take into account the fact that there were some 
animal imports for fattening, but the bias cannot be 
significant given the relative shares of animal net imports 
over production. Fresh meat net imports were considered too.
(4) Production is consumption less net imports.
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Table A.5
Wine Production, 1846-1912 (OOOhl)
1846 [2 500] 1882 2 528
1849 2 568 1885 3 713
1852 2 996 1888 [3 700]
1855 1 516 1891 [3 500]
1858 946 1894 [3 300]
1861 1 013 1897 [4 300]
1864 [1 452] 1900 5 708
1867 [1 903] 1903 4 742
1870 [2 355] 1906 4 568
1873 2 042 1909 4 816
1876 [2 193] 1912 4 008
1879 [2 354]
Notes and sources:
Official statistics for wine cover the years 1848-1862, 
the average for 1861/70, 1873, 1892, 1893 and 1898 to 1903. 
These were published by Justino (1986: 268). For 1880 to 
1885, (presumed) official statistics were published in A 
Vlnha Portuguesa (1886, pp. 54-55). Until 1900, and except 
for 1846, the gaps were filled with information regarding the 
quality of the crops, in order to ascertain the comparability 
of the years for which quantitative information is available. 
From 1900 the statistics considered are from Comércio do 
Porto (29/12/1917), which are in accordance with official 
statistics for the averages centred in 1902 and 1916. For 
further details see chapter 2, and Lains (1990).
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Table A.6
Indexes for Agricultural Output, 1846-1912 
(1870*100)
Year
1846
1849
1852
1855
1858
1861
1864
1867
1870
1873
1876
1879
1882
1885
1888
1891
1894
1897
1900
1903
1906
1909
1912
Cereal8
92.3
93.1
97.5
95.5
101.7
98.3
96.8
98.7 
100.0 
102.9
94.9
91.2
97.7
94.2
104.6
110.6
110.8 
115.8 
117.7
135.2 
131.0
127.2
129.3
Wines
106.2
109.0
127.2 
64.4 
40.2
43.0
61.7
80.8
100.0 
86.7
93.1 
100.0
107.3 
157.7
157.1
148.6
140.1
182.6
242.4
201.4 
194.7
204.5
170.2
Animal
Products
91.4
92.0
92.3
91.4
92.6
90.7 
89.9
94.2 
100.0
99.1
98.3
107.2
113.7
122.4
127.4
132.8 
138.0 
135.6
142.3
145.8
153.2
131.8
148.3
Total
96.3
97.6
104.9
84.6
79.8
78.8
83.7
91.7 
100.0
96.6
95.5
99.3 
106.0
123.1
128.4 
129.7
128.9
142.9
164.2
159.1 
158.0
152.5
148.2
Notes and sources:
Partial indexes are taken from tables A.l, A.4 and A.5. 
"Total" is the aggregation of the former three indexes 
according to value shares for 1884 from table A.7 (bottom). 
As the structure of agriculture did not change considerably 
the index is not sensible to the base year chosen. 
Furthermore it is representative of the whole non-forestry 
agricultural index given that the residual remained roughly 
constant (see table A.7).
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Table A.7
Contemporary Estimates for Agricultural Output
Volumes
1853/62
(1 )
1861/70
(2)
1884
(3)
1898
(4)
1900/09
(5)
Wheat (000 hi) 2 000 2 680 1 966 2 553 3 355
Maize (000 hi) 5 600 6 781 4 481 7 540 7 100
Rye (000 hi) 2 400 2 136 1 694 2 800 2 100Wine (000 hi) 5 000 3 483 3 257 5 200 7 600
Meat (ton) 33 817 67 285 ? 96 311 93 400Dairy ? ? ? ? ?
Wool (ton) ? ? ? 4 474 5 500
Potatoes (000 ton) 130 202 180 [277] 350
Olive oil (000 hi) 149 276 213 600 628
Fruits and Vegeta. ? ? ? ? ?
Values (contos) (1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Wheat 7 246 9 710 7 196 10 400 17 000
Maize 12 981 15 853 12 860 22 100 21 300
Rye 3 485 4 800 5 624 7 700 8 400
Wine 36 000 19 586 22 050 23 000 36 000
Meat 7 396 13 718 17 000 24 811 25 000
Dairy 1 300 6 737 7 000 8 500 [8 600]
Wool 1 700 2 000 [2 000] 1 072 2 000
Potatoes 2 348 4 040 5 760 6 100 7 000
Olive oil 2 228 5 200 3 209 10 800 12 600
Fruits and Vegeta. 5 400 6 972 5 000 7 300 [10 000]
Total 80 084 88 616 87 699 121 783 147 900
Value Shares (1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cereals 29.6% 34.2% 29.3% 32.9% 31.6%
Wine 44.9% 23.1% 27.4% 27.4% 22.7%
Animal Products 13.0% 22.1% 25.1% 18.9% 24.3%
Other 12.5% 20.6% 18.2% 20.8% 21.4%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Notes and sources:
(1) Figueiredo (1873, pp. 262, 264, 281, 282).
(2) Soares (1873, pp. 3, 8, 12, 18, 20, 22). The olive oil price was corrected
according to Justino (1988-1989) and Pereira (1983, p. 191).
(3) Mateus (1986, table A.3). Dairy and wool products were taken as equal
proportions as in 1861/70. This source is considered "contemporary" because 
its author corrects the official values according to contemporary evidence.
(4) Costa (1900, pp. 117, 317, 340, 571). The author does not give output
values, so agricultural prices from Justino (1988-1989) were used.
(5) Pereira (1915, pp. 57, 77 84, 98, 231, 240, 343, 371). Fruits and 
vegetables were evaluated at 180 000 contos which is manifestly exaggerated. I 
used the 1861/70 proportions instead.
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Tabla A.8
Comparison of Indexas for Agricultural Output Growth
(1900/09-100)
Contemporary estimates
1853/62 1861/70 1884 1898 1900/09
Cereals
Wine
Meat
79.6
65.8
36.2
92.4
45.8
72.0
64.8
42.9
?
102.7
68.4
103.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
Total output
Value
Prices
54.1
88.8
59.9
93.1
59.3
86.9
82.3
100.8
100.0
100.0
Volume 60.9 64.3 68.2 81.6 100.0
Present estimates
1852/61 1864/70 1882 1897 1903/09
Cereals
Wine
Animal products
74.9 
34.4
63.9
75.1
40.4
66.0
74.5
53.7
79.2
88.3
91.3 
94.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
Total output 
Volume 55.6 58.7 67.7 91.3 100.0
Notes and sources:
"Contemporary" estimates are taken from table A. 7. The partial indexes 
are deducted from growth quantities. Prices are from Justino's (1988- 
1989) agricultural price index. "Present" estimates are those of table 
A.6. Note that this only a indicative comparison, and no conclusions can 
be drawn regarding the reliability of my index. Nevertheless it should 
be pointed out that total output trends given by both approaches are 
similar. For partial indexes important differences are those for wine 
and meat in 1853/62. The contemporary source for this period seems, 
though, in broad disagreement with the other sources, given the 
implausible rates of growth for wine and meat, compared to the 
subsequent periods.
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Table A.9
Comparisons of Agricultural Productivity Levels
Cereals and Potatoes (kg/ha)
Portugal France U.K. Spain Europe(*)
--------------------  Wheat -----------------------------------
1861/62: 546 1862: 1201 1892: 1840 1857: 457
1902/3: 591 1902: 1359 1902: 2293 1901/10: 900 1909/13: 1280
1861/62: 830 1857: 702
1902/3: 952 1909/13: 1460
1861/62: 357 1857: 364
1902/3: 454 1901/10: 791 1909/13: 1490
-------- -— --------- Potatoes--- -- --- -- ------------— ----- -
1862: 11555 1892: 14618 1857: 2290 1880: 7008
1912/13: 7000 1902: 7671 1902: 14114 1909/13:11440
Animal products (kg/head)
Portugal France U.K.
----------  Cattle meat -------------
1852: 220 1850: 331
1906: 250 1910: 421 1907/8: 306
1851/62: 1.9 1892: 2.4 1892: 2.2
1901/3: 2.0
Mediterranean crops (hi/ha)
Portugal France Spain Italy Hungary
1870: 15 1870/72: 17 1857: 5
1903/12: 22 1903/12: 31 1903/12: 12 1903/12: 10 1903/12: 13
1857: 1.24
c.1900: 1.76 c.1900:1.41 c.1900: 1.76
(*) Russia excluded
Sources: Eddie (1968, p. 213), Mateus (1986, p. 13), O’Brien and Keyder 
(1978, pp. 120-21), Pereira (1915, p. 384-85), Tortella (1985a, p. 78- 
79).
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Table A*10
The Use of Land
---  1867 --- ---  1902 ---
Area
1-Under crop 
Cereals 
Vines
Olive-trees 
Fruit-trees 
Gardening and other
2-Not under crop (*)
3-Agricultural (1+2)
4-Forestall
5-Productive (3+4)
6-Not cultivated (fit)
7-Not cultivated (unfit) 
TOTAL (5+6+7)
000 ha % 000 ha %
1 886 21.3 3 111 35.1
1 127 12.7 1 392 15.7
204 2.3 313 3.5
200 2.2 329 3.7
70 0.8 131 1.5
295 3.3 946 10.7
2 072 23.4 1 926 21.7
3 958 44.6 5 037 56.8
1 240 14.0 1 956 2 2 .1
5 198 58.7 6 994 78.9
3 329 37.5 1 534 17.3
341 3.8 341 3.8
8 868 100.0 8 868 100.0
Sources: Bastos (1936, p. 25, table X), Mateus (1986, p. 10) 
and Pereira (1915, p. 337).
Notes: The 1867 census figure for the area under forest was not 
used, given that thickets (matas) were incorrectly included: an 
area equal to the one in 1902 was admitted (600 000 ha). Most 
of the area not cultivated, but fit, in 1903 had a potential 
for forestation, as may be inferred by the fact that in 1960 
2/3 of it was occupied by forests.
The original designations are the following: "Superficie: l'­
agricola cultivada; 2-agrlcola inculta (pastagens, pousios e 
charnecas produtivas); 3-agricola; 4-florestal; 5-produtiva; 6- 
inculta mas cultiv&vel; 7-incultivàvel."
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Table A.11
Labour Force by Industrial Sectors 
(000, %)
Sectors Workers employed
1910 -
1845 1852 I II
No. % No. % No. % No. %
----------- -— — --- ---- --- --- — --- — ---- ----
Cottons 3 001 31.4 4 867 34.5 21 011 33.7 20 264 27.1
Woollens 2 342 24.5 3 702 26.3 10 357 16.6 11 647 15.6
Linens 208 2.2 383 2.7 2 678 4.3 2 678 3.6
Food indus. 512 5.4 [750] 5.3 4 568 7.3 4 568 6 .1
Cork indus. 77 0.8 164 1.2 4 580 7.4 6 634 8.9
Tobacco 407 4.3 1 325 9.4 4 136 6.6 3 372 4.5
Metallurgy 670 7.0 823 5.8 3 814 6 .1 9 134 12.2
Paper 936 9.8 1 071 7.6 1 689 2.7 2 100 2.8
Ceramics 1 406 14.6 942 6.7 2 543 4.1 3 968 5.3
Soap indus. na na 64 0.5 764 1.2 764 1.0
Canned fish — - - - 6 136 9.9 9 688 12.9
TOTAL 9 559 100% 14 091 100% 62 276 100% 74 817 100%
Sources: Reis (1986a) and Lains (1990).
Notes: The food industry figure for 1852 was corrected by the 
correspondent share for 1845 given that the original figure was 
too low (i.e., 103). For the year circa 1910 two hypothesis are 
considered by Jaime Reis: higher Bhares for metallurgy and canned 
fish mean that hypotheses II presents a more "modern" type of 
industrial growth. Note that these census are probably biased 
towards the more modern industries in each sector, what would 
account for the lower shares for less concentrated industries like 
linens, ceramics or soap. See on this matter Reis (1986a, p. 927) 
and Lains (1990).
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Table A.12 
Value Added by Industrial Sectors
Sectors Value added (contos)
c.1850 c.1910
I II
per w. total share per w. total share total share
Cottons .115 559 25.9 .138 2895 22.0 2792 17.5
Woollens .203 752 34.9 .253 2620 19.9 2947 18.6
Linens .196 75 3.5 .235 630 4.8 630 4.0
Food indus. .192 144 6.7 .399 1823 13.8 1823 11.4
Cork indus. .140 23 1 . 1 .167 763 5.8 1105 6.9
Tobacco .150 199 9.3 .333 1377 10.5 1123 7.0
Metallurgy .214 176 8.2 .306 1166 8.9 2791 17.5
Paper .067 72 3.4 .168 283 2 .1 352 2.2
Ceramics .152 143 6.7 .155 394 3.0 615 3.9
Soap indus. .092 6 0.3 .362 277 2 .1 277 1.7
Canned fish - - - .153 936 7.1 1478 9.3
TOTAL .153 2149 100% .212 13164 100% 15932 100%
"per w." * value added per worker at current prices.
"total" * value added per worker x working force;
"share" * sectorial shares of value added.
Sources: Table A.11, Reis (1986a, p. 920) and Lains (1990).
Notes: Estimates for value added per worker are based on various 
regional industrial census published circa 1865, and on the 1891 
national industrial census: thus, they are evaluated at prices for 
c.1865 and c.1890, respectively. Figures for c.1910 should be more 
reliable, although the coverage of both census is rather small.
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Table A.13
Indexes for Industrial Output, 1851-1914
Year PIL 
(1865=100)
PIR 1 PIR 2 
(1900-100)
1851 72.5 32.9 31.6
1854 88.8 35.4 34.2
1855 90.6 35.8 34.5
1856 93.0 35.3 35.0
1861 105.6 32.9 33.1
1865 100.0 39.7 38.3
1866 108.5 40.4 38.6
1867 114.2 41.2 39.9
1868 11 1 .0 40.4 38.5
1869 115.1 41.8 40.4
1870 115.4 48.5 45.5
1871 106.8 41.0 40.0
1872 132.3 46.9 47.3
1873 158.7 57.2 55.2
1874 171.4 52.5 53.5
1875 175.0 52.7 52.8
1876 163.3 48.4 47.9
1877 176.8 56.8 54.7
1878 174.9 55.1 53.4
1879 178.8 54.5 51.6
1880 163.4 49.3 49.7
1881 190.3 53.5 53.6
1882 182.4 56.9 57.6
1883 196.8 56.2 56.9
1884 200.9 57.5 58.0
1885 216.4 56.3 57.7
1886 279.3 67.0 69.0
1887 252.7 69.9 72.1
1888 246.2 70.6 72.6
1889 256.5 64.3 67.9
1890 214.1 74.8 79.1
1891 263.0 69.3 73.2
1892 276.5 68.6 71.8
1893 308.9 74.5 75.8
1894 266.9 71.5 71.8
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Table A*13 (contd.)
Year PIL PIR 1 PIR 2
1895 286.5 77.6 78.0
1896 251.2 76.1 76.4
1897 279.3 87.4 86.6
1898 292.6 89.5 89.3
1899 313.9 93.5 91.4
1900 349.5 100.0 100.0
1901 316.6 94.9 96.4
1902 334.0 98.0 99.7
1903 346.3 103.3 106.2
1904 365.0 108.2 109.9
1905 318.2 97.5 102.0
1906 303.3 98.4 105.4
1907 369.5 108.7 113.7
1908 340.6 104.9 109.7
1909 333.9 107.2 109.8
1910 404.8 115.5 120.4
1911 455.4 127.2 133.3
1912 425.9 125.5 136.6
1913 441.3 128.2 137.8
1914 354.3 110 .6 114.2
Sources: Reis (1986a) and Lains (1990). PIL and PIR are the 
aggregates of partial industrial indexes, according, 
respectively, to value added shares relative to c. 1850 and 
c.1910 of table A.12. To take into account changes in the 
industrial structure, PIL should be used for the period between 
the decades of 1850 and 1870, while PIR should be used from the 
1870s onwards (see text).
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Table A.14
Rates of Growth for Industrial Output, 1854-1911 
(%, per year)
Period PIL Period PIR1 PIR2 Average
1854-1861 2.51 1854-1865 1.05 1.03 1.78 <*>
1861-1875 3.67 1865-1873 4.67 4.67 4.17 <*)
1875-1890 3.98 1873-1890 1.59 2.14 1.87 <$>
1890-1900 1.07 1890-1900 2.95 2.37 2.66 <$>
1900-1911 2.44 1900-1911 2 .21 2.65 2.43 (S)
1854-1875 3.28 1854-1873 \oto•CM 2.55 2.92 (*)
1875-1911 2.69 1873-1911 2.21 2.65 2.43 ($)
1854-1890 3.57 1854-1890 2.10 2.36 2.68 <#>
1890-1911 1.78 1890-1911 2.56 2.52 2.54 (5)
1875-1900 2.82 1873-1900 2.09 2.23 2.16 ($)
1854-1911 2.91 1854-1911 2.27 2.52 2.57 <#)
Source: computed from table A.16.
Notes: The above periods were defined according to peak years, 
i.e. the years at which differences to trend values, given by OLSQ 
regressions, were larger. The value of the trend rate of growth 
lyes between 2.09% and 2.73% per year. The rates of the last 
column are averages weighted by the representativeness of each 
index, according to:
<*> - 1/2 PIL + 1/4 PIR1 + 1/4 PIR2
($) “ 1/2 PIR1 + 1/2 PIR2
<#> - 1/3 PIL + 1/3 PIR1 + 1/3 PIR2
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Table A.15
Comparison of Estimates for Industrial Output Growth
(%, per year)
Total value added in industry (conto8)
1850 1910
PIR1 PIR2
At 1865 prices 2 149 At 1891 prices 13 164 15 932
Price index 0.97 
(1865*100)
Price index
(1891*100)
0.96 1.0 1
At 1850 prices 2 085 At 1910 prices 12 637 16 091
Annual growth rates, 1850-1910
PIL PIR1 PIR2
From values above
Nominal growth - 3.05% 3.46%
Price trends 0.27% 0.59% 0.56%
Real growth 2•78%-3•19% 2.46% 2.90%
From table A.13 (real growth) 2.91% 2.27% 2.52%
Sources: Tables A.12 and A.13. Prices from Lains (1990).
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Table A.16
Total Male Labour Force (000)
Male labour force
Census Total Total male -------- ----------
years population population Census Estimtd
[1854] 3 492 n.a. n.a. 962
1864 3 830 1 842 n.a. 1 053
1878 4 160 1 996 n.a. 1 144
1890 4 660 2 251 1 752 1 242
1900 5 016 2 402 1 916 1 328
1911 5 548 2 637 2 019 1 435
Sources: Pereira (1983) and Silva (1970)
Notes: Estimated male labour forcé (last column)
population from the 15-59 age group. This proportion and the 
proportion relative to male population only (shown between 
brackets) did not vary significantly: 1864: 27.5% (n.a.); 
1878: 27.5% (57.2%); 1890: 26.7% (55.2%), 1900: 26.5%
(55.3%); 1911: 25.9% (54.4%). From 1890 to 1911 estimated and 
census male labour force have the similar rates of growth.
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Table A.17
Agricultural Labour Force and GDP per capita
Labour force in agriculture (%>
GDP per -------- ---------------------------------
capita European norm Portugal
Portugal ---------------- —-------- ------
Year ($1970) All LDCs Total Hale
-------- --------- — --- —  ------- --------  --- ---
(i) (2) (3) (4) (5)
------- --------- ------ - ——-----  -------
1850 274 72.7 68.7 n.a. [68.7]
1870 262 74.4 69.7 n.a. 169.7)
1890 317 69.1 66.8 61.7 66.9
1911 353 66.4 65.3 57.4 61.0
1950 481 58.0 60.8 49.1 53.6
1960 687 47.4 54.8 43.4 49.3
Notes and sources:
(1) GDP extrapolated backwards from Summers and Heston (1988;
which have been interpolated to 1970 dollars, to fit Crafts' 
regressions.
(2) and (3) "European norm" are averages for structural economic 
variables in nineteenth century Europe, estimated through linear 
regressions on GNP per capita and population size by Crafts 
(1984). For the share of agricultural labour force in total 
population (AGLAB) the relevant regressions are ("all" * 17 
European countries; "LDCs" 9 countries with a per capita income 
of less than $500 in 1880):
All - AGLAB * 238.655 - 30.186 In Y + 2.808 In POP
(15.033) (-12.128) (3.304)
R2 * 0.794; SEE * 7.290
LDCs - AGLAB » 161.524 - 17.004 In Y + 2.070 In POP
(3.994) (-2.648) (1.449)
R2 « 0.244; SEE - 7.637
(4) Census agricultural labour force.
(5) From 1890, census male agricultural labour. For the previous
years (1850 and 1870) I assumed that the share for male 
agricultural force for Portugal was equal to the share for total 
agricultural labour force given by the European norm for later- 
developers (LDCs). These values are those that fit better with the 
actual 1890-1960 values. Although the difference between actual 
and fitted values is around 10% for 1910, 1950 and 1960, I
admitted no difference in 1850 and 1870, in agreement with Crafts'
(1984, p. 447) finding that later-developers tend to have higher 
agricultural shares than the norm at the same income levels: 
Portugal was one of the poorest countries, even among this group 
(see chapter 1). Because the range of possible values is narrow, 
these assumptions are safe.
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Table A. 18
Structure of Male Labour Force
Shares (%) Total (000)
Year Agricul. Industry Services Agricul. Industry Service
1850 [68.7] [17.4] [13.9] [656] [166] [133]
1870 [69.7] [16.8] [13.5] [761] [183] [147]
1890 66.9 18.3 14.8 831 227 184
1900 66.4 18.8 14.8 882 250 196
1911 61.0 21.7 17.3 875 312 248
Notes and sources: For 1850 and 1870, the shares for agriculture 
are from table A.17; the shares for industry and services were 
estimated with the further assumption that the ratio share of 
services/share of industry was the same as in 1890-1911 (roughly 
80%). From 1890 the figures are from the population census.
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Table À* 19
Rates of Growth for Output, Labour and Output per Labour 
in Agriculture and Industry, 1850-1911 
(%; per year)
Period Output Labour Output/Labour
Agricul. Industry Agricul. Industry Agricul.
Industry
1850-1870 -0.26 1.92 0.75 0.49 -1.0 1 1.43
1870-1890 1.40 2.55 0.44 1.08 0.96 1.47
1890-1900 2.07 3.13 0.60 0.97 1.47 2.16
1900-1911 -0.85 2.65 -0.07 2.03 -0.78 0.62
1870-1900 1.67 2.73 0.49 1.05 1.18 1.68
1870-1911 0.94 2.71 0.34 1.31 0.60 1.40
1850-1900 0.94 2.54 0.60 0.82 0.34 1.72
1850-1911 0.58 2.55 0.48 1.04 0.10 1.51
Sources : Computed from tables A.6, A.13 and A.18. To computi
growth rates between comparable years (i.e. peak to peak or trough 
to trough), the benchmark years (the centre of three year 
averages) are the following:
Agriculture: 1852, 1870, 1888, 1900. Given that 1912 is a trough 
year it should be compared with 1861.
Industry: 1851, 1870, 1891, 1900 and 1912.
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Table A.20
Compared Rates of Growth for 
Agriculture, Industry, Physical Output and GDP, 
1850-1911 (%, per year)
Physical Prod.
Period Popul. Total per c. Justino
(1 ) (2) (3) (4)
1850-1870 0.67 0.44 -0.23 0.50
1870-1890 0.81 1.77 0.96 1.15
1890-1900 0.74 2.41 1.67 0.15
1900-1911 0.92 0.28 -0.64 0.33
1870-1900 0.78 2.01 1.23 CM00«o
1870-1911 0.82 1.51 0.69 o•o
1850-1900 0.74 1.46 0.72 0.69
1850-1911 0.77 1.22 0.45 0.63
Notes and sources:
(1) From table A.l
(2) and (3) Average of agricultural and industrial rates of 
growth, weighted respectively by the coefficients 0.676 and
0.324 for 1890.
(4) Indirect GDP growth estimated from Justino (1987).
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obs
1846
1847
1848
1849
1850
1851
1852
1853
1854
1855
1856
1857
1858
1859
1860
1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
Table A.21
for Agriculture, Industry and Physical Output!
(1900=100) !
PAG PIND PHY
58.7 NA NA
58.9 NA NA
59.2 NA NA
59.4 NA NA
60.9 NA NA
62.4 26.5 52.6
63.9 NA NA
59.5 NA NA
55.3 30.1 48.7
51.5 30.5 46.2
50.5 30.9 45.5
49.5 NA NA
48.6 NA NA
48.4 NA NA
48.2 NA NA
48.0 31.6 43.1
49.0 NA NA
50.0 NA NA
51.0 NA NA
52.5 33.8 48.2
54.2 35.3 49.4
55.8 36.6 50.9
57.5 35.6 51.6
59.2 37.0 53.3
60.9 40.0 56.4
60.2 35.5 53.8
59.5 42.5 55.5
58.8 50.8 58.0
58.6 51.0 56.8
58.4 51.4 56.6
58.2 48.2 54.9
58.9 55.8 57.9
59.7 54.3 57.9
60.5 53.0 58.1
61.8 49.5 57.8
63.2 53.5 60.1'
64.6 57.3 62.2
67.9 56.5 64.2
71.3 57.8 66.9
75.0 57.0 69.1
76.0 68.0 73.4
77.1 71.0 75.1
78.2 71.6 76.1
78.5 66.1 74.5
78.7 76.9 78.2
79.0 71.3 76.5
78.8 70.2 76.0
78.7 75.2 77.5
78.5 71.7 76.3
81.3 77.8 80.1
3c(<
obs PAG PIND PHY
1896 84.1 76.3 81.5
1897 87.0 87.0 87.0
1898 91.2 89.4 90.6
1899 95.5 92.4 94.5
1900 100.0 100.0 100.0
1901 98.9 95.7 97.9
1902 97.9 98.8 98.2
1903 96.9 104.8 99.4
1904 96.7 109.1 100.7
1905 96.4 99.8 97.5
1906 96.2 101.9 98.1
1907 95.1 111.2 100.3
1908 94.0 107.3 98.3
1909 92.9 108.5 97.9
1910 92.0 117.9 100.4
1911 91.1 130.3 103.8
1912 90.3 131.1 103.5
1913 90.3 133.0 104.1
Notes and sources:
PAG: From table A.6, with interpolations.
PIND: Averages of PIL, PIR1 and PIR2 according
weights on table A.14
PHY: Weighted average of PAG and PIND, according to 
weights on table A.20
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APPENDIX B
NEW VALUES FOR PORTUGUESE FOREIGN TRADE STATISTICS
In the last two or three decades several studies have 
investigated the accuracy of trade statistics, by comparing data 
from different pairs of countries.1 Generally speaking, these 
studies have shown that exports tend to be undervalued, while 
imports tend to be overvalued. Furthermore, these studies also 
conclude that trade flows among countries are most of the times 
badly recorded, especially in the case of transit countries, like 
Belgium or the Netherlands, which reexported goods from other
1. These studies followed pioneering works such as that of Zuckermann (1921). 
Among the most recent revisions of nineteenth century foreign trade 
statistics, see Don (1968), Prados (1981 and 1986), Degrdve (1982), Lains 
(1986), Pamuk (1987) and Tena (1989). Zuckermann (1921) provides a first 
complete comparison of World international trade statistics for the years 
1909/13, which was criticised by Morgersten (1963), and recently recovered in 
Federico and Tena (1989). This last work also presents a complete survey on 
the literature concerning the accuracy of international trade statistics.
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Western European countries and their colonies to Central Europe 
and Britain; and the United States through which ports some trade 
reached Latin America.
Portuguese trade statistics do not compare badly with those 
of most countries. Instead, they may be considered rather 
accurate at least from 1865 onwards, when they start appearing 
annually. Trade values were established according to the 
declarations of exporters and importers, and not according to any 
lists official values, as existed in other countries and which 
most of the times were not revised regularly.1 Portuguese trade 
statistics also recorded the direction of trade according to real 
origin and destination. But reexports from the African colonies 
appear separately only after 1880. Trade in bullion and specie is 
also excluded from the totals after that year. Furthermore, some 
goods were imported under special conditions, such as railway 
equipment, and were not registered in the totals; some of the 
coal imported was then reexported to the coaling stations in Cabo 
Verde and Madeira. The necessary adjustments were made 
accordingly.2
To check the accuracy of the Portuguese foreign trade 
statistics I will follow here the standard procedure, which is to 
compare the values for Portuguese exports and imports in
1. Export prices declared by traders were however controlled by official 
tables with minimum prices that were in principle revised quarterly. See 
Amzalack (1919, p. 41).
2. For further detail see Lains (1986, pp. 411-12).
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Portugal's official statistics to the correspondent values 
recorded by the major trade partners. Such a procedure has 
several limitations. Firstly, the sample of countries is 
restricted by the quality or accessibility of information. French 
statistics, for instance, are not reliable before 1870, whereas 
trade statistics for Germany are non-existent before 1871, and 
are reliable only from 1880.1 Furthermore, the comparability of 
foreign trade statistics among pairs of countries is rendered 
difficult by the use of different methods used to register trade 
flows. These differences include evaluation by official prices or 
by declared values; registration of real origin and destination 
or registration according to areas of shipment and delivery; 
inclusion of transit trade and trade in gold and silver in 
aggregate trade flows; and the usual distinction between FOB and 
CIF prices.2 Inter-country comparisons of trade statistics are 
also disturbed by smuggling.
Most of the data I shall be using here refers to four 
Western European countries. Data for trade outside Europe is more 
difficult to obtain, specially for Latin America. Brazil, 
Portugal's major trading partner in Latin America, has no safe 
statistics for exports because of deficient record of
1. See Giffen (1882, p. 191), Platt (1972, p. 120), and Lewis (1981, Appendix 
1), who corrects German's trade figures for 1833-80.
2. See the survey in Degrdve (1982, pp. 94-97) of the different country 
systems.
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destinations.1 The other major Overseas trading area, Portuguese 
African colonies, do not have independent trade data.
Except for the USA and Brazil, most statistical publications 
register export values at free on board (FOB) prices, and import 
values including cost, insurance and freight (CIF). I did not 
compute specific freight factors for Portugal because 
fluctuations in international freight rates do not vary 
significantly. I used an index of freight rates which links 
North's (1950) index for US Exports from 1842 to 1869, and 
Cairncross' (1953) index for UK trade from 1870 to 1913. To 
reduce the strong fluctuations in the American index prior to 
1870, which are caused by the Civil War, I used five-year 
averages of that index. As we could expect, the above two freight 
indexes are highly correlated. The simple correlation coefficient 
for the period in which they overlap (1870-1910) is 0.93. The 
linked index was used to multiply a freight factor for the year 
1873, given by British consular report, which puts freight 
charges of Anglo-Portuguese trade at 7% of the value. I increased 
this percentage to 10% to take in account the higher rates for 
the Southern Atlantic freights.2 The yearly freight conversion
1. Brazilian exports were often directed to the "Channel", before reaching 
their final destination, according to market conditions. See Platt (1972, 
p.122) and Com6rcio Exterior do Brasil (n.d., p. LXIX).
2. This 10% were estimated as follows: freight rates between Portugal and 
Brazil were about two times freights between Portugal and Europe, and the 
South Atlantic accounted for about 1/3 of Portuguese trade. Then:
10% - 2/3 x 7% + 1/3 x 14% (approx.)
Freights are from Parliamentary Papers (1873, p. 959).
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factor is presented in table B.3 below. It is important to note 
that the use of international freights imply margins of error of 
probably not more than 5% of the traded values.
The countries with which Portuguese trade figures are here 
compared systematically are the United Kingdom, France, Belgium 
and Germany. Spanish trade figures will be used to make a first 
estimate of smuggling over the land border. Correction 
coefficients for trade to and from these countries are defined as 
the ratio of the value of trade given by the foreign statistics 
to that given by Portuguese statistics, corrected for freights 
and converted into pounds sterling at market exchange rates. 
Thus, Portuguese official values should be multiplied by the 
coefficients to obtain the "true” values.
Table B.l shows five-year averages for the correction 
coefficients regarding the countries above, as well for other 
countries for which statistics could be found. This table is 
summarized in table A2.2. Yearly correction coefficients for 
Great Britain from 1855, plus France and Belgium from 1875, and 
Germany from 1883, are presented in table B.3.1 Because it was 
Portugal's major trade partner throughout the period, special 
care is given to the computation of correction coefficients for
1. British Abstracts for Foreign Countries give tables for France in which 
either exports (1862-1873) to Portugal or imports (1873-1883) from Portugal 
are not discriminated. I resorted to other sources, but nevertheless I do not 
have a continuous series before 1875. In the case of Germany the same problem 
arises before 1883, but in any case statistics for this country previous to 
1880 are not reliable, as pointed out above in the text. Given the small 
weight of trade with these countries in the earlier periods, their exclusion 
does not affect significantly the results.
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the United Kingdom. British statistics, which are certainly among 
the best before World War I, do have some drawbacks. In fact, not 
until 1854 did imports and reexports start being evaluated at 
market values instead of at "official" values, which had been for 
the greatest part fixed in the seventeenth century (in 1696). 
Before 1904 exports and imports were registered according to 
ports of shipment and landing. Only after that date did they 
start registering the true origin and final destination.
For specific inter-country comparisons more detailed 
problems arise. British statistics take trade with Portugal 
proper separately from trade with the Atlantic islands (Azores 
and Madeira); and trade in bullion and specie as well as 
reexports were included in the totals. As Portugal is a sea-borne 
country, its direct trade with Britain is well recorded in 
British statistics, in opposition to reexports from Portuguese 
the colonies and the transit trade between Britain and Spain.1
The British source for Anglo-Portuguese trade here used are 
the tables in the Parliamentary Papers, where the level of detail 
is good enough to overcome the problems of compatibility pointed 
out above. This disaggregate comparison also shows that the 
errors arise mainly in what evaluations are concerned and not as
1. The mis-specification of the directions of British trade is less important 
for sea-borne countries as Portugal. An information regarding 1904, the year 
when Britain changed the classification from countries of last shipment to 
countries of consignment (i.e. proper origin), shows that Portugal sent to 
Britain less than 1.3% of its exports through other countries such as France, 
Germany or Spain (Parliamentary Papers, 1905, p.424). See also Platt (1972, p. 
122). For a general correction of British statistics see Imlah (1958).
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much in the record of traded quantities.1 Two first yearly 
correction coefficients were computed for Portuguese exports and 
imports to and from the UK (see table B.3). In the cases of 
France, Belgium and Germany, the available sources only give 
trade by totals, disaggregated by major trade partners (as well 
as totals by major commodity classifications). The estimated 
individual correction coefficients for each of these countries do 
not show any regular pattern, nevertheless, the errors tend to 
compensate. More importantly, the joint index of the three 
countries is proximate to that for the UK, giving some sort of 
confidence to our results (see graph B.l).
The available information on the United States of America is 
not included in the yearly correction coefficient, because 
comparisons between the two different country sources are not 
always feasible. For instance, in 1895/99 Portuguese exports to 
the US, according to US statistics would be 6 times the value 
given by Portuguese statistics, an error that is due to the fact 
that US statistics do not distinguish exports from reexports. 
Cocoa and coffee reexported from Portuguese African colonies 
through Lisbon appear in US statistics as of Portuguese origin. 
These reexports increased sharply in the 1890s, and such increase
1. Given that imports statistics are rather accurate (see below), this 
concerns only exports. Correction coefficients for values and volumes of 
Anglo-Portuguese exports are presented in Lains (1986, p. 415).
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explains the major differences depicted in table B.l.1 In the 
case of Brazil, it was not possible to find enough information 
for the years prior to 1910.2 Also because of transit trade, 
exports from Portugal to Belgium after 1890 appear with large 
differences in the two sources. In 1910/13 this error reaches an 
extremely high value because Portuguese reexports in general, and 
to Belgium in particular, rose considerably. In consequence, I 
excluded Belgium from the average yearly index in the years after 
1910.
We may look now at the correction coefficients for Spain. 
Contrarily to what happens with the other countries, imports from 
Spain appear as overvalued in Portuguese statistics, while 
exports appear as undervalued, for most of the period (see tables
B.l and B.2). This is due to smuggling over the common border: 
smuggling from Spain to Portugal was registered as Spanish 
exports in Spain, where no important duties were to be paid, but 
not as Spanish imports into Portugal, to avoid import tariffs 
(and vice-versa). The detour from one customs house to the other 
was rendered possible by the considerable distance between most
1. According to two US consular reports for 1880 and 1907, trade between North 
America and Portugal was carried by British vessels, through England. This 
probably led to some errors on American statistics given that they registered 
origin as last shipping port. See Commercial Relations (1880, p. 983) and 
(1907, pp. 469-70), and Amzalak (1919, p. 63).
2. For a comparison of Portuguese and Brazilian statistics for trade between 
the two countries see also Salgado (1927, pp. 28, 38-39).
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of the customs houses on either side of the border.1 Given that 
Spanish statistics do not distinguish transit trade and include 
bullion and specie in the totals, I assumed constant smuggling 
coefficients according to the available information (see table
B.4). The resulting correction of Spanish imports into Portugal 
is particularly important in what respects the trend after 1893, 
when a commercial treaty between the two countries reduced trade 
restrictions: the jump in imports shown by Portuguese official 
statistics is thus attributed to the legalisation of the 
smuggling that occurred before that treaty.2
After going through the particulars, we can now turn to the 
analysis of the yearly correction coefficients with which trends 
of Portuguese trade shall be revised. According to the results 
summarised in table B.5, correction coefficients for imports fall 
in the range 0.83 5 to 1.175, with an average for the years from 
1855 to 1913 of just 0.978. The value of imports in Portuguese 
statistics are thus rather accurate, the small error of 
undervaluation being compensated by the estimated smuggling from 
Spain. The case of exports is different, the errors falling in
1* Most customs houses on the Spanish-Portuguese border were located at more 
than about five kilometres from the border, as it may be deducted from the 
maps in Serr&o (1986, pp. 289-91), As late as April 1900, the Portuguese 
parliament had a lively discussion over the initiative of a local clerk, who 
transferred the customs office to his own village, far from the border and 
with no road links to it. See Di&rio da Camara [••.] (4-4-1990).
2. In the beginning of the period, there is evidence of large smuggling of 
British cotton goods and other to Spain through Portugal. This smuggling 
appear as exports in Portuguese statistics. If they are taken out, Portuguese 
exports to Spain are considerably reduced till 1870. See chapter 3, Prados 
(1984, pp. 129-30) and Lains (1986, p. 395).
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the range between 0.954 to 2.352, with an average of 1.439 for 
1855-1913. Graph B.2 shows the trends for both coefficients.
After 1891, when Portugal left the gold standard, the high 
values for the correction coefficient of exports is to a large 
extent explained by the use in official statistics of the par 
instead of the market exchange rate, for most of the 1891-1913 
period. In some period, though, this practice was not followed. 
As is mentioned in a British consular report, in April of 1893 
the customs house began to use an exchange rate for the pound 
sterling close to the market value (£ 1 = 5$400) instead of the 
par rate (4$500), as previously. This is patent in graph B.3, in 
the shape of a reduction of the correction coefficient deflated 
by an index for the exchange rate (par value - 100), during the 
years 1893-1895.1 The other decline of the curve in the same 
graph in 1904-1905, may also be attributed to a change of the 
kind, although for these years I do not have direct evidence.2
After accounting for the exchange rate fluctuations, the 
error in official values for Portuguese exports falls within 
acceptable boundaries, except for a few years. Until 1886 the 
correction coefficient varies from 0.910 to 1.393, with an
1. The change in the exchange rate used by Portuguese customs is mentioned in 
Diplomatic and Consular Reports (...) (1894, p. 6)*
2. Regarding the incorrect valuation of exports see for instance Salgado 
(1927, pp. 303-5, 397)« According to this author, exporters declared the value 
of their merchandise without taking into account changes in the value of the 
currency. However, the author uses market exchange rates to convert the values 
in Portuguese currency into pounds, and in some occasions he uses the par 
exchange rate but for both imports and exports. See also Salgado (1939).
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average of just 1.144. Between 1887 and 1890 the coefficient 
jumped to an average value of 1.356. This level is maintained 
until 1908 (see table B.6 and graph B.3), when the values go up 
again. It should be noted that the fluctuations in the correction 
coefficient for exports are not caused by variations in its 
coverage, because the coefficients for the UK, the aggregate for 
France, Belgium and Germany, and for Spain depict the same 
patterns.
Although the correction coefficients seem rather 
trustworthy, care should be taken in estimating growth rates 
between single years that fall in the periods for which no full 
explanation for the errors may be provided, namely, the years 
between 1887 and 1890 and between 1909 and 1913. In any case, the 
corrected statistics have to be used taking into account the 
limits of the correction coefficients presented here.
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SOURCES FOR TRADE OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES
ANNUAIRE STATISTIQUE DE LA BÉLGIQUE, Bruxelles, various years (starting 1870).
ANNUAIRE STATISTIQUE DE LA FRANCE, Paris, various years (starting 1878).
COMÉRCIO EXTERIOR DO BRASIL, 1910-1914, Rio de Janeiro: 
Ministério da Fazenda, vol. 1, n.d.
ESTADISTICAS DO COMÉRCIO EXTERIOR (ESPAÑA), 1871, 1880,
1890, 1910.
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS - Statistical Tables Relating to 
Foreign Countries. Part IX to Part XII, vol. LX, 1864, p. 525; 
vol. LXXIV, 1866, p. 1; vol. LXX, 1867-68, p. 553; vol. LXIX, 
1870, p. 1.
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS - Statistical Abstract for the 
Principal and Otther Foreign Countries in each year from 1873 to 
1882-83 (London: HMSO, 1885), vol. LXXXII, 1884-85.
PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS - Statistical Abstract for the 
Principal and Otther Foreign Countries in each year from 1882 to 
1891-92 (20th No.) (London: HMSO, 1894), vol. XCI, 1894.
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT FOT THE PRINCIPAL FOREIGN COUNTRIES in 
each year from 1860 to 1873 (2nd No.), London: HMSO, 1875
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT FOR THE PRINCIPAL AND OTHER COUNTRIES 
in each year from 1892 to 1901-02 (30th No.), London: HMSO, 1904.
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT FOR THE PRINCIPAL AND OTHER COUNTRIES 
in each year from 1901 to 1912 (39th No.), London: HMSO, 1914
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT FOR THE UNITED STATES (1895-1904) (27th
No.), Washington, 1905 and 1903-13
STATISTISCHES YAHRBUCH FUR DAS DEUTSCHE REICH [editions for 
1880, 1895, and 1914], Berlin, 1880, 1895 and 1914.
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Table B.l(*)
Portuguese Trade according to Different Sources
1865/69
E X P O R T S I M P O R T S
(1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Countries X(P) X*(P) X(F) 3/2 M(P) M' (P) M(F) 7/6
1-U.K.
2-France(#)
3-Belgium
4-Germany
2204.2
115.3
24.5
41.0
2398.2
125.4
26.7
44.6
2446.3
254.7
43.3
na
1.020
2.030
1.624
2507.4
733.0
1 . 1
69.6
2304.6
673.7
1.0
64.0
2342.6
847.2
7.5
na
1.016
1.258
7.705
5-Spain(+) 281.1 305.8 119.3 0.390 452.8 416.2 1962.2 4.715
6-U.S.(")
7-Brazil
34.2
632.0
34.2
687.6
43.8
na
1.281 170.3
672.3
170.3
617.9
164.0
na
0.963
(*) For notes and sources see end 
(#) Except 1869 
(+) 1865 and 1866 
Average freight conversion factor
of table 
: 1.088
1870/74
E X P O R T S I M P O R T S
(1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Countries X(P) X'(P) X(F) 3/2 M(P) M' (P) M(F) 7/6
1-U.K.
2-France(*)
3-Belgium
4-Germany
3108.2
69.7
47.2
83.5
3437.7
77.1
52.2
3915.5
388.4
76.4
na
1.139
5.038
1.464
2848.3
531.3
11.0
124.7
2575.3
480.4
9.9
3015.4
547.0
54.4
na
1.171
1.139
5.470
5-Spain 371.2 410.5 949.3 2.312 504.6 456.2 1087.6 2.384
6-U.S.
7-Brazil
53.2
796.2
53.2 89.5
na
1.682 294.9
663.3
294.9 298.9
na
1.014
(*) 1870
Average freight conversion factor: 1.106
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Table B.l (cont.)
1875/79
E X P O R T S I M P O R T S
(1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Countries X(P) X'(P) X ( F) 3/2 M(P) M'(P) M(F) 7/6
1-U.X.
2-France
3-Belgium
4-Germany
2841.0
204.2
45.7
133.4
3105.2
223.2
50.0
3585.4
373.4
91.1
na
1.155
1.673
1.824
2894.0
1133.2
177.1
238.2
2647.8
1036.7
162.0
2927.3
902.1
180.0
na
1.106
0.870
1 . 1 1 1
5-Spain 283.2 309.5 222.7 0.719 522.7 478.2 1228.4 2.569
6-Ü.S.
7-Brazil
79.2
952.8
79.2 10 1 .1
na
1.277 706.6
500.4
706.6 716.1
na
1.013
Average freight conversion factor!: 1.093
1880/84
E X P O R T S I M P O R T S
(1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Countries X(P) X*(P) X(F) 3/2 M(P) M' (P) M(F) 7/6
1-U.K.(*)
2-France
3-Belgium
4-Germany
3021.9
737.5
55.9
206.7
3260.6
795.8
60.3
3598.7
782.4
89.7
na
1.104
0.983
1.487
2629.1
921.8
209.1
621.4
2436.6
854.3
193.8
2650.9
769.7
205.7 
na
1.088
0.901
1.061
5-Spain 332.4 358.7 305.4 0.852 426.7 395.5 950.3 2.403
6-U.S.
7-Brazil
143.9
1061.1
143.9 206.4
na
1.434 1167.4
480.4
1167.4 968.4
na
0.830
(*) 1880/82 for exports.
Average freight conversion factor: 1.079
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1885/89
Table B.l (cont.)
E X P O R T S I M P O R T S
(1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) <B)
Countries X(P) X'(P) X(F) 3/2 M(P) M’(P) M(F) 7/6
1-U.K.
2-France
3-Belgium
4-Germany
1774.2
1323.5
86.7
354.1
1882.4
1404.2
92.0
2847.9
1960.4
85.4
na
1.513
1.396
0.928
2768.2
1136.2 
315.3
1014.2
2609.0
1070.8
297.2
2656.2
937.0
402.4
na
1.018
0.875
1.354
5-Spain 251.4 266.7 318.2 1.193 548.2 516.7 1147.0 2.220
6-U.S.
7-Brazil
132.8
928.6
132.8 276.5
na
2.082 1024.9
433.8
1024.9 878.9
na
0.858
Average freight conversion factor: 1.061
1890/94
E X P O R T S I M P O R T S
(1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Countries X(P) X*(P) X (F) 3/2 M(P) M'(P) M(F) 7/6
1-U.K.
2-France
3-Belgium{*
4-Germany
1413.6 
207.2 
) 146.2 
400.5
1487.1
218.0
153.8
421.3
2810.6
325.9
108.6
620.7
1.890
1.495
0.706
1.473
2124.6
875.9
350.1
866.5
2019.6
832.6 
332.8
823.7
2323.2
788.3
438.5
660.8
1.150
0.947
1.318
0.802
5-Spain{#) 266.6 280.5 1128.3 4.023 576.3 547.8 1089.8 1.989
6-U.S.
7-Brazil
144.1
1147.3
144.1 399.3
na
2.771 1113.5
408.6
1113.5 981.2
na
0.881
(*) 1890, 1893 and 1894
(#) Except 1894 for imports
Average freight conversion factor: 1.052
Average exchange rates to the pound (for currencies not in the gold 
standard): 5$297 reis; 28.71 pesetas.
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Table B.1 (cont.)
1895/99
E X P O R T S I M P O R T S
(1 ) (2) (3) <4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Countries X(P) X'(P) X(F) 3/2 M(P) M' (P) M(F) 7/6
1-U.K.
2-France
3-Belgium
4-Germany
1560.8
125.6
112.5
335.6
1629.5
131.1
117.5
350.4
2876.3
332.9
188.8
776.1
1.765
2.539
1.607
2.215
2138.5
650.2
265.3 
957.8
2048.4
622.8
254.1
917.4
2294.0
520.8
285.9 
733.1
1.120
0.836
1.125
0.799
5-Spain 566.2 591.1 1133.6 1.918 634.8 608.0 1343.1 2.209
6-U.S.
7-Brazil
80.7
1008.8
80.7 483.0
na
5.985 986.4
287.0
986.4 669.9
na
0.679
Average freight conversion factor: 1.044
Average exchange rates to the pound (for currencies
standard): 6$276 reis; 32.80 pesetas.
not in the gc
1900/04
E X P O R T S I M P O R T S
(1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Countries X(P) X‘(P) X(F) 3/2 M(P) M* (P) M(F) 7/6
1-U.K.
2-France
3-Belgium(*
4-Germany
1345.2
144.7
) 135.7 
372.3
1400.4
150.6 
141.3
387.6
2818.3
359.1
257.5
804.5
2.013
2.384
1.823
2.076
3048.1
950.8
411.5
1602.5
2928.1
913.4
395.3
1534.4
2921.7
805.4
481.1
1124.1
0.998
0.882
1.217
0.730
5-Spain 857.0 892.1 1254.1 1.406 918.3 822.1 1199.5 1.360
6-U.S.
7-Brazil
110.4
869.8
110.4
941.1
781.1
1760.8
7.075
1.871
1057.0
441.4
1057.0
407.9
813.7
392.9
0.770
0.963
(•) Except 1902
Average freight conversion factor: 1.041
Average exchange rates to the pound (for currencies not in the gold 
standard): 5$884 reis; 34.33 pesetas.
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1905/09
Table B.l (cont.)
1 a*
1 
X 
1 
H
i 
i 0 R T S I M P O R T S
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Countries X(P) X’(P> X(F) 3/2 M(P) M* (P) M(F) 7/6
1-U.K.
2-France
3-Belgium
4-Germany
1508.4
155.9
185.6
483.6
1571.8
162.4
193.4 
503.9
2917.5
383.7
379.8 
750.7
1.856
2.362
1.964
1.490
3620.5
1277.1
473.0
2097.0
3474.6
1225.6 
453.9
2012.5
3299.7
998.8
531.7
1538.6
0.950
0.815
1.171
0.765
5-Spain 1025.0 1068.1 1655.2 1.550 931.6 894.0 1440.5 1.611
6-U.S.
7-Brazil
119.3
1098.0
119.3
1188.0
1201.9
2132.2
10.08
1.795
1162.5
344.3
1162.5
318.2
547.3
267.4
0.471
0.840
Average freight conversion factor: 1.042
Average exchange rates to the pound (for currencies not in the gold 
standard): 4$881 reis; 29.25 pesetas; 8$850 Brazilian gold reis.
1910/13
* 
i 
M X ►0 C R T S I M P O R T S
(1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Countries X(P) X’(P) X(F) 3/2 M(P) M'(P) M(F) 7/6
1-U.K.
2-France
3-Belgium
4-Germany
1627.6
250.7
213.5
619.6
1705.7
262.7
223.7 
649.3
2969.5
593.5
854.6 
1185.2
1.741
2.259
3.819
1.825
4014.9
1239.8 
746.8
2428.8
3831.0
1183.0 
712.6
2317.6
3885.4
1166.3
743.7
2044.2
1.014
0.986
1.044
0.882
5-Spain 10 2 1.1 1070.1 2032.6 1.899 864.2 824.6 1982.1 2.404
6-U.S.
7-Brazil
199.4
1223.9
199.4
1341.4
1365.2
2849.7
6.846
2.124
1483.2
283.6
1483.2
258.8
658.5
214.9
0.444
0.830
Average freight conversion factor: 1.048
Average exchange rates to the pound (for currencies not in the gold 
standard): 5$248 reis; 27.35 pesetas; 8$850 Brazilian gold reis.
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Notes:
X and M stand for exports and imports, while P and F refer 
to Portuguese and Foreign sources, respectively. X' and M' stand 
for exports plus freight rates and imports minus freight rates.
Correction coefficients in column (4) are defined as the 
ratio of the value of exports or imports in foreign statistics to 
the respective value in Portuguese statistics, corrected for 
freight rates and converted into pound sterlings at market 
exchange rates.
Sources:
See References, Sources for trade of Foreign countries. The 
greatest problems with the sources concern Belgium, Spain, US and 
Brazil, after 1890, because these countries include reexports in 
the aggregate values used in this table. Except for the US and 
Brazil, exports and imports are valued FOB and CIF, respectively.
Freight conversion factors are estimated from North (1950, p. 
549) and Cairncross (1953, p. 176) and the freight factor for 
Portugal in 1873 from Parliamentary Papers (1873, p. 959) (see 
text). Values for the United States are not converted because 
this country's statistics give export values at CIF and imports 
at FOB prices, respectively. For the case of Brazil, a freight 
conversion factor double the average was considered.
Par exchange rates for the pound sterling are: 4.5 Portuguese 
mil-reis; 25.23 French and Belgium francs, Italian lira, and 
Spanish peseta; 20.26 German mark; and 4.87 US dollars. See 
Chisholm (1889, p. 484). For the exchange rates outside the gold 
standard the sources are: Prados (1986, p. 148), Mata (1984), and 
Brazil [...] (1910, p. 162).
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Table B.2
Correction Coefficients: Summary
Exports
65/69 70/74 75/79 80/64 85/89 90/94 95/99 00/04 05/09 10/13
(1) U.K.
(2) F+B+G
(3) Spain
1.02
1.96
0.39
1.14
3.59
2.31
1.16
1.70
0.72
1 .10
1.02
0.85
1.51
1.37
1.19
1.89
1.33
4.02
1.76
2.17
1.92
2.01
2.09
1.41
1.86
1.76
1.55
1.74
2.32
1.90
Importb
65/69 70/74 75/79 80/84 85/89 90/94 95/99 00/04 05/09 10/13
(1) U.K.
(2) F+B+G 
(4) Spain
1.02
1.27
4.72
1.17
1.23
2.38
1 . 1 1
0.90
2.57
1.09
0.93
2.40
1.02
0.98
2.22
1.15
0.95
1.99
1 .1 2
0.86
2 .21
1.00
0.85
1.36
0.95
0.83
1.61
1.0 1
0.94
2.40
(2) Prance, Belgium and Germany 
Source: Computed from table B.l.
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o b s
1855
1856
1B57
1858
1859
1860
1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1B69
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1B87
1888
1B89
1890
1891
1892
1B93
1894
1B95
1896
1897
1898
1B99
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
Yearly
Table B 
Correction
.3
Coefficients
CCXUK CCMUK CCXBF6 CCM8FG CCX
1.228 0.987 NA NA 1.228
1.186 0.959 NA NA 1.186
NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA NA
1.083 0.940 NA NA 1.083
NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA NA
0.997 0.B60 NA NA 0.997
0.98.7 0.882 NA NA 0.987
1.060 0.949 NA NA 1.060
0.966 0.986 NA NA 0.966
1.081 0.899 NA NA 1.081
1.015 0.897 NA NA 1 .015
1.128 0.993 NA NA 1.128
1.179 0.899 NA NA 1.179
1.136 0.752 NA NA 1.136
1.297 0.650 NA NA 1.297
1.195 0.914 2.239 0.958 1.286
1.163 0.855 1.665 0.927 1.248
1.334 0.826 1.936 0.900 1 .419
1.225 0.808 1.631 0.872 1.280
0.939 0.865 1.273 0.B63 1.200
1.227 0.886 1.549 1.028 1.289
1.153 0.888 1.430 0.B60 1.235
0.963 0.898 1.145 0.841 1.015
1.124 0.B16 0.790 0.714 0.980
1.133 0.793 0.740 0.768 0.954
1.534 0.968 1.227 0.675 1.370
1.471 0.976 1.199 0.649 1.301
1.733 0.884 1.101 0.688 1.413
1.652 0.837 1.166 0.785 1.415
1.453 0.833 1.416 1.005 1.437
1.506 0.895 1.217 0.932 1.408
1.615 0.825 1.196 0.869 1.468
1.957 0.718 1.653 0.B82 1.B67
1.812 0.712 1.633 0.855 1.749
1.655 0.735 1.466 0.B33 1.586
1.608 0.807 1.570 0.826 1.595
1.71B 0.799 2.143 0.763 1.853
1.917 0.733 2.258 0.974 2.029
2.223 0.844 2.641 0.937 2.352
1.739 0.823 2.498 0.902 1.970
1.771 0.791 2.381 0.964 1.976
1.725 0.808 2.496 0.B52 1.963
1.758 1.038 1.970 0.694 1.823
1.631 1.016 1.858 0.831 1.703
1.395 1.013 1.845 0.827 1.562
o b s  CCXUK CCMUK CCXBFG CCMBFG CCX CCM
1905 1.121 1.040 1.719 0.786 1.327 0.955
1906 1.252 0.964 1.663 0.796 1.399 0.917
1907 1.283 0.985 1.701 0.826 1.432 0.939
1908 1.529 0.933 1.807 0.881 1.627 0.945
1909 1.590 0.980 1.954 0.879 1.719 0.936
1910 1.910 0.830 2.342 1.093 1.951 0.993
1911 1.686 0.975 1.764 0.980 1.717 1.013
1912 1.700 0.954 2.398 0.880 1.805 0.948
1913 1.925 0.936 2.406 0.897 1.973 0.938
Notes :
(1) and (2) - Correction coefficients for exports to and
imports from the UK,
(3) and (4) - Weighted averages of the correction
coefficients for France9 Belgium (except 1891, 1892, 1896, 1902,
for lack of data, and 1910-13, for the reasons pointed in the
text) and Germany (from 1883 onwards).
(5) - Correction coefficients for total exports (weighted 
average of columns (1) and (3)).
(6) - Correction coefficient for total imports (weighted
average of columns (2), (4) and the correction coefficient for
smuggling from table B.4)
Sources: See table B.l.
Table B .4
Correction Coefficients for Smuggling from Spain,
obs CCMSP ccrisP A
1855 6.843 3.500
1656 5.610 3.500
1857 NA NA
1858 NA NA
1859 NA NA
1860 NA NA
1861 3.481 3.500
1862 NA NA
1863 NA NA
1864 NA NA
1865 5.764 3.500
1866 3.662 3.500
1867 NA 3.500
1868 NA 3.500
1869 NA 3.500
1870 NA 2.500
1871 2.016 2.500
1872 NA 2.500
1873 3.582 2.500
1874 2.806 2.500
1875 3.439 2.500
1876 1.824 2.500
1877 2.925 2.500
1878 2.178 2.500
1879 2.480 2.500
1880 2.470 2.500
1881 2.199 2.500
18B2 1.937 2.500
1883 2.715 2.500
1884 2.860 2.500
1885 2.584 2.500
1886 2.425 2.500
1887 1.834 2.500
1888 1.808 2.500
1889 2.544 2.500
1890 2.199 2.500
1891 2.496 2.500
1892 3.146 2.500
1893 2.051 2.500
1894 2.107 1.500
1895 1.840 1.500
1896 2.151 1.500
1897 1.714 1.500
1898 1.825 1.500
1899 1.855 1.500
1900 1.584 1.500
1901 1.566 1.500
1902 1.263 1.500
1903 1.346 1.500
1904 1.142 1.500
o b s  CCMSP CCMSPA
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1.218 
1.529 
1.653 
1.892 
2.238 
2.865 
2.168 
2.177
NA
1.500
1.500
1.500 
1 .500
1.500
1.500
1.500
1.500 
1. 500
Notes
Correction of Spanish imports is mainly a correction for 
smuggling. Due to differences in definition of trade totals in 
the statistics of the two countries (see text), the correction 
coefficient for smuggling is taken as the average trends shown by 
the proper correction coefficient.
(1) - Correction coefficient for imports from Spain
(2) - Adopted correction coefficient for smuggling from 
Spain.
Sources: See table B.l
Average Yearly Correction Coefficients
Table B.5
Exports Imports
1855-1856 1.207 1.116
1861 1.083 1.175
1865-1869 1.018 1.1151870-1874 1.151 1.052
1875-1879 1.248 0.987
1880-1884 1.095 0.940
1885-1889 1.387 0.936
1890-1894 1.616 0.913
1895-1899 1.960 0.892
1900-1904 1.805 0.933
1905-1909 1.501 0.944
1910-1913 1.862 0.973
1855-1913 1.439 0.978
Minimum 0.954 0.835
Maximum 2.352 1.175
Standard error 0.349 0.085
Source: Table B.3, columns (3) and (7)
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Table B.6
Correction Coefficient for Exports, Exchange Rate Index, 
and Freight Conversion Factor
obs OCX CCXIN EINDEX FREIGH
1855 1.228 1.228 1.000 1.086
1856 1.186 1.186 1.000 1.086
1857 NA NA 1.000 1.086
1858 NA NA 1.000 1.086
1859 NA NA 1.000 1.086
I860 NA NA 1.000 1.095
1861 1.083 1.083 1.000 1.095
1862 NA NA 1.000 1.095
1863 NA NA 1.000 1.095
1864 NA NA 1.000 1.095
1865 0.997 0.997 1.000 1.088
1866 0.987 0.987 1.000 1.088
1867 1.060 1.060 1.000 1.088
1868 0.966 0.966 1.000 1.088
1B69 1.081 1.081 1.000 1.088
1870 1.015 1.006 1.009 1.103
1871 1. 128 1.128 1.000 1.102
1872 1.179 1.169 1.009 1.102
1873 1.136 1.136 1.000 1. 100
1874 1.297 1.297 1.000 1.106
1875 1.286 1.295 0.993 1.097
1876 1.248 1 .242 1.004 1.098
1877 1.419 1.413 1.004 1.100
1878 1.280 1.274 1.004 1.08B
1879 1.200 1.192 1.007 1.085
1880 1.289 1.295 0.996 1.086
1881 1.235 1 .219 1.013 1.088
1882 1.015 1.002 1.013 1.082
1883 0.980 0.967 1.013 1.076
1884 0.954 0.941 1.013 1.066
1885 1.370 1.349 1.016 1.058
1886 1.301 1.298 1.002 1.057
1887 1.413 1.410 1.002 1.057
1888 1.415 1.412 1.002 1.062
1889 • 1.437 1.434 1.002 1.070
1890 1.408 1.399 1.007 1.062
1891 1.468 1.367 1.074 1.057
1892 1.867 1.465 1.274 1.048
1893 1.749 1.405 1.244 1.046
1894 1.586 1.233 1.287 1.045
1895 1.595 1.260 1.266 1.041
1896 1.853 1.425 1.301 1.044
1897 2.029 1.389 1.461 1.044
1898 2.352 1.489 1.580 1.049
1899 1.970 1.442 1.366 1.044
1900 1.976 1.407 1.404 1.050
1901 1.963 1.384 1.418 1.040
1902 1.823 1.434 1.272 1.039
1903 1.703 1.373 1.240 1.040
1904 1.562 1.299 1.203 1.038
abe CCX CCX IN £ INDEX FREIGH
1909 1.327 1.246 1.069 1.039
1906 1.399 1.374 1.016 • 1.037
1907 1.432 1.380 ' 1.032 1.038
1906 1.627 1.408 1.199 1.039
1909 1.719 1.492 1.192 1.038
1910 1.931 1.409 1.310 1.039
1911 1.717 1.960 1.086 1.037
1912 1 «80S 1.633 1.109 1.038
1913 1.973 1*696 1.163 1.039
Hôtes:
(1) Correction coefficient for exporte.
(3) Index for the exohtnge rate of the mil-reis to the 
sterling (4.5 (par value) = 100).
(2) (l)/(3)
(4) Freight conversion faetor.
Souroes: See table B.l
pound
Correction Coefficients for Exporte
Source: Table B.3
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APPENDIX C
DATA FOR PORTUGUESE FOREIGN TRADE
This appendix presents the main aggregate and disaggregate 
series for Portugal's trade by value and volume according to the 
official publications, for the years 1842-43, 1848, 1851, 1855- 
56, 1861 and 1865-1913, as well as the price indexes. Special 
care is needed in using official statistics after 1891, because 
exports were evaluated at the par exchange rate, whereas imports 
were evaluated at the market exchange rate. As a rule of thumb 
all the disaggregated official series for exports after 1891 
should be corrected by multiplying by the exchange rate index 
(EINDEX). For further details see Appendix B and Lains (1986).
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SOURCES
MAPAS GERAIS DO COMÊRCIO de Portugal coin as suas possessôes 
ultramarinas e naçôes estrangeiras, Lisboa: Direcçâo Gérai das 
Alfândegas e Contribuiçôes Indirectas [1842-1861].
ESTATÍSTICA DO COMÊRCIO de Portugal corn as suas possessôes 
ultramarinas e naçôes estrangeiras, Lisboa: Direcçâo Gérai das 
Alfândegas e Contribuiçôes Indirectas [1865-1879].
COMÊRCIO DO CONTINENTE do Reino e Ilhas Adjacentes com 
países estrangeiros e com as provincias portuguesas do ultramar, 
Lisboa: Conselho Superior das Alfândegas [1880-1896].
COMÊRCIO E NAVEGAÇÂO, Lisboa: Direcçâo Gérai da Estâtística 
e dos Próprios Nacionais [1897-1914].
Other:
MAPAS ESTATÍSTICOS E DO RENDIMENTO, Lisboa: Alfândega Grande 
de Lisboa, various issues.
MAPAS ESTATÍSTICOS E DO RENDIMENTO, Porto: Alfândega do
Porto, various issues.
DATA
Values are expressed in C0NT0S DE REIS
Quantities are expressed in TONS, except when otherwise specified 
The base year for the indexes is 1900=100
The tables are grouped according to the following headings:
C.l - Aggregate Values, Volumes and Prices: Exports and Imports 
C.2 - Exports and Imports by Classes of Goods 
C.3 - Export Series 
C.4 - Import Series
C.5 - Exports and Imports by Countries 
C.6 - Reexports
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C.l
AGGREGATE VALUES, VOLUMES AND PRICES FOR EXPORTS AND IMPORTS
EXPORTS
X - Official values, current prices 
XC - Revised values, current prices 
XF - Official values, constant prices 
XFC - Revised values, constant prices 
CCX - Correction coefficient 
PX - Price index (Fisher formula)
PXC - Revised price index (Fisher formula)
IMPORTS
M - Official values, current prices 
MC - Revised values, current prices 
MF - Official values, constant prices 
MFC - Revised values, constant prices 
CCM - Correction coefficient 
PM - Price index (Fisher formula)
PMC - Revised price index (Fisher formula)
TERMS OF TRADE
RT = PX/PM 
RTC = PXC/PMC
BULLION AND SPECIE
XOP - Exports of gold and silver 
MOP - Imports of gold and silver
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ob s X XC XF XFC CCX
1842 6 0 0 4 . 8 NA 6 0 2 2 . 9 1 1 9 0 2 . 0 NA
1843 6 3 7 3 . 3 NA 8 0 5 3 . 2 1 5 9 1 4 . 0 NA
1844 NA NA NA NA NA
1845 NA NA NA NA NA
1846 NA NA NA NA NA
1847 NA NA NA 1 9 0 5 9 . 0 NA
1848 7 5 6 4 . 4 NA 9 6 4 4 . 8 1 9 0 5 9 . 0 NA
1849 7 7 2 6 . 0 NA NA NA NA
1850 8 4 1 6 . 3 NA NA 1 7 5 8 3 . 0 NA
1851 7 9 8 6 . 5 NA 8 8 9 7 . 6 1 7 5 8 3 . 0 NA
1852 6 8 5 5 . 4 NA NA NA NA
1853 1 2 3 1 5 . 3 NA NA NA NA
1854 1 2 8 2 5 . 9 NA NA NA NA
1855 1 2 0 8 8 . 9 1 4 8 4 4 . 3 9 5 5 1 . 2 1 8 8 7 4 . 2 1.  228
1856 1 4 5 9 6 . 6 1 7 3 1 0 . 8 1 0 7 5 7 . 3 2 1 2 5 7 . 7 1 . 186
1857 1 3 8 0 7 . 6 NA NA NA NA
1858 1 1 9 7 1 . 6 NA NA NA NA
1859 1 3 6 1 7 . 9 NA NA NA NA
186 0 1 4 7 0 9 . 8 NA NA 1 9 1 4 8 . 0 NA
1861 1 3 2 4 8 . 5 1 4 3 4 3 . 2 9 6 8 9 . 5 1 9 1 4 7 . 6 1 . 0 8 3
1862 NA NA NA NA NA
1863 NA NA NA NA NA
1864 NA NA NA NA NA
1865 1 5 2 9 1 . 7 1 5 2 5 3 . 0 1 1 7 5 1 .  1 2 3 2 2 1 . 5 0 .  997
1866 1 6 3 2 3 . 3 1 6 1 1 2 . 3 1 1 8 3 0 . 2 2 3 3 7 7 . 8 0 .  987
1867 1 4 8 7 5 . 1 1 5 7 6 4 . 7 1 1 3 5 3 . 3 2 2 4 3 5 . 4 1 . 060
1868 1 5 0 5 3 . 0 1 4 5 4 5 . 6 1 1 3 7 4 . 5 2 2 4 7 7 . 3 0 . 9 6 6
1869 1 5 9 6 8 . 7 1 7 2 5 5 . 6 1 3 1 7 9 . 8 2 6 0 4 4 . 9 1 . 0 8 1
1870 1 9 3 9 6 . 2 1 9 6 7 8 . 2 1 5 4 8 8 . 5 3 0 6 0 7 . 0 1 . 0 1 5
1871 1 9 9 0 0 . 5 2 2 4 4 2 . 2 1 4 8 6 3 . 3 2 9 3 7 1 . 6 1.  128
1872 2 1 1 7 3 . 8 2 4 9 6 3 . 5 1 6 1 9 2 . 9 3 1 9 9 9 . 0 1.  179
1873 2 1 8 9 6 . 6 2 4 8 7 1 . 5 1 6 5 4 4 . 5 3 2 6 9 3 . 8 1 . 1 3 6
1874 2 1 0 3 5 .  1 2 7 2 8 8 . 8 1 8 0 5 5 . 9 3 5 6 8 0 . 5 1.  297
1875 2 2 4 8 9 . 7 2 8 9 2 1 . 0 1 7 4 0 1 . 5 3 4 3 8 7 . 4 1 . 286
1876 1 9 5 7 8 . 5 2 4 4 2 7 . 2 1 6 8 5 3 . 3 3 3 3 0 4 . 1 1 . 248
1877 2 1 6 8 1 . 3 3 0 7 6 9 . 3 1 6 8 0 7 . 2 3 3 2 1 3 . 0 1 . 4 1 9
1878 1 7 3 7 9 . 9 2 2 2 5 2 . 4 1 3 8 9 9 . 5 2 7 4 6 7 . 0 1.  280
1879 1 6 9 4 1 . 0 2 0 3 2 7 . 2 1 4 0 7 8 . 8 2 7 8 2 1 . 3 1.  200
1880 2 3 2 8 8 .  1 3 0 0 1 7 . 8 1 9 4 0 6 . 8 3 8 3 5 0 . 0 1 . 2 8 9
1881 2 0 6 4 4 . 4 2 5 4 9 8 . 7 1 7 2 5 4 . 0 3 4 0 9 5 . 9 1.  235
1882 2 2 5 5 5 . 9 2 2 8 9 0 . 5 1 9 6 6 0 . 0 3 8 8 5 0 . 4 1 . 0 1 5
1883 2 2 7 8 9 . 0 2 2 3 3 3 . 9 1 9 6 9 1 . 5 3 8 9 1 2 . 7 0 .  9 80
1884 2 1 5 6 9 . 3 2 0 5 7 4 . 6 1 9 2 0 0 . 0 3 7 9 4 1 . 5 0 .  954
1885 2 2 6 4 7 .  1 3 1 0 2 8 . 5 2 0 7 0 1 . 2 4 0 9 0 7 . 9 1 .  370
1886 2 6 1 0 8 . 2 3 3 9 6 7 . 8 2 6 1 9 7 . 3 5 1 7 6 8 . 9 1.  301
1887 2 1 2 3 9 . 3 3 0 0 1 8 . 6 2 0 8 8 4 . 3 4 1 2 6 9 . 7 1 . 4 1 3
1888 2 3 4 4 3 . 0 3 3 1 6 0 . 7 2 4 2 6 5 . 6 4 7 9 5 1 . 6 1 . 4 1 5
1889 2 3 3 4 3 . 7 3 3 5 5 6 . 6 2 2 7 8 5 . 5 4 5 0 2 6 . 7 1 . 4 3 7
1890 2 1 5 3 8 . 6 3 0 3 2 5 . 1 1 9 6 6 2 . 8 3 8 8 5 5 . 9 1 . 4 0 8
1891 2 1 3 7 9 . 0 3 1 3 8 8 . 9 1 9 1 7 5 . 7 3 7 8 9 3 . 4 1 . 4 6 8
obs
1892
18 93
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
190 0
1901
1 902
1903
1904
1905
19 06
19 07
190 8
19 0 9
1 910
1911
1 912
1913
1 914
XC XF XFC CCX
2 4 6 3 1 . 2 4 5 9 7 5 . 0 2 2 1 8 2 . 3 4 3 8 3 4 . 7 1 . 8 6 7
2 3 4 0 7 . 9 4 0 9 5 2 . 1 1 9 9 0 3 . 0 3 9 3 3 0 . 6 1 . 7 4 9
2 3 9 2 3 . 7 3 7 9 4 6 . 0 1 9 8 4 5 . 5 3 9 2 1 6 . 9 1 . 5 8 6
2 6 9 6 1 . 0 4 3 0 0 7 . 7 2 2 6 2 7 . 8 4 4 7 1 5 . 1 1 .  595
2 6 1 3 9 . 0 4 8 4 3 8 . 6 2 4 7 1 0 . 7 4 8 8 3 1 . 3 1 . 8 5 3
2 7 3 1 1 . 0 5 5 4 1 6 . 4 2 7 6 1 4 . 8 5 4 5 7 0 . 0 2 . 0 2 9
3 1 1 2 4 . 0 7 3 2 1 5 . 4 3 1 7 6 2 . 4 6 2 7 6 6 . 3 2 .  352
2 8 8 0 4 . 0 5 6 7 5 7 . 3 2 8 6 3 2 . 2 5 6 5 8 0 . 6 1 . 9 7 0
3 0 9 3 1 . 0 6 1 1 2 3 . 2 3 0 9 3 1 . 0 6 1 1 2 3 . 2 1 . 9 7 6
2 8 2 8 1 . 0 5 5 5 2 6 . 7 2 9 0 8 9 . 7 5 7 4 8 4 . 6 1 - 9 6 3
2 8 4 3 5 . 0 5 1 8 2 7 . 9 2 8 9 1 2 .  1 5 7 1 3 3 . 6 1 . 8 2 3
3 0 6 0 3 . 0 5 2 1 1 9 . 2 3 1 7 3 9 . 3 6 2 7 2 0 . 5 1 . 7 0 3
3 0 7 1 2 . 0 4 7 9 6 7 . 4 3 1 9 6 1 . 7 6 3 1 6 0 . 0 1 . 5 6 2
2 8 9 6 9 . 0 3 8 4 5 1 . 1 3 0 5 9 3 . 5 6 0 4 5 6 . 3 1 . 3 2 7
3 0 5 9 3 . 0 4 2 8 0 0 . 4 3 2 3 7 7 . 0 6 3 9 8 0 . 6 1 . 3 9 9
3 0 4 1 0 . 0 4 3 5 4 3 . 1 3 2 0 8 8 . 2 6 3 4 1 0 . 1 1 . 4 3 2
2 8 3 7 7 . 0 4 6 1 6 6 . 0 3 0 6 7 4 . 5 6 0 6 1 6 . 4 1 . 6 2 7
3 0 8 8 0 . 0 5 3 0 9 6 . 9 3 3 2 4 0 . 0 6 5 6 8 6 . 2 1 . 7 1 9
3 5 7 2 4 . 0 6 9 7 0 6 . 0 3 8 2 9 7 . 6 7 5 6 8 0 . 5 1 . 9 5 1
3 4 0 6 5 . 0 5 8 4 9 2 . 8 3 7 2 1 3 . 2 7 3 5 3 7 . 7 1 . 7 1 7
3 4 3 1 7 . 0 6 1 9 4 4 . 2 3 7 5 5 0 . 1 7 4 2 0 3 . 3 1 . 8 0 5
3 5 2 8 7 . 0 6 9 6 3 7 . 8 3 7 8 2 9 . 1 7 4 7 5 4 . 7 1 . 9 7 3
2 7 1 4 8 . 0 NA NA NA NA
obs
1842
1843
1844
1845
1846
1847
18 48
1849
1850
1851
1852
1853
1854
1855
1856
1857
1858
1859
1860
1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
18 76
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1 890
1891
PX PXC
9 9 . 7 NA
7 9 .  1 NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
7 8 . 4 NA
NA NA
NA NA
8 9 . 8 NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
1 2 6 . 6 7 8 .  6
1 3 5 . 7 81 . 4
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
1 3 6 . 7 7 4 . 9
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
13 0 .  1 6 5 . 7
1 3 8 . 0 6 8 .  9
1 3 1 . 0 7 0 .  3
1 3 2 .  3 6 4 . 7
121 . 2 6 6 .  3
1 2 5 .  2 6 4 .  3
1 3 3 . 9 7 6 . 4
1 3 0 . 8 7 8 . 0
1 3 2 . 4 7 6 .  1
1 1 6 . 5 7 6 . 5
1 2 9 .  2 8 4 .  1
1 1 6 . 2 7 3 .  3
1 2 9 .  0 9 2 . 6
1 2 5 . 0 8 1 . 0
1 2 0 . 3 7 3 .  1
1 2 0 . 0 7 8 . 3
1 1 9 . 7 7 4 . 8
1 1 4 . 7 5 8 . 9
1 1 5 . 7 5 7 .  4
1 1 2 . 3 5 4 . 2
1 0 9 . 4 7 5 . 8
9 9 . 7 6 5 . 6
1 0 1 .  7 7 2 . 7
9 6 . 6 6 9 . 2
1 0 2 . 4 7 4 . 5
1 0 9 .  5 7 8 .  0
1 1 1 . 5 8 2 . 8
o b s PX PXC
1892 1 1 1 . 0 1 0 4 . 9
1 8 9 3 1 1 7 . 6 1 0 4 .  1
1 8 94 1 2 0 . 6 9 6 .  8
1 895 1 1 9 . 2 9 6 .  2
1 8 96 1 0 5 . 8 9 9 .  2
1 897 9 8 . 9 1 0 1 . 6
1 898 9 8 . 0 1 1 6 . 6
1 8 99 1 0 0 . 6 1 0 0 . 3
1 90 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0
1901 9 7 . 2 9 6 . 6
1 902 9 8 .  3 9 0 . 7
1 9 03 9 6 . 4 8 3 .  1
1904 9 6 .  1 7 5 .  9
1 905 9 4 . 7 6 3 . 6
1 9 06 9 4 . 5 6 6 .  9
1 907 9 4 . 8 6 8 . 7
1 908 9 2 . 5 7 6 . 2
1 9 09 9 2 . 9 8 0 . 8
1 910 9 3 .  3 9 2 .  1
1911 9 1 . 5 7 9 .  5
1 912 9 1 . 4 8 3 . 5
1 913 9 3 . 3 9 3 .  2
1 914 0 . 9 NA
Hs
obs
1842
1843
1844
1845
1846
1847
18 48
1849
185 0
1851
1852
1853
1854
1855
1856
1857
1858
1 859
1860
1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
18 69
1870
1871
1872
187 3
1874
1875
18 7 6
1877
1878
18 7 9
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
M MC MF MFC
9 8 2 2 . 3 NA 1 5 8 1 1 . 8 1 8 8 1 1 . 8
1 2 3 0 8 . 5 NA 1 6 5 5 0 . 4 1 6 5 5 0 . 4
NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA
1 0 7 4 0 .  1 NA 1 5 6 9 9 . 6 1 5 6 9 9 . 6
8 9 4 8 . 3 NA NA NA
9 4 0 1 . 4 NA NA NA
1 2 0 1 9 . 9 NA 1 5 5 3 7 . 6 1 5 5 3 7 . 6
9 6 7 1 . 6 NA NA NA
1 2 1 3 8 . 3 NA NA NA
1 4 6 8 7 . 7 NA NA NA
1 6 0 8 0 . 6 1 8 3 9 3 . 0 1 9 8 9 9 . 3 2 0 0 7 1 . 5
1 9 2 1 3 . 1 2 0 8 8 8 . 7 2 0 8 7 0 . 2 2 0 6 0 5 . 9
2 0 1 5 1 . 9 NA NA NA
1 9 2 6 2 . 9 NA NA NA
1 8 1 7 7 . 4 NA NA NA
2 0 0 9 7 . 3 NA NA NA
2 4 7 1 7 . 3 2 9 0 3 7 . 5 2 5 9 0 1 . 0 2 8 1 6 4 . 5
NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA
2 4 8 0 4 . 1 2 6 3 8 3 . 3 2 2 3 0 1 . 8 2 3 9 9 9 . 3
2 4 9 4 3 . 3 2 7 8 3 0 . 9 2 2 4 3 1 . 0 2 4 7 1 2 . 6
2 6 2 3 6 . 8 3 0 5 8 2 . 1 2 3 6 7 0 . 9 2 5 3 0 9 . 6
2 5 4 0 9 . 9 2 8 7 9 5 . 2 2 2 9 3 3 . 1 2 2 9 5 4 . 7
2 3 9 2 6 . 3 2 6 2 1 1 .  6 2 3 0 7 0 . 4 2 4 4 7 4 . 7
2 4 3 2 4 . 9 2 4 6 2 3 . 5 2 3 5 5 0 . 1 2 3 1 4 0 . 6
2 3 6 6 5 . 0 2 6 4 4 7 . 4 2 3 4 1 4 . 5 2 2 9 3 9 . 7
2 7 9 0 1 . 3 2 9 3 2 5 . 3 2 7 4 2 9 . 5 2 7 9 0 4 . 8
3 0 6 6 7 . 9 3 1 9 8 0 . 1 3 0 9 9 9 . 6 3 0 6 8 6 . 0
2 7 0 1 4 . 7 2 8 0 5 5 . 8 2 8 4 6 6 . 5 2 8 2 6 6 . 6
3 4 1 1 6 . 9 3 5 0 4 9 . 5 3 5 8 7 8 . 5 3 4 5 8 4 . 0
3 0 4 8 7 . 9 3 0 1 1 5 . 9 3 3 1 8 2 . 3 3 2 4 5 7 . 3
3 2 2 6 0 . 6 3 1 3 3 6 . 6 35741  . 9 3 5 4 6 8 . 1
2 8 8 3 4 . 7 2 7 9 8 7 . 4 3 4 3 3 5 . 2 3 4 8 6 4 . 7
3 4 1 0 5 . 7 3 3 2 9 8 . 7 3 9 8 9 9 . 0 3 9 2 2 9 . 2
3 3 2 1 2 . 9 3 4 1 9 4 . 4 3 8 4 0 5 . 3 3 6 7 6 8 . 8
3 3 42 5  . 6 3 2 7 1 6  . 3 39641  . 4 3 8 4 9 8 . 8
3 3 6 2 5 . 1 3 2 4 5 5 . 7 3 9 9 5 8 . 5 3 8 3 5 5 . 9
3 1 1 8 7 . 0 2 6901  . 5 4 0 7 6 2 . 0 3 9 6 0 4 . 9
3 2 5 5 5 . 0 2 8 1 1 3 . 0 4 3 2 0 5 . 0 4 1 5 4 0 . 2
3 2 7 2 9 . 0 2 9 9 3 2 . 3 4 6 0 0 0 .  0 4 3 6 9 3 . 2
3 7 2 5 2 . 0 3 4 5 6 6 . 1 5 3 1 2 6 . 1 5 2 3 6 1 . 3
3 7 1 5 7 . 0 3 3 0 0 0 . 4 5 4 4 0 2 . 6 5 3 1 4 0 . 9
3 8 0 8 2 . 0 3 4 9 4 3 . 3 5 4 3 5 6 . 3 5 3 4 6 7 . 9
4 1 8 4 3 . 0 4 3 2 1 5 . 6 5 8 8 1 7 . 8 5 7 7 4 6 . 8
4 4 3 0 5 . 0 4 4 8 4 7 . 3 6 0 8 0 0 . 1 5 8 5 7 7 . 6
3 9 5 0 9 . 0 3 7 3 3 4 . 6 5 3 0 6 7 . 8 5 1 5 4 4 . 8
obs
1892
1893
1894
1895
18 96
189 7
189 8
1 899
19 00
1901
190 2
190 3
19 04
1905
19 0 6
19 07
1 90 8
19 0 9
1910
19 11
1912
191 3
M MC
3 0 8 2 9 . O 2 7 0 1 0 . 5
3 8 3 0 7 . 0 3 4 3 4 3 . 8
3 5 6 6 7 . 0 2 9 7 8 5 . 2
3 9 8 4 1 . 0 3 4 7 8 0 . 1
3 9 5 3 1 . 0 3 3 3 7 6 . 2
4 0 4 2 5 . 0 3 6 5 7 3 . 6
4 8 6 O 6 . 0 4 5 5 6 7 . 6
5 0 6 2 0 . 0 4 5 4 7 3 . 2
5 9 7 2 4 . 0 5 4 5 6 8 . 4
5 7 8 2 3 . 0 5 1 2 3 9 . 8
5 5 5 9 7 . 0 5 1 6 5 1 . 7
5 8 8 0 6 . 0 5 7 0 5 5 . 6
6 2 0 4 3 . 0 5 9 8 6 6 . 8
6 0 6 7 8 . O 5 7 9 5 4 . 9
6 0 3 9 1 . 0 5 5 3 8 2 . 2
6 1 4 5 3 . 0 5 7 7 0 3 . 9
6 7 2 4 8 . 0 6 3 5 4 0 . 1
6 4 7 5 7 . 0 6 2 3 4 9 . 4
6 9 5 0 7 . 0 6 9 0 O 6 . 9
6 8 1 2 7 . 0 6 9 0 1 5 . 6
7 4 6 1 6 . 0 7 O 7 3 0 . 7
8 8 9 7 8 . 0 8 3 4 8 5 . 5
3 3 *
MF MFC
4 1 8 0 7 . 7 4 0 4 1 3 . 5
4 8 6 9 9 . 5 4 8 8 3 8 . 2
4 6 7 8 2 . 5 4 3 4 6 5 . 6
5 2 7 8 3 . 5 4 9 1 5 2 . 1
5 3 3 5 5 . 4 5 0 1 4 8 . 1
5 2 2 6 2 . 4 4 8 7 4 8 . 5
5 3 0 9 8 . 1 4 8 8 4 6 . 5
5 6 7 9 3 . 4 5 1 7 2 1 . 5
5 9 7 2 4 . 0 5 4 5 6 8 . 5
5 8 5 4 3 . 1 5 4 4 2 8 . 9
5 8 6 0 9 . 5 5 4 6 8 0 . 2
6 3 4 1 6 . 4 5 8 0 5 6 . 7
6 6 2 4 2 . 8 6 0 6 4 6 . 5
7 0 0 9 9 . 4 6 4 1 0 0 . 7
6 9 6 6 3 . 2 6 3 4 5 4 . 0
6 8 7 7 7 . 8 6 2 2 9 4 . 2
7 0 8 8 4 . 4 6 4 3 1 3 . 1
6 9 1 4 0 . 5 6 2 3 7 3 . 2
7 3 4 1 2 . 5 6 6 0 8 6 . 9
7 2 5 6 8 . 2 6 5 4 4 9 . 4
7 9 5 9 0 . 4 7 1 7 7 2 . 8
9 0 3 4 2 . 2 8 0 6 4 8 . 5
obs
1842
1843
1844
1845
18 46
1847
1848
1849
1850
1851
1852
1853
1854
1855
1856
1857
1858
1859
1860
1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1 876
1877
1878
1879
18 80
1881
1882
188 3
18 84
1885
18 86
1887
1888
18 89
1890
1891
PM PMC
6 2 .  1
7 4 . 4  
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA
6 8 . 4  
NA 
NA
7 7 . 4  
NA 
NA 
NA
8 0 .  8
9 2 .  1 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA
9 5 . 4
9 5 . 4  
NA 
NA
111.2 
111.2 
110.8 
110.8
1 0 3 . 7
1 0 3 .  3 
101. 1
1 0 1 . 7
9 8 .  9
9 4 .  9
9 5 .  1 
91 . 9 
90 .  3
8 4 . 0
8 5 . 5
8 6 . 5  
8 4 .  3
8 4 . 2
7 6 . 5
7 5 .  3
7 1 .  2 
7 0 .  1 
6 8 .  3 
7 0 .  1
71 . 1
7 2 .  9
7 4 . 4
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA
91 . 6
1 0 1 . 4  
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA
10 3 .  1 
NA 
NA 
NA
1 0 9 .  9
112.6 
120. 8
1 2 5 . 4
1 07 .  1
1 0 6 . 4
1 1 5 . 3
1 0 5 .  1
1 0 4 .  2
9 9 .  3
101 . 3
9 2 . 8
8 8 .  4 
8 0 .  3 
8 4 .  9
9 3 . 0
8 5 . 0
8 4 . 6
6 7 .  9
6 7 . 7
6 8 .  5
66.0 
6 2 .  1 
65 . 4 
7 4 .  8
7 6 .  6
7 2 . 4
obs PM PMC
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
73.7
78.7
76.2
75.5
74.1
77.4
91.5
89. 1
100.0 
98. 8
94.9
92.7
93.7
86.6
86.7
89.3 
94. 9
93.7
94.7
93. 9
93.8
66.0
70.3
68.5
70.8
66.6
75.0
93. 3
87.9
100.0
94. 1
94.5 
98. 3
98.7
90.4 
87. 3
92.6 
98. 8
100.0
104.4
105.4
98.5
obs RT RTC
1842 160. 5 NA
1843 106.4 NA
1844 NA NA
1845 NA NA
1846 NA NA
1847 NA NA
1848 114.6 NA
1849 NA NA
1850 NA NA
1851 116.0 NA
1852 NA NA
1853 NA NA
1854 NA NA
1855 156.6 85.8
1856 147.4 80.3
1857 NA NA
1858 NA NA
1859 NA NA
1860 NA NA
1861 143.3 72.7
1862 NA NA
1863 NA NA
1864 NA NA
1865 117.0 59.7
1866 124.1 61.2
1867 118.2 58. 2
1868 119.4 51.6
1869 116.8 61.9
1870 121.2 60.4
1871 132.5 66.3
1872 128.5 74.2
1873 133.8 73.0
1874 122.8 77.1
1875 135.9 83.0
1876 126.4 79.0
1877 142.9 104.9
1878 148.9 100.9
1879 140.8 86.1
1880 138.8 84.2
1881 141.9 88.0
1882 136.3 69.6
1883 151.3 84. 5
1884 149.1 80. 1
1885 153.8 110.7
1886 142.1 99.4
1887 148.9 117. 1
1888 137.9 105.8
1889 144.0 99.6
1890 150.3 101.9
1891 149.8 114.4IIIIIIIIIIIIIIII IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II
ì i ’ì
o b s
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
t
RT RTC
150.6
149.5
158.1
157.9
142.8
127.9
107.0
112.9
100.0
98.4
103.7
104 .0
102.6
109.4
109.0
106.1
97.5
99.2
98.5
97.5
97.5
94.7
156.9
148.1
141.2
135.9
149.0
135.4
125.0 
114. 1
100.0 
102.6
96.0
84.6
76.9
70.3
76.6
74.1
77.1
80.988.2
75.4
84.7
90.0
o b s XOP MOP
1842 4 3 8 . 4 3 . 7
1 843 5 2 7 . 0 6 . 0
1844 NA NA
1845 NA NA
1846 NA NA
1847 NA NA
1848 9 3 3 . 2 6 5 . 7
1849 9 5 3 . 1 5 0 0 . 0
1 850 1 0 3 5 . 2 5 0 0 . 0
1 851 2 1 4 . 1 1 7 2 9 . 3
1852 1 8 3 . 8 1 3 1 9 . 0
1853 1 0 0 0 . 0 3 0 2 4 . 2
1854 1 2 9 0 . 2 3 5 1 4 . 2
1 855 2 2 8 8 . 0 2 6 9 3 . 9
1 856 1 0 4 7 . 0 1 2 3 8 . 7
1 857 9 9 0 . 3 1 3 0 0 . 0
1 858 8 5 8 . 7 1 2 0 0 . 0
1 859 9 7 6 . 8 1 1 7 6 . 6
1 860 1 0 5 4 . 9 2 2 8 0 . 6
1861 7 2 6 . 3 1 9 1 7 . 6
1862 NA NA
1863 NA NA
1864 NA NA
1865 3 8 8 7 . 3 4 0 6 . 3
1 866 2 0 9 9 . 2 1 9 6 8 . 0
1 867 1 6 0 9 . 9 4 0 2 . 8
1868 2 0 1 8 . 2 7 3 0 . 8
1 869 4 7 0 . 0 3 1 0 . 8
1870 2 8 5 . 5 1 1 4 4 . 2
1871 1 6 4 . 2 3 6 2 2 . 0
1872 1 1 7 . 0 1 7 9 5 . 6
1 873 6 9 . 7 3 9 3 1 . 2
1874 1 1 0 . 9 1 6 0 7 . 1
1 875 1 1 7 . 0 2 5 9 8 . 3
1 876 1 6 8 2 . 2 4 5 4 6 . 1
1 877 1 5 1 1 . 3 7 8 0 . 5
1 878 1 8 9 0 . 1 3 5 9 1 . 6
1879 2 6 2 8 . 2 1 2 4 4 . 5
1880 5 5 . 9 2 6 1 7 . 5
1881 1 2 5 . 4 3 0 0 7 . 5
1 88 2 2 6 0 4 . 3 3 4 5 4 . 6
1883 4 6 9 . 9 3 9 7 3 . 0
1 884 2 9 4 . 6 2 7 8 7 . 0
1885 8 4 6 . 8 4 1 7 7 . 0
1 886 2 2 . 2 9 4 4 2 . 0
1887 5 . 4 5 0 3 1 . 0
1 888 6 2 1 . 2 6 6 8 5 . 0
1 889 1 9 8 7 . 6 1 0 4 6 2 . 0
1 890 1 0 5 3 8 . 8 1 4 5 3 3 . 0
1891 2 9 8 0 3 . 7 8 2 6 9 . 0
II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II
o b s XOP MOP
1892 9 3 4 5 . 3 3 7 6 1 . 0
1 893 5 9 2 9 . 5 1 5 3 0 . 0
1894 3 8 8 3 . 9 8 2 6 . 0
1 895 2 3 0 8 . 0 1 1 4 3 . 0
1 8 96 3 7 3 7 . 0 1 2 8 5 . 0
1 89 7 2 1 9 6 . 0 2 5 7 . 0
1 898 2 0 7 9 . 0 2 1 9 6 . 0
1 899 1 2 1 6 . 0 8 9 8 . 0
1 900 1 6 3 5 . 0 4 8 2 . 0
1901 1 3 8 2 . 0 3 7 0 . 0
1 9 02 1 0 7 2 . 0 4 0 0 . 0
1 903 1 2 9 8 . 0 4 9 8 . 0
1 904 7 2 8 . 0 4 4 4 . 0
1 905 5 0 4 . 0 5 9 5 . 0
1 906 3 4 8 . 0 6 6 7 . 0
1 907 9 2 7 . 0 2 8 5 . 0
1 908 1 6 0 4 . 0 2 9 3 . 0
1 909 9 2 0 . 0 1 8 8 6 . 0
1 910 6 1 4 . 0 6 1 7 . 0
1911 4 1 7 . 0 9 5 4 . 0
1 912 6 4 1 . 0 1 0 7 2 . 0
1 913 1 3 9 8 . 0 9 6 3 . 0
3 ^
C.2
EXPORTS AND IMPORTS BY CLASSES OF GOODS
EXPORTS
VXI - Raw materials
VXII - Foodstuffs
VXIII - Processed foodstuffs
VXIV - Manufactures
XOUT - Other
XTOT = X
IMPORTS
VXI - Foodstuffs and tobacco 
VXII - Raw materials 
VXIII - Intermediate goods 
VXIV - Manufactures 
MOOT - Other 
M = M
343
obs VXI VXII VXIII VXIV XOUT XTOT
1842 298. 3 568. 2 3284.7 1041.4 812.2 6004.8==1843 314.8 662.9 3308.7 1205.3 881.6 6373.3
1844 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1845 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1846 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1847 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1848 396.1 1321.2 4212.4 653.6 981 . 1 7564.4
1849 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1850 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1851 585.4 1197.1 4533.9 696.2 973.9 7986.51852 NA NA NA NA NA NA1853 NA NA NA NA NA NA1854 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1855 584. 2 1729.4 6555.4 972.7 2247.2 12088.91856 998.0 1853.8 8987.2 952. 1 1805.5 14596.61857 NA NA NA NA NA NA1858 NA NA NA NA NA NA1859 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1860 NA NA NA NA NA NA1861 1786.2 2451.1 6572.8 823.9 1614.5 13248.5
1862 NA NA NA NA NA NA1863 NA NA NA NA NA NA1864 NA NA NA NA NA NA1865 3095.7 1694.0 8073.4 667. 3 1761.3 15291.7
1866 3094.0 2013.7 8504.7 771.5 1939.4 16323.31867 2452.3 2433.3 7523.3 652.0 1814.2 14875.1
1868 2491.6 2814.4 7405.4 653. 1 1688.5 15053.0
1869 3131.3 2710.5 7196.8 735.2 2194.9 15968.71870 2994.4 3758.7 9051.8 832.4 2758.9 19396.21871 3317.5 3791.0 9187.1 903.8 2701.1 19900.5
1872 4192.3 3314.0 10321.2 889.9 2456.4 21173.8
1873 4322.9 4031.9 9587.5 1017.3 2937.0 21896.6
1874 3785.4 3849.0 9725.2 1018.5 2657. 1 21035.2
1875 3321.5 3494.2 11701.1 1358.3 2614.6 22489.71876 2696.1 2998.5 10841.7 934.4 2107.8 19578.51877 3708.4 3028.5 11787.9 909. 8 2246.7 21681.3
1878 3634.6 3007.9 7713.5 782.7 2241.2 17379.9
1879 3403.9 2892.2 7360.6 834. 1 2450.2 16941.0
1880 5514. 3 3717.6 9931.7 1151.8 2972.7 23288.1
1881 3818.3 2807.8 10130.7 1017.0 2870.6 20644.4
1882 4198.9 3735.4 10722.8 931. 5 2967.3 22555.9
1883 3756.5 3522.0 11673.2 830.7 3006.6 22789.0
1884 3470.4 3024.0 11398.9 1048.5 2627.5 21569.3
1885 3076.5 1972.2 14219.4 931. 6 2447.4 22647.1
1886 3260. 1 1915.8 17805.6 821.1 2305.6 26108.21887 3337.9 2237.4 12447.2 868. 8 2348.0 21239.3
1888 3324.9 2487.4 14169.3 1091.5 2369.9 23443.0
1889 3823.0 2366.5 13309.3 1240.1 2604.8 23343.7
1890 3988.0 1955.2 12163.4 1101.3 2330.7 21538.6
1891 3859.6 1679.3 12523.1 1061.8 2255.2 21379.0
obs VXI VXII VXIII VXIV XOUT XTOT
1892 3064.9 1709.4 14720.4 1252.7 3075.8 24631.21093 4203.1 1600.0 12594.7 1640.3 3201.0 23407.91094 4984.6 2179.9 10901.1 1018.9 4039.2 23923.7
1095 5123.0 1930.1 13005.0 2170.0 4644.9 26961 . 0
1096 4310.0 1747.1 12737.0 2270.0 5066.9 26139.0
1097 4311.0 2366.3 12300.0 2525.0 5800.7 27311 .0
1090 3060.0 3093.1 13701.0 3714.0 6667.9 31124. 0
1099 3596.0 1952.2 12069.0 3062.0 6524. 8 28804.0
1900 4001.0 2141.1 12005.0 3753.0 8150.9 30931.0
1901 4360.0 2144.1 11843.0 2209.0 7636.9 28281.0
1902 4063.0 2231.0 12737.0 1971.0 7433.0 28435.0
1903 4167.0 2270.0 12600.0 2879.0 8607.0 30603.0
1904 4496.0 2220.1 11712.0 3104.0 9179.9 30712.0
1905 4057.2 1905.1 12941.0 2822.0 7243.7 28969.0
1906 4000.0 2002. 1 13242.0 2687.0 7781.9 30593.0
1907 4763.0 1979. 1 12775.0 2733.0 8159.9 30410.0
1900 4236.0 1770.3 11776.0 2286.0 8300.7 28377.0
1909 4320.0 2133.1 12150.0 3121.0 9155.9 30880.0
1910 4664.0 2378.0 15327.0 3960.0 9395.0 35724.0
1911 4307.0 2610. 1 15146.0 2554.0 9439.9 34065.0
1912 4910.2 2022.2 16100.0 2206.0 9070.6 34317.0
1913 5403.0 2505.0 15597.0 2179.0 9523.0 35287.0
1914 4207.0 1743.0 12691.0 1870.0 6637.0 27148.0
3 ks
o b s
1842
1843
1844
1845
1846
1847
1848
1849
1850
1851
1852
18531854
1855
18561857
1858
1859
1860
1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
VMI VMII VMIII VMIV VMOUT
2218.4
3146.3 
NA
NA
NA
NA
2526.3 
NA
NA
3318.7 
NA 
NA
NA
4245.8
7305.7 
NA
NA
NA
NA
6536.3 
NA 
NA
NA
8926.1
8327.9
9315.7
9407.2
7961.6
9793.6
7900.5
8958.2
8355.4
8152.7
11263.6
12474.4
11128.8
11647.8
13844.0
11552.2
12101.4
13393.7
11140.2
11695.7
10923.4
12132.0
11831.8
11444.5
11490.8
11692.2
11821.3
1224.1
1629.1 
NA 
NA
NA
NA
1404.0 
NA
NA
1566.7 
NA
NA
NA
2246.4
2170.1 
NA
NA
NA
NA
3123.3
NA
NA
NA
2805.9
3358.2
3671.3
3265.7
3132.3
3801.2
3662.6
3895.0
5154.2
4100.3
5873.0
3836.1
4675.5
4224.3
4190.2
4723.5
4536.7
4797.5
4891.0
4997.2
4871.1
6250.65407.0
5765.4
6269.9
7287.8
6474.7
1034.8
1298.1 
NA 
NA
NA
NA
1425.0 
NA
NA1602.4 
NA
NA
NA
1692.9
1779.2 
NA
NA
NA
NA
2355.9 
NA
NA
NA
1912.2
1842.8
2068.5
1673.0
1708.7
1912.8
2157.5
2481.7
3298.0
3755.2
3395.2
2722.4
2708.8
2345.7
2175.8
2720.3
2677.6
2827.0
2772.5
2851.3
3349.2
3445.9
3862.4
4101.9
4539.1
4330.7
3984.9
3430.6
4809.0 
NA
NA
NA
NA
3956.6 
NA
NA
4054.0 
NA
NA
NA
5144.2
4716.7 
NA
NA
NA
NA
5995.5 
NA
NA
NA
6779.0
7486.5
6762.9
6041.8
5961.4
6448.5
6593.6
8503.7
8819.7
7316.9
9232.6
8143.7
7299.1
6698.1
6634.5
7908.1
7548.0
6660.3
6528.0
6888.3
7181.3
7844.0
8149.0
8522.2
9737.6
10165.3
8270.1
1914.4
1426.0 
NA
NA
NA
NA
1428.2 
NA
NA
1478.1 
NA 
NA
NA
2751.33241.4 
NA
NA
NA
NA
6706.3 
NA
NA
NA
4380.9
3927.9
4418.4
5022.2
5162.3
2368.8
3350.8
4062.7
5040.6
3689.6
4352.5
3311.3
6448.4
3918.8
7261.2
6308.8
6561.9
5946.6
5855.3
6122.5
6404.0
7579.5
7906.8
8248.0
9805.6
10829.0
8958.0
ob s
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
VMI  V M I I  V M I I I  VM IV VMOUT
1 0 6 5 1 . 3 6 3 7 2 . 7
1 2 7 6 1 . 0 8 1 8 4 . 7
1 1 6 1 5 . 6 7 7 6 0 . 3
1 4 1 7 9 . 6 7 8 2 6 . 7
1 3 4 6 0 . 0 7 5 9 0 . 5
1 5 0 3 8 . 0 8 1 1 0 . 0
1 4 3 5 2 . 0 1 1 0 7 6 . 0
1 5 0 5 8 . 0 1 1 6 1 4 . 0
1 4 4 2 4 . 0 1 5 7 4 1 . 0
1 5 3 6 4 . 0 1 4 8 1 2 . 0
1 3 7 0 3 . 0 1 5 1 5 4 . 0
1 5 5 4 0 . 0 1 4 6 6 0 . 0
1 7 4 2 3 . 0 1 4 3 4 5 . 0
1 9 0 7 4 . 0 1 2 1 7 9 . 0
1 6 2 9 8 . 0 1 2 4 0 9 . 0
1 3 4 7 7 . 0 1 4 9 4 3 . 0
2 1 4 6 7 . 0 1 4 6 5 2 . 0
2 0 3 8 2 . 0 1 4 1 7 5 . 0
1 8 0 7 0 . 0 1 7 0 5 8 . 0
1 4 3 4 7 . 0 1 8 0 2 9 . 0
1 9 1 1 9 . 0 1 7 9 5 4 . 0
2 4 9 4 5 . 0 1 8 9 1 9 . 0
2 0 0 6 3 . 0 1 5 6 7 9 . 0
. 6 4 2 2 8 . 6 5 9 8 7 . 8
. 5 5 4 6 1 . 2 7 1 8 9 . 6
. 9 5 0 9 1 . 8 7 3 1 4 . 4
. 2 5 6 0 5 . 1 7 9 9 5 . 4
. 4 5 6 5 2 .  2 8 4 0 8 . 9
. 2 5 8 2 0 . 0 7 2 0 6 . 8
. 9 7 0 1 7 . 0 1 0 3 9 4 . 1
. 2 7 1 2 6 . 0 1 0 7 4 4 . 8
. 4 8 0 7 9 . 0 1 4 0 1 1 . 6
. 0 8 8 2 9 . 0 1 2 0 8 2 . 0
. 0 8 1 6 6 . 0 1 1 8 1 4 . 0
. 0 8 8 8 4 . 0 1 2 1 7 4 . 0
. 0 9 2 1 5 . 0 1 3 1 8 4 . 0
. 0 8 6 9 2 . 0 1 3 6 7 1 . 0
. 0 9 1 3 9 . 0 1 4 8 4 5 . 0
. 0 9 7 3 7 . 0 1 5 5 9 8 . 0
. 0 9 8 6 5 . 0 1 3 5 0 3 . 0
. 0 8 8 2 8 . 0 1 3 5 0 9 . 0
. 0 1 0 1 2 2 . 0 1 5 8 3 0 . 0
. 0 1 0 3 0 8 . 0 1 6 2 6 7 . 0
. 0 1 0 9 5 6 . 0 1 6 5 0 8 . 0
. 0 1 2 1 9 5 . 0 2 1 9 3 8 . 0
. 0 9 8 4 9 . 0 1 5 0 9 1 . 0
3 588
4 710
3884
4234
44 1 9
42 50
57 66
6077
7 46 8
6736
6 760
7548
78 76
7062
77 00
7698
7761
7 863
8427
9176
10079
10981
8649
C.3
EXPORT SERIES
1 Raw hides and skins
2 Raw wax
3 Raw wool 
(100 Raw silk)
4 Raw cork
5 Minerals
5a Antimony 
5b Copper 
5c Manganese 
5d Iron
6 Cattle (units)
7 Sardines 
(101 Wheat)
(102 Corn)
8 Oranges (000 units)
9 Almonds
10 Figs
11 Potatoes, onions and dry vegetables 
11a Dry vegetables
lib Potatoes 
11c Onions
12 Salt (000 tons)
13 Canned fish
14 Flour
(103 Fruit preserves)
15 Olive oil
16 Port wine (000 litres)
17 Madeira wine (000 litres)
18 Common wine (000 litres)
19 Textile manufactures 
19a Woollens
19b Silks 
19c Cottons 
19d Linens 
(104 Hats) (units)
20 Footwear (pairs)
21 Corks
(105 Chinaware)
(106 Books)
(107 Ropes)
(108 Tools and machinery for industry)
22 Iron manufactures
23 Other
348
obs
1842
1843
1844
1845
18461847
1848
1849
1850
1851
1852
1853
1854
1855
18561857
1858
1859
I860
1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
18731874
1875
18761877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1690
1891
VXl VX2 VX3 VX4 VX5
29.7 88.6 84.3 95.7 0.05.7 96.5 75.0 137.6 0.0
NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA NANA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA NA
22.6 81 . 1 110.7 181.7 0.0NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA NA6.9 124.4 200. 1 254. 0 0.0
NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA NA
28.9 152. 1 132.0 271. 2 0.0
33.6 379. 3 227.0 355.0 0.0
NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA NA
32.8 437. 2 225. 2 421.4 650.0
NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA NA
57. 1 625.6 428.6 515.3 1320.0
61 .8 653.5 530.5 534.7 1279.0
81. 8 447. 1 237. 2 621 .7 1003.0
101 . 1 637. 1 210.2 562.7 886. 0
111. 5 698. 3 316.7 584. 4 1347.0
86.0 262.0 241.8 594. 2 1769.0
100. 9 764. 6 497. 6 681 .0 1185.0
70. 8 817.6 360. 5 1010.7 1891.0
117. 9 583. 1 382.7 963.8 2223.0
150. 1 650 . 8 217.0 1030.1 1719.0
96.4 439. 3 225.3 790.6 1761.0
184.5 780.0 201 . 5 784. 2 722.0
167.8 524.9 251 .5 952.4 1788.0
166.8 478.5 224.6 1081.2 1668.0
148. 1 1018.0 169. 9 1036.8 1024.0
145.2 604.7 381 . 2 2355.7 2009.0
149.6 104. 1 198.0 1734.4 1615.0
233. 1 117.8 220.7 2137.3 1478.0
105.9 92. 1 203.3 1958.0 1384.0
109. 7 80. 0 133. 8 1978.3 1163.0
92.3 79. 9 149.3 2097.3 649.0
99.8 91.0 155.2 2072.3 825. 0
119.7 62.5 183.7 2052.7 909.0
176. 3 59. 8 199.0 1812.3 1066.0
218.0 39. 6 202. 8 2048.7 1301.0
199.5 34. 8 142.9 2290.4 1308.0
189.4 44.0 135.1 2236.9 1242.0
obs VX1 VX2 VX3 VX4 VX5 VX6
1892 88.6 47. 1 161.3 2190.0 1368.0 132.3
1893 129.4 27.8 159.5 2167.0 1788.0 18.3
1894 149. 2 93.3 191.9 2224.2 2316.0 597. 2
1895 249.0 85. 0 186.0 2704.0 1884.0 622.01896 206. 0 41.0 219.0 2677.0 1162.0 410.01897 292.0 113.0 251.0 2854.0 798.0 904.0
1898 308.0 174. 0 151.0 2436.0 796.0 656. 01899 287.0 85.0 155.0 2075.0 988.0 355. 01900 243.0 122.0 135.0 2257.0 1239.0 468. 0
1901 242.0 125.0 201.0 2490.0 1303.0 494 . 0
1902 180.0 95.0 157. 0 2395.0 1232.0 484.0
1903 186.0 101.0 155.0 2604.0 1120.0 662.01904 265. 0 188.0 145.0 2767.0 1131.0 801.0
1905 299.0 79. 0 151.0 2446.0 1082.0 494 . 0
1906 334. 0 115.0 177.0 2983.0 1183.0 636. 0
1907 242. 0 88. 0 92.0 3095.0 1242.0 385.01908 304. 0 121.0 79.0 2595.0 1130.0 487.0
1909 355.0 104.0 189.0 2752.0 912.0 449.0
1910 278.0 87.0 155.0 3195.0 947.0 417.0
1911 210.0 136.0 107.0 2959.0 894.0 565.0
1912 265.0 192.0 139.0 3173.0 1141.0 400. 0
1913 310.0 170.0 113.0 3551.0 1258.0 833. 0
1914 268.0 110.0 138.0 2780.0 911.0 346.0
2^c.
t/fttuu-
obs VX7 VX8 VX9 VX10 VX11 VX1 2
1842 0.0 287. 1 46.4 75. 1 38.0 113. 11843 0.0 380. 9 22. 0 85.0 47. 0 120. 21844 NA NA NA NA NA NA1845 NA NA NA NA NA NA1846 NA NA NA NA NA NA1847 NA NA NA NA NA NA1848 145.5 506. 9 39.7 83. 6 65.0 224. 1
1849 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1850 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1851 87.8 531.4 66.8 112.9 74.0 172.41852 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1853 NA NA NA NA NA NA1854 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1855 43.6 674.9 44. 3 110.1 129. 0 391 . 3
1856 95. 5 739.9 20. 5 132.8 125.0 365. 3
1857 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1858 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1859 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1860 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1861 77.7 757. 9 56. 3 203.0 327.0 326.8
1862 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1863 NA NA NA NA NA NA1864 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1865 44. 7 600. 8 56. 5 182. 3 194.0 215.7
1866 96. 5 655.7 82.2 214.2 240.0 216.2
1867 87.2 530. 5 158.3 234.6 277.0 308. 2
1868 85. 2 584.9 129.8 323.3 242.0 302.0
1869 69. 8 572. 9 106.4 299. 5 320.0 270. 8
1870 131.7 738. 1 80. 8 237.5 362. 0 280.7
1871 96. 8 627.4 101. 1 431 .7 510.0 230. 4
1872 127.0 736. 8 104.5 390. 6 357.0 239.0
1873 188.9 887.4 109.7 470.9 448.0 364.3
1874 154.8 922. 3 100. 1 355. 0 530.0 601.5
1875 173 . 8 501 . 6 71.8 160.4 495.0 282.4
1876* 143.0 556. 9 64. 9 313.0 420. 0 254.4
1877 0.0 447.7 227.9 234. 1 617.0 220. 2
1878 83.4 468. 9 91 . 5 199. 6 670. 0 182.0
1879 123.8 187.7 0.0 361. 6 576. 0 279.7
1880 202.4 378. 6 222. 3 445 . 6 748.0 300. 7
1881 123. 9 346. 6 78. 0 506. 8 469. 0 199. 9
1882 128.9 409. 4 138.7 238. 8 562.0 167.8
1883 235.4 195. 9 91 . 8 364. 6 332.0 279.0
1884 284.8 181.0 106.0 216.8 355.0 175.4
1885 109.7 164. 9 97.8 271 . 1 350. 0 120.8
1886 187. 2 143.5 154. 3 360. 2 337.0 175.4
1887 220. 3 97. 1 102.4 531 . 3 449. 0 275. 9
1888 236.0 81.5 141.6 388. 1 468.0 259.5
1889 196.9 102. 0 243. 8 365.8 516.0 285. 2
1890 197.6 67. 2 209.4 381.7 515.0 166. 8
1891 225.9 54.4 175. 2 209. 2 529.0 183.5
3 ri
obs VX7 VX8 VX9 VX10 VXU VX12
1892 241.6 65.7 119. 1 262.3 609.0 153. 31893 176. 3 63. 9 248.5 190. 6 811. 0 167.3
1894 184.5 69. 3 292.0 313.0 567.0 152. 8
1895 170.0 56.0 83.0 327.0 542.0 128.0
1896 86.0 71.0 258.0 283.0 528. 0 96.01897 193. 0 55.0 171.0 246. 0 630. 0 159.0
1898 252. 0 73.0 482.0 396.0 933. 0 165.0
1899 168.0 48. 0 265.0 233.0 725.0 140.0
1900 128.0 64. 0 354.0 275.0 683. 0 148.0
1901 196.0 42.0 154.0 311 .0 748.0 179.0
1902 302.0 33. 0 168.0 348.0 712.0 161.0
1903 198.0 23.0 380.0 185.0 667.0 120. 01904 220.0 9.0 248.0 205.0 597.0 107.0
1905 261.0 17.0 358. 0 147.0 517.0 87.0
1906 322.0 9.0 241.0 174.0 532.0 114.0
1907 327.0 7.0 549.0 95.0 464 . 0 126.0
1908 339.0 9.0 263.0 97.0 423. 0 132.0
1909 438.0 7.0 455.0 151.0 473.0 130.0
1910 580.0 3.0 465.0 218.0 543.0 125.0
1911 731.0 4.0 448.0 221.0 526.0 102.0
1912 748.0 2.0 119.0 168.0 520. 0 50.0
1913 625.0 4.0 418.0 149. 0 494.0 45.0
1914 360. 0 3.0 169.0 177.0 620.0 49. 0
3 5 1
\í fia
obs VX13 VX14 VX15 VX16 VX17 VX18
1842 0.0 0.2 212.9 2624.5 22.3 424.8
1843 0.0 0.0 144.3 1955.6 864. 1 344.7
1844 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1845 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1846 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1847 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1848 0.0 0.0 192. 8 2943.3 533.9 542.4
1849 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1850 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1851 0.0 4.2 176. 7 2646.2 744. 1 946 . 9
1852 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1853 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1854 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1855 0.0 207.7 238. 9 4474.4 296. 1 1318.0
1856 0.0 57.4 1336.0 5953.9 232.0 1385.51857 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1858 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1859 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1860 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1861 0.0 78. 8 687. 6 4282.0 296.4 1178.6
1862 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1863 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1864 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1865 4.6 19.4 485.9 6470.6 141 . 7 911 .9
1866 3.3 27.8 827.4 6478.4 157. 3 966. 3
1867 7.4 35. 3 1233.8 5185.8 169. 3 845.8
1868 0.0 60.6 422. 1 5709.5 184. 7 968. 9
1869 0.0 41 . 0 282. 1 5533.2 257.7 1018.5
1870 0.0 30. 3 306.4 7252.2 326. 5 1076.9
1871 18.1 21 . 1 983. 0 6488.3 384. 8 1254.3
1872 12.6 22.9 1016.3 7306.1 443.4 1497.6
1873 19.4 36.4 667. 2 7095.0 429. 8 1289.9
1874 5.7 42. 1 364.0 6989.8 393.7 1849.1
1875 14.0 46. 9 431 . 5 9046. 1 427.4 1660.0
1876 13.9 16.3 475 . 4 7793.2 441. 2 2011.4
1877 17.7 13.5 334. 3 8554.6 566. 3 2228.7
1878 16.3 30.4 350. 2 5480.9 325.8 1433.0
1879 38.6 37.8 108. 9 5136.9 447.0 1526.7
1880 101.7 29.8 89. 6 6537.4 605.8 2465.8
1881 137. 3 30. 5 108. 0 5935.6 625.4 3245.7
1882 323.7 32. 2 103. 3 5654.5 779. 9 3713.9
1883 318.3 64 . 4 140. 6 6299.4 562. 6 4222.5
1884 364.7 57. 3 247. 9 6045.5 594.7 4016.5
1885 397.0 54.9 225.9 6261.7 415.6 6788.9
1886 720.5 30.4 90.4 7225.7 430.7 9226.5
1887 899.5 35.0 84 . 5 5153.1 432. 2 5773.9
1888 891. 1 32.7 229.0 5413.8 797.4 6735.3
1889 681.9 28. 2 199.7 6035.5 640.7 5648.2
1890 974. 6 31.4 106. 2 6197.6 683. 1 4016.7
1891 1136.9 41 . 1 112.6 6397.4 759.7 3965.1
3 53
obs VX 13 VX 14 VX15 VX16 VX17 VX18
1892 1033.8 92.3 132.0 7714.6 633.6 4994.0
1893 928.9 116.8 205.1 5961.9 659.8 4624.01894 765.0 104. 2 209. 6 5416.4 653.5 3678.61895 1081.0 87.0 526.0 6344.0 733.0 4214.0
1896 1163.0 120.0 391.0 6205.0 675. 0 4102.01897 1336.0 180.0 417.0 5860.0 787. 0 3643.01898 1480.0 208.0 511.0 6456.0 788.0 4237.0
1899 1105.0 190.0 553.0 5700.0 780.0 4435.01900 1260.0 219.0 695. 0 5739.0 798.0 4092.01901 1353.0 195.0 505.0 5511.0 750. 0 3472.0
1902 1510.0 284.0 551.0 5684.0 773.0 3886.0
1903 1692.0 243. 0 560.0 5334.0 793.0 4010.01904 1537.0 210.0 490.0 4630.0 752.0 4048.01905 1657.0 217.0 543.0 5027.0 829.0 4614.01906 2025.0 214.0 397.0 5559.0 740. 0 4258.0
1907 1826.0 237.0 571.0 5266.0 517.0 4315.0
1908 1766.0 248.0 458. 0 4945.0 489.0 3830.01909 1783.0 277.0 693.0 5040.0 491 .0 3825.0
1910 1877.0 283.0 711.0 6704.0 583. 0 5130.01911 2301.0 338.0 544.0 5678.0 602.0 5643.0
1912 2518.0 403.0 684.0 6260.0 606.0 5594.0
1913 2485.0 399.0 519.0 6279.0 645.0 5239.01914 1876.0 538.0 550. 0 5403.0 471. 0 3813.0
ob s
1842
18431844
1845
18461847
18481849
1850
18511852
18531854
1855
1856
1857
1858
1859
1860
1861
1862
18631864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
18731874
1875
18761877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
VX19 VX20 VX21 VX22
948. 0 9.5 1 . 5 61.
:U5.0 12.8 20. 1 33.NA NA NA NANA NA NA NANA NA NA NANA NA NA NA574.0 4.2 0.0 64.NA NA NA NANA NA NA NA571.0 9.6 5.2 74.NA NA NA NANA NA NA NANA NA NA NA
802. 0 18.9 24. 3 73.
738.0 32. 3 19.9 98.NA NA . NA NA
NA NA NA NANA NA NA NANA NA NA NA
573.0 63.5 29.4 85.
NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA
413. 0 64. 9 26. 3 71 .
460. 0 90.0 39. 1 74.
371.0 88.6 36. 1 72.
347.0 93.0 50.0 61.
370.0 115.0 53.6 89.
423. 0 141. 7 59. 1 96.
372.0 188.9 65. 4 126.
418.0 198. 3 53.7 102.
393.0 180.7 198.0 104.
385. 0 180. 5 234. 3 106.519.0 242.4 338. 1 126.
381.0 168.4 184. 7 101.
337.0 132. 2 214.5 127.
223.0 148. 2 148. 9 115.
239.0 155. 1 202.3 121 .
287.0 212.9 403. 2 123.
180.0 293.8 333.6 101 .164.0 174 . 9 395. 2 79.
111.0 157.0 405 . 0 104.
133.0 192.5 559. 3 95.
131.0 178.9 487.7 71.
118.0 115.2 451 . 7 63.
159. 0 88. 9 492.0 62.
194.0 88. 2 666. 6 70.
202.0 77. 2 810.4 77.
187.0 48. 3 720. 7 72.
203.0 43. 1 649. 1 86.
3 * *
4
2
0
7
4
0
2
8
9
3
0
7
9
4
4
6
2
1
9
5
3
2
2
7
9
4
0
0
6
0
5
1
5
3
o b s
1892
18931894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
19031904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
VX19 VX 20 VX21 VX22
380.0 44.4 665.0 79.8
659.0 57.5 738.0 107.4
782.0 70.6 755. 1 118.91041.0 69.0 833.0 131 .0
1245.0 61.0 757.0 121.0
1507.0 107.0 673.0 125.0
2597.0 131.0 686.0 183.0
2725.0 109. 0 735.0 154.02374.0 154.0 862.0 179.0
1098.0 107.0 797.0 142.0
802.0 106.0 840.0 110.0
1672.0 105.0 890.0 114.0
1860.0 106. 0 923.0 117.0
1530.0 106. 0 948.0 115.01410.0 104.0 961. 0 108.0
1382.0 112.0 989.0 136. 0
981.0 97.0 976.0 123.0
1888.0 98.0 899. 0 114.0
2708.0 13.0 974. 0 130.0
1235.0 124.0 960.0 112.0
881.0 113.0 962.0 119.0
861. 0 112.0 890.0 160.0
770.0 83.0 759.0 135.0
obs QX1 QX2
1842 160 161
1843 23 3261844 NA NA1845 NA NA
1846 NA NA1847 NA NA
1848 143 197
1849 NA NA
1850 NA NA
1851 147 312
1852 NA NA
1853 NA NA
1854 NA NA
1855 109 288
1856 110 640
1857 NA NA
1858 NA NA
1859 NA NA
1860 NA NA
1861 111 688
1862 NA NA
1863 NA NA
1864 NA NA
1865 226 965
1866 200 1002
1867 344 796
1868 616 988
1869 513 1040
1870 479 432
1871 387 1126
1872 270 1217
1873 145 9771874 763 1088
1875 318 795
1876 1001 1579
1877 856 1032
1878 507 943
1879 904 2042
1880 456 1341
1881 520 236
1882 805 239
1883 387 216
1884 392 190
1885 437 187
1886 498 193
1887 598 160
1888 882 152
1889 1074 105
1890 990 94
1891 950 115
\j<uùunó
QX4 QX5B QX6
2037 0 445
2820 0 520
NA NA NA
NA NA NANA NA NA
NA NA NA
3968 0 2004
NA NA NA
NA NA NA4954 0 816
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
4772 0 4365
6428 0 5881
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA7944 49793 11725
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
9630 146663 6767
9936 141649 7349
11503 111873 8257
11203 85690 13379
12054 140947 23330
10675 274363 30857
12630 118884 27405
15805 181689 18096
16556 222024 20018
18604 168053 14650
12239 167805 24213
16253 61773 14708
14428 183478 16732
11343 175366 15719
10980 96976 15818
17471 179023 17434
18996 154600 14530
22562 163950 24617
19527 136783 23737
21691 107528 19993
21481 52416 10329
21784 81394 6371
22931 90211 6787
21010 96984 10842
23658 79770 7616
23053 114065 4832
22302 120399 2104
QX3
305
445
NA
NANA
NA
449NA
NA
893
NA
NA
NA
506
641
NA
NA
NA
NA
787
NA
NA
NA
1330
1545
795
761
1231
947
1668
1091
1092
652
725
752
993
881
736
1212
609
767
800
582
686
720
826
925
956
631
626
? > ^
o b s
1892
18931894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
19031904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
QX1 QX2 QX3
798 124 732
649 80 906740 279 871
1251 241 8181034 135 968
1453 194 1109
1602 260 748
1451 167 671
1244 219 587
1184 228 860
858 164 863
895 181 1121
1392 321 1063
1502 133 1190
1658 193 1571
1467 148 767
1521 205 595
1759 167 1586
1371 147 1237
1055 227 842
1349 320 1227
1545 288 1092
1395 184 2303
3se
QX4 QX5B QX6
23424 131424 1735
22655 192573 368
22713 253373 10006
26929 195226 13246
28475 171351 17395
32215 268319 23763
28605 288741 15943
24526 365680 9664
26920 404015 12824
29265 489869 13608
27739 443649 11883
30761 397765 16637
34900 463732 18556
27465 380922 15195
38434 377009 18211
40565 397038 10081
35029 401961 13547
36258 306624 11444
43132 324956 9505
42808 276698 13972
45839 368703 10498
48137 399617 17345
40939 292958 5786
obs
18421843
1844
1845
18461847
18481849
18501851
1852
18531854
1855
1856
1857
1858
1859
1860
1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
QX7 QX8 QX9 QX10 QX11A
0
0
NA
NANA
NA
6587NA
NA4030
NA
NA
NA
1681
3072
NA
NA
NA
NA
2394
NA
NA
NA
1702
1832
3032
922
2616
5466
2361
3656
6950
4491
4699
4140
0
2297
2861
38482784
3143
6024
8588
3582
5979
7257
7838
6542
6555
7481
96
133
NA
NA
NA
NA
]NA
NA1
NA
NA
NA
137
70
206
205
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
224
190
615
343
258
287
357
323
368
237
320
297
552
240
447
188
147
158
155
101
98
92
72
49
51
68
4536
302
149
NA
NANA
NA
330
NA
NA410
NA
NANA
250
236
NA
NA
NA
NA
411
NA
NA
NA
308
545
872
750
691
485
623
697
780
855
602
541
3450
842
0
887
343
769
528
646
544
1065
735
892
1435
1198
772
2414
2675
NA
NA
NA
NA
2738
NA
NA2923
NA
NA
NA2234
2327
NA
NA
NA
NA
4700
NA
NA
NA
5750
5390
6860
8689
7896
6986
8689
13639
12268
6952
3135
7942
4815
3584
7114
7365
8399
5495
9088
5394
6695
8353
13264
9701
9169
9558
6348
120
101
NA
NA
NA
NA
48
NANA157
NA
NANA
717
350
NA
NA
NA
NA
2868
NA
NA
NA1689
2147
1996
2103
1781
17521868
1373
2969
9615
1621
911
2734
6728
1946
2988
3165
26511747
1320
1488
1813
1763
2126
3867
2125
1629
¿5^
obs QX7 QX8 QX9 QX10 QX11A QX11B
sssrsssssss ==«*=============== = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = s s s s s s = = = = = = = = = = =
1892 8021 43 503 8746 2955 85831893 5796 43 1079 5861 3511 85721894 6170 47 1273 7825 3417 101721895 5651 37 394 8179 3772 100881896 2838 47 1750 7074 4840 115351897 5825 37 1222 6396 4557 155561898 5667 48 2267 10439 5407 200051899 2988 32 1121 6047 2813 164941900 2341 41 1111 7171 4988 160661901 3408 27 704 9043 6696 167561902 5625 20 862 9155 5093 16391
1903 3472 17 2123 5426 6048 200701904 4207 5 1022 6064 7160 152071905 5556 11 2522 4214 5611 14236
1906 6383 6 1249 6041 6391 149951907 6471 4 2671 2650 5741 12042
1908 5899 6 1424 2731 3988 134231909 8481 4 1841 4771 4824 14987
1910 11559 1 2555 7082 6260 15991
1911 14870 2 2676 7212 7010 14037
1912 14391 1 1320 5339 7535 11669
1913 11750 2 2282 4909 4765 15137
1914 6916 2 977 5818 4098 18300
3éc
obs
1842
18431844
1845
1846
1847
1848
1849
1850
1851
185218531854
1855
1856
1857
1858
1859
1860
1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
QX11C QX12 QX13 QX14 QX15
1667
1573NA
NA
NA
NA
2597
NANA
2867
NA
NA
NA
3820
3577
NA
NA
NA
NA
8118
NA
NA
NA8026
7371
8488
7202
1023512094
16438
8197
10296
11341
12042
8031
30785
9228
12520
13901
11928
15980
13875
13152
15348
14807
17662
19055
16328
16893
18105
68
132 00
2
1
NA
NA
NA
NA
NANA
1
NANA
NA
182
30
268
107
NA
NA
NA
NA
1
NA
NA
NA
90
145
142
177
183
167 
192168
184 
258 
423 
258 
246 
192 
103 
168 
192 
126 
114 
188 
116
81
118
183
173
190
111145
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
0
0
0
NA
NA
NA
NA
0
NA
NA
NA
3114
31
0
0
0
113
68
105
41
70
68
64
65 
182
372 
533
1551
1602
2949
3555
6444
8614
7733
5681
8125
10087
NA
NA
NA
NA
NANA
43
NA
NA
NA1981
419
NA
NANA
NA
765
NA
NA
NA216
318
357
640
392
271
238
245
369
741
577
154
135
323
390
373339
286
664
586
555
331
408
394
276
316
419
984
732
NA
NANA
NA
1459
NA
NA
1119
NA
NA
NA
1320
8888
NA
NA
NA
NA
3450
NA
NA
NA
3262
5350
6795
1948
2523
1678
5896
5822
4259
2422
4317
3779
1247
2043729
480
620
586
986
1489
1511
671
686
1571
1267
589
544
3>C I
obs QX11C QX12 QX13 QX14 QX15 QX16
1892 20918 153 10272 908 632 362931893 20415 167 9232 1166 1089 259291894 16674 151 6350 1168 1144 241091895 20535 126 10728 879 2744 272511896 16167 90 11546 1272 2145 284561897 18009 130 11755 1732 2163 280991898 20145 143 13224 1973 2592 313281899 15068 136 9546 1732 2231 279171900 13217 149 10809 2408 3795 275311901 13930 163 11872 2138 2836 268401902 21764 149 14639 3082 2902 274721903 15118 112 17088 2820 3258 256361904 12364 101 15683 2537 2708 215861905 11173 82 17009 2615 3065 235211906 9181 107 21417 2628 1899 263621907 8904 118 19374 2994 2673 245111908 7857 124 18738 3431 2019 230511909 9494 120 19089 3758 3397 234571910 9636 119 20218 4174 3590 311361911 9060 97 24921 4284 2101 256251912 9782 42 27451 4922 3044 283101913 9077 40 26795 4192 2133 288901914 16165 47 20264 5575 2108 26408
{/ZíuHc
obs QX17 QX18 QX19A QX19B QX19C QX19D
1842 79 6444 26 1 646 941843 3080 9189 93 1 856 1441844 NA NA NA NA NA NA1845 NA NA NA NA NA NA1846 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1847 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1848 1525 15974 8 1 530 40
1849 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1850 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1851 3322 15393 10 1 512 431852 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1853 NA NA NA NA NA NA1854 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1855 840 9673 16 8 627 57
1856 721 7894 13 3 680 38
1857 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1858 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1859 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1860 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1861 402 6044 25 2 479 40
1862 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1863 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1864 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1865 203 14773 27 3 197 25
1866 289 7886 43 3 212 58
1867 310 7001 37 2 247 50
1868 375 7969 30 1 202 18
1869 385 10185 22 3 221 43
1870 433 9636 30 4 657 54
1871 589 11415 62 4 233 23
1872 645 15242 28 4 286 20
1873 741 12099 65 3 264 16
1874 693 23808 159 5 242 30
1875 840 17489 37 1 712 125
1876 876 20506 26 2 583 52
1877 1529 22684 18 0 173 265
1878 618 15664 39 4 153 9
1879 1019 14884 27 10 182 71
1880 1348 24551 38 5 175 195
1881 1293 39142 42 5 80 10
1882 1538 44181 38 3 99 12
1883 1286 50530 36 1 65 3
1884 1612 47158 23 2 115 3
1885 2309 112981 29 3 81 5
1886 2393 153776 28 2 48 8
1887 2112 116491 35 2 97 5
1888 2414 143872 53 2 114 7
1889 1908 115535 83 2 115 9
1890 2040 58814 57 2 137 6
1891 2384 49197 90 2 136 10
3 * 3
obs QX17 QX18
1892 1929 61953
1893 1962 490651894 2007 35027
1895 2283 38711
1896 2254 45395
1897 2417 47710
1898 2430 52651
1899 2511 52610
1900 2620 52714
1901 2393 49838
1902 2554 53923
1903 2640 49686
1904 2498 48850
1905 2749 63757
1906 2516 61972
1907 2425 64120
1908 2324 57414
1909 2385 60461
1910 2826 81592
1911 2966 87899
1912 2852 83530
1913 3429 75625
1914 3255 56183
QX19B QX19C QX19D
1 346 10
1 693 16
2 965 15
2 1404 31
5 1600 22
2 1877 29
2 3915 21
2 3928 18
2 3046 11
2 1323 4
1 883 5
1 2462 4
1 3116 4
1 2412 2
1 2194 1
1 1831 3
1 1278 2
1 2865 1
1 4165 3
1 1719 2
0 1237 2
1 1244 2
0 1090 0
QX19A
121
123
130
97
144
120
181
171
119
64
35
43
5337
29
67
87
77
66
30
32
18
17
obs
1842
18431844
18451846
1847
1848
1849
18501851
1852
18531854
1855
1856
1857
1858
1859
1860
1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
QX20 QX21
17929 15
18286 297
NA NANA NANA NANA NA6000 0NA NANA NA13714 58NA NANA NANA NA20347 249
44129 195NA NANA NANA NA
NA NA
105031 380
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA68600 272
122513 402
134843 355
139626 451
101404 469
282362 524
314133 481
387598 459
314155 839
405881 2320
433907 2552
235600 1159
207213 986
221119 649
208501 920
635540 1154
576154 1140
547702 2038
449696 1329
517687 1664
554952 1337
319735 1263
217653 1413
205194 2026
189693 2516
109052 2156
76166 2162
QX104 QX105
4211 55
2190 58
NA NA
NA NANA NA
NA NA
1280 43
NA NA
NA NA1840 157
NA NANA NA
NA NA48009 75
54819 82NA NANA NA
NA NA
NA NA82610 233
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
11585 277
92704 254
90822 126
44880 256
65590 320
84081 368
90699 357
84835 335
71781 260
75183 860
59733 18347998 404
72355 230
205999 155
245506 170
272876 352
268981 336
206810 266
70443 332
68711 218
91662 195
56795 185
72962 232
110722 214
112908 240
75829 144
53819 195
QX22
337
178
NA
NANA
NA
704
NA
NA695
NA
NA
NA
406
557
NA
NA
NA
NA
672
NA
NA
NA
472
652
509
959
633
667
936
687
1150
861
13251007
1172
1622
1066
825
1591
618
785
752
688
648
772
863
893
893
1030
3
o b s
1892
18931894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
19031904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
QX20 QX21
76949 2183
111062 2316
142443 2548
139090 2939
91925 2798
118624 2804
121379 3030100708 2977
126924 3457
84701 3410
93235 3360
96143 3745
108769 3577
104550 3603
104463 3828
139210 4218
102570 4059
118750 4006
135705 4016
114524 3843
118030 4178
101248 3960
90569 3442
QX104 QX105
49452 190
71684 229
82596 588
99662 307
82830 255139567 352
210262 325
158142 302
163722 358
69854 350
49376 271
44989 180
39145 169
32807 263
28868 290
40576 245
30429 173
49404 192
79091 210
39767 232
38517 148
43863 173
24597 128
QX22
922
1562
1555
1543
1488
1394
2556
1496
1490
1131
1043
1219
1215
1077
1136
1343
1156
1179
1389
1216
1266
1739
1310
3 ci
obs QX107 QX108
1842 27 01843 11 01844 NA NA1845 NA NA1846 NA NA1847 NA NA1848 9 01849 NA NA1850 NA NA1851 14 0
1852 NA NA1853 NA NA1854 NA NA1855 99 01856 109 01857 NA NA
1858 NA NA1859 NA NA1860 NA NA
1861 135 23
1862 NA NA
1863 NA NA1864 NA NA
1865 155 676
1866 230 170
1867 151 31
1868 185 253
1869 228 49
1870 214 72
1871 195 94
1872 198 108
1873 158 154
1874 140 3
1875 112 8
1876 127 1
1877 59 0
1878 81 51
1879 114 120
1880 170 149
1881 113 195
1882 161 90
1883 98 0
1884 86 0
1885 113 48
1886 137 73
1887 143 31
1888 166 69
1889 167 61
1890 133 61
1891 164 41
ob s
1892
18931894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
QX107 QX108
185 69
163 86
170 65
186 90
169 35
158 69
148 70
159 101
264 202
242 83
146 87
209 69
216 53
223 59
203 70
180 75
136 73
143 138
212 52
140 82
186 96
133 86
194 54
foi«)
C.4
IMPORT SERIES
1 Live animalsla Cattle (units)2 Butter3 Cod-fish4 Cereals
4a Wheat
5 Rice
6 Sugar
7 Coffee and tea
7a Coffee
7b Tea
8 Tobacco, raw and manufactured8a Raw tobacco
9 Raw cotton
10 Raw wool
11 Raw silk
12 Raw flax and hemp
13 Raw hides and skins
14 Oil-seeds
15 Chemical fertilizers16 Dye-stuffs
17 Sulphur
18 Coal and coke
19 Cotton thread
20 Flax, hemp and jute thread
21 Leather
22 Cement
23 Chemical products
24 Timber
24a Wood
25 Wrought and cast iron
26 Wrought and cast steel
27 Copper and brass plates
28 Tin plates
29 Cottons
30 Woollens
31 Silks
32 Kerosene
33 Paper
34 Steel, iron and copper, manufactured
35 Tools and machinery for industry
36 Railway equipment
37 Other
370
obs VM1 VM- VM3 VM4 VM5 VM6
1842 80.3 393. 7 823.4 32. 6 49.7 478.-8
1843 101.3 420. 2 955.5 41 . 9 462.5 727.01844 NA NA NA NA NA NA1845 NA NA NA NA NA NA1846 NA NA NA NA NA NA1847 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1848 60.0 316.7 694.0 198. 8 250.2 721.9
1849 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1850 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1851 90. 2 401.8 891.5 188.2 194. 1 978.7
1852 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1853 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1854 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1855 325.8 396.1 874. 3 600. 0 153.3 1265.0
1856 386.7 467.5 1009.9 2529.1 553.6 1645.91857 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1858 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1859 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1860 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1861 1347.1 53: .7 1046.0 182.9 403.8 2126.3
1862 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1863 NA NA NA NA NA NA1864 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1865 798.8 483.5 1302.6 1972.1 474. 6 2092.2
1866 964.5 490.4 1447.7 1664.4 281 .6 2150.9
1867 758.6 545. 0 1306.2 3131.9 290.4 1991.6
1868 462.2 475.0 1201.5 3727.7 442.9 1737.31869 636.3 468. 6 1190.2 2220.9 491 . 2 1844.01870 918.4 478. 7 1142.4 2955.1 422.4 2362.71871 1033.6 468.4 1380.4 1901.2 474.2 1737.6
1872 1441.1 559. 4 1653.2 1641.4 474.5 2069.6
1873 825. 2 503.0 1461.3 1551.5 399.7 1946.31874 971.5 540. 1 1277.1 1660.9 323.4 2072.4
1875 895.6 558.0 1373.5 4455.6 701. 3 1942.4
1876 981.8 528. 1 1355.3 5848.3 656. 3 1744.01877 1635.9 623. 0 1408.7 2968.8 600.7 2296.2
1878 1143.8 611.9 1306.3 4612.9 415.8 1999.31879 858.0 644.7 1271.9 7023.7 537.7 1837.6
1880 670.0 912.0 1395.2 4916.0 580. 2 2076.6
1881 914.5 591 .5 1395.2 5433.1 559.7 2006.2
1882 1027.8 516.0 1455.9 6551.8 634.5 2000.7
1883 998. 1 560.6 1361.1 4627.0 662.7 1910.91884 938.0 502. 2 1576.5 5024.5 711.4 1789.21885 1037.1 501. 8 1720.3 4170.0 618.3 1639.61886 1322.2 510.7 1796.6 4734.2 607.5 1721.91887 873.9 555.4 1625.1 4911.0 675.3 1651.2
1888 1207.1 464.0 1682.3 4133.9 699.7 1672.8
1889 1725.7 476.0 1978.6 3290.4 711. 1 1839.3
1890 1418.2 476. 1 1747.5 3967.3 808. 9 1981.81891 1071.9 428.0 1607.5 4988.5 732. 8 1803.6
55ZSSSSS=========SSS5SSS22S IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII s:3ss:ss::as=================
3 ^ 1
ob s
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
VMl VM2 VM3 VM4 VM5
430 
1083 
1262 
2034 
2487
2664.0
3142.0
1844.0
2831.0
3348.0 
4211 .0
3333.0
3490.0
3138.0
2607.0
2391.0
3416.0
2859.0
3456.0 
3031 . 0
2516.0
1976.0
305.0
275.6
267.4
248.5 
244. 9
187.4
142.0
86. 0
65.0 
39. 0
37.0 
33. 0
38.0
32.0
33.0 
32. 0
32.0
13.0
11.0 
12.0 
12.0
5,
4,
2,
,0
00
1657.3
1833.8
1906.3
1960.0 
2270. 1
2208.0
1918.0
1932.0
2821.0
3449.0
3459.0
3525.0
3262.0
3055.0
3636.0
3753.0
3916.0
4040.0
4127.0
3873.0
5336.0
4388.0
3870.0
0
4691.6
5746.8
4178.2
5540.8
4236.8
5989.0 
4781
6465.0
3797.0
3496.0 
951 . 0
3390.0
4558.0
7214.0
4529.0
1461.0
7945.0
7161.0
4408.0
906.0
5041.0
11392.0
8984.0
624.9 
659. 1
600.6
804.4 
791, 
666 . 
805, 
1082. 
1136, 
1201. 
1276. 
1200. 
1624. 
1562. 
1491 . 
1601 . 
1878. 
1657. 
1699. 
1773. 
1719.
2019.0
1771.0
.4 
0 
.0 ,0 
.0 
,0 
.0 
,0 
.0 
0 
0 
0 
,0 
0 
0 
0 
0
V i
\f W-
obs VM7 VM8 VM9 VM10 VM11 VMl 2
1842 286.0 73.9 69.5 1 . 3 81 .7 446.8
1843 304.0 133.9 59.0 23.4 165.3 714.01844 NA NA NA NA NA NA1845 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1846 NA NA NA NA NA NA1847 NA NA NA NA NA NA1848 166.0 118.7 118.5 55. 3 155.4 579. 4
1849 NA NA NA NA NA NA1850 NA NA NA NA NA NA1851 466.0 108.2 218.4 67.8 158.7 473.01852 NA NA NA NA NA NA1853 NA NA NA NA NA NA1854 NA NA NA NA NA NA1855 499.0 132.3 369.6 104. 0 287.5 512.61856 569.0 144.0 354.4 129.6 156.8 355. 1
1857 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1858 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1859 NA NA NA NA NA NA1860 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1861 566.0 331.5 508.7 220.7 296.4 524.4
1862 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1863 NA NA NA NA NA NA1864 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1865 761 .0 1041.3 566 . 3 284. 3 250.6 540. 9
1866 763.0 565.4 764.4 348. 8 307.0 363.8
1867 753.0 539.0 554.9 305. 0 268.6 886.9
1868 736.0 624.6 485.3 286.5 277.7 368.2
1869 641. 0 469.4 595.4 393.4 268. 2 606.7
1870 935. 0 578.9 564.6 405.7 214. 7 737.7
1871 412.0 493. 1 528. 1 395. 1 340. 2 650.7
1872 641.0 478. 0 568.5 517.4 224.7 393.7
1873 807.0 861.4 537.8 656.7 288. 9 613.9
1874 834.0 473. 3 491. 5 670.7 183. 1 467.9
1875 785.0 552. 2 573.9 836. 2 182.8 591.5
1876 760. 0 600.6 511.6 601. 3 125.8 464.4
1877 775.0 820. 5 594.8 613.6 160.3 478. 6
1878 827. 0 730. 8 586. 3 768.0 125.4 514.6
1879 785. 0 885.4 724.9 581.8 116. 2 477.0
1880 715.0 287. 2 862.5 609. 7 137. 9 375.5
1881 751 .0 450. 2 833. 1 777.9 111.8 223.4
1882 718.0 469.0 806. 1 621.0 98.4 265.4
1883 496. 0 523.8 907.2 686.2 100.0 233.7
1884 521.0 632.9 825.4 757.8 94.7 319.2
1885 657.0 579. 3 891.4 745.5 102.6 299.0
1886 690. 0 748. 9 1045.6 1352.0 87.8 350.21887 732. 0 807.9 1012.3 905.3 96.3 361. 2
1888 824.0 760.7 1118.8 923.5 138.6 363.9
1889 758.0 711.7 1180.0 954.0 108. 7 472.0
1890 759.0 533.4 1891.7 1215.1 107. 2 341. 3
1891 823.0 366.0 1591.3 836.7 84.2 276.5
IIIIIIIIIIIIIIII s s s s s s s s s SSSSSBSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSKSSSSS IIHIIIIIIUIIIIIIIIIIIIII = s x z s s =
3 - » ?
ob s
1 8 9 2
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
18991900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
VM7 VM8 VM9 VM10 VM11
783.0 359. 2 1646.3 058. 3 74 . 1857.0 443. 1 2583.7 1676.4 140.4884.0 505.8 2399.7 1157.7 133. 6890.0 751.4 2590.3 1149.5 115.7952.0 617.5 2103.7 1091.3 118.7945. 0 516.0 2840.0 1174.0 113.0947.0 581.0 3532.0 1150.0 162.0839.0 721 .0 3486.0 1536.0 174.0851 .0 705.0 4476.0 1542.0 245.0
910.0 615. 0 3855.0 1478.0 177.0934.0 610.0 3956. 0 1565.0 175.0
992.0 737.0 3905. 0 1667.0 187.0966. 0 919.0 4017.0 1334.0 180. 0
961 .0 730. 0 3670.0 1001.0 176.01007.0 576. 0 3123.0 964.0 184. 0
981.0 759.0 4529.0 1111.0 203.0
945. 0 838.0 4357.0 1027.0 227.0
961 .0 1043.0 4194.0 1176.0 195.0954. 0 877. 0 5658.0 1442.0 207.0
930. 0 946.0 6105.0 1427.0 192. 0
849.0 980. 0 5234.0 1617.0 257.0
1103.0 1018.0 5676.0 1672.0 240.0
913.0 1100.0 4916.0 1200.0 281.0
i h
\f
obs VM13 VM14 VM15 VM16 VM17 VM18
1842 423.9 0.0 0.0 89.4 13.4 98.1
1843 413.4 0.0 0.0 108.0 8.7 137. 31844 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1845 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1846 NA NA NA NA NA NA1847 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1848 217.5 0.0 0.0 114.1 1.7 162. 1
1849 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1850 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1851 195.0 0.0 0.0 144.9 21.5 287.4
1852 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1853 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1854 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1855 400. 0 53.4 0.0 221. 9 8.2 289. 21856 404.4 114.4 0.0 204. 1 9.9 441.4
1857 NA NA NA NA NA NA1858 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1859 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1860 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1861 650.6 86.6 0.0 196.7 185. 3 453.9
1862 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1863 NA NA NA NA NA NA1864 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1865 411.3 60. 1 0.0 169.9 56. 1 466.4
1866 455.3 131.7 0.0 187.5 140.4 659. 3
1867 372.4 124.0 0.0 200.3 253.8 705.4
1868 354.9 125.5 0.0 167. 1 230.3 970. 2
1869 299.7 81.3 0.0 168. 2 77.3 642. 11870 477.7 123.5 0.0 194. 8 127.6 954. 9
1871 496.4 70. 7 0.0 207. 3 119.2 854.9
1872 759. 9 90.6 0.0 222.4 160.5 957. 3
1873 1113.6 23.5 0.0 267 . 9 142. 2 1509.7
1874 906. 3 31. 1 0.0 266. 3 96.4 987.0
1875 683. 0 31.4 0.0 301 . 0 225. 0 2448.2
1876 525.8 61.9 0.0 236. 1 104.3 1204.9
1877 793.3 69.6 0.0 325.6 130.8 1508.9
1878 688.4 80.8 0.0 290.5 97. 1 1073.2
1879 501.5 107.6 0.0 276.3 206.5 1198.4
1880 615.9 38.4 0.0 267.5 331.4 1484.7
1881 713.5 92.4 0.0 299.0 287.6 1198.0
1882 653.8 114.4 0.0 367.5 444. 8 1426.1
1883 570.7 109.5 0.0 274.8 498.6 1510.3
1884 616.8 121. 1 0.0 339.3 291.7 1631.2
1885 589. 1 98.6 10. 2 338.4 376.7 1419.6
1886 709.6 157.0 71.3 369.7 576.7 1530.7
1887 700.0 107. 3 16.6 372.7 328.3 1507.0
1888 788. 3 188.1 49. 1 401.7 260.0 1533.4
1889 744. 1 132.6 40.0 461 .7 304. 2 1872.6
1890 671.0 212.5 55. 1 442.5 327.8 2023.6
1891 536.0 269.4 69.3 415.6 265.2 2130.5ssssasssssss=rsssssrs=SSSSiSSSSSSSsarsssrssssSSSSSISSSS tlIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII
ob s
1892
18931894
18951896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
VM13 VM14 VM15 VM16 VM17
780. 8 253.4 49. 8 306.7 336.0
844. 2 349. 2 49.5 409.7 198. 3834. 7 363.5 54.0 316.5 190. 8
776. 0 455.0 88.5 354. 2 267.0
908. 8 559. 2 82. 0 406. 2 224.7754.0 393. 0 121.0 406.0 184.0
822.0 1021.0 340. 0 550.0 247.0
744.0 764. 0 455.0 499. 0 422.01240.0 965.0 465.0 583. 0 339.0
1397.0 724.0 737.0 534.0 394.0
1547.0 1174.0 912.0 562.0 273.0
1317.0 1139.0 932.0 660.0 362.0
1152.0 1024.0 847.0 614. 0 226. 0864.0 1118.0 862.0 523. 0 279. 0
1145.0 1089.0 1225.0 532.0 299.0
1123.0 1322.0 1367.0 510.0 205. 0
1119.0 1152.0 1433.0 510.0 266.01019.0 1098.0 1192.0 562.0 358.0
1416.0 1436.0 1555. 0 621 . 0 257.0
1584.0 1904.0 1556.0 603.0 373. 0
1505.0 1415.0 1452.0 642.0 335.0
1415.0 1602.0 1313.0 696. 0 337. 0
981. 0 1297.0 1149.0 444. 0 211.0
obs VM19 VM20 VM21 VM22 VM23 VM24
1842 177. 1 0.0 47.8 1 . 2 61.3 251.7
1843 289.6 0.0 51.2 1 . 1 126.8 391 .91844 NA NA NA NA NA NA1845 NA NA NA NA NA NA1846 NA NA NA NA NA NA1847 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1848 270.7 0.0 36.4 1.4 53.8 420. 6
1849 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1850 NA NA NA NA NA NA1851 204.2 0.0 40. 1 1. 6 167.6 539.41852 NA NA NA NA NA NA1853 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1854 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1855 223.2 0.0 38.6 6.6 107.0 358. 6
1856 276.9 0.0 51. 5 3.2 139. 3 429. 1
1857 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1858 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1859 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1860 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1861 175.5 2.5 79. 7 32.4 150.5 562.6
1862 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1863 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1864 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1865 164. 1 50.5 142. 1 8.7 167.8 621. 5
1866 231.5 48. 9 157.5 13.2 168.9 473. 5
1867 194.6 40. 3 158.0 13.9 194. 2 493.4
1868 180.7 41. 0 132.0 9.2 163. 2 446.4
1869 192.9 35.6 120.5 11.6 174. 8 387.9
1870 166. 2 48. 8 83.0 7.6 170.4 586.2
1871 202.4 69.8 126.6 12.1 269.9 530.6
1872 203.4 52.4 130.7 12.4 270.9 590. 9
1873 330.7 77. 9 182.9 12.9 263.3 839.0
1874 335.8 96. 1 98.8 26.0 227.5 1123.81875 357.9 103. 3 191 .4 23.8 271.8 778.6
1876 254.0 84. 1 191. 5 23.7 255. 2 784. 1
1877 216.3 99.7 216.4 27.0 276.7 842.3
1878 81.2 82.8 170. 2 31.7 249.4 652. 6
1879 182.7 73.4 202.2 40. 3 261.5 658.1
1880 198.7 112.7 207.6 35.0 293.0 872.9
1881 209.8 143. 6 149.3 52.9 265. 1 794. 3
1882 209.0 127.5 172.7 49. 1 283. 2 895.3
1883 241.7 111.8 183.3 63. 3 196.0 826.0
1884 253.7 128. 2 188. 1 79.0 218.7 713.5
1885 275.9 150.4 237.0 91. 3 320.8 998.9
1886 272.2 160. 1 288.9 187. 9 322.3 1042.7
1887 284.9 193.8 297.4 242.1 334. 2 1098.9
1888 361.6 215. 1 305.0 176.9 296.6 1318.3
1889 272.8 235.7 324.9 187.5 299.9 1590.7
1890 329.7 234.5 344.0 241. 1 372.7 1148.2
1891 399.0 176.9 332.8 159.4 311.7 1028.6: = S = SS33S S S35 SS SSSSSSSSKSSSXSSSSBSCSSSSSaCSSSSssssssssssSSSSS8CSSSS IIIIIIIIIIIIIIII
Obs VM19 VM20 VM21 VM22 VM23 VM24
1892 192.5 205. 0 181. 5 108.4 355.4 1071.9
1893 275.3 277. 2 250.9 129.0 504.6 1538.51894 263. 2 277. 1 210.6 114. 6 576.4 1060.5
1895 341 . 1 270.9 255.5 88.5 599.7 1140.0
1896 362.5 269. 9 298.4 97.6 654.0 1022.1
1897 370.0 285.0 310.0 99. 2 512.0 1133.0
1898 452.0 344. 0 338.0 98. 9 769. 0 1600.0
1899 488. 0 398.0 378. 0 124. 2 784.0 1504.0
1900 408. 0 463.0 478. 0 150.4 1001.0 1717.0
1901 445.0 432.0 500.0 155.0 930. 0 1421.0
1902 423.0 431. 0 544. 0 159. 0 916.0 1436.0
1903 450. 0 440.0 544.0 159.0 1223.0 1694 . 0
1904 440.0 426. 0 582.0 152. 0 1528.0 1722.0
1905 456.0 380.0 603.0 155.0 1151.0 1616.0
1906 448.0 411.0 628.0 173.0 1227.0 2056.0
1907 435.0 427.0 629.0 173.0 1360.0 1742.0
1908 401 .0 366. 0 648.0 154.0 1337.0 1616.0
1909 226.0 448.0 747.0 154.0 1436.0 1751.0
1910 287.0 499. 0 858.0 187.0 1192.0 1704.0
1911 272.0 513.0 983. 0 203.0 1457.0 1776.0
1912 276.0 749. 0 976.0 243. 0 1473.0 2000.0
1913 224.0 822.0 1019.0 307.0 1592.0 2099.0
1914 186. 0 691. 0 855.0 216.0 1803.0 1542.0
lì'i
cM ì>
obs VM25 VM26 VM27 VM28 VM29 VM30
1842 370. 0 38.2 50.2 37.3 2419.7 678. 2
1843 312.5 44. 6 48.6 31.8 3321.4 1054.51844 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1845 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1846 NA NA NA NA NA NA1847 NA NA NA NA NA NA1848 512.2 45.7 51.3 32.9 2878.2 799.0
1849 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1850 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1851 462. 1 53.3 80.7 53.4 2769.9 862. 61852 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1853 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1854 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1855 706. 3 50.4 134.8 67.4 3308.0 985.31856 643.4 37. 2 132.2 66.4 2821.9 1089.21857 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1858 NA NA NA NA NA NA1859 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1860 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1861 1136.2 65.2 81. 1 70. 2 3576.1 1290.3
1862 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1863 NA NA NA NA NA NA1864 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1865 542.9 74. 1 84.8 55.7 3822.0 1610.9
1866 585. 0 53.5 56. 9 53. 9 4625.2 1560.8
1867 743.4 51.5 82.4 96.8 4283.9 1432.9
1868 507. 1 52.4 76.3 64. 7 3782.3 1224.6
1869 589. 0 49. 9 74. 9 71 . 6 3383.7 1247.2
1870 644. 1 65. 1 65. 3 76. 1 3968.5 1200.1
1871 698. 3 54. 5 91 . 3 102.0 3820.5 1532.2
1872 960.7 53.0 95.8 111.5 4247.3 2316.9
1873 1207.8 70. 3 165.8 147.4 4698.0 1768.2
1874 1399.0 128.9 171.3 148. 0 3598.3 1678. 1
1875 1281.4 111.8 136.4 138.8 3953.0 2165.7
1876 852. 6 63. 3 104. 2 109. 7 3435.6 1840.9
1877 762.0 58.8 99. 1 110.5 3333.0 1687.1
1878 799.5 70. 9 107.7 99.7 2974.4 1337.2
1879 479. 1 57.8 118.3 102.4 2657.2 1257.5
1880 724.4 50. 2 92.4 133.4 3881.5 1479.4
1881 756. 8 50. 5 112.9 142.4 3276.3 1410.5
1882 840.3 64.8 77. 2 107.9 2741.3 1482.0
1883 881. 6 57.3 62.7 148. 8 2748.6 1527.9
1884 930.8 56. 3 97.5 185.5 2715.1 1581.2
1885 898. 8 75.0 120.9 180. 2 2820.4 1444.6
1886 824.8 50.4 72. 3 224. 3 2977.0 1514.0
1887 897. 1 52.8 81.7 379.5 2945.6 1493.4
1888 993.6 66. 3 92.6 275.9 3022.1 1622.6
1889 1131.2 85.4 100. 0 311 .0 3281.8 1752.7
1890 1163.8 73.8 91.7 331.2 3021.4 1670.4
1891 989.4 46. 1 99.4 441. 6 2557.4 1398.9
: s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s II II II II II II II II II II IISSSS222S2SS52S222S22 s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s
o b s
18921893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
18991900
1901
1902
19031904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
VM25 VM26 VM27 VM28 VM29
912 
1176 
1001 
961 
1115 
1006 
1336 
1659
2078.0
1686.0
1603 
1720 
1792 
1539 
1613 
1662 
1766 
1675
2104 
1910 
2337 
2648 
1588
.0
,0
.0
0
,0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
53.7
70.8 
80. 0
94.0
115.3
89.0
165.0
164.0
229.0
221.0
153.0
322.0
156.0 
241. 0
165.0
194.0 
200 . 0
206.0
287.0
308.0
186.0
308.0
357.0
152.3
94.8
90. 6
106.0
124. 1
94.0
125. 0
169.0
238.0
238.0
187.0 
214. 0 
233. 0 
196. 0 
225. 0
227.0
342.0
256.0
237.0
199.0 
202. 0
241.0 
243. 0
355.6 
392. 7210.4
377.0
360.0 
352. 0
539.0 
409. 0
706.0
708.0
908.0 
782. 0
845.0725.0
754.0
849.0
931.0
964.0
1072.0
1555.0
1637.0
1721.0
1168.0
1152.7
1931.9
1751.3
2041.0
2084.22034.0
2347.0
2575.02556.0
2574.0
2546.0
2810.0
2715.0
2682.0
2927.0
2930.0
2609.0
2738.0
3517.0
3579.0
3539.0
3445.0
2780.0
iï*
obs VM31 VM32 VM33 VM34 VM35 VM36
1842 70.2 0.0 24. 8 197.7 40.0 0.0
1843 65.3 0.0 29.7 302.5 35.6 0.01844 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1845 NA NA NA NA NA NA1846 NA NA NA NA NA NA1847 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1848 56. 0 0.0 10.3 123.0 90. 1 0.01849 NA NA NA NA NA NA1850 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1851 92.7 0.0 10.2 222.4 96. 2 0.01852 NA NA NA NA NA NA1853 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1854 NA NA NA NA NA NA1855 363.4 0.0 13.5 318.0 156.0 0.0
1856 439. 2 0.0 17.8 189.6 159.0 0.01857 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1858 NA NA NA NA NA NA1859 NA NA NA NA NA NA
I860 NA NA NA NA NA NA1861 509. 1 0.4 16.7 371 .5 231.4 0.0
1862 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1863 NA NA NA NA NA NA1864 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1865 456.7 73.8 87.0 179. 1 215. 3 334. 21866 452. 8 124. 2 86. 3 154.5 194.8 287.9
1867 467.4 139.0 79.7 180. 1 159. 3 20.6
1868 415.8 208.6 81.6 156.5 121 .6 50. 8
1869 433.3 373.4 69. 2 252.2 156.7 45.71870 410.9 426.6 58.8 146. 9 194. 9 41. 8
1871 499. 8 285.5 55.1 172.5 186.2 41.8
1872 517.9 307.9 79.4 210.1 281 .6 542.6
1873 766.7 324.7 125.4 223.4 485. 1 428. 21874 636.5 243.7 105.8 343.2 456.8 254.5
1875 835.5 148. 1 118.7 560.7 676.7 774. 2
1876 785.8 182.0 138.9 422. 2 904. 9 433.4
1877 774.2 248.4 190.4 356. 0 425.6 284.4
1878 655.6 260.6 326. 0 281. 1 537.0 326. 2
1879 625.7 294.8 195. 0 267.7 445. 9 890.7
1880 589.3 222.0 175. 3 275.4 421 .9 863.3
1881 614. 2 309.3 148. 2 314.4 528. 1 947.0
1882 674.8 250.4 189.4 305.7 332.9 683.8
1883 774. 8 154.0 182. 1 317.6 480.0 343.0
1884 714.7 290.5 163. 2 499.3 619.3 305.0
1885 982. 1 247.7 185. 2 524.1 567.7 409. 5
1886 963.8 247.0 243.7 403.8 568.5 926.2
1887 961 .7 240.5 227.8 465.8 691.5 1122.7
1888 974.5 324. 1 246.2 460.8 839.8 1032.1
1889 1200.3 366.6 248.7 722.2 1038.4 1126.9
1890 1028.4 442. 2 279.6 645.0 1294.3 1784.0
1891 786.2 524. 1 288.9 496. 2 867.7 1350.7IIIIIIIIIIIIII IIIIIIIIIIIIIIII
obs
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
19031904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
19131914
VM31 VM32 VM33 VM34 VM35
409. 3 
679. 5
618.0
722.0 
736. 3
686.0 
741 .0
805.0
818.0
767.0
760.0 841 .0
897.0
970.0 
971 .0
1082.0
919.0
943.0
1098.0
980.0
1050.0
1164.0
1022.0
530. 1529.4 
532. 5 
468. 8
514.8
532.0
542.0 
572. 0
568.0
660.0
562.0
565.0
465.0
475.0 
503. 0
530.0
510.0
510.0
521.0507.0
594.0 
498. 0
482.0
168. 7
252.3 
149. 3
131.5 
156. 0 
176. 0
196.0
212.0
185.0
233.0 
205. 0
203.0
199.0
185.0
157.0
181.0
183.0 
196. 0
202.0
216.0
218.0
230.0
187.0
361. 1
414.6 
330. 5 
373. 1 409. 7
452.0
569.0 
560. 0
712.0 884. 0
898.0827.0
897.0994.0
987.0
1009.0
1004.0
854.0
1028.0
1059.0
1376.0
1347.0
1 0 2 2 . 0
772.4 
701. 8
804.5749.4
756.4
991.0
1517.0
1173.0
1805.0
2004.0
1389.0
1805.0
1897.0
1693.0
1875.02341.0
2278.0
2224.0
2224.0
2243.0
2661.0
3524.0
2714.0
i l *
obs QM1A QM2 QM3 QM4A QM5 QM6
1842 3723 1007 12109 0 7116 58261843 3418 1096 14464 853 6689 76891844 NA NA NA NA NA NA1845 NA NA NA NA NA NA1846 NA NA NA NA NA NA1847 NA NA NA NA NA NA1848 5794 842 11333 1573 5073 85201849 NA NA NA NA NA NA1850 NA NA NA NA NA NA1851 2988 959 14138 2360 2728 102961852 NA NA NA NA NA NA1853 NA NA NA NA NA NA1854 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1855 9111 962 13375 9984 1941 120701856 10922 979 15249 25269 7728 13138
1857 NA NA NA NA NA NA1858 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1859 NA NA NA NA NA NA
I860 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1861 30765 1043 12291 3942 5445 14736
1862 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1863 NA NA NA NA NA NA1864 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1865 37157 1134 12083 30216 7527 15933
1866 37987 1130 13865 26699 4193 15868
1867 31193 1189 13060 37169 4295 15259
1868 23861 980 12550 42080 6752 132161869 32725 996 11534 27892 7735 145431870 41780 959 11393 32279 6963 17957
1871 53147 894 13540 22210 7075 13244
1872 54155 1028 14767 24783 7855 15810
1873 44723 963 15712 21306 7109 167371874 39292 917 16700 21929 6167 17527
1875 38507 1062 16703 68844 12876 18520
1876 48429 1078 15399 78870 12730 18036
1877 77094 1214 16758 41400 11707 19448
1878 51409 1215 16723 73703 10401 19961
1879 38446 1311 17637 87657 10440 195911880 35108 1319 19608 70931 11258 20051
1881 45813 1236 20135 81865 11401 20755
1882 43070 1181 19897 107311 12777 20411
1883 42859 1086 17380 85819 14512 198881884 43412 1126 20132 103761 15013 213491885 43624 1172 23011 102433 13238 22796
1886 54076 1295 23760 120828 13735 242281887 32995 1279 21468 125392 14836 25733
1888 35058 1098 21100 102595 14790 24000
1889 49368 1172 24731 76304 15110 25444
1890 38211 1151 21110 94687 16837 27564
1891 28956 989 19568 112385 15948 25277
IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII NIIIIII11IIII SSSSSSS8SSS s s s s s s s s s s SSS3SSSSS s s s s s s s s s
3 W
obs
1892
1893
1894
1895
18961897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
19031904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
19131914
QM 6
24502
25076
26083
2674326440
25512
26691
2722028736
28690
28862
31192
32888
31757
32700
33097
33258
35012
32915
37223
35774
38842
38069
QMIA QM2 QM3 QM4A QM5
18761 537 19562 112171 1278238680 487 21133 144404 13814
30555 474 22482 106508 12816
32923 467 22681 137903 1743535039 423 25005 118794 1657836323 279 23610 141227 13260
47789 172 19287 69714 1342633660 130 16719 100455 16370
45098 73 22086 136870 17517
46844 71 25027 92316 18341
54708 61 25524 9170 19444
41615 75 26117 74796 1817429189 66 24133 89330 25181
42225 64 22237 127167 24244
40567 65 26948 104868 22891
36715 62 28012 26194 24831
41396 28 29802 125302 26065
49967 22 30489 106099 25369
69276 24 32179 82302 26241
43880 24 29625 11939 27327
37161 9 35264 64828 26484
25511 7 33259 174159 306986994 4 27990 148022 27306
obs QM7A QM7B
1842 934 71
1843 1007 851844 NA NA
1845 NA NA
1846 NA NA1847 NA NA
1848 668 36
1849 NA NA
1850 NA NA
1851 1068 119
1852 NA NA
1853 NA NA
1854 NA NA
1855 1256 1581856 1183 192
1857 NA NA
1858 NA NA
1859 NA NA
I860 NA NA
1861 1442 198
1862 NA NA
1863 NA NA1864 NA NA
1865 1585 217
1866 1700 229
1867 1799 235
1868 1941 171
1869 1697 215
1870 2824 259
1871 893 160
1872 1576 184
1873 1582 248
1874 1548 246
1875 1691 264
1876 1777 244
1877 1702 262
1878 2075 265
1879 2098 268
1880 1919 253
1881 2092 276
1882 2257 312
1883 2246 184
1884 2360 241
1885 2645 259
1886 2634 263
1887 2144 281
1888 2493 262
1889 2341 273
1890 2316 291
1891 2040 242
QM9 QM10 QM11
338 6 13
412 117 24
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
631 289 30
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
722 386 30
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
1757 402 41
1586 511 18
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
1892 952 39
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
943 956 24
1322 1248 31
1373 1492 25
1406 1034 25
1610 1615 27
1595 1725 27
1950 1846 32
1961 1925 16
1969 2274 32
1640 1992 30
2083 2624 29
2041 1559 19
2681 1629 27
2430 2538 19
2756 2095 15
3385 2334 19
3310 2889 16
3305 2447 12
3998 2743 13
3744 2875 14
4159 2855 14
5120 5143 12
5032 3921 13
5452 4415 17
5990 4065 15
8232 4040 13
7192 3059 11
QMBA
882
1284
NA
NA
NA
NA
990
NA
NA
737
NA
NA
NA
1255
651
NA
NA
NA
NA
1239
NA
NA
NA
1334
1246
1265
1694
1231
1354
1237
1317
1541
1459
1674
1704
1953
1770
2920
764
1416
1720
1698
1626
1807
1726
2123
2434
2215
2067
1691
o b s
1892
18931894
1895
1896
1897
18981899
1900
1901
1902
19031904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
QM7A QM7B QM8A QM9 QM10
1956 248
2008 274
2012 2831974 266
2106 274
2206 268
2434 271
2489 265
2466 282
2662 299
2828 291
3040 318
2943 3132994 307
3118 324
3203 310
3221 300
3275 306
3198 299
2999 289
2755 291
3160 276
2977 252
7361 3550
10952 5107
10547 4080
12821 4631
9863 415113357 4059
15413 311115672 3981
15945 3207
13333 3868
14939 4503
14256 4515
14932 3441
16061 2476
13013 1965
17151 2390
15543 2005
14692 232616360 2341
17941 2485
18154 2645
17639 251414757 1658
1798
1838
1885
2598
2346
2010
2288
2576
2682
2565
2416
3615
4003
2444
1976
2591
2341
3171
2586
3057
2895
3181
3476
obs QM12 QM13 QM14 QM15 QM16 QM17
1842 3143 2338 0 0 408 264
1843 4399 2203 0 0 455 128
1844 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1845 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1846 NA NA NA NA NA NA1847 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1848 3651 1293 0 0 741 311849 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1850 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1851 2740 1098 0 0 702 3301852 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1853 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1854 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1855 2899 1441 2232 0 1390 260
1856 2443 1269 5107 0 1082 302
1857 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1858 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1859 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1860 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1861 2497 2135 3894 0 840 3365
1862 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1863 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1864 NA NA NA NA NA NA
1865 3140 1987 2018 0 713 1270
1866 2176 2126 5402 0 956 2401
1867 4265 1671 4179 0 1265 5285
1868 1817 1408 3805 0 1108 5639
1869 2757 1382 2735 0 871 1854
1870 3434 2016 2882 0 1275 4378
1871 2229 1807 2080 0 1235 4125
1872 2121 2438 3097 0 1285 5362
1873 2883 3040 715 0 1909 4725
1874 2441 2632 1088 0 1159 4162
1875 2891 2216 1215 0 1587 6469
1876 2532 2226 2760 0 1278 2918
1877 2565 2770 3072 0 2149 4969
1878 2829 2830 3127 0 2117 3087
1879 2651 2027 3792 0 1431 8295
1880 2102 1988 1086 0 1722 13341
1881 1463 2023 2939 0 1508 9352
1882 1866 2110 3604 0 1937 16942
1883 1737 1858 3730 0 1708 18115
1884 2399 2125 3988 0 1774 9531
1885 2191 1979 3820 533 1777 19022
1886 2388 2481 5162 3795 2359 31330
1887 2563 2485 4752 1005 2422 18739
1888 2695 2774 4554 2981 2671 15471
1889 3397 2647 4600 2326 2898 17923
1890 2551 2682 5759 2954 3092 18190
1891 2187 2014 7339 4372 3010 13148SS5SSSSSSTSSSSSSSSSSSSsssssssssssassssssssssssrssssSSKSSSSSSSsssssessssss
obs
1892
18931894
1895
18961897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
19061907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
QMl 7
1345110456
985116977
13191
8477
8835
13895
12985
13086
10251
14633
9291
14382
14063
10661
12406
14482
11339
16735
15228
15121
8741
QMl2 QM13
1701 2969
2113 2863
2292 3202
1917 2426
2496 30222182 2391
2160 2294
2188 2115
2095 2808
2037 3360
2076 3681
2437 3038
1947 2755
1883 1995
1529 2441
1700 2516
1878 2625
1893 2384
1750 31551898 3628
1861 3436
1805 2828
1225 2045
QMl 5 QMl 6
3513 2239
3630 2671
3446 2384
6027 2333
6432 2785
9551 2422
23705 3131
26022 3118
28965 3310
44853 3512
62999 3868
67743 4457
68562 4738
77095 5205
100015 5357
123213 5147
124076 5083
102659 5355151324 6340
142606 5674
133820 6363
104493 6663
97851 3852
QMl 4
8754
9524
9857
12872
15363
9432
15802
13759
16445
12148
19195
19715
20363
19786
20812
23021
23177
20620
2293330805
2344326171
22103
o b s
1842
18431844
1845
18461847
1848
1849
1850
18511852
18531854
1855
1856
1857
1858
1859
1860
1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
18831884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
124A
1024
1513
NA
NA
NA
NA2937
NA
NA
2180
NANA
NA
15211404
NANA
NA
NA
1293
NA
NA
NA
836
816
1472
1203
797
1574
1322
1518
2032
3651
1930
1687
2154
1500
1900
2231
3215
4143
3080
1995
3549
3416
3184
QM18 QM19 QM20 QM21 QM22
36092 287 0 133 41
33670 406 0 114 40
NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA NA
47565 636 0 87 33
NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA NA
83008 403 0 45 52
NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA NA
87879 519 0 47 235
109624 388 0 60 163
NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA NA
100674 257 4 62 1763
NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA NA
110652 131 59 103 467
165887 184 53 102 903
145655 172 51 106 886
197235 158 51 88 656
142747 157 48 94 696
187023 145 72 86 419
166381 180 103 102 869
180531 210 83 94 854
260388 407 107 106 737
185567 458 135 80 1757
426223 554 142 112 1478
217656 371 126 122 1704
238711 244 173 153 1891
227972 108 151 127 2595
253340 200 111 148 3519319234 218 214 139 2690
326407 241 258 101 4673
385783 233 288 101 4637
409727 306 264 101 6246
433761 344 258 114 8084
400638 343 470 124 10320
441776 342 594 141 17852
452100 365 781 147 21432
496225 424 993 149 15888
583507 320 1128 164 18720
628707 375 1124 167 26872
641910 406 910 152 14553
4418
3959
3719
3309
2538
3488
3663
4592
38323304
4182
4318
3370
6067
56793826
2974
3842
43804370
9486
7276
3885
QM 18 QM 19 QM20 QM21 QM22
616756 211 1150 93 9412
539413 308 1489 143 11124640704 271 1296 122 13387617391 335 1490 151 10364627317 337 1517 165 10975662827 358 1389 157 12013
758654 321 1526 138 9996775148 350 1678 159 10081
891556 284 1912 238 12424
870415 295 1744 217 13023
968126 319 2009 209 14857
934901 332 1943 224 14816
986388 327 1963 247 16069
957446 381 1848 256 18850
1086511 398 2019 256 22797
1187183 357 1739 233 20261
1186514 317 1632 241 17631
1202633 194 2374 261 19074
1227476 239 2897 265 23132
1181765 242 2770 302 26341
1374006 269 3588 318 31013
1392029 205 3645 274 35873
1211116 174 2420 252 23599
3°io
i/c¡u-Hi*
obs QM25 QM26
1842 8587 327
1843 10016 4141844 NA NA
1845 NA NA
1846 NA NA1847 NA NA
1848 12037 397
1849 NA NA
1850 NA NA
1851 13501 580
1852 NA NA
1853 NA NA
1854 NA NA
1855 16472 601
1856 15212 403
1857 NA NA
1858 NA NA
1859 NA NA
1860 NA NA
1861 30845 759
1862 NA NA
1863 NA NA1864 NA NA
1865 16516 795
1866 17667 689
1867 20029 595
1868 13027 695
1869 12040 650
1870 15459 809
1871 16276 716
1872 16427 607
1873 23906 737
1874 25725 1020
1875 28314 1067
1876 18749 729
1877 20912 718
1878 28632 1096
1879 22661 820
1880 29202 679
1881 30878 783
1882 27612 1045
1883 37938 1015
1884 46137 886
1885 39744 1017
1886 42595 879
1887 50545 945
1888 55381 1226
1889 49535 1589
1890 43835 1203
1891 41880 750
QM28 QM29 QM30
271 2841 289244 3809 466NA NA NANA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
286 4483 317
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
434 3716 303
NA NA NANA NA NA
NA NA NA
489 4781 350
479 4398 339
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
576 4750 420
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
NA NA NA
736 2966 532
598 3690 491
1075 4274 468
721 4059 409824 3991 435
843 4431 434
1056 4212 499
919 5276 850
1135 5480 626
1143 5291 646
1267 6081 828
1033 5823 680
1286 6133 673
1254 5772 621
1214 5289 521
1582 5321 662
1842 5642 554
1491 4929 518
2092 5879 547
2644 5061 540
2644 5485 614
3223 5901 701
6348 5976 715
4668 5680 760
5213 5646 8304984 4986 830
6635 3975 662
QM27
131
168
NA
NA
NA
NA
186
NA
NA
206
NA
NA
NA
271
272
NA
NA
NA
NA
249
NA
NA
NA
303
173
303
278
291
226
308
299
416476
356
294
289
390
407
273
342
232
199
360
510334
368
300
388
347
365
o b s
189210931094
1095
10961097
1090
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
291364
361411
358286
263
303
329357
337
370
333352
341
330
304
299
303
261240
241
167
QM25 QM26 QM27 QM20 QM29
44363 1157 545 5094 167843197 1337 484 7070 2613
38974 1506 435 4000 2347
39083 2081 463 6774 2847
40204 2223 435 6923 280638028 1452 368 7206 249438774 2348 396 0631 287542356 2329 474 6160 3165
40083 2326 502 7416 2855
41432 3044 491 0446 2566
43923 2287 485 11705 265649084 4344 589 11267 2819
52320 2182 665 12830 243150842 5890 566 11945 2548
54204 2929 593 12537 2723
53734 3021 490 12645 2609
56584 2791 045 14727 2139
55539 3149 702 15359 2344
64123 4776 692 17074 2949
63928 6816 604 24347 2742
73542 2865 571 25323 2678
80976 5732 641 24369 2489
50642 8082 695 17310 1954
obs QM31 QM32 QM33 QM35
1842 3 0 87 286
1843 3 0 110 245
1844 NA NA NA NA1845 NA NA NA NA
1846 NA NA NA NA1847 NA NA NA NA
1848 2 0 38 6781849 NA NA NA NA1850 NA NA NA NA1851 4 0 33 4041852 NA NA NA NA
1853 NA NA NA NA1854 NA NA NA NA
1855 24 0 54 543
1856 30 0 70 775
1857 NA NA NA NA
1858 NA NA NA NA
1859 NA NA NA NA
1860 NA NA NA NA
1861 32 4 54 890
1862 NA NA NA NA
1863 NA NA NA NA
1864 NA NA NA NA
1865 32 657 346 1170
1866 32 1107 337 812
1867 35 1411 310 611
1868 34 1771 333 631
1869 31 3421 206 786
1870 33 3801 180 714
1871 35 2711 177 1058
1872 44 3051 274 1408
1873 55 3669 436 2083
1874 51 4367 447 2260
1875 60 2920 356 2669
1876 54 3693 451 5183
1877 68 4949 723 2302
1878 66 5667 933 2398
1879 56 6974 1021 1986
1880 54 6048 927 1954
1881 46 8240 955 2200
1882 48 7878 1071 1622
1883 59 5439 1227 2628
1884 64 9550 1139 3006
1885 118 9078 1350 3184
1886 97 9428 1785 3285
1887 107 9446 2092 4104
1888 117 10385 2271 4598
1889 132 10971 2475 6624
1890 124 12203 3231 7553
1891 93 12442 2857 3924
o b s
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
QM31 QM32 QM33 QM35
47 14174 1232 3571
63 13775 1865 2890
55 14654 663 3209
71 13646 600 3339
76 13173 703 3394
71 14234 715 4274
64 14129 796 542170 14970 832 5061
69 13973 707 5616
67 16568 742 5702
68 15051 654 4624
76 17343 700 6148
76 14765 661 689594 15995 712 6861
90 16552 617 8504
86 17485 664 9966
77 17507 641 9257
81 17942 668 8207
96 18539 697 8902
87 18758 757 8949
110 18067 785 10406
119 18050 795 13497
120 17023 602 9501
EXPORTS AND IMPORTS BY COUNTRIES
C.5
1 United Kingdom
2 Spain
3 France
4 Italy (1871 borders)
5 Germany (1871 borders)
6 Belgium
7 Holland
8 Sweden and Norway
9 Russia
10 USA
11 Brazil
12 African colonies
395
o b s
1842
1843
1844
1845
1846
1847
1848
1849
1850
1851
1852
18531854
1855
1856
1857
1858
1859
1860
1861
1862
18631864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
XP1 XP2 XP3 XP4 XP5
2842.2
2896.8 
NANA
NA
NA
3908.9 NA
NA
3860.3 NA
NA 
NA
6209.6
6983.8 
NA
NA
NA
NA
7439.0 
NA
NA
NA
9413.5
9532.8
8759.1
8660.2
8999.812068.4
11386.0
12446.5
13201.0
11262.3 
13585. 2
10295.3
11395.9
9028.0
7817.6
10180.3
8612.9
9874.0
8204.0
7549.3
6879.8
6722.0
6763.7
7827.9
8528.2
7978.5
7497.9
1105.5
1381.1 
NA
NA
NA
NA
914.5 
NA
NA771.0
NA
NA
NA
1078.5
1297.9
NA
NA
NA
NA
1278.6 
NA
NA
NA
1188.2
1331.1
1137.8
1332.5
1335.6
1846.0
1553.2
1730.3
1821.6
1399.9
1330.9
1313.8
1384.6
1203.8
1137.8
1777.9
1621.1
1460.9
1367.3
1251.0
1245.2
1155.7
1210.3 
939. 2
1105.0
879.5 
887. 8
102.5
70.5
NA
NA
NA
NA
35.0NA
NA
41.8
NA
NA
NA
295. 1
172. 9
NA
NA
NA
NA
222.7 
NA
NA
NA
363. 1 
431 . 1 560. 1
615.2
623.7
313.8 
551 .9 
478. 8 
688. 2 
628. 1 
649. 3
1251.4
1124.2 
689. 9 
880. 2
1201.0
2593.4
2762.9
4945.2
5090.4
6494.5
9490.6
4818.05207.4
3768.3
1522.3
1289.3
132. 6 
70. 2 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA39.6 
NA 
NA
52.9 
NA 
NA 
NA
66.5165. 6 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA139.7 
NA
NA
NA
415. 3
222.830.4
155. 9
193. 6 
86. 5 
148. 7
157.5
171.8
177.8 
85. 3
107. 8
149.9
216.4 
233. 2 
226. 2 
151. 0
166.4
159.5
151.0 
151 . 8 
164. 1 
188. 0167.7
197.5
221.2
179.5
92. 2 
204. 8 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA196. 4
NA
NA225.6 
NA
NA
NA
424.2425.7 
NA
NA
NA
NA187. 1 
NA 
NA 
NA
130. 6 
180. 3 
260. 9
191.0 158. 6 
174. 3
318.5
381.7
285.4
719.0 
551 . 9
699.6 
671 .6416.7 
661. 1 
908. 1744.4 
937. 2
1025.5
1035.3
1138.9
1317.9
1620.3
1902.6
1986.9
2065.9
2307.7
3 ^
obs XP1 XP2 XP3 XP4 XP5 XP6
1892 8718.9 1408.7 1015.4 105.3 2220.8 440. 3
1893 6552.6 1371.0 906.0 187.0 1960.8 632.01894 6691.5 2512.7 756.0 221. 2 2053.0 1048.3
1895 7225.7 3227.8 716.8 183. 1 2107.7 813.4
1896 7248.7 3166.0 612.0 247. 5 2023.3 740. 8
1897 7402.8 3926.7 900.2 277.6 2177.2 548.9
1898 8774.2 4054.6 1011.5 326.6 2156.6 750.6
1899 7821.0 3390.9 700.7 297.4 2064.8 675.7
1900 7926.6 4749.1 975.9 252.0 2200.8 845.0
1901 8323.3 4431.8 762.0 289.4 2146.1 819.4
1902 8292.6 4612.1 751.2 325. 9 2144.5 715.1
1903 8038.0 5372.4 928.4 378. 1 2040.5 747 . 31904 6994.4 6048.2 838. 3 309. 3 2421 .0 865. 8
1905 7250.7 4120.2 709.6 354. 6 2279.0 826. 1
1906 7886.9 5020.9 960. 2 521. 2 2505.4 934.6
1907 7367.9 4941.0 673. 3 503. 5 2475.4 936.6
1908 7016.5 5396.6 654.5 486. 7 2251.5 894.5
1909 7289.8 5535.7 806. 0 470. 0 2291.6 938. 21910 7990.4 5085.3 894. 1 515.5 3296.9 1229.2
1911 6935.2 5763.5 1359.0 629. 3 3300.2 1110.7
1912 7280.9 5169.8 1675.8 603.9 3000.6 1030.1
1913 7601.3 5479.1 1334.2 579.0 3408.6 1111.2
1914 8246.2 2219.5 1054.1 506.5 1518.8 538.6
o b s
1842
1843
1844
1845
18461847
1848
1849
1850
1851
1852
18531854
1855
1856
1857
1858
1859
1860
1861
1862
18631864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
XP7 XP8 XP9 XP10 XP11
125.4
166. 8 
NA NA 
NA 
NA
101.3 NA
NA 
90. 0 
NA 
NA 
NA
61.3
175.9 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA
125 . 6 
NA 
NA 
NA
168.6 
180. 4
182.6 
248. 2
219.6 
169. 5
433.4 
393. 3394.7
220.7
167.0 
164. 9
115.7 
124. 2 
141 . 9
253.8
154.4
118.0
113.9 
129. 4
159.0 
206. 5 
231. 1
237.4
277.6 
282. 2 
301 .2
47.8
35.9 
NA
NA
NANA
124.2
NANA
96.6
NA
NA
NA
146. 2
132. 3
NA
NA
NA
NA
161 . 5 
NA 
NA 
NA132.7
157.5 
160. 8
168.0 
129. 2152.4
131. 3
209.8
304.0
468.7
93.8
151. 8
167. 2 
71 . 0
147.5
447.0 
258. 9
225.8
227.9
194. 1
208.8
213.4
223. 2
299. 3
286.9 
187. 2
361.6
61. 1 
320. 3 NA 
NA 
NA 
NA
268.8 
NA NA
230. 1 
NA 
NA 
NA2.3224. 7 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA
319.6 
NA 
NA 
NA
95.6 
270. 2
415.5
173.5
173.0 
221 . 0
537.9 
754. 8 
448. 7 
360. 1 
186. 8 
171 .0 
186. 9 
109. 7
124.4
645.6
343. 0 
379. 2
387.4 
366. 7 
370. 7 
269. 3 
318. 1 
306. 3
335.9
322.6 
284. 2
90. 2
46.3 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA
331 . 0
NANA
591 .6 
NA 
NA 
NA
236.4 
451 . 2 
NA
NA
NA
NA
55.5
NA
NANA
158. 8
194.5
139.9
118.5 
158. 1 
180. 9 
363. 2 
203. 7 
183. 3
266.4
376.7
397.8 346. 9
315.4
344.8 
609. 7
643.5 
699. 1 
660. 9 
625. 5
632.8 
646. 8 
645. 8
553.6
509.0
729.5
805.9
1275.6
1050.7 
NA
NA
NA
NA
1473.5 
NANA
1689.5 
NANA
NA
2960.1
3919.1 
NA
NA
NA
NA
2641.0 
NA
NANA
2631.8
2966.2
2580.6
2767.2
3274.8
3174.8
3478.6
3455.5
3547.8
4258.04149.4
3686.6
5253.4
4195.3
4153.4
5917.6
4472.8
4828.8
4557.8
4098.2
4180.4
4575.4
3686.2
4191.6
4259.9
5180.6
5274.2
o b s
1892
18931894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
19091910
1911
1912
1913
1914
XP7 XP8 XP9 XP10 XP11
329. 9 173.2 406.4 900.4 6781.4
395.9 219.3 620.7 841 .0 7155.3389.5 303. 2 735. 1 539. 2 5994.2
623. 1 321.9 760.0 475.7 7342.2
585. 1 333. 2 649.6 506.2 6578.5
405.2 433.4 924.0 610.3 5630.5
424.3 458.4 785.7 479.0 6350.8
422. 3 491. 8 693. 6 459. 9 5753.3
503.5 512.7 763. 3 579.4 5537.9
534.2 551.6 811.5 611 .5 4670.0
457. 9 498. 2 616.4 739. 4 5293.8
475.5 446.5 931.7 723.3 5078.5
429. 5 319.4 952. 3 595. 0 5008.8
466.0 318.6 787. 1 490. 8 5796.6
394.4 342.0 929.4 418.7 5391.7
498.8 356.7 946. 2 551. 3 5624.2
317.4 363.7 650. 9 586. 2 4838.5
469.4 350.7 688. 8 865. 2 5145.4718.3 405.6 779. 0 1122.4 6460.0
755.5 379. 1 876.6 841. 6 6316.2664.4 397.0 789. 8 996.6 6723.5
700.6 436.9 939.0 1224.7 6193.2
482.6 611.3 485.8 1437.4 3817.2
o b s
1842
18431844
1845
18461847
18481849
1850
1851
1852
1853
1854
1855
1856
1857
1858
1859
1860
1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
18731874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
MP1 MP2 MP3 MP4 MP5
5715.9
7442.7 NA NA 
NA 
NA
6388.4 
NA 
NA
7097.2 
NA 
NA
NA
8876.2
10240.8 
NA
NA 
NA 
NA
12661.6 
NA 
NA 
NA 
11900. 3
12097.3
11618.3
10612.1
10187.8
11429.8
12317.0
13535.2
14968.3
11836.7
15877.5
13133.3
13031.6
11528.5
11554.0
12672.0
12338.111835.7
10915.5
11392.5
11635.5
12174.4
12250.2
12309.6
13913.7
13263.0
11780.5
200. 5
273. 5
NA
NA
NA
NA
255.4
NA
NA
273. 6 
NA 
NA 
NA
1073.1
1040.4 
NA
NA
NA
NA
2391.7 
NA
NA 
NA
2 0 1 0 . 0
2348.7
2349.3
1574.8
1904.7
1821.2
2039.8
2749.9
2491.6 
2251 .7
2266.3
2139.0
2400.0
2503.7
2451.5 
2085. 1
2181.8
1958.2
1715.3 
1660. 1
1636.5
2593.6
2265.2
2550.7
3289.4
2938.5 
2511. 1
388.7
425.0NA
NA
NA
NA
402. 2
NANA
559.5
NA
NA
NA
1450.6
1760.6 
NA
NANA
NA
3035.7 
NA
NA
NA
3785.0
3377.4
3335.6
2920.03073.7
2390.7 
2167. 4
3803.5
4072.04400.9
5868.4
5460.15160.4
4743.1
4264.9
4134.84392.3
4083.0
3898.4
4231.5
4484.7
5130.04953.5
4986.5
6010.2
6862.2
5320.8
346. 3
300. 9 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA
46.8 
NA NA
100.2 NA 
NA 
NA
164.5 
206. 8 
NA
NA
NA
NA
148.5 
NA
NA 
NA 
63. 2 
65. 2
159.4
135.5206.9
133. 2
99. 9 
29. 9
85.2 
82. 3 
201 . 0 
264. 3 
244. 8
174.8 
279. 3 
400. 1
350.4 
657. 2623.7 
651 . 0
609.7 
799. 3
436.6
534.7
675.4
795.6
754.4
287.7 
345. 1 
NA
NA
NA
NA
185. 2
NA
NA
250. 3 
NA NA 
NA
580. 3
296. 0
NA
NA
NA
NA
304.4 
NA
NA
NA344. 5
249.4
224.5
398.6
349.5 
399. 7
329.8
470. 2
1046.3
560.6813.9
632.4
1123.7
1160.2
1628.3
1859.6 
2520. 1
2679.1
3212.3
3710.7
3754.4
4494.8
4507.8
4706.0
5356.0
6303.1
5162.6
^ 0 0
obs MPI MP 2 MP3 MP4 MP5 MP6
1892 9302.8 1700.7 3434.2 788.0 2785.4 888. 3
1893 10871.8 2856.8 3825.9 365.2 4439.7 1031.51894 9808.9 2960.2 3755.5 551. 2 4258.1 1183.4
1895 10911.9 3803.0 4014.4 836.0 5244.0 1232.1
1896 12176.9 3844.1 3858.0 857.6 5624.1 1351.31897 11612.0 4210.4 3490.8 400. 0 5298.6 1194.0
1898 15577.0 4508.2 4690.4 605.0 6626.4 2234.7
1899 16838.1 3553.3 4351.2 996. 0 7263.1 2425.9
1900 19114.2 4597.4 5008.1 822. 2 8617.6 2580.4
1901 17646.4 5333.4 5680.4 913.4 8969.7 2403.3
1902 17341.4 6034.6 5677.9 948. 1 9220.0 2268.9
1903 17425.6 5400.6 5606.5 1164.7 9884.6 2206.4
1904 18148.8 5648.9 6000.1 1258.0 10454.9 2646.2
1905 17077.3 5222.8 6085.2 1044.2 9607.2 2447.61906 17431.2 4300.2 6430.8 1005.7 10285.0 2347.8
1907 18566.8 4115.9 6700.1 1210.5 10974.4 2199.71908 17833.5 4832.3 6186.7 1444.7 10325.3 2306.9
1909 17450.6 4263.9 5764.5 1231.8 9986.5 2240.4
1910 19939.3 4711 . 3 6249.4 1292.1 10585.0 2780.21911 19398.5 5105.5 5238.4 1060.1 12127.7 5269.1
1912 21022.6 4480.5 6943.3 1111.0 12432.6 3579.6
1913 23489.6 3843.6 7594.0 1815.8 15840.0 4048.81914 21361.9 2124.7 5536.4 798.4 10333.6 2391.1
So I
o b s
1842
1843
1844
1845
18461847
1848
1849
1850
1851
1852
1853
1854
1855
1856
1857
18581859
1860
1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
18831884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
MP7
127. 3
197. 2
NANA
NA
NA
129. 1
NA
NA
170.9
NA
NA
NA
131 .5
146. 5
NA
NA
NA
NA
138.5 
NA
NA
NA
242. 3
237.5394.4 
382. 1
322.3398.7
415.5
437.8
382. 9
722.7 
435 . 2
297.9
249.5 
321 .0 
409. 9
274. 9
383. 0
255.3 
311 . 9 
423. 2
478.0 
423. 1
374.6 
368. 7 
347 . 6
416.9 
409. 1
MP8
263.8
233.7 
NA
NA
NA
NA366.6 
NA
NA
306.7 
NANA
NA
300.9 
374. 3 
NA
NANA
NA
492.6
NA
NA
NA
667. 6
473.2 
608. 8 
478. 1 
395. 1
478. 3 
442. 1
513.2 
692. 6 
773. 3 
731 .7
924.0
1214.6
1361.5 
904. 1
1212.2 766. 7 
742. 1 
6 8 6 . 1 
748. 7
793.4 
741. 2 
876. 2
982.8
1351.3
1235.5
1102.6
MP9
471. 1
703. 0
NA
NA
NA
NA
485. 5
NA
NA
419. 2 
NA NA 
NA
3.8
290.9
NA
NANA
NA
516.3 
NA
NA
NA
698.0
528.2
2324.6
2247.2
987.8
1199.9
820.0
479. 6 
899. 3 
692. 1
1197.8 
544. 9
509.4
531.7
545.4
516.3
513.2
748.0
467.8
325.5
276.5 
470. 7 
499. 6 
856. 8
1084.6
447.6 
757. 2
ko l
MP10
161 . 6
195.7
NA
NA
NA
NA437.5
NANA
353. 3 
NA 
NA 
NA
391 .4
860.4 
NA 
NA NA 
NA
812.0 
NA 
NA 
NA
709. 1
502.9 
588. 9 
899. 7
1130.9
1690.8
1506.6
1210.4 
941 . 1
1285.6
2305.2
3191.6
2146.9
2266.1
5989.2
5297.2
5444.3
5653.5
4989.9
4882.5
4624.5
4978.1
5307.0
4483.8
3665.2
5148.1
5252.5
MP11
1446.9
1798.0 
NA
NA
NA
NA1643.4 
NANA
1807.4 
NA
NA
NA
2351.5
2730.1 
NA
NA
NA
NA
3334.6 
NA
NA
NA
3003.3
3409.4
3025.1
2808.1
2880.53164.0
2409.2
2994.4
3196.9
3160.8 
2481. 1
1924.7
2625.4
2176.0
2051.7
2126.3
2384.6
2316.9
2027.2
1953.01922.4
2013.7
1874.0
2148.2
1803.3
1945.7
2054.2
o b s
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
19021903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
19131914
MP7 MP8 MP9 MP10 MP11
328. 2 
361 .8
266.6 
260. 1
249.3
289.4
369.7
508.9
519.9700.8 
840. 9734.4
870.4
867.1
904.0
1031.8
1214.3
1131.4
1354.5
1815.6
1577.7
1788.8
1527.6
817.3
1464.9
1375.21126.7
1019.3
1241.0
1250.2
875.9
1153.1
1718.6
1249.7
1281.1
1344.3
1574.4
1691.3
1760.6
2078.5
2143.5
1995.0
2037.9
2956.3
2977.7
2903.8
267.2
407.8 
229. 1583.7
1985.5
3267.5 
649. 9
1084.4
710.8
690.0 
679. 2
881.6
1947.1
3134.5
1299.6
523.0 
566. 5
749.4
2528.4
560.6
1093.1
883.8
800.8
6037.9
7290.8
5761.1
6814.5
4420.7
4615.6
7042.7
8060.2
8962.4
7550.2
3988.9
6169.5
4425.1
3468.2
4682.06063.7
7238.4
6918.1
7428.0
5835.4
7979.5
9892.0
8982.2
1911.1
2428.2
2483.62021.7
1624.4
1945.1
1956.0
1459.4
2873.82035.9
2857.1
3092.4
2127.2
1972.5
1965.3
1847.6
1309.0
1307.1
1149.0
1853.6
1299.6
1651.2
2166.8
C.6 
REEXPORTS
RX - Total reexports
RXUK - Reexports to the United Kingdom
RXFRA - Reexports to France
RXAL - Reexports to Germany
RXBEL - Reexports to Belgium
RXAF - Reexports to the African colonies
RMUK - Reexports from the United Kingdom
RMFRA - Reexports from France
RMAL - Reexports from Germany
RMBEL - Reexports from Belgium
RMAF - Reexports from the African colonies
404
(?fd*?o£T$ - r«A/AT«OAJr
C u> Asrts)
obs RX RXUK RXFRA RXAL RXBEL RXAF
1842 773.5 NA NA NA NA NA
1843 1083.3 NA NA NA NA NA
1848 1227.4 NA 74.8 NA NA NA
1851 1566.5 634.2 89.0 45.9 NA 519.5
1855 1616.2 888.1 229.0 196.7 NA 397.4
1856 2366.3 391.9 160.8 11.7 0.1 733.6
1861 2014.2 187.9 88.3 7.6 0.0 771.8
1865 2952.4 507.0 474.8 15.7 0.4 944.8
1866 2925.1 589.5 360.9 6.9 0.3 1041.0
1867 2859.3 543.6 299.0 49.7 0.0 744.6
1868 3021.8 510.3 363.3 116.2 0.8 922.8
1869 3495.9 492.5 542.5 72.5 0.0 1250.9
1870 2745.9 423.7 132,0 1.8 0.3 1010.5
1871 3539.8 650.7 437.7 192.3 0.0 1247.4
1872 4306.6 907.5 364.4 342.7 0.3 1474.1
1873 3514.5 699.0 403.5 211.5 3.0 1142.9
1874 3882.8 952.2 395.0 195.2 5.5 1131.7
1875 3563.7 518.2 670.9 282.6 7.4 1069.1
1876 3367.6 506.7 612.4 225.6 0.4 1218.7
1877 2766.3 414.4 492.8 297.9 0.0 867.7
1878 2057.9 362.7 302.1 141.1 10.8 742.7
1879 2400.2 523.8 306.3 127.4 4.0 838.7
1880 3363.5 NA NA NA NA NA
1881 3999.3 NA NA NA NA NA |2ll,y
1882 3616.7 NA NA NA NA NA i o • C
1883 3694.0 NA NA NA NA NA
1884 3989.5 NA NA NA NA NA
1885 3022.2 NA NA NA NA NA
1886 3279.7 NA NA NA NA NA
1887 4235.8 704.6 144.1 959.9 190.3 1377.1
1888 5524.1 623.7 132.0 1660.0 152.6 2001.3
1889 6982.2 1026.2 292.9 1788.5 129.2 2338.8
1890 6936.5 655.3 284.9 1853.4 201.7 2223.5
1891 7455.6 1076.7 468.8 1607.0 134.1 2668.6
1892 8743.8 NA ) I3D. i, n aJ6? -6 NA \35S NA
2951.8 11893 9914.4 697.2 333.5 3097.1 204.5
1894 10452.1 1419.6 429.9 2395.6 229.4 2531.6
1895 9074.4 1602.7 306.9 2451.4 155.6 1925.2
1896 8173.9 1662.7 369.5 2364.6 235.9 1516.4
1897 8712.9 1599.1 272.2 2402.7 207.9 1626.5
1898 12083.7 2354.2 451.4 3219.6 445.2 2006.7
1899 13819.4 3901.2 244.0 3573.2 611.0 2001.4
1900 13381.5 3684.2 130.4 2987.4 492.3 2462.8
1901 13560.8 4021.2 211.9 2763.5 498.3 1690.9
1902 12178.7 2894.1 168.3 2909.6 506.0 1400.8
1903 15162.0 3646.7 528.0 3572.2 649.1 1629.7
1904 15672.3 4047.2 273.0 4175.9 711.8 2020.0
1905 14664.1 3808.9 325.2 4410.7 581.7 1800.5
1906 15525.1 3366.0 232.2 3810.4 481.7 2008.3
1907 15389.6 3851.6 367.6 3698.0 451.0 2674.1
obs RX RXUK RXFRA RXAL RXBEL RXAF
1908 16014.1 2401.9 308.5 3756.3 559.8 3033.5
1909 17722.3 1692.5 415.8 4428.7 918.9 3099.1
1910 21135.1 1335.0 691.0 4942.8 1406.7 3136.8
1911 19376.7 1178.0 456.7 4531.8 1513.6 NA L
1912 22458.9 979.7 380.0 5072.5 1619.7 NA
1913 18145.9 925.3 303.2 3086.4 1027.4 NA
1914 18355.5 968.7 171.5 2058.5 802.6 NA *
( C ca/ ^ s )
obs RX RMUK RliFRA RMAL RMBEL RMAF
1842 773.5 NA NA NA NA NA
1843 1083.3 NA NA NA NA NA
1848 1227.4 337.5 10.9 12.4 1.3 216.5
1851 1566.5 471.6 33.1 20.4 5.9 360.6
1855 1616.2 428.8 42.7 24.5 1.1 712.6
1856 2366.3 758.4 27.2 31.2 7.8 655.4
1861 2014.2 784.6 55.0 55.0 2.9 408.4
1865 2952.4 961.7 129.9 25.5 1.6 929.6
1866 2925.1 1040.7 200.5 37.8 0.3 767.1
1867 2859.3 785.0 161.8 28.0 1.1 808.6
1868 3021.8 859.9 172.3 80.2 0.3 969.7
1869 3495.9 1165.2 156.2 124.8 0.3 1373.3
1870 2745.9 1176.5 183.0 26.1 0.0 601.8
1871 3539.8 1104.9 100.3 190.3 1.4 1396.5
1872 4306.6 1367.4 195.5 89.9 15.4 1949.2
1873 3514.5 984.6 117.9 48.9 9.8 1648.5
1874 3882.8 975.6 108.9 90.6 35.6 1852.9
1875 3563.7 736.7 176.2 H7C r»' W* • ¿L. 22.4 1775.5
1876 3367.6 896.2 53.5 229.9 35.7 1413.7
1877 2766.3 812.8 45.7 154.4 0.5 1394.3
1878 2057.9 605.4 155.8 129.5 14.1 831.5
1879 2400.2 832.4 70.6 105.4 27.4 933.0
1880 3363.5 NA NA NA NA 1372.5
1881 3999.3 NA NA NA NA NA
1882 3616.7 NA NA NA NA NA
1883 3694.0 NA NA NA NA NA
1884 3989.5 NA NA NA NA NA
1885 3022.2 NA 11325 2- n a s 'í-3 NA fiO S NA 5°¡ k NA l-L/Oc Y
1886 3279.7 NA |l/g.c NA loi W NA /{¿.I NA Vfc-5 NA
1887 4235.8 1469.5 102.6 145.9 61.7 2254.8
1888 5524.1 1999.6 148.0 198.9 106.9 2704.3
1889 6982.2 2243.6 209.9 249.3 101.1 3693.0
1890 6936.5 1983.1 237.7 305.2 128.8 3836.9
1891 7455.6 2250.1 251.7 335.8 128.3 3920.4
1892 8743.8 NA ¿COC.U 
2576.3 '
NA (50.0 NA lji.0 NA I0i$-ü 
153.2 1
NA ¿93',
1893 9914.4 184.9 427.6 6146.0
1B94 10452.1 2053.7 172.2 505.3 83.2 7123.8
1895 9074.4 1600.2 184.1 404.5 66.8 6301.0
1896 8173.9 1337.0 163.9 305.0 57.7 5860.1
1897 8712.9 1533.4 148.9 234.1 68.9 6291.0
1898 12083.7 1990.0 185.0 322.5 164.2 8864.7
1899 13819.4 2120.3 168.1 419.4 238.9 10382.5
1900 13381.5 2901.4 185.8 404.7 o t t  r »■ « L . 9064.8
1901 13560.8 2680.3 203.4 410.5 119.8 9496.3
1902 12178.7 2824.0 147.6 362.1 70.5 7957.3
1903 15162.0 2581.3 166.6 411.5 95.6 10866.6
1904 15672.3 2512.6 173.7 557.1 120.1 11174.8
1905 14664.1 1963.0 176.6 546.6 75.6 10810.6
1906 15525.1 2161.1 272.0 627.2 45.5 9388.9
1907 15389.6 2479.8 239.7 966.4 86.9 10499.9
4 ¿ > >
□bs RX RMUK RMFRÀ RMAL RMBEL RMAF
1908 16014.1 2230.7 221.2 1423.2 103.0 10791.3
1909 17722.3 2459.0 176.2 1598.7 122.6 12298.5
1910 21135.1 2430.8 174.4 1496.4 169.3 15701.7
1911 19376.7 1986.9 215.0 3132.4 245.0 12675.6
1912 22458.9 2677.4 228.4 2319.7 184.1 15604.8
1913 18145.9 2592.7 226.2 2566.0 117.3 10843.7
£fcfxi*>«Tr- Coazunojj
C C 0  tJTX>±)
obs RXOFF RXHIDE RX
1842 636.2 137.3 773. 5
1843 1035.2 48.1 1083.3
1848 1181.5 45.9 1227.4
1851 1538.6 27.9 1566.5
1855 1567.4 48.8 1616.2
1856 1710.9 655.4 2366.3
1861 1605.8 408.4 2014.2
1865 2022.8 929.6 2952.4
1866 2158.0 767.1 2925.1
1867 2050.7 808.6 2859.3
1868 2052.1 969.7 3021.8
1869 2122.6 1373.3 3495.9
1870 2144.1 601.8 2745.9
1871 2143.3 1396.5 3539.8
1872 2357.4 1949.2 4306.6
1873 1866.0 1648.5 3514.5
1874 2029.9 1852.9 3882.8
1875 1788.2 1775.5 3563.7
1876 1953.9 1413.7 3367.6
1877 1372.0 1394.3 2766.3
1878 1226.4 831.5 2057.9
1879 1467.2 933.0 2400.2
1880 1991.0 1372.5 ¿36s>. 5
fcXWtDc -  (L c e k ^ ih  Atg<Àe^et|
<2.x CsvcAcJf /vexjp*»^  (s ftyoFP 4-Cyrtijw)
fc*t>CP - Ojjicit^  claV
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